The Spanish Civil War could be another event that could be affected, particularly with how I doubt Vorbeck would be as open as Hitler in his support for the Nationalist cause, even if he'd certainly sympathize with them.
The Spanish Civil War will be one of the first major points of divergence which I am excited to get to.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
Anglo-German vs Franco-Soviet "Cold War" wen?
Anglo German Rapprochement certainly, cold war against the Soviets? imho yes. France having very, very cold relations with Germany probably, though I suspect that vLV will do its best to defuse that. But France aligning itself with the Soviet Union? I don't see that.
 
7 - Not Yet Lost

8mm to the Left: A World Without Hitler​


"The Poles knew who they were before the Russians had crawled out of their forests. Before the Germans had a kaiser. Before the Hungarians knew God. And it was this ancient sense of self which allowed us to survive it all; the Teutons, the Lithuanians, the Russians, the Germans. Now here we stand, a nation of our own at long last; what force on Earth can oppose us?” - Anonymous Polish Poet, 1937

Not Yet Lost​





In March, 1933, a Welsh reporter by the name of Gareth Jones journeyed through the South-West Soviet Union, visiting the Russian and especially the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics in order to investigate the rumours of famine which had been trickling out through refugees fleeing into Eastern Poland and Romania. What he witnessed there horrified him beyond words: Whole towns of starving peasants, wandering bands of hungry men, farm animals and pets cut down for food, bloated bodies rotting on the streets. It was a horror comparable to the Western Front in the Great War. It was the Holodomor, the "Terror famine".

Gareth Jones returned to the United Kingdom shortly afterwards and published the news of his findings, only to be met with widespread opposition and criticism. Soviet officials and correspondants would decry his "lies" as intended to paint the Soviet Union in a negative light, passing off what he had seen as simple malnutrition. The American journalist Walter Duranty, a resident of Moscow, would denounce the article, backed quickly by the New York Times which profited heavily from his work. Even after Jones provided a detailed analysis of the famine and its causes, many papers would refuse to believe him. He would be banned from returning to the Soviet Union and would suffer a torrent of hate mail from Communist sympathisers who refused to believe criticism about the world's leading Communist state.

Jones's text would take an extra month to be translated and make its way into continental Europe, and while few paid it much mind (few, especially in Eastern Europe, cared if Russians were dying), several states would capitalise on the rumours.

The Polish and Romanians, already somewhat aware of the event due to their shared border with the Ukrainian SSR, would use this as an example of "Communist cruelty"; it formed the basis for a discreditation of the secessionist Ukrainian minority. Both nations had seized lands with significant Ukrainian populations following the Great War (Romania in Southern Bessarabia and Poland in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia) and both were united in their attempts to pacify these regions and oppose Soviet expansionism.

France and Spain, both struggling with a rising Communist movement, refrained from commenting to keep from stirring the pot of their tumultuous governments. France's Centre-Left government feared takeover by more extreme Communist elements as well as potential backlash from the equally-extreme Rightist groups, while in Spain the still-new Spanish Republic had far more important things to concern themselves with than the treatment of farmers and peasants hundreds of kilometres away.

Germany would follow in the footsteps of their Polish neighbours and use it as a denunciation of the "godless Soviets" and call for the liberation of the Ukrainian people. What set Germany apart from Poland, however, was a unique trump card rooted in their own recent history.





"Today I come to you, people of Germany, not as your President, but as a fellow Child of God, and I ask you to please join me in praying for our Ukrainian brothers and sisters currently suffering under the boot of Russian and Communist oppression," began President von Lettow-Vorbeck on the sunny Sunday of April 23rd, 1933. He was still dressed in his Sunday best, his family sitting in the next room and listening to his speech through the radio.

"For too long the noble peoples of the East have been subject to the tyranny of their neighbours, the ruthless Russians or the conniving Poles. Let us not forget that it was Kiev, not Moscow, from whence the tree of Eastern Christianity grew, no matter how their oppressors tried to make us forget. It was only for a few brief months in 1918 that the star of the Ukraine was allowed to break free before it was again snuffed out by the Polish and Russians.

