1992-Signalling
Devvy
Donor
1992 - Safety on British Rail
A memorial at Clapham to the victims of the rail crash. (*1)
The 1980s had been a hard time for British Rail. A number of high profile crashes, including loss-of-life had occurred in the late 1980s, with some down to driver error (in one occassion exacerbated by lack of signal visibility due to overhead cables), and one down to faulty signalling equipment. British Rail had accepted blame for a number of incidents, and had been slated by the public at large; newspaper headlines decried "Is the train safe?", whilst coroner's inquests returned rulings of unlawful killing. In addition to this, the fire at Kings Cross tube station also put the spotlight on the related London Underground system, who shared many similar processes and systems as British Rail. The board duly highlighted new concerns for safety, and a renewed drive to resolve them; tackling human safety, implementing best practices, and installing safety technology. As the 1990s turned over, British Rail had a significant amount of work to do.
The response of an external investigation in to British Rail was further damning, and internally BR reformed itself with the incoming (new) Bob Reid as Chairman, bringing a safety committee to the fore in the Board meetings. A large reform in the processes for workers on the physical railway by giving much greater responsibility to the person in charge of work on site resulted in an upswing in safety for them; in later years this took the form of a personally assigned portable "men at work" balise; the person in charge would fit this to the track in front of the area they were working to alert the incab BBS system of any train approaching to either emergency stop, or slow down to either 25km/h or 50km/h depending on the nature of the works being carried out (*2). A reform of working practises to formalise a lunch break with national testing for drugs & alcohol after safety-critical incidents or when reporting for safety-critical jobs attempted to reform the working culture of British Rail, where the job inevitably involved caring for other's safety in some form - but was tempered by the national problem of drug and alcohol abuse within the United Kingdom. (*3)
The major result however, was the problem of signalling attentiveness; making sure the signal showed the correct aspect and was duly acted upon by the train driver. Here, the Pullman service was ahead of the times; it's system of track-based balises, or beacons, allowed the automatic transfer of signal information from track to train, and the display incab of the target speed and speed limit. This was all operated by a single electronic signalling centre based at Rugby, which controlled the entire route from London to Liverpool and Leeds, simplified by the largely segregated nature of the line. Any changes in target speed were accompanied by a bing or buzz depending on whether the speed went up or down, and had to be acknowledged by the driver within a few seconds. This system, for the first time, would be overlaid on existing traditional routes, with the South Western Main Line (*4) and several of the associated branches, from London to the South Coast.
The new "Networker" train (*5), currently under order and construction for Network South East, would include the new cab equipment to support the new signalling systems, whilst also including the rail equivalent of a "black box" for post-incident analysis. The new trains would also feature a new "Cab Secure Radio" (*6) for voice communication (via a radiowave system) between driver and signaller, and the new version of the BBS (British Rail's "Balise Based Signalling") also transmitted the identifier for the local signaller, allowing the driver to press a single button and be connected with the signaller. On the opposite side, with the rebuild of signalling processes to sit in four large electronic signalling centre (Wimbledon, Guildford, Southampton and Poole), the train equipment would transfer the train identifier and last known position (as identified by the last balise) with the call to the signaller, so the signaller knew who they were talking to. An emergency button also allowed the driver to communicate to a special emergency line in the signalling centre. Signallers could then change signals to danger nearby at the flick of switch - the remaining signals, in common with the high speed line would be linked to the balise and show either a red light for danger/stop (showing where to stop, and reduced to a single red light instead of the two red lights on the high speed route), or a blue light to proceed at limited speed until the next balise would refresh signalling information.
A standard BBS signal; lower red indicates stop/danger, upper blue indicates continue past and adhere to incab signalling information.
A few years later, with signalling reforms coming to an end on the South West Main Line "Network", a corresponding rebuilt was begun on the Great Western Main Line and branches - a large job. A new signalling operations centre at Slough would control the entire suburban (and mostly electrified) stretch from London outwards to High Wycombe, Oxford, Swindon, Newbury and Basingstoke (*7). With the new version of BBS also allowing the train to transmit some information back to the signalling system (train identifier), the system could work out punctuality and begin to live inform station staff about the punctuality of incoming services.
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(*1) This is a real memorial to the victims of the 1988 Clapham Rail Crash; I didn't want to use any real pictures of the crash as personally I think it'd be a bit distasteful.
(*2) The in-cab signalling would then obviously reset back to normal when hitting the next balise.
(*3) Most of that paragraph is roughly OTL.
(*4) So the same system as the Pullman/High speed signalling is rolled out to the South West Main Line (where the crash happened), on it's full length.
(*5) A new electric multiple unit for NSE, to be covered at some point.
(*6) Cab Secure Radio is/was a real thing (rapidly being replaced by the European standard GSM-R), for roughly this purpose. The only real difference here, is the BBS balises tell the train which signalling centre to route "call the signaller" calls to.
(*7) Yes, the Chiltern Line is usually lumped in under the Great Western Main Line brand here in this TL, as it's effectively a suburban branch of the GWML operating out of Paddington station (remember Marylebone closed down).
