Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

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26 January 1942. Camp Borden, Ontario, Canada.

The General Order had become effective, and all around the camp the various officers were trying to figure out how to go about putting it into practice.

4th Canadian Infantry Division had been established in May 1940. The three Infantry Brigades had slowly taken shape, and being last in line for equipment, had slowly built themselves up during 1941. General Order 132/42 had reorganised and renamed the Division as the 4th Canadian Armoured Division.

Following the normal organisation for an Armoured Division, there would be an armoured car regiment, two armoured Brigades (each of three Regiments), and a Support group. The Support Group would still have the odd mixture of a field regiment of artillery, along with an anti-tank regiment, a light anti-aircraft regiment and one battalion of infantry.

There was already talk about following the model of British Armoured Divisions in North Africa, who had moved away from the Support Group model. That kind of Division would have its own Artillery (three field regiments) and with two Armoured Brigades and would have an Infantry Brigade (Motor) attached.

At this point however Ottawa were following the same model as 5th Canadian Armoured Division. Alongside the formation of the Armoured Division the 11th Infantry Brigade, would become the basis for 2nd Army Tank Brigade taking with it 26th Army Tank Battalion (The Grey and Simcoe Foresters) and the 20th Army Tank Battalion (16th/22nd Saskatchewan Horse). These would be joined in due course by the 23rd Army Tank Battalion (The Halifax Rifles).

The conversion to an Armoured Division meant that 10th Infantry Brigade was now to be known as 3rd Armoured Brigade, and the three regiments (British Columbia Regiment, The Elgin Regiment and the South Alberta Regiment) would become 28th, 25th and 29th Armoured Regiments, but keeping their traditional names in brackets. The Lake Superior Regiment would be Motorised and stay part of the 3rd Armoured Brigade.

12th Infantry Brigade was now known as 4th Armoured Brigade, and again the three regiments were now called 21st (The Governor General’s Foot Guards) 22nd (The Canadian Grenadier Guards) and 27th Armoured Regiments (The Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment). The Machine Gun Battalion (The Princess Louise Fusiliers) would become the Motor battalion for 4th Armoured Brigade.

The 18th (Manitoba) Reconnaissance Battalion would become the 18th (Manitoba) Armoured Car Regiment, and the Irish Regiment of Canada would be the motorised battalion in the Support Group.

On paper the creation of an Armoured Division and an Army Tank Brigade required 340 Cruiser and 178 Infantry tanks as the minimum requirement. Production of the Valiant IA* (2-pdr, diesel engine) continued at Canadian Pacific Railway, but would soon be moving to the IIA* as 6-pdr production in Canada progressed. The new CAC1 (Canadian/Australian Cruiser) known as the Ram in Canada was now being built by Montreal Locomotive Works. This tank’s gun was the slimmed down version of the 25pdr gun developed in Australia, with 3-inchs of frontal armour and 2-inches on the side, the 28.5 ton tank was powered by the Cummings diesel engine, and ran on Hotchkiss style suspension.

Since 5th Canadian Armoured Division in England were using the Valiant IA* it had been decided that the 4th Canadian Armoured Division would use the upgraded Valiant IIA*, while the Tank Brigade would use the Ram which was now in full production. Having the 25-pdr as its main armament would mean that its role of supporting infantry would have a good HE punch against enemy fortifications. Its armour wasn’t too much different from the Matilda II Infantry tank, so it was believed it could function effectively in that infantry support role.

It would take months to retrain the men of 4th Canadian Armoured Division from infantry to armoured warfare. General Crerar, before he left his role as Chief of the General Staff, had estimated that the Division and Tank Brigade might be able to be equipped and shipped to the UK before the end of 1942, then, hopefully, be fully trained and operational by mid-1943.

 

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27 January 1942. Fort Canning, Singapore.

The tension in the ‘war room’ had been growing over the hours waiting for updates from the front. With General Auchinleck looking on, and doing his very best not to interfere, Lieutenant-General Percival’s Head of Intelligence was briefing the officers present on the current situation.

The battle of Ipoh had raged for nearly a week, Lt-Gen Heath’s III Indian Corps had managed to hold their positions for a solid four days before the river was finally breached. The 11th Indian Division had made good their withdrawal to the second line and, eventually, the third defensive position at Kampar Hill. All that time, the Japanese offensive had been bloodied and weakened. In doing so it had cost the 11th Indian Division to be seriously weakened, with Major-General Murray-Lyon having to be hospitalised from exhaustion. 9th Indian Division on the east coast had had a similar fight on its hand, but had retrained cohesion as it withdrew all the way back to Kuantan.

The Australian Major-General Cecil Callaghan’s 8 Division, with the Divisional Cavalry’s Stuart tanks at the forefront, had begun the counterattack the previous day. Having concentrated at Bidor, the Australians had advanced under the cover of darkness to Banja. 2/18 Battalion’s A and B Companies forced a crossing of the river, which was extended by the rest of the Battalion. The engineers managed to get a pontoon bridge over the river under the cover of the Division’s artillery. Once the bridge and a ferry were operational, the rest of 22nd Brigade crossed over, the Stuart tanks being ferried over, while the rest of Brigade’s vehicles and men used the pontoon bridge.

After 22nd Brigade had crossed, the 27th Brigade moved up to follow them across the river. Lieutenant-General Mackay’s plan called on Callaghan’s men to advance as rapidly as possible towards Taiping. If they could be a blocking force to prevent any Japanese withdrawing through the town, it would effectively create a Japanese pocket around Ipoh to Kuala Kangsar. 16th Brigade, the third Brigade in 8 Division would follow on the heels of 27th Brigade.

While the Australians were attempting their flanking move, the British 18th Division, with 7th Bn RTR supporting them, had begun passing through the 11th Indian Division to begin pushing the Japanese back. Morshead’s 9 Australian Division was in reserve, but the hope was that they would be able to pass through 8 Division and move up towards Penang while the 8th and 18th Divisions destroyed the main Japanese force.

Auchinleck was also happy to hear reports coming from Burma that Lieutenant-General Slim’s offensive had also got underway, albeit with the limited objective to regaining Tavoy and Victoria Point airfields and hopefully being able to cut the railway from Bangkok south. Slim’s force was partially coming by sea, some of the Landing Ship Infantry (HMS Queen Emma and Glengyle) and A Lighters that had brought reinforcements from Basra were carrying the units tasked with capturing the airfield.

There was an all out effort by the RAF, and the American Volunteer Group over the south of Burma and Thailand to support this offensive. Likewise over the counter-attack around Ipoh had the full support of both the bomber and fighter squadrons of the RAF and RAAF. Flying Tomahawks and Hurricanes, there was a vast improvement in the British fighters’ effectiveness against the Japanese. Some of the Tomahawk squadrons were experimenting with close air support missions, the pilots being taught by the veterans from North Africa.

Fighting the Japanese to a standstill had been a great achievement by Percival’s men in Malaya. Unfortunately, Japanese progress in other places was being slowed but not yet stopped. Much of the British and Indian forces in North Borneo were now either moved or defeated. Around Balikpapan the surviving Japanese were having to be winkled out at some cost to the KNIL and Indian troops. The loss of some of their supply ships to Dutch and British submarines was presumed to be causing havoc to the Japanese timetable.

The Australians at Rabaul had given the Japanese a very bloody nose and had, as planned, pulled back into the interior of New Britain. Auchinleck was currently working out a strategy for pulling them out before their supplies dwindled completely.

On the Celebes, the Japanese landing at Kendari was being resisted by the Dutch and US troops, it wouldn’t surprising to find that the Japanese would attempt to reinforce this attack, and the USN and KM (Koninklijke Marine) had deployed submarines to try to intercept this.

The situation for the Americans on Bataan seemed bleak, they seemed to keep pulling back to other defensive lines, only to be pushed back again and again. Douglas MacArthur had been quite forthright about what support he wasn’t getting, expecting the Royal Navy and KM to provide aid in addition to that supplied by the USN Asiatic Fleet. Admiral Phillips’ first response had been censored, and a second, less negative, message had been sent saying that he would do what he could, when he had anything available. The fast minelayer HMS Abdiel was being considered for a run to Corregidor, but Phillips wanted some kind of American promise of aerial cover while approaching and leaving, and that while docked at night the unloading of ammunition and medical supplies, and the loading of personnel to be evacuated, could be done in the course of one night.

Reports of fresh Japanese troops arriving by sea towards Patani had been received, but they were too far north for the RAF’s bombers and torpedo bombers to intercept. It wasn’t clear just how large the reinforcement had been, but the sighting by an American submarine suggested that it was only a smallish convoy. The Captain of the submarine had also attempted to torpedo the convoy but reported that his torpedoes had either missed or failed to detonate. This was an increasingly common report coming from the USN. The Dutch and British submarines hadn’t reported any such difficulty.

Force Z, after its successful battle of Makassar Strait, had returned to the Indian Ocean heading to Ceylon. HMS Ark Royal would take onboard the new Lend-Lease Martlet IIs (G-36Bs with folding wings), and it would need a week or two of training to make sure the pilots were qualified for deck landings in the new type. Meanwhile HMS Prince of Wales and escorts were supporting the landings at Victoria Point.

Auchinleck was beginning to think that the situation for his ABDA command was beginning to stabilise. He was aware that the Japanese still had the initiative, and that they were lot better than pre-war predictions. He was also conscious that the British Empire was fully committed to the fight, and that the Far East was getting its fair share of the military resources. The sleeping giant of America was also awakening and therefore the Japanese had already lost, they just didn't know it yet.

General Auchinleck also thanked his lucky stars that the initial Japanese attacks at Jitra and the Ledge had been blunted. If they had managed to knock 11th Indian Division off-kilter at the beginning of the campaign the Indian troops might never have recovered. Likewise with 9th Indian Division, if they had suffered the quick loss of Kota Bharu their morale would probably have led to failure to get a grip at all. Instead, both Divisions had proven worthy of their salt, though at a high cost. With the offensive now was in the hands of fresh and well-trained Divisions, and if he was gambling man, he’d put money on the Australian 9 Division winning the race to Bangkok.

 

[allanpcameron]

28 January 1942. Valetta, Malta.

The conclusion to the fighting in North Africa had very positive side-effects for the people of Malta. Without any need to run convoys to Tripoli, the Italian and German air forces had less pressing reasons to suppress the British bases on Malta. The Luftwaffe had focused for awhile on Crete, and the Regia Aeronautica had flown a number of missions, primarily reconnaissance, over Malta. The fighting in Russia was a greater concern in Berlin and some Ju 88 squadrons were withdrawn and sent to the fighting in the Crimea.