I call on all Germans to support the Ukrainian cause, not just through our opposition to the evils of Communism, but through our own shared responsibility. Let us not forget the triumph of German armies over the Russian horde in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which first freed the Ukraine from the shackles of oppression, just as we sought to free all of Eastern Europe. Some have forgotten this generosity, others have betrayed it. No! Germany will not give in! We will stand as a bulwark against the Bolshevik menace! I call on all the free peoples of Europe: Join us in defence of our nation! Our civilisation! Our future!"

Von Lettow-Vorbeck lifted his finger from the recording button, taking several deep breaths to recover himself. Beside him Father König, the leading minister from the Berlin Cathedral, took over, beginning a series of prayers for the suffering in the Ukraine while von Lettow-Vorbeck departed the recording studio. A glass of water was pushed into his hand by his wife the moment the door closed behind him and he took it with an appreciative smile.

"How was it?" he asked, taking a sip.

"Perfect," answered von Papen with a grin. He and von Schleicher were standing off to the side, having observed the entire thing. It had been their idea to take advantage of the current famine, inspired by his move against Hugenberg several years ago, and following the Sunday service they had all but kidnapped his family (and the poor minister) and rushed them here to make the speech while families were at home and primed to listen. "The part about the betrayal of our generosity was inspired. It might even win us a few friends in the Baltics, though Poland will see it as the insult it is."

"Who cares what the Polish think," von Schleicher dismissed with a wave of his hand. "They will learn their place in our Europe soon enough."

Little six-year-old Ursula von Lettow-Vorbeck, already tired from the long service preceding the radio broadcast, had fallen asleep on the nearby couch. Von Lettow-Vorbeck sat down beside her and began stroking her hair. "I have no desire to get drawn into a war with Poland over the Ukrainian Question," he warned the duo before they went too far. "Poland will be aligned soon enough, but a Fourth Partition would only serve to make us the front-line against the Soviets, and our army is far from prepared to defeat the Poles, much less the French and Romanians if they join on Warsaw's side."

Von Schleicher scowled, but nodded. The integration of the Stahlhelm into the government as a preliminary tactic for rearmament was well-underway but had yielded far from the necessary results to consider an all-out offensive war. Not to mention the German economy, still brittle and only in the first stages of recovery, couldn't support anything more demanding than a border skirmish. "We need to put more effort into discrediting them," he decided instead. "Poland has already frozen itself out of an alliance with the Czechs after the Teschen border dispute debacle and the Lithuanians won't touch them because of Vilnius. Romania and France are the main issues."

Martha cut in. "What about Stresemann's treaty? If we reaffirm the loss of Alsace, the French might look the other way while we deal with Poland."

Von Papen sneered at her, opening his mouth to say something before he was quickly cut off by von Schleicher, who said, "You make a fair point, Lady von Lettow-Vorbeck, but France is in a fragile position, much like our own. It would not make sense to give up a card we hold unless we need to." Von Lettow-Vorbeck did not miss von Papen's initial reaction and his eyes narrowed slightly at the Catholic.

"The point is moot for now, regardless," von Lettow-Vorbeck declared, "we are in no position to revise Versailles and we must first stabilise the Reich before we can begin bringing others into our orbit. Let us wait and see if we can accomplish the former, first." This effectively brought the discussion to an end and he rose, lifting his daughter into his arms so that they could return home.

Before leaving, he shot a narrow-eyed glare at von Papen when the other man was not looking.





In the grand scale of things, the German support for the Ukraine did very little except for earning the perpetual ire of Polish nationalists and the remaining German Communists who trusted in Stalin's propoganda. While the Polish government did not explicitly attack the Ukrainian population in South-Eastern Poland, neither were they especially accommodating, often treating the native inhabitants like interlopers and attempting to enforce the Polish language and Roman Catholic faith on the people living there. Ukrainian separatism and nationalism was therefore repressed as much as the government could constitutionally achieve.

One minor event resulting from von Lettow-Vorbeck's support would be that the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, the largest and most important organisations-in-exile calling for an independent Ukraine, would move their official quarters from Vienna to Berlin. The group would spend much of May and June that year publically calling for war on Poland and eventually the USSR to create a free Greater Ukraine, but to little effect.