A memorial at Clapham to the victims of the rail crash. (*1)
The 1980s had been a hard time for British Rail. A number of high profile crashes, including loss-of-life had occurred in the late 1980s, with some down to driver error (in one occassion exacerbated by lack of signal visibility due to overhead cables), and one down to faulty signalling equipment. British Rail had accepted blame for a number of incidents, and had been slated by the public at large; newspaper headlines decried "Is the train safe?", whilst coroner's inquests returned rulings of unlawful killing. In addition to this, the fire at Kings Cross tube station also put the spotlight on the related London Underground system, who shared many similar processes and systems as British Rail. The board duly highlighted new concerns for safety, and a renewed drive to resolve them; tackling human safety, implementing best practices, and installing safety technology. As the 1990s turned over, British Rail had a significant amount of work to do.
The response of an external investigation in to British Rail was further damning, and internally BR reformed itself with the incoming (new) Bob Reid as Chairman, bringing a safety committee to the fore in the Board meetings. A large reform in the processes for workers on the physical railway by giving much greater responsibility to the person in charge of work on site resulted in an upswing in safety for them; in later years this took the form of a personally assigned portable "men at work" balise; the person in charge would fit this to the track in front of the area they were working to alert the incab BBS system of any train approaching to either emergency stop, or slow down to either 25km/h or 50km/h depending on the nature of the works being carried out (*2). A reform of working practises to formalise a lunch break with national testing for drugs & alcohol after safety-critical incidents or when reporting for safety-critical jobs attempted to reform the working culture of British Rail, where the job inevitably involved caring for other's safety in some form - but was tempered by the national problem of drug and alcohol abuse within the United Kingdom. (*3)
The major result however, was the problem of signalling attentiveness; making sure the signal showed the correct aspect and was duly acted upon by the train driver. Here, the Pullman service was ahead of the times; it's system of track-based balises, or beacons, allowed the automatic transfer of signal information from track to train, and the display incab of the target speed and speed limit. This was all operated by a single electronic signalling centre based at Rugby, which controlled the entire route from London to Liverpool and Leeds, simplified by the largely segregated nature of the line. Any changes in target speed were accompanied by a bing or buzz depending on whether the speed went up or down, and had to be acknowledged by the driver within a few seconds. This system, for the first time, would be overlaid on existing traditional routes, with the South Western Main Line (*4) and several of the associated branches, from London to the South Coast.
The new "Networker" train (*5), currently under order and construction for Network South East, would include the new cab equipment to support the new signalling systems, whilst also including the rail equivalent of a "black box" for post-incident analysis. The new trains would also feature a new "Cab Secure Radio" (*6) for voice communication (via a radiowave system) between driver and signaller, and the new version of the BBS (British Rail's "Balise Based Signalling") also transmitted the identifier for the local signaller, allowing the driver to press a single button and be connected with the signaller. On the opposite side, with the rebuild of signalling processes to sit in four large electronic signalling centre (Wimbledon, Guildford, Southampton and Poole), the train equipment would transfer the train identifier and last known position (as identified by the last balise) with the call to the signaller, so the signaller knew who they were talking to. An emergency button also allowed the driver to communicate to a special emergency line in the signalling centre. Signallers could then change signals to danger nearby at the flick of switch - the remaining signals, in common with the high speed line would be linked to the balise and show either a red light for danger/stop (showing where to stop, and reduced to a single red light instead of the two red lights on the high speed route), or a blue light to proceed at limited speed until the next balise would refresh signalling information.
A standard BBS signal; lower red indicates stop/danger, upper blue indicates continue past and adhere to incab signalling information.
A few years later, with signalling reforms coming to an end on the South West Main Line "Network", a corresponding rebuilt was begun on the Great Western Main Line and branches - a large job. A new signalling operations centre at Slough would control the entire suburban (and mostly electrified) stretch from London outwards to High Wycombe, Oxford, Swindon, Newbury and Basingstoke (*7). With the new version of BBS also allowing the train to transmit some information back to the signalling system (train identifier), the system could work out punctuality and begin to live inform station staff about the punctuality of incoming services.
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(*1) This is a real memorial to the victims of the 1988 Clapham Rail Crash; I didn't want to use any real pictures of the crash as personally I think it'd be a bit distasteful.
(*2) The in-cab signalling would then obviously reset back to normal when hitting the next balise.
(*3) Most of that paragraph is roughly OTL.
(*4) So the same system as the Pullman/High speed signalling is rolled out to the South West Main Line (where the crash happened), on it's full length.
(*5) A new electric multiple unit for NSE, to be covered at some point.
(*6) Cab Secure Radio is/was a real thing (rapidly being replaced by the European standard GSM-R), for roughly this purpose. The only real difference here, is the BBS balises tell the train which signalling centre to route "call the signaller" calls to.
(*7) Yes, the Chiltern Line is usually lumped in under the Great Western Main Line brand here in this TL, as it's effectively a suburban branch of the GWML operating out of Paddington station (remember Marylebone closed down).