For the RAF, as well as the civilian population, this was an enormous relief. Squadrons which had been sorely depleted had time to rest and recuperate. With ships able to travel in relative safety from Alexandria, the island’s supply needs were being replenished and even expanded. Squadrons equipped with Wellington and Beaufort bombers, and others with Hudsons and Martin Marylands, flying search and reconnaissance missions, were building up their strength to take the fight to the Italians, or French, whichever came first.

For the infantry defenders of the island, there was an easing of the threat of invasion. That didn’t equate to their lives getting any easier, but thoughts began to turn towards offensive action. 1st Independent Squadron RTR in Malta Command had begun with 17 Matilda II and a single Vickers Mark VIC tank. Spare parts for the tanks were fairly low down the list of priorities for supply runs, so five Matilda IIs had ended up being stripped to keep the other dozen running. The Light Tank had long since been un-serviceable and its guns had been reassigned to other units.

The use of some of the tanks as bulldozers and other non-combat roles had been much appreciated at the time, and the RAF bases, the main beneficiaries of this, had been extended and improved with their help. Now that the threat level was reduced, Major Raymond Drury, Officer Commanding the Squadron, wanted to concentrate on training with the infantry.

The tanks had regularly trained with the various British Infantry Battalions acting both as aggressors and defenders. Drury had kept two troops of Infantry Tanks as the main counter-attack force should an invasion happen. The experience meant that both the Infantry and the Tankies were well used to cooperation. The idea that the garrison might have to think about moving over the offensive was something that nobody had given very much thought to.

Drury had put in a request that his force might receive something in future convoys to get his fighting force up to full strength. The Matilda IIs would certainly need full overhauls, and the arrival of more tanks in Egypt in the latest Winston Special had given him some hope of that happening.

 

[allanpcameron]

29 January 1942. Victoria Point, Burma.

14th/20th King's Hussars were in the third phase of mechanisation of the Cavalry Regiments, meaning they had had their final exercise as a mounted unit in Secunderabad in 1938. Like all the other Cavalry Regiments the transition was a mixed experience. As one of the few British Cavalry Regiments in India the process was slower than for most.

The first three Light Tanks had arrived in 1939 just after the start of the war, and it was only when the 17/21 Lancers were recalled back to Britain that the Hussars got their eclectic mix of Mark II and VI Light tanks, Carden-Loyd Carriers and a selection of various wheeled vehicles.

Once they had been mobilised in May 1941 they had been at the forefront of enabling the Indian Cavalry Regiments from 3rd Calvary Brigade (4th Duke of Cambridge's Own Hodson's Horse and 13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers) to catch up with them in mechanised warfare knowledge and training in the new 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade. Eventually the three Regiments went to Iraq and Iran where they took on more cast off tanks from other British units. The 14th/20th Hussars had come off best as they had received the M3 Stuart tanks previously owned by the Household Cavalry Regiment.

Having no sooner disembarked at Rangoon the Regiment had been chosen to support the offensive to retake the Tavoy and Victoria Point airfields on the southern tip of Burma. Two of the Landing Craft Tank(1) that had carried the tanks from Basra all the way to Rangoon would now be part of a mini-invasion force. In addition to the three LCTs each carrying 6 Stuart tanks, HMS Glengyle and Queen Emma also carried 3 Landing Craft Mechanised each which carried one Stuart tank. After a series of exercises to see if the Hussars could master the art of driving off a Landing Craft onto to a beach to support the infantry, which they did after a fashion, they had set sail.

The six crews on board the two Landing Ship Infantry had much easier ride than the twelve on the LCTs. HMS Queen Emma with LCT 106 would land in the vicinity of Tavoy, while HMS Glengyle carried on to Victoria Point in the company of LCT 107. HMS Prince of Wales, two cruisers and four destroyers also split between the two destinations to provide naval gunfire support and protection from enemy action. Aerial cover was provided at Tavoy by Tomahawks and the more distant Point Victoria by Beaufighters.

The operation to recapture Tavoy also included an overland movement from Moulmein, in which the rest of the Hussars, along with elements of 28th East African Brigade had set off a few days previously. Guided by Tulip Force their arrival was set to coincide that of the seaborne element, to approach the objective from two directions, hopefully surprising and overwhelming what seemed from reconnaissance to be a small garrison of Japanese and Thai troops.

Victoria Point, being almost 300 miles further south, was a different kettle of fish. A small band from Tulip Force had infiltrated the area and reported that the airfield was both abandoned and undefended. The commanding officer of the 1/4th Bombay Grenadiers Battalion sailing on HMS Glengyle was less than trusting of this information and had prepared his men, with the two troops of the Hussars’ tanks, to expect a fight when they arrived at their destination.

The Grenadiers, like the Hussars, had taken part in the dress rehearsal exercises, their first taste of amphibious warfare. The last exercise had gone well enough that it got the green light to proceed. A small cadre of Commandoes thought that, unless they faced a dug-in and determined enemy on the beach, they would do fine. The importance of preparing the beach for the landings would fall on the Royal Navy ships, the 14-inch guns of the battleship had impressed the Grenadiers no end when they had watched as the guns had been exercised on the way.

The Hussars and Grenadiers had gotten used to working together in Iraq, and while the officers were happy to converse in English, some of more junior tank commanders worried about communications between themselves and the junior officers and NCOs of the men from Bombay. Many of the Other Ranks in the Hussars hailed from Lancashire and while they’d been in India since before the war, they reckoned there was enough joint training to get by.

Just before dawn two seaplanes from the Cruiser and Battleship and taken off to provide gunfire corrections. As soon as there was enough light to correct shot, the ten 14-inch guns spoke together after an initial ranging round had been fired. The Grenadiers and Hussars didn’t have the leisure to watch. They were too busy climbing down into the LCMs and LCAs and getting themselves ready for a beach assault. The 6-inch gun and 4-inch guns of the cruiser and destroyers joined in the bombardment, along with the 5.5-inch guns of the battleship’s secondary armament.

Under the cover this shore bombardment, the LCAs and LCMs lined up on the beach chosen for this assault. There were unexpected problems with the surf as they closed with the beach and one of the LCAs was capsized causing the only casualties of the day. Once the initial wave of two Companies and the three tanks managed to clear the beach, they began heading for the airfield as planned. HMS Glengyle carried 24 LCAs, each capable of carrying a platoon of troops. The problem was the crew of HMS Glengyle had to swing out on luffing davits the deck stored LCAs after those carried on the gravity davits had launched. The Commanding officer had wanted his Battalion to attack in a single wave, but had been advised that it would be best to have the first wave clear the beach if possible, as the LCMs would need to return to the ship to load up the motor transport, especially the carriers, that would need to carry forward ammunition and supplies.

By mid-afternoon all the tanks and men were ashore and finding that Tulip Force’s intelligence had been mostly correct. There was a platoon of Thai soldiers in the vicinity of the airfield who surrendered immediately on sighting the lead tank and the Indian troops following. The violence of the Naval gunnery had been more than enough to convince the Thais that there was nothing hereabouts worth dying for.

Two the Bombay Grenadiers Companies, with a troop of three tanks moved forward from the airfield to secure the town and wharves that would be needed to bring in supplies. Once more a small detachment of Thai soldiers were quick to surrender, but there were questions over the allegiance of the Burmese Police, who were taken into custody until that question could be answered satisfactorily. The final contingent off HMS Glengyle was a team of Engineers and RAF men who were tasked with examining the airfield and set about the task of getting it operational as quickly as possible.

In the late afternoon the first Japanese presence was noted when an aircraft was sighted. It had long enough to report what it had seen, by this time HMS Prince of Wales, the cruiser and one of the destroyers had withdrawn well over the horizon. HMS Glengyle and the other destroyer would have been the only ships noted. The expectation was that if the Japanese would try to bomb the ships it would mostly likely happen the next morning. Whether the RAF’s Beaufighters would be there to cover them was unclear, so the senior naval officer ordered the ships to set out to sea, with the problem of sailing with much of the Grenadiers stores and equipment still waiting to be unloaded.

The Indian troops had carried the usual basic pack with them and so would probably be fine for about 24 hours, unless they got into a serious fight. The Navy promised that they would be back the next day. There were plenty of Indian and Chinese people who were more than happy to welcome their liberators, though among some of the Burmans there was less of a feeling of being liberated. The Thai troops, on being treated well as POWs, were more than happy to provide the intelligence officers with details of the surrounding area. On asking about Thailand itself, they were less inclined to provide information.

The airfield had been put out of action before it was abandoned. The runway was cratered, all the buildings and stores had been burnt. For the RAF men who examined it, they believed that with enough men and equipment, it would be safe for landing in about a week, but they would need a ship with stores to arrive to get it back in operation, even just as a brief stopover for aircraft ferrying from Rangoon to Singapore.

 

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30 January 1942. Balikpapan, Borneo.

The Ito Detachment (1st Kure Special Landing Force, 228th Infantry Regiment with various support units ~5300 men) had been due to invade the island of Ambon. There were two problems. The first was that intelligence that Ambon was as well protected as Rabaul had been, meant that the Japanese force probably wasn’t strong enough to capture the island, at least not without severe problems. The losses taken by the South Seas Detachment at Rabaul had already put on hold that part of the operation.

The fact that Balikpapan on Borneo was still in the hands of the Dutch and British was a very sore point between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army. The loss of so many ships in the Makassar Strait, with the resultant losses for the invasion force, had the Army throwing accusations at the Navy for not protecting their men satisfactorily. The Navy, still reeling from the losses, burned with shame at an obvious failure of theirs being pointed out so brazenly. Vice-Admiral Kondo, commanding the Distant Cover Group (Battleships Kongo & Haruna, aircraft carriers Hiryu & Soryu, three cruisers, eight destroyers) had been too distant to intervene when the battle had broken out. The British and Dutch ships had hit the transports and their close escort hard, then withdrawn before Kondo’s fleet could react in a timely manner.

The loss of much of the Sakaguchi Detachment in that failure had meant that to regain the initiative and take Balikpapan, the Ito Detachment was off the coast of Borneo ready to try again. Along with the close escort of one Cruiser, fifteen destroyers, a variety of patrol boats and sub-chasers, protecting the eleven transports, the Distant Cover Force had sailed south from the Celebes Sea into the Makassar Strait, much closer to the invasion fleet than they had been previously.

