Alternate Battle of the Falkland 1914.

Greetings all. Just thought I'd post for your entertainment and amusement a different take on the Battle of the Falklands in 1914. In this AU the German presence in Chile has contacts through an Irish officer on a Chilean steamer that has a regular transport contract for Mutton from the Falklands and learns of the arrival of the Canopus early and passes this information on to Von Spee after the battle of Coronel. Familiar with Canopus'es limitaions from shared time in the China station and with thisnew intelligence Admirla Von Spee arives off Port Stanley already expecting to commit to an action with a British Presence. Unlike IRL where he broke off at the unexpected presence of RN units, he commits to a closing action. It's often been speculated what the result would have been had he closed with the unprepared RN ships at anchor and with cold boilers and this is Part One of my take on subsequent events.


CHAPTER 13 - Graf Spee and the Falklands.



0445hrs 8 December 1914 - South Atlantic: SMS Scharnhorst



Coming through the doorway of the bridge of the Armoured Cruiser Scharnhorst, Vice Admiral Maximillian Von Spee was unconsciously ordered “As you were”, before he even cleared the hatch, pre-empting the Officer of the Watch even as he was straightening. Catching his eye with a brief nod, he then continued on past the dimly lit compass platform with a brief glance at the heading before continuing on by the suddenly rigidly attentive helmsman out to into the darkness of the bridge wing. With the ease of long familiarity of the current commission the crew by now were well aware of his preferences and avoided unwelcome displays of regimentation were possible nowadays, which found favour with all parties.



Hidden by the darkness he smiled slightly to himself as his trailing flag-lieutenant, remained on the dimly lit bridge and struck up a quiet conversation with the Officer of the Watch, and silently to himself began to count. The slight smile broke into a grin as less than three minutes later another darkened figure appeared and softly moved to join him on the bridge wing. “You can tell we’ve become creatures of habit,” he greeted the greatcoated figure of his Flag-Captain as he silently moved to join him from his sea cabin behind the bridge. He saw the pale flash of a matching grin and the faint movement of his nod, but his sally was met with continued silence as expected. By now the partnership of the two of them was a well-practiced balance of friendship and routine, symptomatic of the best of professional relationships, both efficient and comfortable. After a moment or two of silence, as expected came the considered, “You haven’t changed your mind, have you?” the humour detectable in the voice.

“Have you thought of any new ideas which might make me?” came the response.

“Aside from the risk involved… No.”

“Oh good, I thought for a moment we might not have been in agreement,” he quipped, before allowing the exchange to die. In reality the two of them had already discussed the available options facing them in great detail long before reaching this point, the exchange simply now a well-worn method of displaying agreement between the two of them.



With this interplay done the two of them resumed their companionable silence again, for a time simply enjoying the moment, the wind of the passage and gentle movement of the ship underfoot unnoticed. In a rare display of clarity, the complete array of southern stars arched overhead, sharp and brilliant, an unusual event this far south in the hemisphere, and in contrast to many of the preceding foul dawns of recent days. With such a sight and the mirror like state of the surrounding seas, von Spee was suddenly moved to comment,” It’s shaping up to be a marvelous morning, whatever we may make of it,” and received a grunt of confirmation, before turning to conduct a professional scan of the surrounding horizon.



This quiet interlude lasted only a moment before the anticipated interruption arrived as the duty officer appeared, stating, “Sir, it’s 0500 hours… continue as planned?” and Captain von Schultz responded, “Carry on,” with a nod of assent. Disappearing back into the wheelhouse, the two officers remained on the wing, listening to a brief announcement then hearing an increased background bustle in the darkness, as the Scharnhorst crew moved to their action stations around them. Well aware of the anticipated order and already having fed early, this process went ahead seamlessly with the calm certainty that was the sign of an experienced and well-trained crew.



With the faintest of predawn glow just beginning to give a hint of the line of the horizon behind the ships, they could feel the thrum of the engines underfoot increase as the Scharnhorst slowly began to gain speed. Above the clatter of a signal lamp flashed to the accompanying vessels and the faint lumps in the darkness that were the three trailing cruisers began to diverge and move up to form a line abreast upon their flagship as previously planned. Watching on wordlessly, von Spee noted without surprise, the noticeably greater cascades of red sparks emitted from the three funnels of the light cruiser Leipzig as it moved to its position to port at the southern end of the forming line. He was well aware of the deteriorating state of its machinery and this display was just another visible symptom of the known engineering issues, not worth signaling about. Fortunately, the upcoming action would not be fought at night, and this would not be a give-away, otherwise with no lights visible the only indication of its presence was the growing white of its bow wave gleaming slightly as it steadily moved up. Satisfied it would be soon in position, he gave the horizon one more sweep, now discernible as the faintest of lines against the paler eastern sky, before heading through the wheelhouse to check on the other two cruisers forming line abreast to starboard as they closed on the unsuspecting Port of Stanley. Once on the starboard wing, he could clearly see the dark silhouette of Scharnhorst’s sistership Gneisenau, sans sparks, almost in in position, and possibly beyond the faint impression of the bow wave of the last vessel, the light cruiser Nurnberg. All appeared to be in hand and as the last ship reached its position the line began to accelerate to 18 knots on its run west towards the still invisible loom of the Falkland Islands. They were now in position to implement his planned attack. It all depended to a degree now on how accurate his information was.



He recast his thoughts back to his final meeting with the German Minister to Chile, von Eckert and the naval attaché at the Consul-Generals office in Valparaiso some days earlier. There they had updated the latest intelligence from a Chilean steamer visiting Port Stanley that confirmed the location of the guardship, the old pre-dreadnaught Canopus and that it had been grounded deliberately in the inner harbor. Without this knowledge then his plan of action would have been totally different, and much less formalized.



For a start just the fact that Canopus was a familiar presence from their shared time before the war in the China station had acted as the spur for his initial considerations. He had dined aboard her as a visiting guest several times during their shared period on station, and was well aware of the ageing ships limitations, slow speed, and worn guns with limited elevation and range. This knowledge gave him more confidence in going into action against it, combined with its reported location in the inner harbor had been one of the factors in selecting their current approach from the east. Without this then they would have probably come from the south-east to gain a view through the low ground into the inner harbor of the port, to best view what ships were present. As it was the third light cruiser of the squadron, Dresden, was to approach from that direction to observe the fall of shot of the squadron and provide range corrections. By using their current approach, the high ground of Point Pembroke would mask Canopus, whose low elevation main guns would not be able to clear the terrain, hopefully allowing the German ships free-rein to employ indirect fire against their stationary opponent, a major advantage. Other factors weighing in his decision was that by approaching from the east at dawn with the rising sun behind, it would act to dazzle and hamper any observers trying to spot his approach, looking directly at the rising orb. The last consideration was simply one of prudence. This approach allowed observation into the outer harbor, not immediately possible in an approach from the south-east. He could not assume that Canopus would be the sole Royal Naval presence, and he needed to know what, if any, additional opposition they would face as soon as possible. The final positive that this approach offered was he could see what if any other ships may be present.



Despite having already accepted the committing of his forces to battle this day, he still revisited his thoughts in reaching this decision. In the captains meeting just two days earlier where he had outlined his plan, it was obvious that there was some disagreement with the planned action, but he had outlined his rationale and gained a consensus from those present. It was unlikely that they could return to Germany undetected, and already machinery issues were rising the longer they had to cruise. Despite having capture sufficient vessels in recent times to potentially have sufficient coal supplies to return home, it remained a doubtful prospect. Beyond coal, they had used much of their ammunition, particularly armour piercing rounds, in the recent victory at Coronel. This was one logistic limitation that could not be replaced, and severely impact their chances if they encountered a stronger foe. If contact came it would likely be with a superior force, one which they could not outrun, without sacrificing one or more of their lame ducks to escape. As squadron commander he faced the dilemma that his force was too large to easily avoid detection, but probably not large enough to triumph against a significant foe. It was better to commit to an attack a known older foe that was beatable in this situation. Already they had the propaganda victory of Coronel and the defeat of Admiral Christopher Craddock’s squadron, under their belt, and to add a further victory, regardless of its nature, would better serve the Father land rather than any ignominious losses while pursuing the unlikely objective of returning home.



His greatest fear was to what degree, if any, that the Canopus would have been reinforced after the recent loss. He quite expected that the light cruiser Glasgow and armed Merchant Cruiser Ontario, which had both escaped the defeat at Coronel could be present. That intelligence had also advised that the large Armoured Cruiser Defence in South American waters. Add this presence to those other ships and this was his worst-case fear. Ultimately, he thought that his ships could triumph in this case, but only at the cost of most of his fighting power. In some ways his acceptance of this possibility would simplify any future planning issues. If the squadron was reduced to one or two combat effective ships, which was quite possible if the worst-case scenario eventuated, then these could be freed to more effectively operate independently as commerce raiders. As a professional naval officer, he had long accepted the risk of being killed, but if the action was to be fought at Port Stanley, then having its proximity to help cope with any resulting casualties was also a consideration. He had resolved that facing combat at Port Stanley was the most likely prospect to attain a positive victory for Germany, even if at great cost.



As his thoughts churned through these options again, he could feel no intrinsic need to change, confident in his own mind in this course of action, it was now a matter of simply adapting to whatever tactical events were thrown at him as the day developed. By now the sky was considerably lightened to the east with the stars rapidly disappearing, and he could see turret below him briefly traversing left and right slightly as the muzzles moved up and down, its crew checking its movements as they assumed action stations. He was aware as he was joined by von Schultz again,” All set?” he posed, and receiving an affirmative, he once more cast his eyes around the entire horizon, now a clear line in the pale pre-dawn light. “Well then, we shall see, what we shall see," he finished almost rhetorically to himself.



