Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
I didn't discount land based airpower, though there again the US just curb stomped the Japanese in time, though it wasn't my focus so got lost in the shuffle. Thanks for pointing this out.
It must be said, early on even when the Japanese still had relative air dominance they preferred to fight their surface actions at night: It was their thing. They'd trained for that hard, had hand picked crewmen chosen for their eyesight for such actions, and these watchmen could actually outperform early radar! Later on as the Americans gained air superiority around the Solomons night fighting became necessity rather than preference and the USN learned some hard lessons. Later still, the Japanese discovered that newly improved radar sets coming into service in 1944 actually gave the US a massive advantage in a night fight. From then on the IJN stopped bothering with night fighting as their exclusive forte.
But early on, the Japanese are definitely amongst the masters of the art, radar or not.
As for the subs? We can all agree that at first, barring a few truly brilliant commanders the boats underperformed due to bad (timid, really, and to their credit, most commanders hated it) doctrine and shitty torpedoes. It took a few months, but the doctrine got quickly dropkicked and new, VERY aggressive commanders came in. Took MUCH longer to solve the torpedoes issue, and it shocks me to this day that the torpedo solution (for ALL the torpedoes: Sub, aerial, and shipborne) was achieved through an essentially unauthorized defacto out-of-garage effort ran off the books in Hawaii! And the solution one most local mechanics and engineers could jury-rig on site, so golden! Shocks in that that's what had to happen and that Admiral King, famous for both his temper and intolerance for bullshit, couldn't clean house Back East. But politics be politics....
Oh well, we did get a solid torpedo design out it that was used for decades postwar. That's good, right? (That's sarcasm)
I think that it was USN surface doctrine to look primarily for vertical masts protruding from the sea; silhouettes or smoke on the horizon; aircraft overhead. At least in the early stages of the Pacific War. Fishing boats in the troughs of waves not so much. That's on Ops.
What was atrocious were the rounds expended to sink the fishing boat. That's on Weps.
I suspect that IJN lookouts saw an honor and privilege to serve in that function. The US Seaman Deuce likely saw it as an inconvenience to be tolerated.
At the beginning of the Pacific War, the IJN Air doctrine was superior. The IJN surface doctrine was superior. The IJN subsurface doctrine was of honorable intent. But flat out wrong as implemented.
Then come the "Lessons Learned". I've wondered whether converting fifty year old O-5 & O-6 to Naval Aviators hindered in the growth of NAVAIR. I can see an advantage of a professionally developed senior leadership. Still, the 0-3 & 0-4 coming up were going to experience combat, reflect upon and share new ideas.
Sometimes the CAPT leaves standing orders. Sometimes the OOD needs change course to maneuver and maybe avoid obstacles. Just saying
.
Does anyone know who actually had the deck and conn on TEXAS at the time?
Butchpfd. ADM Hart preferred coastal submarines to fleet submarines. At least per ADM Low
Then come the "Lessons Learned". I've wondered whether converting fifty year old O-5 & O-6 to Naval Aviators hindered in the growth of NAVAIR. I can see an advantage of a professionally developed senior leadership. Still, the 0-3 & 0-4 coming up were going to experience combat, reflect upon and share new ideas.
Sometimes the CAPT leaves standing orders. Sometimes the OOD needs change course to maneuver and maybe avoid obstacles. Just saying
.Does anyone know who actually had the deck and conn on TEXAS at the time?
Butchpfd. ADM Hart preferred coastal submarines to fleet submarines. At least per ADM Low
At the beginning of the Pacific War, the IJN Air doctrine was superior. The IJN surface doctrine was superior. The IJN subsurface doctrine was of honorable intent. But flat out wrong as implemented.
Then come the "Lessons Learned". I've wondered whether converting fifty year old O-5 & O-6 to Naval Aviators hindered in the growth of NAVAIR. I can see an advantage of a professionally developed senior leadership. Still, the 0-3 & 0-4 coming up were going to experience combat, reflect upon and share new ideas.
Sometimes the CAPT leaves standing orders. Sometimes the OOD needs change course to maneuver and maybe avoid obstacles. Just saying
Does anyone know who actually had the deck and conn on TEXAS at the time?
