Hi everyone,
As intended I'm creating this thread to answer @Hammerbolt about Sledgehammer in a better place than Off topic. The discussion started here and continued into the next page up to there . I will therefore go off from Hammerbolt's last post. Note that my arguments are informed by this document.
- pages 7 to about 23 for the actual plan and some shipping assets, some differences with Overlord, benefits and drawbacks (drawbacks which were in part down to the planners having info not given to them for some assets, esp shipping).
- pages 23 to 35 on the general German situation, starting from the airforce
- pages 35 to 49 on comparisons with Dieppe, Overlord and Kasserine
- pages 49 to about 63 on the German situation in the East and West in 1942 and 1944 relative to Allied capability
- pages 63 to 81, mostly on "whether lessons were learned" and experience
- pages 81 to 87 on a more detailed assessment of the air war
- pages 87 to 96 on logistics, and especially shipping
- pages 96 to 107 on very detailed shipping reqs and British high command opposition (if not "obstruction")
- 107 to 119: sort of a conclusion and narrative on the whole ordeal
I would suggest reading the relevant sections first so we can zoom in on the precise points of contention, but as a summary of a doc relative to your questions:
- delaying the cross-channel invasion (and once again Sledgehammer is much more limited than Overlord anyway) to 1944 did not really bring the lessons learned one would expect. The planning for Sledgehammer already included some measures that were not applied to Overlord or Dieppe, with unfortunate consequences (night landing and use of smoke). Moreover, there is little evidence that experience from units and operations from one theater moved to units and operations of another with positive results. Most (US esp) divisions landing in 1944 were green and repeated the same mistakes that happened in Torch and the MTO. It appears that experience was largely acquired through direct combat. As such divisions landing in 1942 would not be notably worse off than in 1944. In fact, the conditions in Sledgehammer would be far more forgiving than Overlord because of the solely defensive posture required after the landings and capture of the peninsula, the enemy's weakness, and the lack of serious beach defenses. Waiting until 1944 complicated planning more than it helped.
- Ditto for coordination. Overlord was not an improvement in planning and 1942 is far more forgiving since you almost don't have to care about actually getting the troops out of the beach.
- Even if the USAF really was this marginal, which might be true although I have not checked and I assume it would have ramped up quickly; the RAF alone was already capable of doing the job.
- Yes they had the shipping for it. Especially if the planners had learnt of the true capabilities that were hidden from them (accidentally or not, we don't know).
- The antitank situation favors the Allies more in 1942 than in 1944, because the Germans only had 400 tanks in the entire France (or Western Europe) as opposed to 1500 while the Allies frankly had more tanks than could be used in the peninsula. The relative quality also favors the Allies since they can field similar vehicles to what was sent in 1944 (Shermans, Churchills with 6 pounder and lighter tanks), while the Germans are stuck with mostly Pz IIIs and short barrel Pz IVs (only 100 long barrelled ones), and even then not in the relevant area. The bocage if anything further helps Allied AT guns, not that they would do too badly against this opposition. Due to relative production rates at the time, the Allies would only reinforce or at least maintain their advantage well into 1943 or even 1944, by which time there aren't really 9 divs in France anymore.
- On Torch: conversely you could also remark that the more difficult logistics of Torch (impossibility to just go back and forth in the Channel, size of the front) meant that the advantages of the Allies and teh weaknesses of the Germans couldn't be leveraged. Poor performance in Kasserine was heavily influenced by the dispersion of American forces here. No such thing over just 17 miles of frontage in the Cotentin. Also, "weaker enemy"? The defense in Tunisia was hardly weak compared to the single static division covering the 300km of Cotentin coast, especially in relative terms due to the differences in force density.
- Good for the forces in Tunisia, because the USAAF still had to relearn that over Normandy in 1944.
As intended I'm creating this thread to answer @Hammerbolt about Sledgehammer in a better place than Off topic. The discussion started here and continued into the next page up to there . I will therefore go off from Hammerbolt's last post. Note that my arguments are informed by this document.
The document adresses your points, specifically:
- pages 7 to about 23 for the actual plan and some shipping assets, some differences with Overlord, benefits and drawbacks (drawbacks which were in part down to the planners having info not given to them for some assets, esp shipping).
- pages 23 to 35 on the general German situation, starting from the airforce
- pages 35 to 49 on comparisons with Dieppe, Overlord and Kasserine
- pages 49 to about 63 on the German situation in the East and West in 1942 and 1944 relative to Allied capability
- pages 63 to 81, mostly on "whether lessons were learned" and experience
- pages 81 to 87 on a more detailed assessment of the air war
- pages 87 to 96 on logistics, and especially shipping
- pages 96 to 107 on very detailed shipping reqs and British high command opposition (if not "obstruction")
- 107 to 119: sort of a conclusion and narrative on the whole ordeal
I would suggest reading the relevant sections first so we can zoom in on the precise points of contention, but as a summary of a doc relative to your questions:
- delaying the cross-channel invasion (and once again Sledgehammer is much more limited than Overlord anyway) to 1944 did not really bring the lessons learned one would expect. The planning for Sledgehammer already included some measures that were not applied to Overlord or Dieppe, with unfortunate consequences (night landing and use of smoke). Moreover, there is little evidence that experience from units and operations from one theater moved to units and operations of another with positive results. Most (US esp) divisions landing in 1944 were green and repeated the same mistakes that happened in Torch and the MTO. It appears that experience was largely acquired through direct combat. As such divisions landing in 1942 would not be notably worse off than in 1944. In fact, the conditions in Sledgehammer would be far more forgiving than Overlord because of the solely defensive posture required after the landings and capture of the peninsula, the enemy's weakness, and the lack of serious beach defenses. Waiting until 1944 complicated planning more than it helped.
- Ditto for coordination. Overlord was not an improvement in planning and 1942 is far more forgiving since you almost don't have to care about actually getting the troops out of the beach.
- Even if the USAF really was this marginal, which might be true although I have not checked and I assume it would have ramped up quickly; the RAF alone was already capable of doing the job.
- Yes they had the shipping for it. Especially if the planners had learnt of the true capabilities that were hidden from them (accidentally or not, we don't know).
- The antitank situation favors the Allies more in 1942 than in 1944, because the Germans only had 400 tanks in the entire France (or Western Europe) as opposed to 1500 while the Allies frankly had more tanks than could be used in the peninsula. The relative quality also favors the Allies since they can field similar vehicles to what was sent in 1944 (Shermans, Churchills with 6 pounder and lighter tanks), while the Germans are stuck with mostly Pz IIIs and short barrel Pz IVs (only 100 long barrelled ones), and even then not in the relevant area. The bocage if anything further helps Allied AT guns, not that they would do too badly against this opposition. Due to relative production rates at the time, the Allies would only reinforce or at least maintain their advantage well into 1943 or even 1944, by which time there aren't really 9 divs in France anymore.
- On Torch: conversely you could also remark that the more difficult logistics of Torch (impossibility to just go back and forth in the Channel, size of the front) meant that the advantages of the Allies and teh weaknesses of the Germans couldn't be leveraged. Poor performance in Kasserine was heavily influenced by the dispersion of American forces here. No such thing over just 17 miles of frontage in the Cotentin. Also, "weaker enemy"? The defense in Tunisia was hardly weak compared to the single static division covering the 300km of Cotentin coast, especially in relative terms due to the differences in force density.
- Good for the forces in Tunisia, because the USAAF still had to relearn that over Normandy in 1944.