So, for the next brief while he stoically tried to be calm, glancing up briefly to sight the first glow of the rising sun catching the top of the foretop above, before raising his glasses to get the first glimpse of the low line of darkness hardening out of the western horizon, now firming and becoming visibly land as the light improved. Initially little could be distinguished beyond that first loom of land, when suddenly came a hail from the lookout above. “Ships in the harbor…, several ships in the harbor, anchored.” Even as he looked up and heard the captain ask for more detail, came a second cry,” Ship under steam outside the harbor, turning this way…, followed by increasing bad news, at least five warships at anchor…, and then the words he feared to hear, “Fighting tops visible sir, one… no two sets of fighting tops at anchor,” came the dread news.



Even as he traded an aghast look with his Flag Captain, catching an equally dismayed look and caught the softly muttered profanity “Schiss”. That shared weight of dismay at the realization for that their worst-case scenario had been far exceeded. As his shocked mind attempted to juggle what his options where he could hear the captain demanding more details from the rangefinder above, "Where they Dreadnaughts or Battlecruisers?" he emphatically demanded. After moments pause, he heard the gunnery officers reply, " I think they are battlecruisers…, yes, two battlecruisers," then firming up with conviction, "Yes two battlecruisers, "I-class I'm pretty sure from what I can see of them, at anchor and I can' see no sign of visible smoke on either," came the elaboration.



Both still reeling from this worst of news he and von Schultz hastily conferred. "Cold start, with no steam raised…, it could take up to two hours to get under way. Should we make a break for it?" he offered. "No, look at the sea state," with a sweeping hand gesture, "They've probably got a good 3 to 4 knots on us, and with conditions like this and all day, nothing is going to slow them down, damn it!" Then realizing his irritation at the news was being shown in his voice, he more calmly continued, "In this latitude at this time of year they'll have at least 14 more hours of daylight to chase us down, even with a start it will be impossible to avoid an action if we flee, they would simply be too fast. Not to count that we will have to sacrifice at least the Leipzig in her state."

"Scatter?" posed von Schultz.

"What are the other ships?" he asked seeking more information.

"Three other ships in the outer harbor beyond the Battlecruisers, one already raising steam or with steam up by the looks of it," came the reply from above, " I make three armored cruisers, one with four funnels, I'd call it Devonshire class, the others are three funneled, probably Monmouth's. Also looks to be several storeships or colliers present as well, some alongside the warships so numbers are unclear."

"A major task group then, just for us. How thoughtful,"

"Scattering won't do much then, one on one at least, and they'll outgun us individually… it's not going to work," he concluded with grim finality.

"Has Dresden signaled yet?"

"Not yet"

"Try raise her. If she has visibility into the inner harbor yet, then report status. If not, she is released for independent action as detailed in the contingency orders. Also pass onto the colliers they are to break off, rendezvous at Point B as per plan."

"So, we fight then?' von Schultz asked rhetorically.

"It's the best choice I think, now that I've put us in this situation," was all he could say, "Or can you suggest something different?"

"No, we've obviously caught them totally by surprise, what with only one appearing to have steam up, aside from the guardship. All we can do is try and pound them while they can't move. Do enough damage and we may be able to make a clean break."

Von Spee grunted in agreement, raising his glasses to his eyes again. "Bloody Battlecruiser all the way down here," shaking his head slightly in chagrined disbelief. "We will just have to make them pay for my mistake."

"What of the guardship, the liner, is it the Otranto?" naming the merchant cruiser that survived their previous encounter at Coronel.

"I think not," came back the response, "Black hull, buff uppers, twin funnels, black… about 10,000 tons. P and O colors, I'd say it's one of their M-class liners converted, probably half a dozen 125-150mm guns fitted. It's definitely closing to engage."

"Direct Nurnberg, to break off and engage independently," he ordered, glancing to port where the lagging Leipzig was now a couple of cables behind Scharnhorst, "and order Leipzig to join her. Once they have engaged and stopped her, they are both released to operate independently."

At that point the signals officer approached them announcing, "Sir Dresden has responded and it's only moment or two from opening up vision of the inner harbor. Submits that it completes that task before breaking off to follow existing instruction. It reports that our colliers are still some 15 miles to its south and have acknowledged their orders and are disengaging as directed."

"Signal Dresden, Concur. Report the inner harbor situation then proceed as previously directed. they are not to engage, confirm," and with a nod the officer turned away.

Von Spee was briefly distracted by the sight of the Leipzig cutting across the stern, and moving to join Nurnberg, both now diverging slightly north to close with the now advancing merchant cruiser which had obviously been at the northern end of a patrol circuit off Port Stanley. By now it was obvious that the British were well aware of the German Presence, with all the visible warships now starting to belch vast clouds of black coal smoke as they frantically fired up their cold boilers in a rush to raise steam and get under way, with a similar cloud now beginning to rise above the masked inner harbor. Having a clear view of the outer harbor he asked, "Has Dresden, given an update yet?"

At this point the first shots came from the distant Merchant cruiser, aimed at the Nurnberg, soon raising three shell splashes short of its target, marking the start of the engagement a little after 8am local time.

Leaving this sideshow to his two light cruisers, von Spee confirmed final tactical details with his flag captain as the range to the still anchored ships in the outer harbor dropped to 20,000 meters. His two armored cruisers would commence fire when it had dropped to 16,000m. With both ships only having around 160 rounds apiece remaining of Armour-piercing ammunition for the main guns, the initial ranging shots would be with common or HE rounds until the range was gained on the targets. While it was still long range, with both vessels being noted gunnery ships and their targets stationary, he was confident that they would rapidly become effective despite the extreme range the action was commencing at. His flagship would engage the more distant of the two anchored vessels, while the Gneisenau would take the nearer. The resulting 'crossing' of each ships LOT, Line Observer to Target, rather than being parallel, would make any 'overs' of the fall of shot obvious and easily identified as specific to that ship. Long competitors in the excellence in gunnery stakes, he was sure that this would result in both crews striving for their best.



While listening to this coordination being confirmed with Captain Maerker of the Gneisenau, he was approached by the signals officer. "Admiral, the Dresden reports that there appear to be three warships in the inner harbor. The Canopus appears to be either anchored or aground at the eastern end as earlier reports indicated. It opened fire at the Dresden's approach, but the rounds are falling several thousands of yards short. The other two ships are both four-funneled light cruisers, probably town-class light cruisers, and Dresden is almost certain one is the Glasgow from the Coronel fight. It has reversed course and is heading south now, and will continue in accordance with previous orders unless otherwise instructed. Message ends sir."

"Thank you." Send to it "Proceed as directed. God Speed and good hunting," before turning his attention back to their own pending engagement.



At this point von Spee found himself in a short hiatus before the range dropped and fire could commence, and for a period reviewed the decisions leading up to this moment. All options were now moot except perhaps even at this late moment disengaging and trying to escape. One more sweeping glance around the horizon, studying the calmness of the day he couldn't see any other course open, as he again found himself unconsciously shaking his head at the presence of the battlecruisers being this far south. Being too fast and too strong made this a suicidal course unless he could inflict maximum damage while they were still at a disadvantage. No, they would just have to create the maximum havoc possible while the British were unable to maneuver, all other plans offered even less palatable results. So, it was with a degree of stoic reluctant acceptance that he responded to the announcement "Range 16,000 meters Admiral," that he ordered, "Permission to open fire," at a little past 0825 hours local time.



In an act of almost unconscious concert, he and his flag captain raised their glasses and watched as with the thump and jar of recoil, the forward guns of the armored cruiser, barrels cocked at maximum elevation, commenced a slow deliberate fire. The familiar brown smoke from the muzzle blast, smelling of cordite drifted back through the bridge as the polished drill of alternating shots with the guns commenced. Again, more could not be realistically asked with both ships finding the range by the third salvo, excellent practice at this range. While Gneisenau achieved a straddle on the nearer ship, what von Spee was not to know was that the third salvo of his own flagship, while not a straddle was to burst less than 40m from the side of the British flagship Invincible. In one of those rare vagaries of military action upon which battles turn, the resulting scythe of shrapnel was to catch the British commander Vice-Admiral Sturdee as he moved forward to his ships conning tower. Severely wounded he was to take no part in the following events, and the head of the British Force was removed before it had even commenced to return fire.



Unaware of this, both German ships continued to engage, with the first British shots being returned even as this was occurring. The very next salvo from Gneisenau would gain its first hit forward on the Inflexible, followed by a hit from Scharnhorst on its fifth, starting a fire near the ships rear funnel. Despite their grim situation, Admiral von Spee found himself fighting the urge to smile as he heard Captain Schultz beside him muttering to himself in a brief moment of distraction, "Maerker's going to be insufferable," referring to Gneisenau's captain as he watched the gunnery performance. While remaining friendly, the sense of competition between the two sister ships had remained intense and enduring, one of the reasons both were renowned as crack gunnery ships. Even in the cauldron of battle it seemed that this legacy of competition lingered. With both ships now having the range and having scored hits upon their stationary targets they now switched to the Armour piercing rounds, maintaining the same deliberate fire for maximum accuracy. Having achieved this as the range dropped to 14,000m, von Spee gave the order for his two armoured cruisers to change course two-points to port, separating them further from the light cruisers, but opening up the arcs for his after guns to join in. At the same time as these cruisers were diverging north, they both now had opened fire to engage the closing Merchant Cruiser. By now both were in range and had already scored several hits on the unarmored vessel, starting a severe fire on board her by appearances.