Butchpfd. ADM Hart preferred coastal submarines to fleet submarines. At least per ADM Low
Yes, because he was tasked with operating in the Philippine and Chinese coastal areas, with depths of under 300 foot common. Fleet subs were only useful to the SE toward the Mandates, and SW into the Deepwater areas of the South China Sea.
IMO, what heart needed were more S - Boat sized subs, but with modern(@1940) design and equipment, but like the earliest fleet boats and the Narwhals, that could operate Mk X or Mk XIV.
Sadly most of the Mk Xs not lost at Cavite, were on the Canopus. Hart readily admitted one of his biggest mistakes, was not sending Canopus and Pigeon out with the rest of the Fleet Train, and loading every sailor he could on those ships.
MWI 41120618 Shuffling The Pack
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Saturday 06 December;
An hour before sundown, the Vildebeest bomber taxied to the aircraft pen, led by a hand-painted RAF blue Morris. There a small ground crew awaited it. It was the last of four aircraft of RAF 212 Sqn to be deployed here, They had flown in from Port Swettenham to be rebased here at Kuantan. The airfield was overcrowded, already hosting 12 Vildebeests of RAF 100 Sqn, 12 Hurricanes of RNZAF 486 Sqn, and 8 Hudsons of RAAF 8 Sqn, as well as these newly arrived four. Two Hudsons and four Hurricanes were parked close to the runway on standby. The rest were under cover: some in pens, others simply under netting amid the rubber trees that stood around parts of the airfield.
For the crews, both ground and air, it was just as bad. The crowding meant more were living in tents than in huts. Given the frequent rain showers, some very heavy, that was unpleasant to say the least. The airfield had telephone communications with AMES 518 COL, the radar station on a hill near town, hence the four Hurricanes at standby.
In Kelantan, both Kota Bharu and Gong Kedah airfields had been given a nearly full AA battery, with six 3-inch guns from 3 Indian HAA Regt. They had arrived here in early October, and were well established; each had a telephone line to the radar unit at Kota Bharu. The other two guns from each battery were based around Kota Bharu town. A further battery had been deployed around the strategic town of Kuala Krai, the important rail station connecting Kelantan to the rest of Malaya.
Kota Bharu airfield had all 12 of RAAF 1 Sqn’s Hudsons along with eight Hurricanes of RAAF 457 Sqn. 457's other four Hurricanes were at Gong Kedah, where RAF 36 Sqn’s 12 Vildebeests and the third flight of RAF 212 Sqn from Penang were also stationed (212's first flight being kept down in Singapore). Both airfields had been given aircraft pens located in woodland, to improve protection, but the work was incomplete. As in Kuantan, many aircraft were protected by camouflage netting only.
The airfields of Northern Malaya had been given some AA defences, although Park had not been happy about the removal of the two 40mm batteries of the 3rd LAA Regt HKSRA, which had provided a close AA defence. These had been withdrawn to provide support to RowForce. What was left was the 5th Indian HAA Regt, which had just become operational five days ago, its batteries covering the airfields at Alor Star, Sungei Patani, and Butterworth. But Park had also been warned that these too, were likely to be withdrawn, to provide AA cover over more strategically important positions.
His Squadrons were making their final deployments. RCAF 414 Sqn, with 16 Battles, all bomb loaded, flew up to Sungei Patani from their airfield at Ipoh, along with five Blenheims out of Taiping, with another three Blenheims flying up to Butterworth. The Hurricanes of RAAF 450 had moved north from Kluang, also into Butterworth, which was now dangerously crowded, as well as half the ground crew, the rest moving to Penang. Underlining the fragmentation of 5 RAAF Wing, RAAF 453 Squadron was remaining in Kahang, held back almost as a strategic reserve. Finally, RAF 134 Sqn had moved back to Kallang from Batu Pahat, to replace the loaned RNZAF 486 Sqn. Park had completed his dispositions; the RAF was ready.
For the Army, unit dispositions had been completed some time now, except for the Indian AA Regts. However, there was still plenty of work for the RAOC and RASC, with many FMSR trains still to be loaded or moved into sidings, road convoys yet to complete their journeys, and dumps to be fully stocked.