President Ignacy Mościcki of Poland was far from a fool. A multilingual chemist who grew up in Tsarist Russia before fleeing to London, he understood the complex web of geopolitics which now surrounded the Second Polish Republic. Freed from the collapsing Russian Empire by the Imperial German Army, newly-freed Poland—under the leadership of Józef Pilsudski—had fought a series of quick successive wars and uprisings against its neighbours in Germany, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and at last Soviet Russia itself to claim a state encompassing not just the majority of Polish-speaking lads, but even Polish-minority territories in White Russia and the Ukraine as well. A mix of sympathy for Poland as well as a desire to weaken the defeated Germany had earned Poland the region of West Prussia as well as portions of Upper Silesia in the Treaty of Versailles to help them grow their industrial might. While not all Polish claims had been fulfilled in Warsaw's favour—the majority of Upper Silesia, as well as Czech Silesia and East Prussian Masovia had been held from them—the current Polish state was the fulfilment of a century of Polish dreams and greater than many had dared to hope for.

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Map of Poland
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Polish_Republic#/media/File:PolishRepublicAdminMap1930.png)


It had been the goal of the 1920's to solidify the various formerly-separate regions, dialects, and religions into a cohesive whole, and the Poland of 1930 was a relatively stable nation compared to many of its neighbours. Now, however, the question emerged of Poland's future. Border disputes with Czechoslovakia had frozen Poland out of the Little Entente alliance of Eastern European states seeking to prevent revanchism, while outstanding issues with Germany and the Soviet Union made alliance with a neighbouring Great Power impossible. Britain and America were too distant and consumed with their own empires to care much for the young Polish state and France, Poland's traditional ally, had begun construction of the defensive Maginot Line which caused doubts in many politician's minds as to whether the French would invade Germany should the Germans do the same to Poland. Further insult came in the Locarno Treaties which were signed in 1925, Germany recognising the Franco-German border and France swearing to never send troops beyond the Rhineland with Britain guaranteeing both, as this treaty had effectively made it impossible for France to honour the Franco-Polish Defensive Alliance of 1921.

The most glaring dispute between Germany and Poland was Polish ownership of West Prussia, formerly the connection between mainland Germany and the now-disconnected East Prussian state, and in particular the Free City of Danzig under Polish protection. The Free City had been created by the victorious Entente following the Great War as a way to ensure Polish access to the sea, as the Vistula, Poland's main waterway, had its mouth along the borders of Danzig and could therefore be blocked if under German control. Danzig, formerly the capital of West Prussia, had an overwhelming German majority and sought to unify with their neighbours in East Prussia, and to prevent this had been made into a de facto Polish puppet. Many Polish statesmen sought to formally annex the region and President Mościcki (as well as his predecessors) had petitioned Britain and France many times to allow it, all to no end.

The replacement of President von Hindenburg with President von Lettow-Vorbeck was a breath of possibility for Mościcki. Von Hindenburg had staunchly opposed all motions towards reconciliation with Poland and had refused to abrogate German claims on West Prussia, Upper Silesia, and the former region of Posen. It was the previous regime which had begun the customs war which cut off Polish trade to Germany and which had badly damaged the Polish economy, something which Mościcki sought to rectify. A proverbial fire was lit under this idea when von Lettow-Vorbeck publicly endorsed Ukrainian Nationalism and pressure rose to solve the Ukrainian Question before instability seized the South-Eastern regions. In June of 1933, Mościcki bit the bullet and reached out to Berlin to begin talks on the formalisation of a Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact.





The Polish-German Summit of 1933 took place on August 17th, 1933, in the city of Marienburg just across the Nogat River from the Free City of Danzig. The choice of location, in particular the Ordensburg Marienburg (Marienburg Castle of the Teutonic Order), was a telling choice, given the castle's history as a construction of the Teutonic Order who served as the forefathers of Prussia, before being taken by Poland along with what was now West Prussia, before being again conquered by Brandenburg-Prussia and remaining part of the German realm from then on. President Mościcki was not ignorant of the message being sent by this when he arrived, nor the far more blatant messages shouted by East Prussian citizens at his car as it drove through the city. Poland and Prussia had been in conflict since its inception and, while he would have loved to at last bring it to an end here and now, he was not so arrogant nor foolish as to believe that generations of hatred could be undone with one treaty, even if it could miraculously fulfil the dreams of both parties.