With their full broadside available, despite still maintaining a deliberate rate of fire, both British battlecruisers were soon being hit regularly, literally sitting targets for the experienced German gunners. Both of them were now returning fire, but had yet to effectively range on the closing and so far, the return fire was as yet ineffectual, having failed to score a hit. Despite this initial success and the obvious fire still burning on the second battlecruiser, neither German officer on the bridge of the Scharnhorst expected little at this early stage of the engagement. German battlecruisers were well armored and built to take their place in the line of battle, and they largely expected that their British opponents would be of a similar nature. So, it came as a total shock when shortly after 0841 Gneisenau's eighth salvo again straddled Inflexible, appearing to score two hits amidships. What followed was clearly visible and subsequently reported by observers from both ashore and on nearby vessels, who saw a flash at the base of the middle funnel, followed by candle of flame from the midships Q-turret reaching the height of the fighting tops. This was followed almost immediately by a catastrophic detonation of its midships magazines, tearing the ship in two, and throwing debris hundreds of feet into the air and leaving a huge billowing chocolate coloured mushroom cloud, drifting south towards Stanley as it billowed up.



From the distant German perspective much of the detail of this catastrophic destruction of the Inflexible was lost, but the brilliant red flare of flame, followed by the rising cloud of the explosion was unmistakable even as it began to disperse. The report of the lookout was superfluous in its blandness "Target has blown up." But the simple banality in detailing the obvious, somehow highlighted its very unexpectedness to the German observers. For a moment or two fire paused aboard both ships as they sought to adjust their minds to the unexpectedness of it. Even as von Spee lowered his glasses and met the equally surprised look of his flag captain a further report came down from above. "Debris from the explosion appears to have damaged the nearest Monmouth class ship. It's lost its foremast and the first funnel appears crumpled," Came the elaboration.

"What targets should Gneisenau engage now?" asked von Schulz, engage the damaged cruiser of both concentrate on the Battlecruiser?"

"Battlecruiser I think, while we still have AP rounds. Order the Gneisenau to switch targets, and we shall continue to close to 10,000 meters to employ the secondary armament," he directed before continuing, "Maybe we can repeat that or cause sufficient damage to prevent pursuit," then again raising his glasses to study the enemy ships in view.



Even as he waited for these instructions to be passed, he used the several minutes before firing would recommence to study the wider developing picture. He briefly ruminated his options if the second battlecruiser also succumbed, should he continue the engagement of the stationary targets at his mercy or disengage the squadron? Still slightly disbelieving the initial destruction, such a repetition was highly unlikely in his professional mind, so he quickly discarded this speculation. As he watched he could see the northern anchored Monmouth class vessel (Kent) now getting under way. Obviously from how quickly it was working up speed it had already been raising steam before their appearance. He watched the slowing growing bow wave as it gained momentum and steered towards the northern edge of the harbor mouth, wondering at its movement. "Minefield?" he speculated to himself, thinking back to his past interactions with Captain Grant of the Cornwallis on the China station. "A thoughtful and capable officer, it was quite possible given time to prepare," before turning his attention to the light cruiser's engagement also to the north.



The Macedonia, armed with 8 4.7-inch guns had boldly closed while he had concentrated on the battlecruiser action. Initially engaging the Nurnberg on the wing of the cruiser line, its boldness had been unrewarded, scoring only a single hit before the Nurnberg, soon joined by the lagging Leipzig, and combined had overwhelmed the unarmored merchant cruiser in less than half an hour with over forty hits. Now powerless, silenced and burning fiercely it was obvious that the mobile cruiser was heading to engage his two cruisers to the north. Now that it had attained sufficient steam to get under way it appeared intent to close with the two German light cruisers, and there was nothing he could do to influence this new action.



At this point the sharper crack of his 5.9-inch secondary armament joined the more deliberate fire of the main armament as they had closed to within 10,000m. He had more AP rounds for these and hopefully they would have greater impact now that the supply of these was running low for his largest guns. At this point he gave the order to reverse course back to a more northern heading, as for the first time the Invincible found range. He felt the deck shiver underfoot as a 12-inch shell impacted on the Scharnhorst, striking well aft. Even as he watched Captain von Schultz turning to hear the damage reports he couldn't help but feel a degree of professional disdain at how long it had taken for this to happen. In the same time his two ships had probably scored over fifteen to twenty hits. Obviously not been keeping up much time on the ranges during peacetime was the only deduction, or perhaps an influx of reserve personnel, he mused distractedly to himself as for the second time in a few minutes another round came aboard. Listening to the reports received it was obvious the difference in damage the heavier guns caused, inflicting severe damage on with each strike on their German opponent.



This was forcing von Spee to reconsider his plan of closing to effective range of his secondary guns, with the counter fire of the Invincible suddenly seemed more accurate and effective at this shorter range, both the British ships on the southern side of the harbor began getting underway. Even as the two German Armored Cruisers expended the last of their limited AP supply and attempted to again open the range, it became apparent that this was no longer an option as the Invincible slowly began to work up to full speed. By 1000 both the Invincible and Cornwall were underway, and despite both being hit now over thirty times, with the majority of those on the Invincible. With both now well under way they began to consistently hit their German opponents. Slowly but surely von Spee could feel that the tide of battle was beginning to swing against his ships, as they lost the initial advantages of the opening stages of the engagement. Looking ahead to the north he could also see that the engagement between the now hard charging British cruiser there and the Leipzig and Nurnberg to the north was also not developing well.



This cruiser, the Kent, having attained sufficient steam to get under way had closed with the two German light cruisers while they were engaging the Macedonia. In the ferocious action that ensued she would be hit over fifty times, but the lighter guns of the German vessel where largely unable to penetrate the Kents armour belt to cause major damage. Nevertheless, her upper works were riddled and several casement guns destroyed by direct hits, the upper bridge wrecked, and one funnel partially knocked over limiting her speed and resulting in over 80 casualties in her crew. This came at great cost with her heavier guns inflicting severe damage on her smaller German opponents. Over the next hour the Leipzig would be silenced and rendered immobile by a number of damaging hits, and leaving the badly damaged Nurnberg, now limping north as it lost speed and only able to reply with two guns. At this point, in pursuit of the retreating Nurnberg, the Kent was to pass within 2000 meters of the stationary and burning Leipzig. While immobile it was still able to take advantage of the opportunity this proximity presented to launch two torpedoes undetected at the passing ship. One of which would hit, striking within 10 feet of the bow, and blowing a large hole and immobilizing it. Rapidly losing speed as water surged into the hole, the Kent would resume engaging the Leipzig hitting it a further 15-20 times before the cruiser would roll over and sink shortly before noon, taking over three-quarter of her crew with her. At this point the largely immobilized Kent, now unable to pursue the Nurnberg, was to concentrate on recovering Leipzig survivors from the freezing waters with its single surviving boat, taking no further part in the battle.



For von Spee, he now was facing the fact that the battle had indisputably turned against him, particularly as the surviving British battlecruiser, despite the number of hits suffered, continued to close with his two armored cruisers. Now that both had exhausted their remaining armored piercing rounds, limited to the less effective HE shells, their hits appeared to be largely achieving little, even as his own guns were steadily being silenced and the number of hits dropped. Both pursuers after skirting the southern end of the narrows, confirming in his mind the presence of mines there, had now settled in on a stern chase.



After initially withdrawing on a course to the NE, he had swung his ships heading to the SE to place the smoke from his laboring ships to best mask their opponents fire, but as the range had dropped, this had proved less effective. The course change had allowed them to cut the corner and close more quickly. By now the enemy was engaging his ship with two turrets whilst the stern turret was firing at the trailing Gneisenau. This weight of fire and the size of shell was now beginning to tell badly on his flagships ability to continue to fight. Already the second funnel had been shot away and the midships guns silenced. As water continued to enter the ship and she lost speed, he could see that his hope that the damage to the Invincible were not eventuating and it was continuing to close remorselessly. Already he could see the Gneisenau would soon overtake her flagging sister ship. He was a little belated in recognizing that he would have best been served by releasing her to proceed independently earlier, but now was the time. With smoke and his own flagships wrecked midships to a degree limiting his vision in that direction, he briefly stepped out of the conning tower on the lee side and confirm with his own eyes her status, before giving the final command to separate. Even as he was doing this and turning back from the bridge wing to give that command, a 12-inch Armour piercing shell fired by Invincibles A-turret would strike and penetrate the Scharnhorst's conning tower at 1125, killing her Captain and all within it. Vice Admirals von Spee's last conscious impression of the action would be of a blinding flash, before he knew no more.
 
PART TWO - (For your enjoyment and comment)!