With the increased air reconnaissance being done by the Dutch and Australians, the Japanese fleet had been spotted and tailed while the Dutch, British and Americans scrambled to get as many submarines into position to attrite the Japanese navy as possible.

In the event six submarines managed to get into shooting positions before the invasion took place. The four Dutch boats claimed five ships sunk between them, the two T Class RN submarines claimed another three, and damage to another two. The USN submarines reported two ships sunk, but again problems with torpedoes. The USAAF put together a B17 strike but was unable to claim any hits on the ships, two bombers were lost to Japanese naval fighters from the carriers. Attempts by the Dutch Naval Aviation, Air Force and the RAAF to interfere was slightly more successful, a few ships were damaged, but at a high cost to the attacking crews and aircraft.

After the fairly simple task of mopping up the Japanese who managed to get ashore, the Dutch and Indian troops were heartened by their success. An effort to reinforce the garrison was made on 26 and 27 January. The decision to withdraw the two Indian Battalions from Pontianak had led to the conclusion that the chances of holding the remaining parts of north Borneo was impossible. A couple of Dutch ships had picked up the remaining European civilians from Pontianak and the majority of the Dutch troops (a few stayed behind with radios to attempt to keep an eye of what the Japanese were doing). The civilians were taken to Java, and the troops dropped off at Balikpapan along with a several tons of supplies.

The main difference between the first and second invasion attempt was the presence of both land and carrier based Japanese bombers and fighters, and much better weather for them to operate. The inability of the Australian Brigade Group at Rabaul to beat off the Japanese attack had been put down to the incessant presence of Japanese aircraft. Although the AA groups had taken a heavy toll of the Japanese aircraft initially, they soon were overwhelmed. After that, the Australian ability to move during daylight was severely hampered, and their fixed positions were targeted from both sea and air. The same now happened to the garrison at Balikpapan.

The main surviving Dutch fighters and the newly arrived American squadrons based on Java were incapable of providing aircover for the garrison. With complete control of the air the Japanese were able to form a beachhead and then move out towards the town and airfield. Much of burning oil infrastructure which had hampered the Japanese previously was now burnt out and the Dutch and Indian troops put up a stiff resistance for as long as they could. Their orders were to fight but maintain their strength as far as possible. Each night, when the aircraft weren’t overhead, the Dutch and Indian troops withdrew to previously prepared positions. As the Japanese logistical system used the night to resupply the forward positions, they were unable to pursue the garrison closely, and found themselves the next day embroiled in another holding action.

The basic plan for the garrison was to hold the Japanese as long as possible, then to withdraw into the interior and make their way south towards Banjarmasin where it was hoped that the troops would be able to be evacuated. By the middle of February, the whole island of Borneo was in the hands of the Japanese, but at a terrible cost. It took a great deal of courage and skill to bring about half of the garrison off the island in the face of Japanese opposition. Over the next few months every now and then a few more troops would make it to Java, with fishing boats, and occasionally submarines, being used to bring them to safety.

The ABDA submarine fleet were still very active and shipping losses were becoming an increasing worry for the Imperial Japanese Navy. What surprised them most of all was that there seemed to be concentration on sinking the transport ships rather than the warships, something that was the opposite way of thinking to the Japanese submarine Captains that were active in the area.

 

[allanpcameron]

31 January 1942. Singapore.

Once more all the stops had been pulled out to protect the incoming ships that had sailed from Liverpool and Glasgow in early December. The second DM (Durban-Malaya) convoy didn’t have as many troops as the one that brought 18th Division, just a large number of men as a replacement pool. It was the arrival of 4th Bn RTR with 58 Matilda Mark II infantry tanks, along with battle replacements (tanks and men) for 7th and 11th Bn RTR that had been highly anticipated and welcomed.

While the 7th Bn RTR was in action against the Japanese in the II Australian Corps counterattack, 11th Bn RTR had been gutted in the fighting over the previous two months. All of the battle replacements would just about bring 11th Bn RTR back up to something like full strength. It was too early to know what kind of state 7th Bn RTR would be at the end of the counterattack. Michael Hedderwick, until recently CO of 11th Bn RTR, had been promoted to Brigadier, becoming CO of the Malaya Tank Brigade. He was keen on using all of the replacements to bring 11th Bn RTR back up to strength, allowing 4th and 11th Battalions to work together to acclimatise and prepare for jungle warfare. There were enough veterans from 11th Battalion to share their experience with the new arrivals, preparing them for what they were to face.

As it had been with the arrival of 7th Bn RTR, so it was with the new arrivals: one in three tanks being fitted with the 3-inch Close Support weapon. The request for more of these guns so they could be retrofitted to the older surviving gun tanks had also been fulfilled. It would take days for the tanks to be unloaded, then moved up to the RTR depot near Johore. The process of stripping the tanks of the protection from the weather at sea would then be followed by repairing any defects and getting them ready for training and action. While the work on the tanks continued, the men would be brought back to full fitness and extensively trained in what to expect in their new posting. 7th Bn RTR had had almost two months preparation before going into action, the race was on for 4th and 11th Battalions to be ready to join them.

 

[allanpcameron]

1 February 1942. Ipoh, Malaya.

Major Tom Craig didn’t know it, but his tank at Arras had come within inches of killing Erwin Rommel, and had killed his aide. As a Lieutenant in D Company 7th Bn RTR, Craig’s leadership had won him a DSO and rapid promotion, returning from other RTR units to command the same D Company. The situation approaching Ipoh was a different proposition to that at Arras.

Firstly his Company was supporting 53rd Infantry Brigade, and unlike the Durham Light Infantry at Arras, his tanks and the men of 5th & 6th Bns Norfolk Regiment and 2nd Bn Cambridgeshire Regiment, had had time to practice tank and infantry cooperation. All three infantry Battalions were fresh, and the new telephone link from the rear of the tank to the turret allowed communication between tanks and infantry. Craig himself was in a command tank, with a radio set tuned to his Company and 7th Bn RTR HQ, and another radio linked to the 53rd Infantry Brigade HQ, and the Royal Artillery Regiment supporting the attack.

Secondly, unlike Arras, this was a prepared attack against a dug in enemy. The encounter battle at Arras had been confusing and his tanks were isolated, ultimately working alone. D Company had taken the heaviest casualties of that day in Arras, as Rommel had organised artillery batteries to engage the tanks directly. Here, the Royal Artillery Forward Observation Post Officer was riding in the other command tank, usually Craig’s second-in-command’s tank. The extra space for the radios meant that the loader for the 2-pdr had been deleted, and the point of the command tanks was to command, its guns only really for self-defence. This wasn’t a battle with the tanks working alone, this was a battle that combined infantry, artillery and armour together to beat the enemy.

Thirdly, the Japanese were proving to be a very different type of enemy from the Germans. Even the SS troops at Arras had known when to give up and run. Not so, the Japanese. ‘Fanatical’ seemed the best description for them. The few Japanese who’d been captured, usually the wounded, were in a poor state physically. The Imperial Japanese Army didn’t seem to have anything like the same logistical support that the British Army expected. There seemed to be a particular problem with food, as both the living and the dead seemed undernourished.

Fighting to the last man and last bullet didn’t seem enough for the Japanese soldiers. Even out of ammunition they would charge the British tanks and men with bayonets, the officers with swords. It wasn’t standard practice, but the experience of 11th Bn RTR had taught that each tank should have half a section of infantry (four men) assigned to it. For all the lack of food the Japanese had, they seemed to have plenty of entrenching tools. They tended to have dug pretty deep dug outs or foxholes, and camouflaged the top. From the first day of the battle a couple of men on the back of each tank were carrying extra hand grenades. When the tank went over foxhole, the men would drop two grenades into the hole. Alternatively, the tank would grind itself down over the mouth of the foxhole to crush and bury its inhabitants. At first no one had really believed what the old hands in 11th Battalion had said. Then on the first day of the fighting a couple of tanks were disabled by Japanese troops appearing from behind with tins of petrol which they poured over the rear of the tank and set it on fire. Once this had been seen, the practice of each tank having its own half section had been taken up in earnest.

As well as the two grenadiers, at least one of the four infantry was armed with a Sten or Thompson submachine gun. Keeping the desperate Japanese troops off the tank was often a close-range exchange for which the submachine gun was the best weapon. Fourthly the Bren Gun on a mount meant originally for AA work, was manned and used primarily when the tank’s own Besa MG was being reloaded or serviced in some way.

The other lesson from 11th Bn RTR’s experience was also being followed was for each troop of three tanks to work together. As a last resort, having another tank able to use its machine gun or Bren to clear the enemy off a tank that was being overrun, was necessary. The fact that one of three tanks in the troop was armed with the Close Support gun meant that this was the one that needed the most protection. The HE projectile gave it the ability to give direct fire support to the infantry was made it central to the troops’ mission.

Craig’s radio tuned to his Squadron net warned him that a particularly stubborn Japanese position was holding up progress. The RA forward observation post was already calling down a bombardment on the map position. Looking at his map, Craig contacted another troop commander and ordered him to prepare to flank the Japanese position. The log and soil bunkers thrown together by the Japanese troops weren't too much of a struggle for the Close Support tanks to demolish. The weight of shot of the 3-inch gun was just under 14 pounds, and it didn’t take too many rounds before the bunker was silenced.

Because of the Japanese use of petrol to attack tanks, thought had been given to fighting fire with fire. Craig wasn’t aware of it, but some kind of flame-throwing tank was being tested under the watchful eye of Major General Percy Hobart. The way the Japanese defended was infuriating to the British soldiers. Fighting to the death, not surrendering seemed to them somehow inhuman. Often British casualties happened at the very end of a contact, with suicidal Japanese efforts. The idea of burning the enemy out was tempting, especially from within the protective armour of a tank, but the range would need to be great enough, probably over 100 yards to be really effective.

It was the 2nd Bn Cambridgeshire Regiment which were being held up, and requesting more support. The Artillery bombardment was brief and fairly accurate, and with six tanks pouring fire onto the Japanese position, the ‘Fen Tigers’ were able to make progress. It was a gruelling process, and it would have to repeated time and time again, but it was progress.