Back in Singapore Naval Base, the arrival of dawn found Force Z gone, but things were just as hectic. Rear Admiral Palliser’s offices were a hive of activity, in an effort to get further ships ready for sea duties. Numerous changes were being made to the orderly normal everyday routines. The dockyard had been hard at it since Phillips first arrived, firstly with Force Z, and now with the ships that were left, and some new arrivals.
An hour before sundown, the Vildebeest bomber taxied to the aircraft pen, led by a hand-painted RAF blue Morris. There a small ground crew awaited it. It was the last of four aircraft of RAF 212 Sqn to be deployed here, They had flown in from Port Swettenham to be rebased here at Kuantan. The airfield was overcrowded, already hosting 12 Vildebeests of RAF 100 Sqn, 12 Hurricanes of RNZAF 486 Sqn, and 8 Hudsons of RAAF 8 Sqn, as well as these newly arrived four. Two Hudsons and four Hurricanes were parked close to the runway on standby. The rest were under cover: some in pens, others simply under netting amid the rubber trees that stood around parts of the airfield.
For the crews, both ground and air, it was just as bad. The crowding meant more were living in tents than in huts. Given the frequent rain showers, some very heavy, that was unpleasant to say the least. The airfield had telephone communications with AMES 518 COL, the radar station on a hill near town, hence the four Hurricanes at standby.
In Kelantan, both Kota Bharu and Gong Kedah airfields had been given a nearly full AA battery, with six 3-inch guns from 3 Indian HAA Regt. They had arrived here in early October, and were well established; each had a telephone line to the radar unit at Kota Bharu. The other two guns from each battery were based around Kota Bharu town. A further battery had been deployed around the strategic town of Kuala Krai, the important rail station connecting Kelantan to the rest of Malaya.
Kota Bharu airfield had all 12 of RAAF 1 Sqn’s Hudsons along with eight Hurricanes of RAAF 457 Sqn. 457's other four Hurricanes were at Gong Kedah, where RAF 36 Sqn’s 12 Vildebeests and the third flight of RAF 212 Sqn from Penang were also stationed (212's first flight being kept down in Singapore). Both airfields had been given aircraft pens located in woodland, to improve protection, but the work was incomplete. As in Kuantan, many aircraft were protected by camouflage netting only.
The airfields of Northern Malaya had been given some AA defences, although Park had not been happy about the removal of the two 40mm batteries of the 3rd LAA Regt HKSRA, which had provided a close AA defence. These had been withdrawn to provide support to RowForce. What was left was the 5th Indian HAA Regt, which had just become operational five days ago, its batteries covering the airfields at Alor Star, Sungei Patani, and Butterworth. But Park had also been warned that these too, were likely to be withdrawn, to provide AA cover over more strategically important positions.
His Squadrons were making their final deployments. RCAF 414 Sqn, with 16 Battles, all bomb loaded, flew up to Sungei Patani from their airfield at Ipoh, along with five Blenheims out of Taiping, with another three Blenheims flying up to Butterworth. The Hurricanes of RAAF 450 had moved north from Kluang, also into Butterworth, which was now dangerously crowded, as well as half the ground crew, the rest moving to Penang. Underlining the fragmentation of 5 RAAF Wing, RAAF 453 Squadron was remaining in Kahang, held back almost as a strategic reserve. Finally, RAF 134 Sqn had moved back to Kallang from Batu Pahat, to replace the loaned RNZAF 486 Sqn. Park had completed his dispositions; the RAF was ready.
For the Army, unit dispositions had been completed some time now, except for the Indian AA Regts. However, there was still plenty of work for the RAOC and RASC, with many FMSR trains still to be loaded or moved into sidings, road convoys yet to complete their journeys, and dumps to be fully stocked.
Back in Singapore Naval Base, the arrival of dawn found Force Z gone, but things were just as hectic. Rear Admiral Palliser’s offices were a hive of activity, in an effort to get further ships ready for sea duties. Numerous changes were being made to the orderly normal everyday routines. The dockyard had been hard at it since Phillips first arrived, firstly with Force Z, and now with the ships that were left, and some new arrivals.