SUPPLEMENT ONE: - DIKIPEDIA
(An Alternate History Factoid by JPD)

Battle of the Falklands 1914

The Battle of the Falkland Islands was a First World War naval action between the British Royal Navy and Imperial German Navy on 8 December 1914 in the South Atlantic. The British, after their defeat at the Battle of Coronel on 1 November, sent a large force to track down and destroy the German cruiser squadron. The battle is commemorated every year on 8 December in the Falkland Islands as a day of remembrance for those who lost their lives. Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee commanding the German squadron of two armoured cruisers, SMS Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the light cruisers SMS Nürnberg, Dresden and Leipzig, and the colliers Baden, Santa Isabel, and Seydlitz[ attempted to raid the British supply base at Stanley in the Falkland Islands. The British squadron consisting of the battlecruisers HMS Invincible and Inflexible, the armoured cruisers HMS Carnarvon, Cornwall and Kent, the armed merchant cruiser HMS Macedonia and the light cruisers HMS Bristol and Glasgow had arrived in the port the day before. Visibility was at its maximum, the sea was placid with a gentle breeze, and the day was bright and sunny. The German squadron caught the British squadron at dawn, unprepared and coaling and closed to inflict maximum damage. With the initial advantage of surprise, the German force was able to inflict major damage to the anchored ships in the outer harbor including the destruction of the battlecruiser Inflexible. The British forces were eventually able to raise steam and in the subsequent closing action all the German vessels. except Dresden and three accompanying colliers were sunk. This was at the cost of the loss of Macedonia in addition to the Inflexible, and extensive damage to the Invincible and two armored cruisers. Though it resulted in the effective destruction of the German Squadron as a raiding force, following on as it did the defeat at the battle of Coronel, it was widely perceived at that time as a second major defeat of the Royal Navy in a short period.

Background

Von Spee’s Squadron

At the outbreak of hostilities, the German East Asia Squadron commanded by Spee was outclassed and outgunned by the Allied Naval Forces in the Pacific. Spee and the High Command did not believe Germany's Asian possessions could be defended and doubted the squadron could even survive in that theatre. Spee wanted to get his ships home and began by heading southeast across the Pacific, although he was pessimistic about their chances and believed the squadron had little realistic hope of avoiding an encounter with significantly more powerful Royal Navy forces.
After successful action and defeat of a British squadron at the battle of Coronel von Spee's officers counseled a return to Germany. The squadron had used half its ammunition at Coronel; the supply could not be replenished, and the extended period at sea was leading to an increasing number of maintenance related issues beginning to affect some vessels. Intelligence reports suggested that the British ships HMS Defence, Cornwall and Carnarvon were stationed in the River Plate. Upon returning briefly to Valparaiso after the battle on 3 November he received an update from the German Consul about Port Stanley when recently visited by a steamer. The report advised that the British Pre-dreadnought battleship, Canopus, was in situ as a guardship for the port and its location in the inner harbor. On 26 November, the squadron set sail for Cape Horn, which they reached on 1 December, then anchored at Picton Island, where they stayed for three days distributing coal from a captured British collier, the Drummuir, and hunting. On 6 December, the British vessel was scuttled and its crew transferred to the auxiliary Seydlitz. The same day during a captains' conference to confirm the status of his vessels, von Spee updated them with the intelligence and proposed to raid the Falkland Islands as the next action for the squadron before considering further options. While recognizing that the raid was strictly unnecessary because the squadron now had as much coal as it could carry, he outlined the rationale for this action. With the poor state of Leipzig's engines (now limited to less than 20 knots) any encounter with a significant RN force would most likely lead to its loss. Secondly, as a former flagship of the China Station, he and his officers were very aware of the Canopus's limitations (slow speed, aging short -range main battery) and that this represented an opportunity to gain another moral victory over the RN. While most of Spee's captains opposed the raid in principle, the increasing constraints facing the squadron were acknowledged and after a brief caucus on the merits of the alternatives nevertheless decided to proceed.



Having determined to attack Port Stanley von Spee organized his plan of attack given the reported location of Canopus. The fastest of his light cruisers, the turbine powered Dresden would approach from the SE were in could view the inner harbor, trailed at great distance by the three colliers. The balance of the squadron would approach in line abreast from the east at dawn. The purpose of this was threefold, to cause any observation of this approach to be hampered by looking directly at the rising sun, to gain observation of the outer harbor for the presence of additional vessels, and to use the terrain to mask the probable arcs of fire of the Canopus located in the inner harbour. With the Dresden located to the SE it would be able to call the fall of shot for the squadron whilst Canopus's low elevation main armament would not be able to effectively engage as the terrain masked the approach of German vessels from the east.
British Preparations


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HMS Canopus arriving in Port Stanley on the 13 November 1914, after the Battle of Coronel, with Sapper Hill being the high ground behind at the left of picture. She would subsequently relocate and deliberately ground herself at the eastern end of the inner harbor to the right of picture to cover both the narrows and eastern approaches to Port Stanley with her main armament. (See Map).
On 30 October, retired Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher was reappointed First Sea Lord to replace Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, who had been forced to resign because of public outcry against a perceived German prince running the British navy, though Louis had been British and in the Royal Navy since the age of 14. On 3 November, Fisher was advised that Spee had been sighted off Valparaíso and acted to reinforce Cradock by ordering Defence, already sent to patrol the eastern coast of South America, to reinforce his squadron. On 4 November, news of the defeat at Coronel arrived. The blow to British naval prestige was palpable, and the British public was rather shocked. As a result, the battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible were ordered to leave the Grand Fleet and sail to Plymouth for overhaul and preparation for service abroad. Chief of Staff at the Admiralty was Vice-Admiral Doveton Sturdee. Fisher had a longstanding disagreement with Sturdee, who had been one of those calling for his earlier dismissal as First Sea Lord in 1911, so he took the opportunity to appoint Sturdee Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic and Pacific, to command the new squadron from Invincible.
On 11 November, Invincible and Inflexible left Devonport, although repairs to Invincible were incomplete and she sailed with workmen still aboard. Despite the urgency of the situation and their maximum speed of around 25 knots (46 km/h; 29 mph), the ships were forced to cruise at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) to conserve coal in order to complete the long journey south across the Atlantic. The two ships were also heavily loaded with supplies and munitions, is light of the perceived difficulty of resupply. Although secrecy of the mission was considered important so as to surprise Spee, Lieutenant Hirst from Glasgow heard locals discussing the forthcoming arrival of the ships while ashore at Cape Verde on 17 November; however, the news did not reach Spee. Sturdee arrived at the Abrolhos Rocks on 26 November, where Rear Admiral Stoddart awaited him with the remainder of the squadron.

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Contemporary rough sketch map of the general location of the ships of the British squadron at Port Stanley on the morning of 8 December 1914. (Note: There are some inaccuracies, with the location of Sapper Hill incorrectly marked at the bottom left of the map and the indication of the location of the actual Canopus observation post at the eastern end of Stanley Harbor unclear. Macedonia was patrolling some 4nmi off Port William.) The British warships present are highlighted in green. The location of the British colliers is not shown.
Sturdee announced his intention to depart for the Falkland Islands on 29 November. From there, the fast light cruisers Glasgow and Bristol would patrol seeking Spee, summoning reinforcements if they found him. Captain Luce of Glasgow, who had been at the battle of Coronel, objected that there was no need to wait so long and persuaded Sturdee to depart a day early. The squadron was delayed during the journey for 12 hours when a cable towing targets for practice-firing became wrapped around one of Invincible's propellers, but the ships arrived on the morning of 7 December.
The two light cruisers moored in the inner part of Stanley Harbor, while the larger ships remained in the deeper outer harbor of Port William. Divers set about removing the offending cable from Invincible; Cornwall's boiler fires were extinguished to make repairs, and Bristol had one of her engines dismantled. The famous ship SS Great Britainreduced to a coal bunker—transferred coal to several smaller colliers to transship coal to Invincible and Inflexible. The armed merchant cruiser Macedonia was the designated guardship for the harbor, while Kent was due to relieve her of this duty next morning. Kent would commence raising steam in her boilers, at 8am after breakfast ready to replace Macedonia the next day, 8 December; as von Spee's fleet arrived shortly after dawn of the same day.

Battle

Opening Moves


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Port William about 8.20am 8 December 1914, photographed from the maintop of Invincible by pay-master Sub-Lt Duckworth looking East. In the distance the smoke of the approaching German squadron is on the horizon with the Cornwall (left) and Inflexible (centre) only just lighting off their boilers. This is the last known photo of Inflexible before its sinking (note the distance to the Cornwall which would be damaged by debris from its destruction). At bottom right Invincibles funnels belch black coal smoke as she too raises steam; her tripod foremast has spiral canvas baffles around the topmast stays to confuse German Rangefinders. (IWM London)
The bulk of von Spee's squadron approached Stanley from the east in line abreast, first appearing over the horizon as the sun rose behind them. At the time, most of British fleet was coaling, with Bristol having her engines partially dismantled to conduct repairs as a result of the long run south. That the British squadron was caught totally unprepared was undisputed, with only two ships under steam to act as guardships and the battleship HMS Canopus, which had been grounded in the inner harbor and was behind a hill masking the German approach. The majority of the crews of the anchored vessels were either finishing breakfast or had already commenced the filthy manual labor of coaling when the alert was sounded. Post-battle investigation would later reveal that the spotting party from Canopus on Sapper Hill had been withdrawn upon arrival of the squadron on the previous day. That manning this post was resumed at 8am on the 8th and responsible for the initial sighting report almost immediately, was one of the damaging revelations of the investigation. It would take Kent approximately 45 minutes to finish raising sufficient steam to maneuver whilst the balance of the squadron with cold furnaces would require up to two hours to be able to get under way. Unfortunately, the squadron would not be granted this time.

The coaling operation had commenced shortly after 0600 with the collier Trelawney coming alongside Invincible and coaling commenced soon after 0700 as divers were put over the side to clear a cable for the starboard propellor. At approximately 0809am the alert was phoned from Sapper Hill to Canopus advising of the approach of the German force, with the signal being relayed by wireless to the Squadron at 0814: From Canopus to Flag: "Urgent: Following received from Sapper's Hill. Multiple men of war approaching from the East." Sturdee had just sat down for breakfast when he received news of the enemy arrival, and immediately issued a general alert and signal to all ships: "Raise steam for full speed and prepare to weigh anchor. Expedite." being sent at 0821. At 0823 the Macedonia outside Port William was released to engage the approaching warships just as they opened fire at a range of 16,000m.