 

[allanpcameron]

2 February 1942. Taiping, Malaya.

Lt-Col Denzil MacArthur-Onslow held a brief Officers Call with the Squadron Commanders of 8 Division’s Cavalry Regiment. (Major John Abbott (2 i/c, OC HQ Squadron), Major Lindsay Miell (OC A Squadron), Major John Holden (OC C Squadron), Captain Tom Mills (OC B Squadron)).

These had been together during the fighting in North Africa (the capture of Bardia and Tobruk among their exploits), now as 8 Division’s cavalry instead of 6 Division, they were again at the forefront of the action. Working from the crossing over the Perak River, the cavalry had been at the forefront with 22 Brigade. Each squadron consisted of a Squadron HQ and three Troops, each made up of four Stuart Light tanks. The fourth Troop in each Squadron was made up of universal carriers, often equipped with Browning machine guns taken from the extra that the tanks had come equipped with.

MacArthur-Onslow listened as each of the Squadron commanders related their current state and position. Each of the squadrons had taken a few casualties, especially supporting the infantry as they took control of Taiping. A few tanks had also been left behind on the route with breakdowns. The complexity of the radial engine on the Stuart meant that not all the crews and mechanics were capable of properly maintaining or fixing something if it broke.

Miell’s A Squadron was forming a blocking force, with 2/19 Battalion, to the north of the town, and sending out patrols to give warning of Japanese reinforcements or supplies coming south. Mill’s B Squadron were protecting the line of march, trying to make sure that the route 8 Division was taking wasn’t being cut off or otherwise disrupted. Holden’s C Squadron were working with 2/20 Battalion moving towards Kuala Kangsar, trying to put a cork in the bottle of the Japanese troops facing 18th Division. 8 Division’s other two Infantry Brigades (16 and 27 Brigade) were deploying to seal the pocket tightly.

8 Division Cavalry Regiment’s Quartermaster, Captain Randle Robinson, was taking notes about what each of the Squadron’s needs were. As feared, the numbers of rounds being fired from the Browning machine guns were higher than expected. This was one of the many things that kept Robinson from a good night’s sleep. The lorries carrying the extra ammo belts were somewhere on the road, mixed up with the rest of the Divisions’ Motor Transport. Robinson promised it would be distributed as soon as it arrived, but each tank and carrier still had just about enough for another day’s fighting.

 

[allanpcameron]

3 February 1942. Bath, England.

Stothert and Pitt were better known for their cranes, but the company, like nearly all engineering firms, was now focussed on war work. Likewise, with so many engineering firms, the company was asked to come up with designs as well as production capacity. Along with miniature submarines for the Royal Navy, the Bath company had been handed some work on tanks too.

The design and production teams had been looking at the problem they’d been given to solve. The new 17-pdr gun being developed was a large beast, but the War Office wanted it mounted in a tank turret. Because Vickers was developing their own High Velocity gun, the turret was to be developed for the next Nuffield designed cruiser tank. Nuffield’s design team were still trying to sort out how to put a 6-pdr into a turret, so Stothert and Pitt had been given the 17-pdr work.

One of their previous forays into tank work had been to create a mantlet with a triple mounting for a 2-pdr, 3-inch howitzer and 7.92mm Besa machine-gun. Nothing had come of that, and looking at the problems facing them to fit a 17-pdr into a turret, there was a suspicion that this would be another waste of time. As there was no hull available for matching the turret to, the company had been put in touch with Sir Albert Stern’s ‘The Special Vehicle Development Committee of the Ministry of Supply’. Known to everyone else as The Old Gang (TOG), Stern had been pushing a super-heavy tank better suited for Great War battlefields. With the Churchill tank now in production it wasn’t entirely clear why Stern was still allowed to use expertise and resources that would be better utilized elsewhere.

Nonetheless, the second version of Stern’s work, universally called TOG 2 was what Stothert and Pitt had to use to test the turret. The one advantage of the size of the TOG 2 was that the turret ring could be big enough to take the large turret needed for the huge gun. The engineers had been doing some calculations on the back of an envelope and had come up with the need for a turret ring of at least 67 inches, bigger even than that of the Vickers Victor.

Even the design team could see that their proposal looked too big and too boxy. The company had been allocated an advisor from the Royal Tank Regiment. Captain Owen Jones had been burned and lost a leg in the fighting in France. Evacuated from Dieppe with the rest of 3rd Armoured Brigade, he’d been judged medically unfit for duty. He came from a family with a small engineering company. Between his military service and his engineering background, the Royal Armoured Corps had been using him as a liaison between themselves and some of the companies building tanks and their components.

When Jones had come to Bath his primary job was to help the designers to understand what the crew of a tank turret would need and where best to put things. Compared with the 2-pdr in the A10 that he was familiar with, the 17-pdr was a monster. The weight of the gun alone was a big enough problem, but the length of the recoil and the size of the ammunition made fitting it into a turret with a gunner, loader and tank commander a design nightmare. Jones agreed with the designers that the turret looked too big and too boxy, but it was the best they could do with what they had.

The task was then to fabricate the turret, fit the gun and transport it to Lincoln where the TOG 2 was at the William Foster & Co works. Once it was mated with the hull, they would be able to test the turret to see what else would need to be changed before the War Office could sign off on it.

 

[allanpcameron]

4 February 1942. Bataan, Philippines.

In order to outflank the American/Philippine defensive line, the Japanese attempted to land behind the line. This had been planned for, and the initial attempts meant that there were pockets of Japanese troops at various places including Lapay-Longoskawayan Quinauan-Aglaloma, Sililam-Anyasan. Although the Japanese had been stopped, 45th Infantry Philippine Scouts had been tasked with clearing these pockets, but it was recognised that the infantry would need tank support.

A platoon of C Company tanks from 192nd Tank Battalion then arrived at Quinauan Point in the early evening of 2 February. The platoon’s commanding officer did a quick reconnaissance of the area, and met with the Philippine Scouts commanding officer. The decision was made to bring the tanks up to the front line and support the infantry with the many machine guns on the tanks. This led to some progress, but the sighting of an enemy anti-tank gun led to a premature withdrawal by the American tanks, leaving the Scouts to dig in for the night.

On the morning of 3 February, after another reconnaissance, during which it was noted that the anti-tank gun had been disabled, the tanks once again re-joined the Scouts and using the cover of the tanks, the infantry followed closely. Progress was steady all day, but there were a couple of problems. Although the M3 Light tanks were fairly manoeuvrable, there was a constant danger from tree trunks, which if the tank went over it could mean it would be stuck. The other problem was coordination with the infantry, as the tanks were fighting battened down, making it dangerous for the Scouts to try to ask the tanks for specific things to be targeted. Once more the decision was to halt for the night, and while the infantry dug in, the tanks withdrew to be refuelled and rearmed.

The morning of 4 February, at 08:45hrs, another five tanks arrived, along with a radio car. Each tank received a walkie-talkie on the same frequency as the infantry and the radio care. For simplicity’s sake the tanks were numbered 1 to 5 so that the tanks would know which one was being called upon by the infantry to go where they were most needed. This made the day’s attack much more successful, with the Japanese being forced back almost to the cliffs. As the day ended, it was clear that the next morning would break the Japanese completely.

The rest of the surviving tanks of 192nd and 194th Tank Battalion were being used in similar ways, at the Big Pocket in I Corps area, as well as the other points where the Japanese had landed. As well as this, the tanks were used to guard airfields from possible parachute landings, guard beaches in case of other amphibious assaults, and as a mobile reserve. The Battalion’s half-tracks were being used to patrol roads in case of enemy infiltration. There was still a belief that help would come in time, though food rationing was becoming a greater problem, meaning that men were often adding anything edible they could catch or kill. The 26th US Cavalry also became as source for horsemeat to supplement the diet.

(This website was the basis for this update.)

 

[allanpcameron]

5 February 1942. Tandjoeng Priok, Java.

Much of the cargo from MV Straat Soenda had been unloaded while she aground in the Sunda Strait, but the final, often waterlogged, items had been cleared from her hold, some basic repairs had been done, and now she was setting sail for proper repairs.

On board the 8000 ton ship had been 80 CTLS (Combat Tank Light Series)-4TAC and CTLS-4TAY tanks manufactured by Marmon-Herrington in Indianapolis, Indiana. These were the first of 234 on order. Trying to lighten the load so the ship could be refloated, many of these tanks had been swung out onto small steamers and even fishing boats and brought to Batavia’s port.

The hand-over of the tanks to the KNIL had therefore got off to a bad start. In general the process of motorising the Cavalry elements of the KNIL had been slow, and the hope had been that these light tanks would be part of a force amounting to some 700 tanks, plus various armoured cars, jeeps and other transport to replace the horses used previously.

The plan was to develop five or six cavalry brigades, with a squadron of motorised cavalry (armoured cars, reconnaissance cars and motorbikes and one platoon of light tanks). The tank battalion would have two squadrons of light tanks and one of medium, cannon-armed tanks. There would be two battalions of motorised infantry, a mixed battalion of 37mm anti-tank guns and 20mm anti-aircraft guns (27 of each type). The Brigade would have a motorised artillery unit and engineers.

Although they had finally received the 70 Vickers built light tanks that had been ordered before the war, only America could now produce the number of armoured vehicles required. The Marmon-Herrington products, originally designed for the US Marine Corps, though rejected by them, had four basic models.

The Light tanks 4TAC and 4TAY differed only by having their turret on either the right or the left of the hull. The one-man turret contained a machine-gun, operated by the tank commander, and was hand cranked around 270 degrees. The reason for having turrets on both right and left of the hulls meant that between them the two types, working in pairs, could cover the full 360 degrees. There was another machine-gun in the hull, and although designed with another two machine gun positions, the KNIL had opted just for the two. The machine-guns, manufactured by Colt Firearms were the Browning .30 cal MG38BT tank machine gun, with the shorter barrel than the regular Browning. With 0.5-inch armour, and powered by a 124hp engine, pushing the 8 tonne tank along at a maximum speed of 30mph.

On order for the Medium tanks was Marmon-Herrington’s Combat Tank Medium Series (194 x CTMS-ITB1). This 13 tonne tank had a larger engine, and the turret contained an American Armament Corporation designed 37mm 44 caliber automatic gun. The standard US M5 or M6 37mm gun was too big for the turret. The company’s timetable for delivering these tanks was delayed, and the first weren’t expected to arrive until April. The other medium tank ordered (200 x CTMS 1GI4) were also delayed. This had a twin 37mm gun, and the ability to be equipped with up to seven machine guns. While it had a more powerful engine, its suspension struggled to deal with the weight of 20 tonnes. As it was simply enlarging the basic light tank design, there were all sorts of concerns about reliability and suitability.