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Driftless
Donor
If the forward based Commonwealth aircraft can get into action, without much destruction on the ground, two beneficial possibilities come to mind: [1] damage to the japanese invasion fleet and [2] Japanese air commanders would be faced with potentially diluting their air power to meet Commonwealth air elements. Could that impact what gets thrown at the improved Force Z of this universe? Or, do the Japanese have more than ample air resources?
Also, even if the Japanese are able to pound those Kota Baru and nearby airfields, they'll need some repair work in turn before they can be used by the IJA
Also, even if the Japanese are able to pound those Kota Baru and nearby airfields, they'll need some repair work in turn before they can be used by the IJA
Out of curiosity, when you say 12 + 8, does that mean 12 active/crewed and 8 reserve or something?
Sekhmet_D
Kicked
IOTL between the damage from Japanese air raids, sabotage by retreating RAF personnel and booby traps left by SOE men, the British estimated that the Japanese would require at least three months to render Kuala Lumpur and Port Swettenham airfields operational after capturing them.
After attempts to clear the booby traps resulted in a number of Japanese casualties, the Japanese used British and Commonwealth POWs as forced labour to render the airfields operational.
Both airfields were up and running in three days.
It's normally IE + IR (Initial Equipment and Immediate Reserve). So 12+8 would mean 12 aircraft normally assigned to missions, with 8 spare.
That's aircraft not pilots/crews. In the UK during the Battle of Britain, the normal establishment for a fighter sqn was about 24 pilots for 16+4 aircraft, iirc*. I don't know if the ratios were the same for other sqn roles and locations, or for the FAA, but I assume it was similar, since generally British (and hence Empire/Commonwealth) doctrine was to have at least as many pilots/crews as aircraft, including reserves.
*I'm away from home so don't have my reference books to hand.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
and
Hi LoftonHenderson and FriendlyGhost, yes as FriendlyGhost says, its aircraft, not pilots, of which there would be a few more. These are Buffalo's that have been re-navalised with arrester hooks, inflatable dinghy's etc added, and there are only the 20 that have been converted, so when they've gone, that's it. The squadron has completed carrier operational training, but lacks a carrier. However, despite their technical training, they are quite green.
How were they "carrier-operationally trained" without a carrier? I'm wondering how a pilot might be considered so qualified if they've never actually taken off or landed on a carrier in gusty weather and rough seas...?
They trained up on Hermes I think before she went for refit. ref post #1276
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
I wonder how long the easier to remove items last when the lack of climb rate starts to tell. OTL they stripped guns, ammo load etc to give their clapped out engines a chance in an environment with worse early warning.
The Buffalo's the RAF had from what I remember had literally second hand engines and instead of 1200hp they had like 1,000hp. In hot and humid conditions this is a massive decrease in performance. Even with the loss of power issue the tactics used left the RAF in considerable danger due to it's own stupidity.
Up to date intelligence of the like aircraft to be seen had been gained by the Fying Tigers and both the RAF and USAAF got the information and ignored it. The Flying tigers said "DO NOT DOGFIGHT" and got ignored.
Racisim exists and is not based on any realistic metric of assesing people's ability to function. The Trope that the Japanese pilots flew monkey copied old aircraft and the pilots needed glasses to see. This was both ignorant in the extreme but colored the full conduct of numerous soldiers, sailors and airmen of just about every rank. The stupidity cost lives and made the Japanese invasion's much easier. NEVER underestimate an opponent.
Back in the early years of Japan's industrial revolution or Meiji restoration the facts supported copying of foriegn materials. The factories got copied and the products copied and this occurred until they caught up with the foriegn powers regarding technology. The Kongo class is a perfect example. Followingthe Kongo class the Japanese proceeded to build world class and world leading Battleships. THey learnt then invented. They did this with everything imaginable, And it is the smart way to do it.
Even through the 1930's aircraft designers got paid to work in Japan and that lead to some interesting snippets like the person who assisted the Zero project was formerly a Heinkel employee and ended up working at CAC during ww2. The Boomerang got his input as we;. The gentleman in question being Fred David an Austrian Jew.