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HMS Invincible getting up steam in Port William. This photo shows the vast quantity of dense black smoke involved in this process and is taken from the north-east, perhaps from HMS Cornwall at around 8.25am shortly before the first German round fell. The southern shore of Port William is in the background with the Narrows (the entry to Port Stanley and the inner harbor) midway between the ship's stern and the right of the photo. HMS Inflexible is out of sight to the left of the picture moored some four cables east of the still stationery Invincible. She would be unable to raise sufficient steam to maneuver for over another ninety minutes, and not actually getting underway until 10.05am.
From the German perspective, the four cruisers approaching from the east had steadily worked up to full speed, with the slower Leipzig at the southern end of the line lagging. As dawn broke, they initially had difficulty distinguishing the presence of ships in the outer harbor, however the rapidly improving light revealed multiple warships including the sight of the distinctive tripod masts of the two British battlecruisers was confirmed at 0808. This news was received with consternation as the disparity of force was far greater than the worst-case scenario previously considered. Von Spee's considered decision to risk the raid on Port Stanley was now proved unwise and he had sailed into a trap unwittingly. [1}

Many would later question his original decision as a gamble and consider it a mistake, but he rapidly recognized that an order to turn away now would lead to utter disaster for the Germans. But with his ships already primed and deployed for battle von Spee immediately identified that with the calm sea state and greater speed of the battlecruisers would be capable of chasing down and destroying his command piecemeal if he broke off at this point, and he elected to continue to close at speed in order to inflict the maximum damage whilst the British force was at a disadvantage. The Scharnhorst would open the engagement with her first ranging shot shortly after 0825.

Engagement

By opening deliberate fire at near maximum range, the German armored cruisers were only able to engage with their forward main armament whilst continuing to close. This was a deliberate plan as both vessels were noted gunnery ships, and to enable the maximum damage whilst both British battlecruisers were still stationary. With Gneisenau engaging Inflexible and Scharnhorst the Invincible this was to prove remarkably effective, with both rapidly finding range by the third salvo. The Battle of Coronel had left both German vessels with barely twenty armor-piercing (AP)rounds per gun of the main armament, and during this stage of the engagement they were using common (HE) rounds to gain range. Whilst the third salvo from Gneisenau, straddled Inflexible, the salvo from Scharnhorst whilst not a straddle was correct for range, with the left-hand most shell of bursting less than 40m from the port side of the Invincible at 0831, with profound effect. At this point, Admiral Sturdee was moving forward from his quarters aft in Invincible to the armored conning tower forward. With the starboard side still blocked by the disengaging collier and scrambling coaling parties and associated paraphernalia he was using the more exposed port side when this shell landed. The resultant shrapnel scythed through his party, killing two and striking him in the upper arm and body thus decapitating the command of the British squadron. Severely wounded and unconscious he would survive but play no further part subsequent events and have his left arm removed above the elbow later that day.

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The remains of HMS Inflexible sometime after 10am on 8 December 1914. Taken from the collier Trelawney and looking towards the northern shore of Port William with the stern of the HMS Inflexible visible above the water on the left as small boats continue to search for survivors. Following its catastrophic destruction, the stern half of its hull would remain upright perched on the floor of the harbor for over an hour before eventually sinking. Without this occurrence and the efforts of the recovery operation the death-toll of the sinking would have been greater.
At this point both British battlecruisers opened fire independently with their response restricted to the A and P turrets on both due to arc of fire restrictions as they lay. Both German cruisers would achieve their first hits shortly their after, Gneisenau forward on Inflexible with its fourth salvo, and Scharnhorst on the Invincibles after superstructure with its fifth. At this point with the range down to less than 14,000m, von Spee gave the order to turn two points to port to open the after arcs of his cruisers whilst continuing to close and for them to switch to AP shells. Both British battlecruisers were now began being hit regularly, while the return fire was as yet ineffectual, having failed to score a hit. Shortly after 0841 Gneisenau's eighth salvo again straddled Inflexible, appearing to score two hits amidships. What followed was clearly visible and subsequently reported by observers from both ashore and on nearby vessels, who saw a flash at the base of the funnel, followed by candle of flame from the midships Q-turret reaching the height of the fighting tops. This was followed almost immediately by a catastrophic detonation of its midships magazines, tearing the ship in two, and throwing debris hundreds of feet into the air and leaving a huge billowing chocolate colored mushroom cloud. Such was the force of the explosion it would be heard clearly in Port Stanley, and a large portion of P-turret, weighing nearly one hundred tons, would land on the Cornwall over 3 cables away, causing casualties and destroying the forward funnel. The Cornwall was the Flagship of the 5th Cruiser Squadron, flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral A.P. Stoddart, Sturdee's second-in -command. This impact bought down the foremast of the Cornwall, removing both its wireless aerials and signals halyards, effectively removing its ability to communicate with other vessels of the squadron. Subsequent numerous hits from the German ships would riddle the cruisers upper deck and prevent attempts to restore communication or transferring command. Admiral Stoddart would be unsuccessful in establishing tactical control as a result until well after the action concluded. This resulted in the actions of the cruisers lacking coordination, each joining individually as they became available. After the detonation of the midships magazine, the front remnant of the Inflexible's hull would roll rapidly to port and sink almost immediately. The shattered stern half would temporarily remain upright resting on the sea floor below, with several meters of the hull clear of the water for nearly an hour, before eventually sinking. The loss of life would have been far more severe but for this occurrence and the presence of several small vessels and boats in the harbor, but as it was only 89 of the complement of 918 would survive its sinking.

The shock of the totally unexpected destruction of the Inflexible was a stunning surprise to both sides and a brief hiatus would occur for several minutes before firing would recommence. When this resumed, the German armored cruisers had closed to within 10,000m to bring their secondary armament into range before reversing course, both now engaging the still stationary Invincible. The Macedonia, armed with 8 4.7-inch guns had boldly closed with the approaching force whilst this was occurring and engaged the Nurnberg on the wing of the cruiser line. This attack would be unrewarded, scoring only a single hit before the Nurnberg, soon joined by the lagging Leipzig, would overwhelm the unarmored merchant cruiser in less than half an hour with over forty hits. Soon powerless, silenced and burning fiercely the Macedonia would eventually sink later that evening losing over one third of her 370 crew. By 0850 Kent had attained sufficient steam to get under way and close with the two German light cruisers. In the ferocious action that ensued she would be hit over fifty times, but the lighter guns of the German vessel where largely unable to penetrate the Kents armor belt to cause major damage. Nevertheless, her upper works were riddled and several casement guns destroyed by direct hits, the upper bridge wrecked, and one funnel partially knocked over limiting her speed and resulting in over 80 casualties in her crew. This came at great cost with her heavier guns inflicting severe damage on her smaller German opponents. By 1050 Leipzig was silenced and immobile, and Nurnberg was limping north at low speed and only able to reply with two guns. In pursuit of the retreating Nurnberg the Kent passed within 2000 meters of the stationary Leipzig, which took the opportunity presented to launch two torpedoes undetected at the passing ship., one of which would strike within 10 feet of the bow, blowing a large hole and immobilizing it. The Kent would resume engaging the Leipzig hitting it a further 15-20 times before the cruiser would roll over and sink shortly before noon, taking 230 of her 295 crew with her, as the Kents single undamaged boat struggled to recovered survivors.



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Invincible recovering Gneisenau survivors around 18:15. Note the shell damage to the after funnel that restricted the battlecruisers top speed.
While this was occurring, the main engagement continued with the Cornwall finally raising sufficient steam to get underway around 0955, joined soon thereafter by the unengaged Carnarvon at 1000 and followed by Invincible at 1005. During this time the range had dropped to under 10,000m and both Invincible and Cornwell had been repeatedly hit. Fortunately for the British, by now the German cruisers had exhausted all AP ammunition and reverted to HE rounds which while badly damaging the upperworks of both British vessels, lacked penetration and only had limited effect on their overall combat power. The most significant effect was the disabling of Cornwall's forward turret and the partial collapsing of Invincibles after funnel. This restricted the draft for the engines. Had von Spee known this it is possible he could have outpaced the damaged battlecruiser if he had broken off the action at this point. This did not occur and after the initial successes the tide of battle was steadily swinging in the British favor. Up to this point the accuracy of British fire had been very poor until the range dropped below 10,000m. The first hit by Invincible main armament was not achieved until 0937, nearly an hour of firing and by the time Invincible had slipped its cable only three hits had been achieved from over 120 rounds fired by the four guns bearing. Once underway the Invincible was able to open its arcs and bring its stern turret into action and it continued to follow the German ships which had now reversed course again and were heading north. By this point von Spee had sent a signal to Dresden releasing her to conduct independent operations with the accompanying colliers.