Of the eighty tanks delivered, those at the bottom of the hold had been badly affected by the water, and there weren’t enough qualified fitters, mechanics or spare parts to get them fit for combat. The decision had been made to prioritise getting twenty-four tanks (enough to equip a full company) fully prepared, even if it meant stripping some of the others of parts. Each tank was taking about one day’s work to get it working and tested. The Cavalry Company chosen to be equipped with these tanks were normally based at Malang, but had arrived at Bandoeng, where they were receiving an intensive training program from the Mobile Battalion based there. As soon as the first few Marmon-Herrington tanks arrived, the drivers and commanders were being trained on their use and maintenance.

General Auchinleck, aware of the problems the KNIL were facing, had requested that Lieutenant-General Percival consider sending to aid from the Royal Armoured Corps resources in Malaya. There wasn’t much in the way that Percival could send, but a few RTR men, recovering from wounds were sent, including a Troop Commander. Even if they couldn’t get all the tanks up and running, at least there was someone with actual battle experience who could aid in the Dutch training program. With many of the 100th Indian Light Tank squadron’s Vickers Light Tanks out of action, a contingent of their Light Aid Detachment was sent to Java, mostly to train the KNIL in keeping tanks running.

 

[allanpcameron]

6 February 1942. Moulmein, Burma.

The declaration of war against Thailand had been made official, though for the men of the 11th African Division it was a moot point. 21st and 22nd East Africa Infantry Brigades had been concentrating at Kawkareik. The pass through the Tenasserim hills had been on the main points at which an enemy invasion from Thailand would have to be resisted. Brigadier Alan Ritchie’s 21st EA Brigade was made up of the 1st Battalion North Rhodesia Regiment, and the 1/2 and 1/4 Battalions of the Kings African Rifles. Brigadier Wilfred Ebsworth’s 22nd EA Brigade had three battalions of the KAR (1/1, 1/6 and 5th Bns). The other Division’s Brigade (1st West Africa Infantry Brigade) would continue the hold the position, and be ready to follow up the incursion into Thailand.

The plan was to advance over the border and through the hills towards the town of Tak and the river Ping. The two Infantry Brigades were accompanied by most of the Division’s artillery, engineers and medical units. The ‘road’ (more like a cart track) towards the Thai border was something that needed to be upgraded for the kind of traffic that would be needed to support a full invasion.

Acting Lieutenant-General Bill Slim had been emphasising the need to improve the infrastructure as far as possible. The Governor of Burma had agreed to this, and the work was being done by local labour under the watchful eyes of the Royal Engineers or Bombay Sappers and Miners. Where enough labour wasn’t available, an agreement had been reached the Governor General in India to provide extra civilian manpower. Slim had also requested elements of the Pioneer Corps be assigned to his command. In the short term he had one of the three Brigades of 14th Indian Division working as Line of Communications troops, while the other two were intensifying their training.

Slim’s old 10th Indian Division was concentrating in Moulmein, ready to follow the 11th African Division. Two Regiments of 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade (13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers, 4th Duke of Cambridge's Own Hodson's Horse) were going to accompany the 10th Indian Division, roads allowing. Once the East Africans had secured Tak and a crossing of the river there, then Douglas Gracie’s 10th Indian Division, would swing south to threaten Bangkok.

Already 2nd Burma Brigade had been moving along the west coast of Burma to re-establish control of the country all the way to Victoria Point. For the most part they were finding very little opposition, with the Thai troops that had replaced the Japanese, generally happy to pull back to their own country rather than take on the Burmese regiments.

Slim had deliberately set a slow timetable for this advance. While the capture of Bangkok and taking Thailand out of the war was important, the priority was to give the Japanese facing the Indian and Australian Corps in Malaya another headache to deal with. It seemed clear that the Japanese had underestimated the size of force they would need to capture Singapore. Having to defend their line of communications back to French Indo-China would be another task for which they were unprepared. Hopefully, by taking the initiative, the British Empire forces would make the Japanese have to react rather than follow their own timetable.

The 7th Indian and 9th (Highland) Divisions remained in place, Slim wanted them fully acclimatised and trained before the next phase of operations, which would possibly need to wait until after the next monsoon season beginning in mid-May and ending around mid-October.

 

[allanpcameron]

7 February 1942. Lembang, Java.

General Auchinleck had arrived back at ABDA HQ from a quick tour of various headquarters. He had wanted to see for himself just exactly what things were like on the ground, and like a curate’s egg, it was good in parts. He had collected local commanders reports so that at this meeting, everyone would be completely updated on what was going on. More importantly, Auchinleck knew that unless the combined American, British, Dutch and Australian forces actually collaborated better, there would be problems down the line.

Auchinleck’s ABDA Command, was made up of General Henry Powall, Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General George Brett, Auchinleck’s deputy commander, and commander of the US Army Air Force. ABDAfloat as the naval forces were known was represented by Vice Admiral William Glassford (Commander Naval Forces) with Rear Admiral Arthur Palliser (Chief of Staff), and Admiral Doorman (Commander Combined Striking Force). Admiral Thomas Hart had just been replaced by Glassford, and was temporarily still on hand to settle his replacement in to his role. ABDAarm, the combined ground forces were commanded by General Hein der Poorten. Finally, Air Marshall Richard Peirse was Commander ABDAair, the air forces available.

Auchinleck had Powall deliver a briefing from each of Admiral Tom Phillips (CinC Eastern Fleet), General Alexander (GOC Burma Army) and Lieutenant-General Percival (GOC Malaya Command). At the moment, the Japanese had been halted around Ipoh, and a counterattack was underway, with an incursion from Burma into Thailand to split the Japanese response. Force Z at Ceylon was preparing for another sortie into the ABDA area and that was being coordinated with Glassford and Doorman. From the British perspective, other than the loss of British Borneo, the situation had stabilised and both Malaya and Burma were looking safe.

Vice Admiral Glassford noted that the actions of Force Z and the Combined Striking Force, along with submarine activity had taken a toll on the Japanese light forces, but that the main Imperial Japanese Navy’s fleet had not yet been engaged. From the US Navy’s point of view, Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii had made it clear that the Asiatic Fleet (now known as US Naval Forces South West Pacific) couldn’t expect much in the way of reinforcement and would have to cooperate with the British and Dutch as best as they could. Admiral Doorman expressed concern for the way in which the Japanese navy almost always were able to operate under an air umbrella, whereas his Striking Force was always pleading for any air cover they could get.

Air Marshall Peirse attempted to defend his Dutch and American pilots, who were doing their best with the very limited resources at hand. The reinforcements to the US Army Air Force were increasing, and he had been insistent on making sure the Dutch airfields were properly prepared to host these precious P40s. The RAF had learned hard lessons during the Battle of Britain, and reinforced in the Battle of Malaya, to make every effort to defend the airfields from attack. Not only were the airfields to be protected by anti-aircraft units, but also with proper revetments and protected storage areas for fuel and ammunition. Peirse, having come from Bomber Command, was keen on the American B17s taking a larger role, but he understood the need to protect the land, sea and air forces from enemy action.

The Japanese had now full control of Borneo, but it had cost them in men and ships. The issue was now to hamper their ability to project power from Borneo, especially air power. Java’s northern shore would be vulnerable to air attack if the Japanese got airfields in southern Borneo operational. General Hein der Poorten gave an account of the resistance that the Dutch and Indian troops had put up before pulling back into the jungle to wage guerrilla warfare or await evacuation. Regarding the situation on Celebes, the Japanese attempt to take Kendari had been defeated, a matter of great delight to the American press. The Texas National Guard artillery unit had played a large part in that story and it was good news among what was otherwise negative stories coming from the Philippines.

A report from General MacArthur gave the latest information, which seemed to suggest that the Japanese had been halted, and that Bataan could hold if enough supplies could be brought in. There was some discussion about that situation. The British take on the situation was that attempting to supply Bataan would be even more difficult than supplying Malta. With Borneo in the hands of the Japanese, as well as the Japanese air forces already based on the Philippines and IndoChina, running any surface convoy would face overwhelming land based airpower. The use of submarines limited how much could be taken in, and brought out. A fast cruiser like HMS Abdiel might have a chance, but unloading and loading in Corregidor would be a terrible risk. The Royal Navy also needed to be reassured that there was sufficient fuel oil to fill her bunkers, allowing her to make the return journey at top speed.

Two Royal Navy submarines, HMS Porpoise and Rorqual were being modified at Singapore to transform their minelaying capacity to carrying supplies to Corregidor. It was expected that their first mission would begin before the end of the week. Whatever American submarines were available to do the same would be assigned by Vice-Admiral Glassford.

The situation that needed to stabilised was the Dutch East Indies. If Kendari could hold, along with Ambon and Timor, where two Australian Brigades were based, then the route between Australian and Java would be secure. The defence of Sumatra depended on Malaya and Singapore holding, which seemed probable. Java was the lynchpin which needed to be protected. Peirse and Brett were confident that the build up of the USAAF would continue. The RAF in Burma and Malaya was being reinforced from the Middle East, and that would keep the left flank secure. HMS Athene had just arrived in Singapore from Takoradi with 40 more Hurricanes.

Outside of ABDA’s operational area, the Japanese landing on New Britain at Rabaul had been strongly contested. The Australian Brigade was still active, but had to pull out of the immediate area. What that meant for New Guinea and the Solomon Islands still wasn’t clear, but that was a matter for the ANZAC area.

Auchinleck was keen to find a way to keep the Japanese off balance. The Striking Force was a reasonable size, but without aircover it was always going to be vulnerable. When Force Z and the Striking Force combined, as they had at the battle of Makassar Strait, it was a powerful force. Once both HMS Ark Royal and HMS Indomitable were available with the new Martlet fighters, it would be a powerful and balanced force. That remained in the future. For the moment the job was to try to intercept any attempts to reinforce their efforts. The South China Sea was probably out of reach until the RAF could send reinforcements for the remaining Hudsons and other strike aircraft.