Up to date intelligence of the like aircraft to be seen had been gained by the Fying Tigers and both the RAF and USAAF got the information and ignored it. The Flying tigers said "DO NOT DOGFIGHT" and got ignored.
Racisim exists and is not based on any realistic metric of assesing people's ability to function. The Trope that the Japanese pilots flew monkey copied old aircraft and the pilots needed glasses to see. This was both ignorant in the extreme but colored the full conduct of numerous soldiers, sailors and airmen of just about every rank. The stupidity cost lives and made the Japanese invasion's much easier. NEVER underestimate an opponent.
Back in the early years of Japan's industrial revolution or Meiji restoration the facts supported copying of foriegn materials. The factories got copied and the products copied and this occurred until they caught up with the foriegn powers regarding technology. The Kongo class is a perfect example. Followingthe Kongo class the Japanese proceeded to build world class and world leading Battleships. THey learnt then invented. They did this with everything imaginable, And it is the smart way to do it.
Even through the 1930's aircraft designers got paid to work in Japan and that lead to some interesting snippets like the person who assisted the Zero project was formerly a Heinkel employee and ended up working at CAC during ww2. The Boomerang got his input as we;. The gentleman in question being Fred David an Austrian Jew.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Reading the latest post, both the British and Japanese have a problem, too many aircraft and not enough fully developed airfields. The Japanese airfields lack the hard runways that the British have. And not having the experience that Park and numerous of his senior offices have from the Battle of France and Britain, do not fully appreciate the necessity of dispersal and harding their vital facilities. Fuel, ammunition and spares, should be stored in a minimum of two ideally three separate and reinforced sites, and all aircraft in protected revetments, dispersed around the airfield. It’s one thing to have read about this in papers, it’s totally different to have experienced this first hand, as Park and numerous officers and men under his command have. There can be little doubt that Park along with the majority of his staff, are not satisfied that their preparations are anywhere near enough, and that along with more and more modern aircraft, anti aircraft weapons, they need better facilities at all the airfields under their command. Park knows from experience that in addition to all the basic preparations, that there are others less obvious that need to be implemented. Each airfield needs two Fire Brigades, one to deal with aircraft, and the other for the facilities on the airfield, you also need a runway repair team, able to quickly repair the runway, with materials, equipment and personnel on site, plus its very helpful to have a bomb disposal team available. It will also be helpful given that everyone knows that the outbreak of war is a matter of days away, to institute a standard stand to, at dawn and dusk, just like an infantry unit. In Poland, France and the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe launched dawn strikes against airfields on day one of the conflict, and Park would be a fool not to expect the Japanese to do the same. Simply by having everyone awake and at their position before dawn, and were possible a flight of fighters in position at maximum altitude over the airfield, is going to make the Japanese job much harder.
The Japanese face the problem that they too have overcrowded airfields, with poor facilities, and no experience of being subjected to deadicated attacks by a functioning opponent. They have become used to basically being able to operate with very little opposition, from secure bases, that have little to no preparation for a counterattack. Nor do they have any experience of operating against a foe that has, admittedly primitive radar systems. Yes they at command level have heard about radar from their own scientists and their German allies, but just how far this information managed to get down the chain, or if they knew about the existence of the British network, or understood what it meant. They also have the problem of which policy to adopt in their initial attack, do they go with an all out attack on a limited number of British airfields, or do they try to attack all the British airfields at one and then same time. Either way unless they reserve aircraft for supporting attacks against other military targets, they stand a good chance of leaving their army without air cover on the outbreak of hostilities. Only being able to provide such support after their initial assault against the British airfields, and once the survivors have returned to their home base and refuelled and rearmed. The British however can launch a dusk attack against the Japanese airfields, were both the aircrews and ground crews are tiered out from a long day of intense operations. Followed up by a drawn attack, which should find the Japanese ground staff shattered by the previous days dusk attack and a night spent without sleep, as they attempted to deal with the results of the previous day’s operations and British assault. The first few days will quickly establish just how successful the Japanese are going to be in establishing dominance in the air, which if they don’t, given their position so far away from the homeland and reinforcements plus facilities for aircraft repair and maintenance, never a Japanese strong point IOTL.