With the Invincibles two bearing turrets engaging the leading Scharnhorst and after turret the Gneisenau, the number of hits began to increase as the range had shortened. The weight of fire and size of shell rapidly began to inflict severe damage, whilst the German fire in comparison was achieving little. At 1128 one of these rounds pierced the conning tower of Scharnhorst, killing its Captain and severely injuring von Spee. By this time his flagship was largely a wreck, guns silent and with extensive damage barely moving at low speed with funnels flattened, afire and well down by the bow. Invincible and the largely undamaged Carnarvon would continue past her in pursuit of the Gneisenau. The damaged and now lagging Cornwall would stand by the Scharnhorst as she continues to steadily settle by the bow until sinking at 1517 Flag still flying. Fortunately, with the calm conditions many survivors would be recovered, including a wounded and unconscious von Spee but she would take 311 of her crew with her. SMS Gneisenau continued to fire and evade until 1615, by which time her ammunition had been exhausted, and she was in a largely similar state to her sister when striking her flag at that time. Given the state of his vessels Invincible would concentrate on recovering Gneisenau's crew from the water, whilst dispatching the largely undamaged Carnarvon at this point to unsuccessfully seek the reported cruiser sighted south of Port Stanley earlier in the day. Gneisenau would finally sink at 1802 with the loss of 290 crew. By the end of the action the Invincible had received over 50 hits, Cornwell 40, and Carnarvon 3. Between them they suffered a total of 138 casualties from the fire of the German ships.

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SMS Nurnberg wrecked and driven ashore north of William Point.​
The remaining British ships had very little direct influence on the action. The Canopus, aground in the inner harbor had fired two rounds at the distant Dresden shortly after 0830 which had fallen well short, before observing the Dresden withdraw to the south. The Glasgow had emerged from the inner harbor around 1025 and had followed Kent in action to the north. Catching her up and passing the sinking Leipzig she would sight the limping Nurnberg close inshore north of William Pt. She would ground herself in shallow water just off the point as Glasgow opened fire at extreme range. Nurnberg fired two flares, so HMS Glasgow ceased fire and closed as the crew abandoned the ship in shallow waters having suffered 59 killed. Helping and recovering these prisoners and wounded would occupy her the rest of the afternoon and she would return to deposit them at Port Stanley after 1840. The final cruiser Bristol would not be able exit Port Stanley until after reassembling her engines after 1300 and would conduct a fruitless sweep south along with Carnarvon to attempt to reacquire the disappeared Dresden. This would be called off late that evening and both would return to Port Stanley and participate in the subsequent British repair and recovery operations for the next several days.

Outcome

In the immediate aftermath of the battle left the British forces preoccupied with coping with the issues of damaged vessels and the recovery of survivors of both sides. For the German forces the battle had represented the effective destruction of the sole large naval force outside of the North Sea or the Mediterranean. The Dresden would escape and rendezvous with the three supporting colliers, which had never come within 15 nautical miles of the action, at Picton island has had previously been agreed.

For the British the sheer scope of the casualties and number of prisoners threatened to overwhelm the limited facilities available at Port Stanley. Despite losing 920 casualties, there remained over 1100 German prisoners, nearly half the population of Stanley, many of them wounded or suffering hypothermia from immersion in the cold waters of the South Atlantic. Captain Maerker, who had survived the sinking of the Gneisenau, as senior surviving officer (von Spee was unconscious and in a critical condition) gave parole for the German forces that evening, and many of them would be sheltered in the homes of the population of Stanley in subsequent days. The consideration and comfort offered would remain a fond memory and be remarked on repeatedly post war by all those affected. Von Spee survived despite his critical injuries, with wounds remarkably similar to those of Sturdee, and would have his left arm removed above the elbow by Invincibles surgeon late that evening. Both his sons, Otto on Nurnberg, and Heinrich on Gneisenau, would also survive, though Heinrich would have his foot removed at the ankle. During the subsequent days the Germans would work with no apparent rancor with the crews of the British ships to bury the dead of both sides with military honors in what would eventually become a designated Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery in Stanley.

The British had suffered a higher total casualty list than the Germans, with 1,174 killed in the action, the majority of those lost in the destruction of Inflexible. The losses had been one battlecruiser and one merchant cruiser sunk in comparison to the German losses of two Armored and two Light Cruisers. Still facing the British force was the issue of coping with the significant damage suffered by the Kent, Cornwall and Invincible, with no resources available to achieve this in Port Stanley. The Port would remain secure with the presence of Canopus, Carnarvon, Glasgow, and Bristol, but it would take months before Kent and Cornwall would receive adequate temporary repairs to undertake the journey to Durban to be fully fixed. Inflexible would be eventually be withdrawn to Britain to receive repairs there in early 1915.

Aftermath

The Battle of the Falkland Islands in practical terms represented a small tactical action which, while decisively won by the British in material terms, ultimately had little real impact on the conduct of naval operations or the outcome of war. However, in propaganda terms and following so soon as it did after the defeat at Coronel, it came as a second stunning blow to the prestige of the British Empire and the Royal Navy in particular, and was widely perceived as a defeat as a result. Despite the sinking of the bulk of the German Far-East Squadron in the action, the damages suffered in achieving this given the disparity of the forces involved, was considered a failure. This was intensified in particular by the loss of the Inflexible, one of the iconic battlecruiser emblems of the modern navy, to the very class of vessels which it was specifically designed to counter. When information of the result was received by telegraph in London, there was widespread initial disbelief and reluctance to accept the news, but upon its confirmation an intense and strident uproar broke out demanding explanation how this could have occurred. The resultant attempts to play down the losses and minimise the damage was largely futile and the subsequent investigation and findings became an exercise in fault-finding primarily aimed at establishing culpability at the outcome and protecting the Royal Navy image. The subsequent success of the Dresden having survived and escaped would only exacerbate the level of scrutiny which resulted.

As squadron commander much of the blame for the result was laid directly at the feet of Sturdee who was deemed to bear responsibility for not having put in place adequate preparations to defend against the arrival of a German Force. Only the extent of his injuries and being unfit for further military service prevented him from facing court martial. He would never fully recover from his wounds and would die disgraced and largely forgotten of injury related complications in 1925. Other senior British commanders involved would also be found at fault and penalised or removed from command. Captain Grant of Canopus was relieved of command and forced to resign for the failure to maintain the observation post on Sapper Hill despite his good work in fortifying Port Stanley. Admiral Stoddart would be removed from his command and never receive another sea going appointment, censured for his inability to establish adequate control of the ships of his squadron or command of the action despite the damage his flagship Cornwall. He would be joined by the captains of both Invincible and Kent who were removed from command and all would be forced to retire at the end of the war. The resultant investigation failed to correctly identify and address a number of key factors that arose from the action. It did not acknowledge the fundamental design flaws of the basic battlecruiser concept, and its vulnerability to plunging fire with only 1.75-inch-thick deck Armor. It failed to recognise that the lack of effect of the German fire was largely due to the exhaustion of AP ammunition rather than any intrinsic strength of the armour layout and design. That the destruction of Inflexible was probably due to a combination of penetration of the magazine or turret and the resultant flash fire of incorrectly stored munitions and cordite charges, led to the detonation of the fifty tons of munitions and charges in the midship magazine, was not recognised at the time. It was only with the subsequent similar events of Jutland and loss of four further battlecruisers that these failings with RN practices in regard to cordite storage would be recognised and addressed. The fact that both battlecruisers, fearing difficulties in resupply, had embarked quantities of main armament munitions well in excess of the magazine capacity would be ignored. That the excess had been secured outside the magazine in the shell and handling rooms would only be confirmed in the 1916 investigation. In light of similar flash fire that resulted at the time, it was recognised that a similar result had been the probable cause of the loss of the Inflexible. The fact that the first investigation had ignored this and failed to make a finding on the cause of loss probably contributed to the subsequent 1916 losses.

The very poor accuracy of the fire of the battlecruisers (less than 5% hits until the range dropped below 10,000m), particularly in contrast to the high standard exhibited by the German gunnery, was not addressed nor the general inadequacies of the Dreyer fire-control system in use either acknowledged or recognised. The failure of the investigation to identify and address these issues would be highlighted by later events of the war, reinforcing the perception that entire investigation was largely aimed at protecting the image of the Royal Navy rather than establishing fact.

For the Germans, the escape and subsequent highly successful cruise of the Dresden would further add damage to the British Imperial image resultant from the battle. Returning to the Pacific after the action, the Dresden would conduct commerce raiding operations for a further six months, capturing, or sinking an additional 13 merchant ships and a cruiser, and tying down virtually the entire Pacific contingents of the British, Japanese and Nieustralis navies involved in this hunt over this period. The highlight of this operation was the raid on the British phosphate operations at Nauru, sinking the guardship, the elderly British protected cruiser Crescent, and capture and scuttling of five phosphate ships, and two further vessels at Ocean Island two days later. Facing major engineering issues and food and ammunition shortages, Dresden would present itself for internment to the US at Pearl Harbor in May 1915.

To this day the wisdom of von Spee's attack on Port Stanley remains highly contentious, with pundits questioning its relative merits and debating his state of mind in electing to undertake this action. Von Spee would remain largely silent in the immediate aftermath of the war but would eventually open up and respond to interviews after the death of Sturdee. When accused of being fatalistic, he would respond, 'No, just realistic', and lay out the background to his thoughts for instigating the action. He basically stated that his force was too large to sustain the support required to conduct commerce raiding as a squadron, yet lacked the size to be able to force its way home through British home waters. Already facing ammunition shortages and growing maintenance issues he felt that any attempt to return to Germany would face ignominious defeat by superior forces. Aware and familiar with the limitations of the Canopus from shared time on the China station, he felt that the squadron could defeat her, even given the prospect of incurring significant damage to achieve this, and that the propaganda benefit offered by such a victory was the best reward now achievable by his squadron. His worst-case scenario conceived saw the inclusion of the armoured cruiser Defence in addition to Glasgow and Otranto from Coronel, and he still considered victory achievable in that case, though it would come at great cost. He considered that such a victory, even at the cost of great damage or destruction of his squadron, would still represent the best achievable gain for the prestige of the German Empire and Imperial Navy, from his force which he could see no realistic way of preserving, beyond ignominious internment with a neutral power. With a defeat of a British force at Stanley he considered he could still possibly be able to employ any smaller surviving force more effectively in the commerce raiding role, and also land survivors resulting from such a battle. He further considered that had he suffered sufficient damage in such an action, he would scuttle a damaged vessel in the narrows to deny future use of the port to the British. For those reasons he approached Stanley on the morning of the 8th, already largely committed to accepting some form of action from an encounter with the British Navy. Whatever the final effect, his decision was to lead to one of the sole large naval actions outside of European waters of the First World War.

