Operation FS and the Kantai Kessen carrier battle in August 1942

[scifilovr]

4. Many of Gehres' actions AFTER the attack are, obviously, highly problematic and even in some cases downright disgraceful. But while I do not know if Gehres benefited from particular connections or favors, I would like to observe that I would not be the first person to observe that US naval leadership seemed to have a pattern throughout the war, as it had indeed for generations before, of giving undue deference to the senior ranks of its officer corps. It is fairly astounding that Captain Charles B. McVay was the only USN CO in the entirety of World War II to be court martialed for the loss of his ship, especially in light of the fact that Admiral Ernest King just happened to have a grudge against McVay's father. Nor do you need only look at other striking oddities like Carleton Wright getting a Navy Cross and a nice shore command after suffering the second worst defeat in US Navy history to find . . . curious patterns of how senior Navy officers got treated.

Would we call such a pattern a case of corruption? I think we need to unpack what we mean by that term in this context.

The USN does have a bad habit of giving a lot of deference to upper ranks and a definite reluctance to punish senior commanders or discourage bad behavior; often leading to poor officers getting high command and then being fired when they fuck up. Part of this is due to the way the Navy's advancement system works, it's entirely performance based. So all the Navy sees is an officer who does well on their FITREPs, does well on inspections and examinations, and appears (on paper) to be a good officer.

But, with specific regard to combat, the Navy does not like to court martial officers for things that happen during battle because of a fear that if the Navy begins doing so, commanding officers will be less focused on the outcome of combat than on how they will be perceived afterwards. A good modern example is the Fitzgerald and MV Crystal collision of eight years ago. The Navy brought criminal charges against the command triad (CO, XO, Command Master Chief) and let me tell you, that sent a bolt of fear through the Navy, because a lot of people became concerned that their screwups were going to be judged not by the merits of a Court of Inquiry or a Board of Investigation, but by a criminal court. A courts martial is less focused on "what went wrong and how do we prevent that in the future" and more on "why are these person guilty of a crime and why should they be punished."

 

[steel_captain]

I'm referring to your braindead take from the post that started this tangent that this one captain being an asshole was somehow a sign of corruption in the Navy and that he was rewarded for being an asshole.

The corruption is he was rewarded when just the opposite was due to him. His being a SOB just exacerbated this situation. As Athelstane points out that Charles McVay gets court martialed because quite likely Ernest King had a hard on against his father is corruption. Ernest King should have been court martialed for allowing the slaughter of merchant ships off the US East Coast from January to May 1942! Both Turner's and Crutchley's heads should have rolled over Savo Island. Halsey should have been called on the carpet for allowing San Bernardino Strait to being left unguarded and then for Typhoon Corba afterwards. The top Navy brass has always loved to protect their own and that extended to Gehres for whatever reason. That is the corruption I refer to.

 

[prester.john208]

The corruption is he was rewarded when just the opposite was due to him. His being a self serving SOB just exasperated this situation. As Athelstane points out that Charles McVay gets court martialed because Ernest King had a hard on against his father is blatant corruption. Ernest King should have been court martialed for allowing the slaughter of merchant ships off the US East Coast from January to May 1942! Every flag officer at Guadalcanal on Aug. 9th should have been court martialed for Savo Island. Halsey should have been called on the carpet for allowing San Bernardino Strait to being left unguarded and then for Typhoon Corba afterwards. The Navy loves to protect their own however and that extended to Gehres for whatever reason. That is The corruption I refer to.

Kimmel was the exception.

 

[Post]

Ernest King should have been court martialed for allowing the slaughter of merchant ships off the US East Coast from January to May 1942!

That wasn't just King's fault. The Army was responsible for airreconnaisance along the coast and didn't do it well. The coastguard was responsible for escorting merchants along the coast and didn't do it well (also because they lacked escorts, more about that later). The merchants were warned to stay overnight in harbors and often didn't do it and many got sunk at night. No-one bothered to blackout the coastal cities because tourism was deemed more important. Roosevelt didn't bother to get the escorts that were requested (well before the war) and when he got them, they weren't the type that was requested and needed. King didn't install a convoysystem due to lack of escorts to escort the convoys but focussed on getting troops across the Atlantic (it's notable that no US troopships were sunk during the war).
But yeah, let's blame it all on King.