An RAAF Squadron of Australian built Beauforts was undergoing training, and No 489 Squadron RNZAF were due to leave Britain to fly in stages to Malaya in their Beauforts, along with No 42 Squadron RAF. 42 Squadron would stay on Malta, allowing the more experienced No 39 Squadron to move to the Far East. Along with the Wellingtons that were arriving in India, it was hoped that a strong offensive force would be created, along with the USAAF B17s and A20s.

The submarine force was going to the most important part of the intervention. The troubles with the American torpedoes were being looked into, with British and Dutch help. It would need time and resources to identify and try to fix the problem. Task Force 2 Service Force, which had shipped originally to Darwin was on its way back to Java, so that the American ships could be properly serviced without having to make the long transit back to Northern Australia.

All the Dutch, British and American submarines that were available, along with as many long-range reconnaissance aircraft were looking for Japanese ship movements. The primary goal, in order to protect Java, was to isolate the Japanese on Borneo to prevent the build-up of their air force. The destruction of fuel and bomb supplies at all captured airfields at least meant that the Japanese would have to ship in these basics to get the airfields operational.

The USN had started with 29 submarines in the area on 8 December, the Dutch with sixteen. Of these about one third of the American and half of the Dutch were old, unfit for operations or undergoing refits. Losses had been taken, but on the other hand the British and Dutch reinforcements from the Mediterranean were beginning to mount up. HMS Trusty and Truant had arrived first, along with three Dutch boats (O-21, O-23 and O-24). Another two T-Class boats (Triumph, Tribune) from Alexandria had followed, in addition, HMS Severn, Clyde, Otus, Olympus, Porpoise and Rorqual were either on route or already arrived, with more T-Class expected when available.

To keep Kendari out of Japanese hands, the Australians were prepared to move one of the Battalions currently on Timor to Celebes. The possibility of moving another from Ambon was considered too risky, as the harbour and airfield at Ambon was still considered to be a Japanese target. Some twenty thousand American troops were on their way to Australia in Convoy BT-200, the majority of which were to garrison the French island of New Caledonia. It would be the end of the month before they arrived in Melbourne, but he build-up of American ground forces in Australia, as well as the Australian 1st Armoured Division coming to operational readiness, gave Auchinleck hope that eventually he would be able to go on the attack.

 

[allanpcameron]

Warangoi River, New Britain.

Brigadier Savage looked up from his notes when he heard a few shots, that rapidly turned into a real fire-fight. It was a distance away, Savage judged at least a mile. The survivors of his Brigade had pulled back from Rabaul after their positions became untenable. He knew that his men had given the Japanese landing force a hard fight, and had inflicted terrible casualties upon them.

The combination of Japanese shore bombardment and total air superiority had meant that Savage had no real option but to pull his men out of the Rabaul area and use their ‘back door’ to ultimately cross the Gazelle Peninsula and reach Wide Bay. A number of volunteers with radios were still keeping an overwatch on the Japanese forces. They reported that the Japanese had begun work on trying to get the airfields back into operation, but it seemed that the Japanese carriers must have withdrawn as air activity was much lower.

The firefight had died down, and a runner had arrived with a message. A Japanese force had been sighted coming towards the Australian position. An ambush had been successfully initiated, killing the leading Japanese troops, with the rest fleeing into the jungle away from the Australians. It was clear that the Japanese had finally discovered the ‘back door’ route and followed it south. How they had managed to do so without being spotted by the various outposts was a mystery.

Lt-Col Patrick Starr’s 2/5 Bn was spread along the river in defensive positions. Having destroyed the ferry and tried to remove all traces of the route the Australians had used obviously hadn’t been as successful as hoped. A Company’s worth of men were on the other side of the river for the purpose of ambushing any nosey Japanese making their way to the river. Surprise was now officially lost.

The chances were that the Japanese had somehow managed to get some of the civilians, either Chinese or indigenous, to guide them along the ‘back door’ path. The Brigade Group had had to leave just about all its heavy equipment behind. They had no artillery or transport, so they could only manage to carry limited supplies at walking pace.

Lt Col John Scanlan, whose 2/22 Battalion had been on the island longest, was ill, as were many of his men. Jungle fevers had taken their toll on the whole Australian force. The sick and wounded were being carried by the able-bodied down the trail towards Adler Bay. Over the previous few nights one or two Catalinas had landed in the bay, allowing the evacuation of some of the wounded and sick. The planes had carried in medical supplies, food and limited amounts of ammunition. Savage had been promised that the Navy was working on getting his men off the island. The best place to do this would be Wide Bay, with the Tol Plantation and Kalai Mission being the best two places for this to happen.

2/5 and 2/7 Battalion, along with all the other units of the Brigade Group which had arrived in January, were still up for a fight, but realised there was a limit to what could be achieved. Holding the river was allowing the majority of the Brigade to move south towards Wide Bay. Lt-Col Henry Guinn (CO 2/7 Bn), was worried that the long coastline would allow for a Japanese force to land behind the defensive position and cut the Australians off from the sea.

The river was too long to guard its whole length, so Savage reluctantly gave Starr the order to pull his men back. Once more every effort was to be taken to destroy anything that would help the Japanese, and to do their best to cover their tracks. Guinn’s Battalion would hold the next river line and allow the Australians to keep an adequate distance between themselves and the pursuing Japanese.

Lt-Col Walstab, the Police Superintendent, with his force of native policemen had tried to warn the locals of the dangers they faced from the Japanese. The rumours coming from Rabaul itself were confirming the fear that Walstab had expressed.

Brigadier Savage was alert to the needs of his men. They’d put up an excellent fight, and certainly there were some who advocated attacking the Japanese now that the enemy’s aircraft weren’t around. Savage didn’t have enough information about the strength of the Japanese force, and without their heavy equipment, it was too risky.

Withdrawal from a battle always had a bad effect on men’s morale, but they knew they had lived to fight another day. Getting off this island was now the priority, and once they’d rested and been reinforced, they could take on the Japanese, hopefully with air support of their own.

 

[allanpcameron]

8 February 1942. Tripoli, Libya.

General Wavell stepped out of the Lockheed Hudson which had carried him back from a secret meeting with General Weygand, the French Governor of Algeria. Work on resolving the issue of Vichy controlled North Africa and Levant had been continuing quietly for months, to the point where Wavell and Weygand could meet face to face.

Weygand was drifting further away from the direction being taken in Vichy, and with O’Connor’s 8th Army sitting on his doorstep, the implied threat was helping focus his mind. The Americans had been instrumental in getting discussions started, but it would much later in the year before they had sufficient Divisions available to get involved in the war in Africa and Europe. The British however had been using the months since the defeat of Italian North Africa to rest and regroup.

More reinforcements were still arriving in Egypt, even if more were being shipped to Burma and Malaya. Rehearsals for an island-hopping campaign to knock the Italians out of some of their Mediterranean islands was reaching its climax. The capture of so much Italian, and some German equipment, had been a real boon to the Greek army which was being rebuilt. The RAF, while diverting some of its strength to the Far East, was also being improved and built up in Malta and North Africa. The American built P40 Kittyhawks were replacing the earlier Tomahawks, and more squadrons of Beaufighters were arriving in theatre. The pressure on the RAF to release Spitfires was growing, but still hadn't been agreed to.

Weygand was still wary of the consequences of his switching sides would have in Metropolitan France. The German occupation of the whole country would be a terrible result, but the promises of American Lend-Lease equipment to build up his French army, with a view to the liberation of France, was enticing. Despite the Japanese attack in the Far East, the British Empire was still strong enough to contain that threat while building up its forces in Africa. The surrender of French IndoChina to the Japanese had been embarrassing enough, but having to rely on the Americans to protect New Caledonia and other French holdings in the Pacific was a reminder of just how low France had fallen.

Weygand had been sounding out the other French Governors: Pierre Boisson (French West Africa), Armand Annet (Madagascar), Henri Dentz (Levant). Pierre Nouailhetas in French Somalialand hadn’t been contacted, as word of his extraordinary brutality made him a liability. In each and every case their problem with the so-called “Free French” was Charles de Gaulle. Colonel Phillipe ‘Leclerc’ Hauteclocque, who had persuaded French Equatorial Africa to join the ‘Free French’ had also got involved, keen to bring all of the French Empire away from the Vichy regime. Leclerc (his nom de guerre) wasn’t as tainted in the eyes of Weygand as de Gaulle was. Leclerc now held the rank of temporary Brigadier-General, which Weygand didn’t recognise, he was still a Colonel according to normal French army protocol. Leclerc, along with Félix Éboué, the Governor of Equatorial Africa, were keen for Weygand to take up the mantle of leader of the Free French. His senior military and civilian positions had more weight than that of de Gaulle, whose personality seemed to hinder any attempts to build bridges.

The reason for the secret meeting with General Wavell was to clarify British intentions. Having a victorious army camped out close to the border with Tunisia had focused the minds of the French army there and also in Algeria and Morocco. Having seen the way in which the Italians, even with German help, destroyed so completely and relatively quickly, was worrying.

The French Army in North Africa, while quite numerous, was poorly equipped, and had very limited capacity to improve that situation locally. The way the Germans had ordered Petain about to remove Weygand from his post in Algeria was yet another insult to the defeated nation. The fact that Weygand had refused to return to France was seen as a form of resistance. With Weygand in command, rather than de Gaulle, the people of France would see that France was not fully defeated, that it fought on, ready to liberate the country when the time was right. The alternative was to fight the British 8th Army and be as roundly defeated by the British as the French Army had been by the Germans. That was a humiliation that could not be countenanced.

Generals Wavell and Weygand’s paths had crossed in 1918 in the Supreme Allied War Council, though Weygand was a number of grades above Wavell. Likewise, they had both served in the Middle East between the wars, and Wavell’s command of French was sufficient to forego the need for a translator. As professional soldiers, the two men broke the ice by talking about the campaigns they had commanded. The defence of France after Weygand took over, and Wavell’s defeat of the Italians gave them plenty to talk over.

Wavell, who hadn’t even told Churchill about the meeting, was keen to hear which way the Frenchman was leaning. Weygand knew full well that should the 8th Army invade Tunisia, the loss of Algeria and Morocco would follow. Wavell knew this too, but his men would be better off fighting the real enemy, rather than those who until recently had been allies and co-belligerents. Wavell wanted to avoid bloodshed, but made it clear that should Vichy order Weygand to fight the British, as a pawn of the Germans, then the French would suffer the same fate as the Italians. On the other hand, should Weygand take up the mantle of leadership of the Free French, then both the British and the Americans would help the French Army in North Africa prepare for the liberation of France.