1. IOTL the British squadron was caught unprepared as detailed, but Von Spee was not expecting to engage any British warships and when the guardship Canopus opened fire on the Dresden approaching from the SE at maximum range he turned away and attempted to escape. With the unusually flat and calm conditions the faster and more powerful ships the British had time to raise steam and eventually run down and sink the majority of the German Squadron after a daylong chase. The turbine powered Dresden would escape and subsequently be caught and sunk off Chile early in 1915. It has often been speculated what would have resulted had he closed and engaged the unprepared force at anchor, and this dikki represents my take had this occurred.
 
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A nice read, lots of work on your part, Thanks, definitely a German victory to sink a BC and damage a BC. Might have some Dogger Bank impacts. Probably as good a victory as possible in that situation.

Only debatable part is maybe the operability of Dresden to go another 6 months, even with 3 colliers. Wonder if it might be better to try and go home.
 
A nice read, lots of work on your part, Thanks, definitely a German victory to sink a BC and damage a BC. Might have some Dogger Bank impacts. Probably as good a victory as possible in that situation.

Only debatable part is maybe the operability of Dresden to go another 6 months, even with 3 colliers. Wonder if it might be better to try and go home.
Thanks, glad you enjoyed it as that's the purpose of putting in the effort. It will also impact on my take of the battle of Jutland in 1916. That will be just as extensive and titled "Battle of the Battlecruisers". Another AU with AUS/NZ as a single nation state called Nieustralis. I felt that the BC loss was defensible in the narrative, stationary target with weak deck armour and plunging fire at range from noted gunnery ships. I've heard annecdotal evidence that additional ammunition was carried by both BC's IRL due to worries about resupply and will mesh this to the 1916 BC losses and their ammo security. J
 
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Nice TL and read. It's your TL of course, but maybe Spee could have sunk one ot two of the armoured cruisers as well, either Cornwall or Kent or even both, since they suffered many hits? This would have made it even more embarassing for RN. Could at least one of the german ACs have escaped as well?

And most interesting to see hints of the ATL Jutland, with 4 british BCs sunk.
 
Nice TL and read. It's your TL of course, but maybe Spee could have sunk one ot two of the armoured cruisers as well, either Cornwall or Kent or even both, since they suffered many hits? This would have made it even more embarassing for RN. Could at least one of the german ACs have escaped as well?

And most interesting to see hints of the ATL Jutland, with 4 british BCs sunk.
Trying to strike a believable historical balance. If you look at the track record of the SMS light cruisers, Emden v Sydney or in the North Sea, the 10.5cm had little real impact on the RN designs with the larger hulls, so while effective against the AMC the damage against the armored cruisers while extensive was largely cosmetic, was my analysis of this fight. IRL both the lights failed to achieve any significant damage on their opponents. Tried to conform to the IRL post-Coronel facts. The two S & G are his heavy hitters with most chance of damaging the more powerful BCs. 80% of the 8.2-inch AP shells gone so once what remained was used the HE or common round from S&G would have been similarly effective as the 10.5cm rounds of the lighter ships. If I had wanted too, I could have had Spee break off once Inflexible was lost but elected not to. In that event Invincible once under way could have pursued either S or G but not if they separated. Rationale for not pursuing this line is my read of the tactical situation as presented. One, the destruction is totally unexpected by all parties and a shock so it's no guarantee that the best option is immediately going to be selected. Two, Von Spee was expecting action of some form, and retreating here would still sacrifice the slower/weaker ships of his command to at best release one of his two larger ships, an anathema to the pride of any professional navy. Three, at the time death in action and fighting the ship as long as possible was clearly part of the ethos of both navy's core fundamentals. If VS was already resigned to not getting home, then inflicting as much damage as possible on major enemy units was still important even at the cost of his command.
 
I like this story. I find the actions of the various ships and commanders to be very plausible, and it was a fun read.

I believe the actions of Macedonia, even thought they seem suicidal. Macedonia's captain would be concerned that entrance to the harbour had to be defended, lest the light cruisers pile in for a torpedo attack.

Just got time to research and comment. In my annoying but well intentioned fact-checky way.
In pursuit of the retreating Nurnberg the Kent passed within 2000 meters of the stationary Leipzig, which took the opportunity presented to launch two torpedoes undetected at the passing ship., one of which would strike within 10 feet of the bow, blowing a large hole and immobilizing it.
Leipzig, and the other German small cruisers present, had one submerged torpedo tube on each beam. Leipzig could only fire one torpedo in a single direction at a time. Then the ship would have to either turn, or reload. I'm not sure how long the reload process took. Still, the outcome could be the same. Leipzig fires one torpedo at Kent, and it hits. Leipzig's 45cm C/03 torpedo would have to be set to the slower speed of 26 knots to reach out to 2000 meters.

Shortly after 0841 Gneisenau's eighth salvo again straddled Inflexible, appearing to score two hits amidships. What followed was clearly visible and subsequently reported by observers from both ashore and on nearby vessels, who saw a flash at the base of the funnel, followed by candle of flame from the midships Q-turret reaching the height of the fighting tops. This was followed almost immediately by a catastrophic detonation of its midships magazines, tearing the ship in two, and throwing debris hundreds of feet into the air and leaving a huge billowing chocolate colored mushroom cloud.
I can't find a range and penetration table for the S&G's 21cm gins.
The closest I can find in caliber and age is the US Navy's 8"/45 Mark 6. This gun is a little hotter than the German guns in question, 45 cal rather than 40 cal, with 200fps faster muzzle velocity, but lets say they work the same.

At 14000m, the S&G's shells landing on Inflexible would have an angle of fall of 16.98 degrees. The table on NavWeaps does not show deck armour penetration, but the way I understand it, the angle of fall when the shell hits a horizontal armour plate forms the hypotenuse of a triangle. A shell hitting at 17 degrees basically has to burrow through 5x as much armour as a shell hitting at 90 degrees, if the shell does not skip off. If the hit on Inflexible was at a place where the deck armour was 1.5 inches thick, this shell would have the same chance of penetrating the deck armour as if it hit side armour 7.5 inches thick. (1.5 x 5). (This is not quite exact, because at that range the shell would be hitting the side amour at 17 degrees as well, which would make the side armour effectively a bit thicker too). At 12,000 yards, the US 8" shell can penetrate between 4.63" and 5" of armour, depending on which table you look at.

Table says no penetration. I say some kind of lucky shot with exceptionally poor ammunition handling on the part of the Inflexible's crew could cause this. Or a hit on a spotting hood, or a turret roof hit that caused hot spall to land right on a cartridge bag, with poor ammunition handling practice on the hoists.

It took me a long time to figure out why early armoured warships could get away with such thin deck armour.

Edit: You picked up on one thing about the battle that I have not heard other commentators mention. That S&G could sit comfortably outside Canopus's range and pummel her at leisure.
 
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Edit: You picked up on one thing about the battle that I have not heard other commentators mention. That S&G could sit comfortably outside Canopus's range and pummel her at leisure.
My understanding is that from the location where Canopus was grounded that no Germans could spot Canopus unless they came inside the harbour (and Canopus couldn't spot the German squadron). Canopus was grounded behind a hill and reliant on spotters from the spotting station on sappers hill. The Germans didn't have spotters set up. They couldn't get around the hills and hit targets they couldn't see.

The other factor of course is that accuracy dropped as range increased. The German squadron couldn't afford to sit out of range of anyone or they would burn ammunition too quickly. As mentioned they were short on ammunition.

Even if S&G could hit Canopus, Canopus was grounded for a reason. It really helped accuracy by simplifying the gunnery calculations. While S&G had long theoretical range Canopus's no one had accurate long shooting at the edge of their range. By grounding range Canopuses and S&G effective range would have become very close.
 
I really enjoyed that. Interesting that the investigation was more of a cover up. If done properly, and the results were taken seriously it would make Jutland much more interesting, from a Royal Navy POV. Very good work!
Allan
 
I like this story. I find the actions of the various ships and commanders to be very plausible, and it was a fun read.

I believe the actions of Macedonia, even thought they seem suicidal. Macedonia's captain would be concerned that entrance to the harbour had to be defended, lest the light cruisers pile in for a torpedo attack.

Just got time to research and comment. In my annoying but well intentioned fact-checky way.

Leipzig, and the other German small cruisers present, had one submerged torpedo tube on each beam. Leipzig could only fire one torpedo in a single direction at a time. Then the ship would have to either turn, or reload. I'm not sure how long the reload process took. Still, the outcome could be the same. Leipzig fires one torpedo at Kent, and it hits. Leipzig's 45cm C/03 torpedo would have to be set to the slower speed of 26 knots to reach out to 2000 meters.


I can't find a range and penetration table for the S&G's 21cm gins.
The closest I can find in caliber and age is the US Navy's 8"/45 Mark 6. This gun is a little hotter than the German guns in question, 45 cal rather than 40 cal, with 200fps faster muzzle velocity, but lets say they work the same.