 

[scifilovr]

The corruption is he was rewarded when just the opposite was due to him. His being a self serving SOB just exasperated this situation. As Athelstane points out that Charles McVay gets court martialed because Ernest King had a hard on against his father is blatant corruption. Ernest King should have been court martialed for allowing the slaughter of merchant ships off the US East Coast from January to May 1942! Every flag officer at Guadalcanal on Aug. 9th should have been court martialed for Savo Island. Halsey should have been called on the carpet for allowing San Bernardino Strait to being left unguarded and then for Typhoon Corba afterwards. The Navy loves to protect their own however and that extended to Gehres for whatever reason. That is The corruption I refer to.

If you court martial every officer for failing in combat, especially at the beginning of the war, then you remove any possibility for those officers to learn from their mistakes and get better. In 1944 and 45, Halsey couldn't have been removed for the same reason MacArthur couldn't. He was a public war hero and there would've been a massive backlash had he been relieved of command.

 

[Athelstane]

As Athelstane points out that Charles McVay gets court martialed because Ernest King had a hard on against his father is blatant corruption.

Now, now, I never said *that*. I simply observed that it was a curious coincidence. Others have made that accusation but to my knowledge, no one has ever found any evidence making the direct connection!

But yes, it is striking that the US Navy lost over 350 ships during the war, but only McVay ever got court-martialed for it.

Ernest King should have been court martialed for allowing the slaughter of merchant ships off the US East Coast from January to May 1942!

That's a hard case, with a lot of blame to go around . . .

Every flag officer at Guadalcanal on Aug. 9th should have been court martialed for Savo Island.

!!

 

[steel_captain]

If Yamamoto is scrapping (or never even entertaining) Operation MI, why would he wait all the way until late August to mount Operation FS? Just to have the benefit of some kind of land-based air operating out of the completed Lunga Point airfield on Guadalcanal?

Yes to have Lunga Point operational plus for SHOKAKU to be fully repaired after Coral Sea and for the airgroups on all the KB carriers to be brought back to full strength after their 5 month rampage.

 

[steel_captain]

That's a hard case, with a lot of blame to go around . . .

Not hard at all, the RN was extremely upset that their own ships were being lost off the eastern seaboard sailing without escorts after being safely brought across the Atlantic under RN and RCN escort and they told King to convoy those ships even if zero escorts could be provided but King refused because he hated the Brits and knew better than them even though they had already been fighting the U-boat threat for two and a half years. Finally in May so many tankers had been lost on the East Coast that the first coastal convoys were formed to immediate drop in losses.

Yes, lots of blame to go around but King was at the center of the debacle and I blame him far more than any other person for the disaster that was Drumbeat!

 

[Athelstane]

If you court martial every officer for failing in combat, especially at the beginning of the war, then you remove any possibility for those officers to learn from their mistakes and get better.

It should be noted that under the Articles of War promulgated under King George II, every Royal Navy captain who suffered loss of his ship was subject to automatic court-martial. In most cases, it tended to be pro forma, and serve as more of an investigation into the loss than an effort to collect scalps. Mainly, though, it was done (like so many other requirements in the AoW) in order to instill aggressiveness into commanding officers in wartime. That requirement lasted well into the 19th century.

US Navy leadership never cared for that practice, and maybe not without good cause. I think the argument is that for a long while, they may have erred a little too far in the other direction.

In 1944 and 45, Halsey couldn't have been removed for the same reason MacArthur couldn't. He was a public war hero and there would've been a massive backlash had he been relieved of command.

I suppose the real questions are a) how big the backlash would have been, b) how big that military leadership and the White House *thought* it would be, and c) whether military leadership and the White House should have been willing to risk the backlash. That said, I think all that really mattered in the end was what the White House thought, since not a few senior military leaders would have been happy to see one or the other before a court-martial!

But I think most objective observers looking at the cases today think there are good arguments that MacArthur and Halsey deserved court-martials.