This came as no surprise to Weygand, and he could see in Wavell a steely determination, as well as a man seeking peace rather than conflict. The problem however was not intrinsically military, it was political. If Weygand raised the Cross of Lorraine and declared himself the leader of France in exile, then the consequences would have to be faced. De Gaulle had been in the right place at the right time to promise that France would fight on. But de Gaulle was too much a divisive figure to rally all Frenchmen to the Cross of Lorraine. Weygand would certainly be the better figurehead, but he was interested more in military matters than politics. Yes, he had served briefly as Minister of Defence in the Vichy government, but he wasn’t a politician at heart.

This was something that Wavell could empathise with, but he noted how often in a military career that it brought soldiers into the political sphere. If Weygand were to declare that he was the military leader of the resistance, and promise that re-establishing civilian control was as much a priority as the liberation of the homeland, then perhaps those not convinced by de Gaulle, might be more inclined to join the fight against the Nazis. Weygand said that it was thought worth more pondering, and the meeting ended, with the two men parting, perhaps not as friends, but with a greater degree of mutual understanding.

 

[allanpcameron]

9 February 1942. Grik, Malaya.

The road to Grik was the only road out of the cauldron between Ipoh and Kuala Kangsar. The remnants of General Yamashita’s 25th Army trudged along the tracks and paths towards, what they hoped was safety. For over a week the fresh British 18th Infantry and Australian 9 Divisions had ground down the 5th, 18th and Imperial Guards Divisions. The Australian 8 Division, had cut the 25th Army off from its main line of communications and resisted every attempt to dislodge their chokehold.

The more tenuous link between Grik and Ipoh had been the target of the RAF’s efforts to interdict the one remaining route open to the Japanese. The situation regarding air cover had changed dramatically over the last few weeks. As the Tomahawk squadrons had become operational, and the Hurricane squadrons had been reinforced, the Japanese mastery of the air had been wrestled off them. The attrition to both sides had been debilitating, but the better airfields used by the British gave them an edge, as had the growing capacity of the Radio Direction Finding equipment. More and more often the Tomahawks were carrying bombs, carrying out an army cooperation role, while the Hurricanes provided an umbrella of protection above them.

The Australian 9 Division Cavalry Regiment’s M3 Light Tanks and the Matilda IIs of the Royal Tank Regiment had ultimately been one of the main factors that inflicted the defeat on the Japanese. While the Stuart tanks had proven vulnerable to the Japanese anti-tank weapons, the Matilda II remained just about impervious. The freshness of the Australian Corps also was an important difference. Most of the Japanese troops had been in action since 8 December, and each of those actions had bled them. Their own logistical system also caused them to be in a weakened state. It may have been the case that their martial spirit was still strong, but when your body is suffering from malnutrition, and you don’t have enough ammunition, then a soldier’s courage, or blind allegiance to their emperor, could only take them so far.

The men from England and Australia had also suffered, but they had begun fresh, and fully equipped. The 9 Australian Division had a strong esprit de corps and the advantage of being battle tested and victorious. With great flexibility, a strong artillery branch, and a way of overcoming obstacles with guile and bloody-mindedness, the Australians had broken Yamashita’s men. It wasn’t a classic definition of a rout, but had many of the characteristics of the same.

At first the lack of prisoners had worried the Corps commanders, but the reality was that the Japanese were literally fighting to the death. Any prisoners that were captured tended to be very sick, and even then, suicidal. Compared to the way the Italians had fought, it was sickening to the Australian troops. The expenditure of ammunition by the Australian Corps was far higher than expected, but it had become clear to just about every Australian that the only sure way to make sure they survived was to use every weapon at their disposal to silence the enemy. Even at that, a great many bayonets had to be cleaned of blood and guts.

Lieutenant-General MacKay, when seeing the way the battle was progressing, urged Major-General Cecil Callaghan (GOC 8 Division) to swing at least one of his Brigades to move up the main road towards Butterworth and Penang Island. The force immediately available to Brigadier Harold Taylor was a Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry Regiment, (Captain Miell’s A Squadron) and most of 2/19 Battalion, carried on lorries. Taylor had ordered Lt Col Charles Anderson to make sure to his advance was to take all necessary precautions to avoid being ambushed and cut off.

Anderson spoke to Captain Miell whose squadron had already done some reconnaissance up the main road towards Butterworth, and knew the next ten miles or so were clear of the enemy. By the time the orders had been communicated, and the transport and supplies sorted, there was only a few hours of daylight left. Anderson and Miell agreed to move up the ten miles to the vicinity of the reservoir. They would camp there until morning and then advance to Bagan Serai where the railway and the road crossed one another.

Taylor was keen on making sure that the other road, on the other side of the reservoir was also covered. Major-General Callaghan had ordered 16 Brigade to deploy a strong force up that road towards Selama. With the Japanese pocket collapsing, the Australians’ who had been the cork in the bottle, were now able to thin out from that role and begin to move northwards. It would however be the next day before 2/3 Battalion would be ready to move, with one of the other Squadrons of the Divisional Cavalry Regiment able to support them with reconnaissance and their armour.

The map, showing the area in OTL.

 

[allanpcameron]

10 February 1942. Tokyo, Japan

The Imperial General Headquarters approved the transfer of the Japanese 4th Infantry Division from Shanghai, China to the Philippine Islands to reinforce Masaharu Homma's forces and finish off the Americans.

It had been planned to transfer 38th Infantry Division, which had successfully captured Hong Kong, to 16th Army, for the capture of the Dutch East Indies. Since the capture of Singapore hadn’t yet been accomplished, it had been deemed necessary to send 38th Division to reinforce the efforts in Malaya. General Sano would be given orders that his 38th Division would be sent first to confront the incursion from Burma threatening 25th Army’s line of communications. At least this formation had proven capable of defeating a British force, and they were expected to do so again.

Imamura’s 16th Army’s (56 Division, less the Brigade on Borneo, (now seriously depleted) and 2nd Division), had the role to capture the Dutch East Indies after the capture of Malaya and the Philippines. The Imperial General Headquarters had to consider whether the losses on Celebes could be made good by sending 2nd Division to capture it. They also needed to capture Ambon, as well as clearing Borneo so that the airfields could encircle Java. The problem was it would take weeks for the troops to arrive at their various destinations due to logistical issues, in other words, getting the Navy to agree and make the ships available.

It was decided that the Philippines and Malaya would have to take precedence. 2nd Infantry Division would also be sent to Malaya, and Imamura would take over from Yamashita who had proven incapable of winning a victory.

Note: The first paragraph is taken from here: and although it is only one source, I suspect it is true. The rest of the update is my best guess at what else they might do. Obviously sending 38th and 2nd Division to Malaya after the defeat of Yamashita seems to be throwing good money after bad. Both Yamashita's 25th Army and Iida's 15th Army have now been completely chewed up, what another two Divisions will achieve where the previous have failed remains a mystery. I do wonder if the Imperial General HQ's intake of lead paint is sufficient to actually think this is a good idea?

 

[allanpcameron]

11 February 1942. London, England.

The eleventh meeting of the third Tank Board had been convened and, as usual, the agenda had many items that needed to be discussed. The chairman, Geoffrey Burton, formerly of the British Small Arms Company, as Director General of Tanks and Transport (DGTT) had two groups in front of him.

The Ministry of Supply team, which under Lord Beaverbrook had appointed two new industrialists to the Tank Board, Oliver Lucas and George Usher. Lucas, who firm produced electronic components, had been appointed Controller General of Research and Development (CGRD). Usher, from the firm International Combustion, which produced steam generating plant, was Director General of Tank Supply (DGTS), responsible for tank production. Burton’s deputy (DDGTT) Major-General John Crawford continued to attend the meetings, although Usher had taken over his role in Tank Supply.

The War Office team was led by Lieutenant-General Gordon Macready, Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff (ACIGS), with Major-General Ronald Weeks as his deputy and Brigadier Alexander Richardson (Director Armoured Fighting Vehicles (DAFV). The only independent member of the Tank Board was Colonel George Green, the American Liaison Officer regarding design and production issues on Armoured Fighting Vehicles.

Beaverbrook’s instructions were for the Tank Board to ‘consider General Staff specifications, types and programmes of armoured fighting vehicles, including their armament, and to take decisions thereon. They were also to receive design and production progress reports.’ Burton had been industrious about the business, and was trying to resolve the fundamental problem of whether the Tank Board was advisory (as originally constituted) or executive (as Beaverbrook desired).

With both Lucas and Usher new to their jobs, and no previous experience of tank design or production, Macready and Richardson were concerned that the ‘customers’ of the tanks, the Royal Armoured Corps, were playing second fiddle to the ‘suppliers’ of tanks. The army knew what it needed, how many it needed and when they were needed. On the current agenda was yet another example of the tail wagging the dog.

At previous meetings it had been agreed that a heavy infantry tank, carrying the 17-pdr gun should be developed. Among the ideas was to look into the possibility of adopting the American T1 (a proposed 50-ton tank with the 3-inch M7 gun). The problem of a designing a tank big enough, with the 4-inch armour needed, weighing about 50 tons, even with the new Rolls Royce Meteor engine, reliability of the automotive parts would be problematic, as would the ability to transport it. Therefore, the idea had then been changed to adapting a cruiser tank to take an enlarged turret capable of handling the weight and power of the new gun.

Richardson had been working with Carden at Vickers and knew that the Victor with the 75mm HV gun would be more than adequate. Work on the alternative turret by Stothert and Pitt and the continuing involvement of ‘The Old Gang’ was beyond the Major-General’s grasp. Whatever would come of the man-hours of design and construction was ultimately a complete waste of time and money.

What the civilians were thinking of would probably be better off as a self-propelled anti-tank gun, but that would be the Royal Artillery’s responsibility, rather than the Royal Armoured Corps. There were enough examples of Italian and German attempts at creating a mobile anti-tank platform with protection for the crew to see just exactly what the options were. The army wanted a tank that was mobile, protected and had a good dual-purpose gun. The Victor ticked all those boxes, and probably would for the next few years. Carden was already working on the follow-on tank to replace the Victor, and again the army knew that there was a good chance that would be just the thing when it was needed, as the A9, A10, A11 and Valiant had been so far.