At 14000m, the S&G's shells landing on Inflexible would have an angle of fall of 16.98 degrees. The table on NavWeaps does not show deck armour penetration, but the way I understand it, the angle of fall when the shell hits a horizontal armour plate forms the hypotenuse of a triangle. A shell hitting at 17 degrees basically has to burrow through 5x as much armour as a shell hitting at 90 degrees, if the shell does not skip off. If the hit on Inflexible was at a place where the deck armour was 1.5 inches thick, this shell would have the same chance of penetrating the deck armour as if it hit side armour 7.5 inches thick. (1.5 x 5). (This is not quite exact, because at that range the shell would be hitting the side amour at 17 degrees as well, which would make the side armour effectively a bit thicker too). At 12,000 yards, the US 8" shell can penetrate between 4.63" and 5" of armour, depending on which table you look at.

Table says no penetration. I say some kind of lucky shot with exceptionally poor ammunition handling on the part of the Inflexible's crew could cause this. Or a hit on a spotting hood, or a turret roof hit that caused hot spall to land right on a cartridge bag, with poor ammunition handling practice on the hoists.

It took me a long time to figure out why early armoured warships could get away with such thin deck armour.

Edit: You picked up on one thing about the battle that I have not heard other commentators mention. That S&G could sit comfortably outside Canopus's range and pummel her at leisure.
With regards to the torpedoes Yes they had a single broadside tube, but carried five torpedoes that could be reloaded. In the IRL battle both Nurnberg and Leipzig are noted each to have fired three torpedoes at their foes, none of which hit. For narrative purposes, Kent cutting the corner in pursuit of Nurnberg comes in effective range of the stationary Leipzig. Convenient? Yes, but for my narrative purposes I'm sticking to it. ;)
For the gunnery effect I'll offer a couple of points. The same Navweapons site makes note that the British turrets had several weaknesses, sighting ports, large gap between the barbette and housing etc. Penetration can be at these weak points. I note that in Dogger Bank the destruction of Dora and Caesar turret of Seydlitz was from a shell that was actually stopped by the barbette armor, but blast and shrapnel effect entered the working compartment that was to result in the loss of both turrets. Secondly the thickest part of the turret was traditionally the face then roof., with the turret rear thinnest. I can't confirm this, but the rear of the Mk B VII turret was I believe anecdotally 25mm, though I can't locate the original source of this memory. With a stationary anchored vessel unable to point a disengaged side turret directly down the threat access with its guns fore or aft, then penetration may be through the turret rear of a wing turret for a midships hit.. This occurred to both Moltke and Seydlitz IRL at Jutland where shell effect was through the rear of a disengaged turret.
Appreciate the feedback thanks, just trying to hhave a coherent reason for the thread structure. T
 
My understanding is that from the location where Canopus was grounded that no Germans could spot Canopus unless they came inside the harbour (and Canopus couldn't spot the German squadron). Canopus was grounded behind a hill and reliant on spotters from the spotting station on sappers hill. The Germans didn't have spotters set up. They couldn't get around the hills and hit targets they couldn't see.

The other factor of course is that accuracy dropped as range increased. The German squadron couldn't afford to sit out of range of anyone or they would burn ammunition too quickly. As mentioned they were short on ammunition.

Even if S&G could hit Canopus, Canopus was grounded for a reason. It really helped accuracy by simplifying the gunnery calculations. While S&G had long theoretical range Canopus's no one had accurate long shooting at the edge of their range. By grounding range Canopuses and S&G effective range would have become very close.
The Canopus was grounded as per the Map taken form the account by Inflexible's Gunnery officer Lt-Comd. R Vernon published in 1920 which also includes the water color image below, which apparently was from his position in the fighting top of Inflexible. Also below is a copy of the German map from "The War at sea: The cruiser war in foreign waters", vol. 1, by Kapitan Zur See Erich Raeder (Yes, that Erich Raeder), in 1922. Both show the location of the grounded Canopus and its arc of fire to the SE. Though accounts disagree about the lay of its heading all confirm it was sighted so that both turrets could cover the narrows as well as the SE approaches with expectation that the wireless station was to be a target. It is best to remember that Stanly is in effect two harbors, an inner and outer, both with RN ships in them on 8 December. The high ground shown in the thread pictures means that there is no direct vision between vessels in each, one of the reasons for the signal station on sapper hill.

Scan_20240412.jpg
View showing the IRL approach of the German vessels from the SE.

IRL this was to be a raid, and one of the first priorities was to shell the wireless station at Hookers point and remove Stanley's ability to alert others to their presence, hence the approach direction. This also provides view into the inner harbor. In my thread only the Dresden is using this approach, the intent is to direct the indirect fire from the balance of the squadron from the East which will use the high ground to mask the arcs of Canopus, which they are generally aware of in this TL. IRL they were not expecting any opposition at all.

Scan_20240412 (3).jpg


Verner's watercolor view from Inflexible's fighting top at the time of Canopus opening fire shows how the terrain masked the view between the two harbors. The smoke to the right is from the opening fire of Canopus, with the fall of shot near Nurnberg and Gneisenau, and the smoke of the more distant three cruisers. Of note are the wireless towers (center) of the station at Hookers Pt, which is covered by the Canopus arc of fire. Transcripts of Midshipman Robert K Dicksons diary who was located in Canopus fighting top indicate there was clear vision of this approach over the low ground at the east end of Stanley Harbour. Though Canopus topmasts were struck down IAW Admiralty instructions, there is no reason in the logic of this thread and a clear line of vision that VS would be unaware of the layout. Vision into the outer Harbou (Pt William) would be direct from the eastern approach in this thread and provide direct sight of the BCs and larger cruisers in that harbor.
 
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I like this story. I find the actions of the various ships and commanders to be very plausible, and it was a fun read.

I believe the actions of Macedonia, even thought they seem suicidal. Macedonia's captain would be concerned that entrance to the harbour had to be defended, lest the light cruisers pile in for a torpedo attack.

Just got time to research and comment. In my annoying but well intentioned fact-checky way.

Leipzig, and the other German small cruisers present, had one submerged torpedo tube on each beam. Leipzig could only fire one torpedo in a single direction at a time. Then the ship would have to either turn, or reload. I'm not sure how long the reload process took. Still, the outcome could be the same. Leipzig fires one torpedo at Kent, and it hits. Leipzig's 45cm C/03 torpedo would have to be set to the slower speed of 26 knots to reach out to 2000 meters.


I can't find a range and penetration table for the S&G's 21cm gins.
The closest I can find in caliber and age is the US Navy's 8"/45 Mark 6. This gun is a little hotter than the German guns in question, 45 cal rather than 40 cal, with 200fps faster muzzle velocity, but lets say they work the same.

At 14000m, the S&G's shells landing on Inflexible would have an angle of fall of 16.98 degrees. The table on NavWeaps does not show deck armour penetration, but the way I understand it, the angle of fall when the shell hits a horizontal armour plate forms the hypotenuse of a triangle. A shell hitting at 17 degrees basically has to burrow through 5x as much armour as a shell hitting at 90 degrees, if the shell does not skip off. If the hit on Inflexible was at a place where the deck armour was 1.5 inches thick, this shell would have the same chance of penetrating the deck armour as if it hit side armour 7.5 inches thick. (1.5 x 5). (This is not quite exact, because at that range the shell would be hitting the side amour at 17 degrees as well, which would make the side armour effectively a bit thicker too). At 12,000 yards, the US 8" shell can penetrate between 4.63" and 5" of armour, depending on which table you look at.

Table says no penetration. I say some kind of lucky shot with exceptionally poor ammunition handling on the part of the Inflexible's crew could cause this. Or a hit on a spotting hood, or a turret roof hit that caused hot spall to land right on a cartridge bag, with poor ammunition handling practice on the hoists.

It took me a long time to figure out why early armoured warships could get away with such thin deck armour.

Edit: You picked up on one thing about the battle that I have not heard other commentators mention. That S&G could sit comfortably outside Canopus's range and pummel her at leisure.
One further point to note was the level of general supply crammed into Sturdee's vessels. It is to be remembered that his squadron only stopped as an intermediate step on the way to the Pacific when VS presented himself to them on 8 December. That Fischer and Churchill both gave a 'prog' to Sturdee to expedite departure is well documented, including sailing with workmen aboard if necessary. Numerous historic accounts confirm that a great mass of stores and equipment in excess of capacity was embarked in haste and was still being organized days after departure. For TL purposes this includes a large munitions load out. Peacetime stowage was 80 rounds per gun, giving a total of 1280 rounds for the two BCs. In the actual engagement both BCs expended a total of 1174 rounds of main gun munitions, in other words nearly 92% of their nominated stowage. Yet Vernon's account as the Inflexible's gunnery officer anecdotally mentions that some 40% of magazine capacity remained after the engagement. If that anecdote was accurate, then it means that up to approximately 120-125 rouds per gune could have been embarked, far in excess of pre-war stowage figure. Now undoubtedly later after Dogger Bank in 1915 the ammunition stowage in the MK B VII turrets was increased to 110 rounds per gun, but at what point this occurred is unclear, and if additional rounds were loaded so soon after the outbreak of war, was the stowage methods secure at this early stage? Note that at his stage the blasting charge for rounds were black powder and lyddite, both less stable fillings. For the purposes of this thread, I have hinted no, part of a process to generate a general magazine security thread for the TL. As with most AH you choose what threads you incorporate, and the ambiguity of sources has enabled my rationalization of the thread presented. T
 
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