If the British can launch a reasonable counter attack against the Japanese Army Airforce, along with the British Armies spoiling attacks just before the upcoming Japanese assault against Malay. There is a good chance that the Japanese never achieve the aerial dominance ITTL, that they achieved IOTL. And without that dominance, and the requirements of supporting the efforts of the Army in China, Burma, and the Philippines, the Army Airforce are going to find themselves very stretched. Unlike the Anglo Americans, who are at a particular low point, and are rapidly going to be producing aircraft as good as anything the Japanese have, and shortly far better than the best the Japanese have. Both nations have established extensive aircrew training systems, and have the space and resources necessary. The Japanese have a limited time to achieve their goals, and if they fail, they are only going to be going down hill in the future. Whereas the British provided them can get through the first six months, without losing their hold on Malaya or Singapore, are comfortably looking at being able to steadily reinforce their forces. And sustaining them until their are able to launch a counter offensive, and drive the Japanese out of Malaya, and subsequently Thailand and French Indo China too. Even if the Japanese enjoy the same success that they did IOTL, in the Philippines, that will serve to only stretch them further. And reduce the resources available to them in Malaysia, and without gaining possession of the oilfields in the DEI, they will be rapidly running out of oil. While the British with access to the oilfields and refineries in Burma and Iraq, will have a vitally unlimited supply of petroleum products.
RR.
The Japanese face the problem that they too have overcrowded airfields, with poor facilities, and no experience of being subjected to deadicated attacks by a functioning opponent. They have become used to basically being able to operate with very little opposition, from secure bases, that have little to no preparation for a counterattack. Nor do they have any experience of operating against a foe that has, admittedly primitive radar systems. Yes they at command level have heard about radar from their own scientists and their German allies, but just how far this information managed to get down the chain, or if they knew about the existence of the British network, or understood what it meant. They also have the problem of which policy to adopt in their initial attack, do they go with an all out attack on a limited number of British airfields, or do they try to attack all the British airfields at one and then same time. Either way unless they reserve aircraft for supporting attacks against other military targets, they stand a good chance of leaving their army without air cover on the outbreak of hostilities. Only being able to provide such support after their initial assault against the British airfields, and once the survivors have returned to their home base and refuelled and rearmed. The British however can launch a dusk attack against the Japanese airfields, were both the aircrews and ground crews are tiered out from a long day of intense operations. Followed up by a drawn attack, which should find the Japanese ground staff shattered by the previous days dusk attack and a night spent without sleep, as they attempted to deal with the results of the previous day’s operations and British assault. The first few days will quickly establish just how successful the Japanese are going to be in establishing dominance in the air, which if they don’t, given their position so far away from the homeland and reinforcements plus facilities for aircraft repair and maintenance, never a Japanese strong point IOTL.
If the British can launch a reasonable counter attack against the Japanese Army Airforce, along with the British Armies spoiling attacks just before the upcoming Japanese assault against Malay. There is a good chance that the Japanese never achieve the aerial dominance ITTL, that they achieved IOTL. And without that dominance, and the requirements of supporting the efforts of the Army in China, Burma, and the Philippines, the Army Airforce are going to find themselves very stretched. Unlike the Anglo Americans, who are at a particular low point, and are rapidly going to be producing aircraft as good as anything the Japanese have, and shortly far better than the best the Japanese have. Both nations have established extensive aircrew training systems, and have the space and resources necessary. The Japanese have a limited time to achieve their goals, and if they fail, they are only going to be going down hill in the future. Whereas the British provided them can get through the first six months, without losing their hold on Malaya or Singapore, are comfortably looking at being able to steadily reinforce their forces. And sustaining them until their are able to launch a counter offensive, and drive the Japanese out of Malaya, and subsequently Thailand and French Indo China too. Even if the Japanese enjoy the same success that they did IOTL, in the Philippines, that will serve to only stretch them further. And reduce the resources available to them in Malaysia, and without gaining possession of the oilfields in the DEI, they will be rapidly running out of oil. While the British with access to the oilfields and refineries in Burma and Iraq, will have a vitally unlimited supply of petroleum products.
RR.