The one particular fear for the Army was Beaverbrook’s obsession with sending aid to Russia. The Soviets only wanted Vickers tanks, although they regretfully had accepted Matilda IIs as well. If a large number of Vickers tanks were being sent to Murmansk, there was the danger of the British Army would be left with Nuffield Crusaders and Vauxhall Churchills in the cruiser and infantry tank roles. Neither of these even had the 6-pdr gun, never mind the 17-pdr. From General Alan Brook (CIGS) all the way down to Richardson, the army was invested in having one all-purpose tank. Designing another tank around the 17-pdr gun just seemed wasteful.

It had been understandable in the late 1930s to increase the war potential of industry by bringing new firms into tank production. The Matilda II was the only real success, although the A13mk4 hadn’t been too bad. It was clear to the ‘customer’ that all available production should go into the tank that the customer wanted. There were certainly other uses for the Crusader and Churchill hulls for specialised vehicles, but what the Armoured Divisions wanted was 75mm HV armed Victors.

In 1941, with great efforts, UK suppliers had produced over 5300 tanks. It was expected that in 1942, that figure could reach about 9500 tanks. The army wanted the vast majority of those tanks to be Valiant IIs and Victors. It would grudgingly accept Crusaders and Churchills, but only as a minority. The Tank Brigades that were converting to Churchills weren’t thrilled that the Churchill wasn’t any great improvement on the Matilda II, except in thicker armour. The expanding Armoured Brigades receiving the Crusaders were in some ways glad just to be getting tanks to train on. As a training tank the Crusader was fine, but the Russians had rejected them for good reason.

Matilda IIs were still showing their worth in Malaya, and the American M3 Light tanks were proving acceptable against the Japanese. The Australians were enthusiastic about the 75mm gun on the Grants they were getting, and the Indians and South Africans would probably accept them too, until the newer M4 arrived later in the year. There was no doubt that sooner rather than later, the British Army would once more be facing the Wehrmacht in Europe. There weren’t many tank crews who wanted to do that in a cruiser tank armed with a 2-pdr gun, nor an unreliable monstrosity designed to fit the 17-pdr. There was a better tank with a better gun available, the civilians had to understand that, otherwise more time and effort would be wasted, only to lead to unnecessary casualties among the Royal Armoured Corps, and the army in general.

 

[allanpcameron]

12 February 1942. Kastellorizo, Greece.

The 7 Australian Division, with the Commandoes and the Poles, were finishing up preparation for taking the fight to the Italian held islands. The Royal Navy’s surface and submarine fleet had put a firm cordon around Rhodes and Karpathos, while the RAF had attempted to suppress the Italian garrison and airfields.

The previous February an attempt to capture the small island of Castelrosso (the Italian name for Kastellorizo) had failed miserably. This time the force was large enough, with plenty of rehearsals to make sure all the elements worked together. Admiral Cunningham had the battleships HMS Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, with cruisers and destroyers on hand to intercept any Italian Navy interference. The final pieces of the puzzle were the arrival back of HMS Formidable from Ceylon, now carrying Martlet fighters along with Albacores and Fulmars, and a clear weather window.

HMS Karanja and Prince Charles, each with a battalion (40 and 41 (RM) Commando) of the Special Service Brigade, were carrying the main invasion force. Three LCT(1)s, each carrying two Valiant I tanks, (one gun and one Close Support tank) were also part of the force, but there was still some doubt about the tanks’ ability to land and get off the beach to support the commandoes. The Greek destroyer Vasilissa Olga was part of the close escort force, and carried a company of Greek troops who would be landed later to regain the island for the Greek people.

The Royal Navy had formed a Levant Schooner Flotilla from various caïques and other small vessels, and these had been used to reconnoitre the area. Some of the Long Range Desert Group men, re-tasked with the same principle of working behind enemy lines providing intelligence, had been landed on Kastellorizo, Kasos, Karpathos and Rhodes.

The report from Kastellorizo was that the Italian garrison was about 250 men. There were a few artillery pieces, mortars and machine guns, covering the approaches to the main town of Kastellorizo. The LRDG had also reported that they hadn’t seen any ship entering the harbour in the previous two weeks and that there was obviously a shortage of water. The report wasn’t able to gauge the morale of the Italian troops or whether they’d be open to a negotiated surrender.

Command of the operation had been given to Rear-Admiral Philip Vian RN. He commanded Force B: the cruisers HMS Naiad (flying his flag), HMS Euryalus and the destroyers HMS Sikh, HMS Kipling HMS Kingston, HMS Foxhound and HMS Gurkha, along with RHS Vasilissa Olga. The intention of the admiral had been to use the ships’ guns as a warning, then to issue a call to surrender. Colonel Robert Laycock, commanding the invasion force asked instead for his men to be able to invade the island by surprise. All the rehearsals only meant so much, the Commandoes would have to go in against opposition at some point. Having a real test was necessary before more difficult islands were invaded. Vian reluctantly agreed, and so long before dawn the commandoes were loaded into their landing craft and set off for shore.

Naval gunfire support was still essential and the LRDG had identified the main Italian artillery position, which would be engaged by two of the destroyers as soon as the landing party lost the element of surprise. Air support from HMS Formidable was to consist primarily in preventing any Italian air force interference. A section of Albacores, loaded with bombs, would also be available should the need arise.

As the landing craft made for shore, they were spotted by an Italian sentry who set of the warning by firing a flare. That was the signal to the gunnery officers on HMS Kipling and Kingston to open fire with their main armament. Three salvos of twelve 4.7-inch guns from the two destroyers amounted to a devastating demonstration of fire-power, something that the Italians had no answer for. When the first wave of Commandoes landed, they encountered only limited resistance.

The Italian garrison surrendered very quickly. The Major commanding the garrison got off a radio message that his men had offered some resistance, but against the overwhelming odds, and to protect the civilian population, he was surrendering to the British forces. As this message was sent in the clear, and with white flags appearing, the Commandoes had the fairly easy task of marshalling the Italian troops to a central point where they were disarmed and processed.

A couple of minesweepers were prepared to enter the port, and the Italian senior naval officer was sent out by boat with the map of the Italian mines. By noon the Greek destroyer Vasilissa Olga had entered the harbour and the Greek troops officially took control of the first Greek island to be liberated from the Axis forces. Some of the Levant Schooners arrived shortly afterwards with supplies of water and other essentials. The Italian prisoners were shipped off the island onboard HMS Karanja, to join their many comrades already in captivity.

From Colonel Laycock’s point of view the exercise had gone pretty much as well as possible. A full report would be made, but his men had been landed in the correct positions, and their training had paid off in both the speed and sureness of taking their objectives. If there had been greater resistance, then some casualties would probably have been taken, but other than a couple of broken bones, and a few cuts and bruises the Medical Orderlies had nothing much to deal with.

As suspected, there were problems with unloading some of the tanks from the Landing Craft Tank. One LCT had found a smooth enough area, and its tanks had been able to get off the beach and onto the ‘road’. The use of the heavy Valiant I tanks wasn’t the best choice, light Tetrarch DD tanks would probably have been a better fit for the mule tracks that counted as roads. The second LCT had run aground too far from the beach to be able to unload the tanks, which weren’t fitted with the Duplex Drive system. Although waterproofed, the tanks wouldn’t have been able to ‘swim’ to the shore. The last LCT had reached the beach, but the tanks weren’t able to climb the rocky slope off the beach. The two tanks had reversed back onto the LCT and it moved them to where the first LCT had successfully unloaded its tanks.

Having four tanks on the island was overkill, but when the first two reached the place where the Italian prisoners were gathered, the crews noted the dismay on the soldiers’ faces. Even if they had put up the fullest resistance possible, the Italian troops had nothing that could easily counter the tanks. The British tanks which had cleared North Africa had gained something of a reputation among the Italian troops, that resistance was futile.

 

[allanpcameron]

13 February 1942. Ping River, Thailand.

The reconnaissance units of 11th African Division had advanced in front of the 21st and 22nd East Africa Infantry Brigades. The Division tended to be lighter than most Divisions on motorised transport, but the 1st Battalion Northern Rhodesia Regiment (1 Bn NRR) had arrived at the river not long after the universal carriers of the reconnaissance companies.

The road between Mae Sot on the border and Raheng (Tak) on the river had obviously had improvements made to it. Some of the locals described how the Japanese had been using local forced labour to upgrade the road. The Japanese had left, but the Thai army had a strong force at Raheng, where the crossing over the river Ping was strongly held.

This information proved correct, as the reconnaissance force found to its detriment. The arrival of 1 Bn NRR provided the Thai artillery with another target. It would take another day or so for the rest of 21st Brigade, with its artillery to arrive, so the African troops dug in. Communications between the infantry battalion and the Brigade HQ, and between the Brigade and Divisional HQs were eventually established.

It wasn’t entirely clear, but air reconnaissance, along with some human intelligence, suggested that a Japanese column was on its way to Raheng from the railway at Phitsanulok, about eighty miles distant. It was crucial that the African troops were fully prepared in case the Japanese were preparing to block the Burma forces attack on Thailand by attacking them, which seemed to be the normal way of things.

Once Lieutenant-General Bill Slim was informed of the intelligence he knew he was in a foot race with the Japanese. Whoever got the river ‘the fastest, with the mostest,’ was the more likely to prevail. 1st West Africa Infantry Brigade, the other part of 11th African Division was well emplaced at the pass between Kawkareik and the border. Slim knew it would they would best be left in place to provide a backstop. Douglas Gracie’s 10th Indian Division, Slim’s old command, were moving up from Moulmein, and Slim ordered Gracie to get a move on and get to the river Ping as soon as possible. Slim also ordered the two regiments of 252nd Indian Armoured Brigade (13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers, 4th Duke of Cambridge's Own Hodson's Horse) accompanying the 10th Indian Division, to do everything in their power to get as far forward as they could. There were plenty of places that the Japanese could get across the river, but very few places where they could get through the hills. Having the complete 10th Indian Division, with two regiments of tanks, would give the Japanese a real headache.

The route from Moulmein to Kawkareik involved a vehicle ferry over the river Gyaing. Since this was essential to swift movement, the engineers had added a pontoon bridge. Slim made sure that the Corps’ Artillery commander knew to put whatever anti-air assets he could scrape up to protect this. He also requested the RAF to find out just exactly what the Japanese column consisted of, and to do everything in their power to attack it, and the railhead at Phinsanulok. The Blenheims of No 113 Squadron RAF were tasked with these two roles and attacks on the Japanese began the next day.