 

[JasTysoe]

King didn't install a convoysystem due to lack of escorts to escort the convoys but focussed on getting troops across the Atlantic (it's notable that no US troopships were sunk during the war).
But yeah, let's blame it all on King.

It's significant that if one checks the Sea Frontier's War Diaries, one can see that there WERE enough escorts to run convoys. They may not have been particularly heavily escorted in the style of late-war Atlantic convoys or mid-war Arctic or Med convoys, but they would have had larger escorts than many convoys at other places and in other times in WW2. Secondly, even unescorted convoys reduce sinkings because they reduce effective visibility.

Check out the relevant War Diaries and see how many escorts were available - there were certainly enough. While you're right that King couldn't control everything, there seems to be clear evidence that he was wrong on convoys and totally wrong if he claimed lack of numbers as the reason.

 

[Athelstane]

Yes to have Lunga Point operational plus for SHOKAKU to be fully repaired after Coral Sea and for the airgroups on all the KB carriers to be brought back to full strength after their 5 month rampage.

OK. Thanks. That's what I suspected.

If I may, though, can I suggest that, barring some other major intervening event, the great likelihood is that the Japanese would stage Operation FS considerably earlier, not waiting for the Guadalcanal airfield to become operational?

Historically, we know that between April 5 and 12, the IJN and IJA staffs finalized the operational outline and timetable for FS. Allowing time for Operation MO and Operation MI to take place, the plan was to assemble the necessary forces for FS in mid to late June, and execute FS, or at least its opening phase, in early July. In large part, this reflected the sense of Yamamoto and indeed many other planners in Tokyo that urgency was needed, before the US was in a position to build up defenses in the South Pacific. This of course was a well-founded fear, because all the key targets had already been built up over the winter and spring of 1942 at the behest of Admiral King. (You can see that the Japanese did not fully appreciate this, as their estimates of garrisons in these islands in April grossly underestimated the forces present!) And then, of course, an even bigger, more dangerous clock was ticking with the fruits of the Two Ocean Navy Act on slipways all over the United States . . .

(See pages 66-93: http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/WebI/JpnOperations/$file/JpnOpsText.pdf?OpenElement )

If in fact there is no Midway operation, it is hard to think that Yamamoto would not be in an even bigger hurry to kick off FS, even if he did not have all six carriers of the Kido Butai to hand. Having thought that Yorktown was also sunk at Coral Sea, he was clearly willing to take on the US carrier forces in the Pacific with even just four of his own carriers in his main body - regardless of whether that was at Midway, or in the New Hebrides. As it happened, though, repairs to Shokaku from the Coral Sea damage were completed by early July, and the air groups rounded out close to that time. I suspect that Yamamoto would do as he did at Midway, using just Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu in First Mobile Fleet in the first phase of FS (Port Moresby and Efate/Espiritu Santu), and then when CarDiv 5 showed up, proceed to the next phase.

 

[Jellico]

It's significant that if one checks the Sea Frontier's War Diaries, one can see that there WERE enough escorts to run convoys. They may not have been particularly heavily escorted in the style of late-war Atlantic convoys or mid-war Arctic or Med convoys, but they would have had larger escorts than many convoys at other places and in other times in WW2. Secondly, even unescorted convoys reduce sinkings because they reduce effective visibility.

Check out the relevant War Diaries and see how many escorts were available - there were certainly enough. While you're right that King couldn't control everything, there seems to be clear evidence that he was wrong on convoys and totally wrong if he claimed lack of numbers as the reason.

And speaking of Mr Bailey, one of the big things he goes on about (and was known at the time) the mere existence of convoys starves raiders of targets. Escorts are icing on the cake.

 

[scifilovr]

It should be noted that under the Articles of War promulgated under King George II, every Royal Navy captain who suffered loss of his ship was subject to automatic court-martial. In most cases, it tended to be pro forma, and serve as more of an investigation into the loss than an effort to collect scalps. Mainly, though, it was done (like so many other requirements in the AoW) in order to instill aggressiveness into commanding officers in wartime. That requirement lasted well into the 19th century.

US Navy leadership never cared for that practice, and maybe not without good cause. I think the argument is that for a long while, they may have erred a little too far in the other direction.

That sounds like the RN was using courts martial as impromptu courts of inquiry, vice criminal proceedings (except in a few cases probably, the infamous Byng comes to mind of course).

I suppose the real questions are a) how big the backlash would have been, b) how big that military leadership and the White House *thought* it would be, and c) whether military leadership and the White House should have been willing to risk the backlash. That said, I think all that really mattered in the end was what the White House thought, since not a few senior military leaders would have been happy to see one or the other before a court-martial!

But I think most objective observers looking at the cases today think there are good arguments that MacArthur and Halsey deserved court-martials.

Probably big enough to cause some serious disruption to the war effort and some major consternation in the service. Lots of people liked Halsey and court martialing him would have started some nasty internecine fighting and would probably become the center of Republican efforts to take down Roosevelt. Even if the Navy and Roosevelt would have wanted to, it absolutely would not have been worth the effort.

If in fact there is no Midway operation, it is hard to think that Yamamoto would not be in an even bigger hurry to kick off FS, even if he did not have all six carriers of the Kido Butai to hand. Having thought that Yorktown was also sunk at Coral Sea, he was clearly willing to take on the US carrier forces in the Pacific with even just four of his own carriers in his main body - regardless of whether that was at Midway, or in the New Hebrides. As it happened, though, repairs to Shokaku from the Coral Sea damage were completed by early July, and the air groups rounded out close to that time. I suspect that Yamamoto would do as he did at Midway, using just Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu in First Mobile Fleet in the first phase of FS (Port Moresby and Efate/Espiritu Santu), and then when CarDiv 5 showed up, proceed to the next phase.

OP's original prompt did say Operation FS goes ahead instead of Operation MI, which, Operation FS seems just barely more sane. Yamamoto was a gambler and he'd be willing to take on what he would expect to be Enterprise and Hornet with just the First Air Fleet. I'm actually not sure if CarDiv5 would sail with them, Japanese carriers were always designed to operate in pairs and as far as I know, CarDiv5 never operated apart from each other. The big question is whether or not Yamamoto would know that Saratoga and Wasp are available to the Americans.

 

[steel_captain]

What about the YORKTOWN? With no Midway then YORKTOWN is going to be at any party thrown

 

[scifilovr]

What about the YORKTOWN? With no Midway then YORKTOWN is going to be at any party thrown

I was speaking about Yamamoto’s perspective. He believes he’s sunk two American carriers and there should only be two left. Can he know that Saratoga and Wasp are available? Yorktown was a surprise at Midway, it would probably be a surprise here.

 

[steel_captain]

Suddenly I am left wondering if Japan had anybody watching ships transiting the Panama Canal and reporting to Tokyo? Obviously this wouldn't involve the SARATOGA but would be meaningful regarding the WASP and every other carrier to follow.

 

[Athelstane]

What about the YORKTOWN? With no Midway then YORKTOWN is going to be at any party thrown

I was speaking about Yamamoto’s perspective. He believes he’s sunk two American carriers and there should only be two left. Can he know that Saratoga and Wasp are available? Yorktown was a surprise at Midway, it would probably be a surprise here.

Yes. The Japanese were convinced that they had sunk Yorktown.

As to what happens with her if there is no Operation MI...there is no need for a 2 day rush job on her, so one wonders if Nimitz sends her off to Puget Sound for complete repair, since there is no urgent need for her. If so, she's probably not going to be available for any combat for FS in July or August....I haven't really thought this one through.

Saratoga and Wasp will be available, though.

 

[scifilovr]

Saratoga and Wasp will be available, though.

But would the IJN know about this? It’s the difference between Yamamoto thinking he’s bringing four against two versus four on four or four on three.

 

[prester.john208]

If you court martial every officer for failing in combat, especially at the beginning of the war, then you remove any possibility for those officers to learn from their mistakes and get better. In 1944 and 45, Halsey couldn't have been removed for the same reason MacArthur couldn't. He was a public war hero and there would've been a massive backlash had he been relieved of command.

Bradley was notorious for relieving commanders after one failure.

 

[Athelstane]

Bradley was notorious for relieving commanders after one failure.

Yeah, people beat up on Patton for being hard on subordinates, but Bradley was much more termination-happy.