Despite the circumstances, Mościcki couldn't help but admire the architecture and scope of the building as he made his way inside. The original fortress had been gradually built upon over centuries but pieces of the original were still visible all over. The black-and-white cross of the Teutonic Order stood alongside the Prussian eagle in many rooms, never having been removed by ensuing caretakers and rulers.

"President von Lettow-Vorbeck," he said in greeting upon passing into the foyer and coming face-to-face with the German President for the first time. Unlike in many of his photographs, the General was wearing a suit and tie, though they seemed to suit him less than his military fatigues. Several guards were posted along the edges of the room but the political clique that Mościcki had come to believe always surrounded him was curiously absent.

"President Mościcki," von Lettow-Vorbeck returned with a crinkly smile, grasping the other man's outstretched hand with both of his own and shaking vigorously. "I was very pleased that you reached out to my government for a meeting. Please, follow me."

800px-Ignacy_Mo%C5%9Bcicki_%28-1934%29_%28cropped%29.jpg

President Ignacy Mościcki of Poland, 1929
(https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ignacy_Mościcki#/media/Datei:Ignacy_Mościcki_(-1934)_(cropped).jpg)


Von Lettow-Vorbeck led the two of them deeper into the fortress, occasionally pointing out notable paintings or statues and giving a brief summary of the figure they depicted. It was a touch informal for the meeting and Mościcki wondered if it was designed to throw him off his game. It wouldn't work, of course—he had been through far more stressful diplomatic engagements than this—but it made the man wonder what the German had planned. Unlike many of his countrymen, Mościcki didn't hate Germans. He had a great deal of respect for their institutions, their devotion to science and innovation, and their hard-working natures. But this did not mean that he was willing to cave to them. It had been the machinations of Prussia which had seen Poland-Lithuania removed from the chessboard of Europe and which had cost them a century of development and spread. If Poland was to return to its natural position as a Great Power, they needed access to the sea and industry, both of which came at Germany's expense, just as the necessary territory had come from Russia and Austria. Poland might not have succeeded in claiming the majority of Silesia nor a larger coastline along the Baltic, but that which they did have they would never give an inch of.

Von Lettow-Vorbeck led them higher into the fortress until they arrived in a large room lined with large windows. In the distance the city of Danzig was visible and it once again felt very pointed as the two sat down at the large table there. Guards were posted around the room but otherwise the two were alone.

"I have no wish to make an enemy of Poland," von Lettow-Vorbeck began, diving right in without formality. Necessity dictated that the two converse in English, their only shared language; Mościcki had learned it while in exile in London and von Lettow-Vorbeck during his time in the army. "The same cannot be said for many in my country."
"I am well aware of that," Mościcki replied, thinking of the protesters outside. "There are some who would gladly sell their souls to see Poland wiped from the map."

Von Lettow-Vorbeck's lips curled in distaste, clearly imagining one such individual. "Imbeciles. They fail to realise that Poland and Germany are natural allies. Neither of us have any desire to see the Communist menace advance one metre further into Europe, and Poland is the barricade preventing that."

"Indeed." Mościcki drummed his fingers briefly on the wooden tabletop. "You know what it is that I want. This rivalry between our two nations has to end, especially this dreaded embargo you've held us under."

The German-Polish Customs War had been ongoing for almost a decade and it had been a real drain on the Polish economy. While it had helped push Polish businesses to increase their trade with other nations, the simple fact that none of them were industrialised enough to make use of the raw minerals which were now being mined in Polish Silesia. The core dilemma was that the customs war had badly hurt Poland and barely dented Germany.

"I completely understand," von Lettow-Vorbeck commiserated. "But you must also understand—the ore you mine is mined with German machines. Transported on German rails. How would it look to our people if we choose to purchase resources which are rightfully ours?"

"Was yours," Mościcki corrected somewhat harshly. "The people living there are the true determiner, and they are Poles through and through. They proved it in 1921 when they voted for Poland."

For the first time von Lettow-Vorbeck's genial expression broke and he scowled as he remembered the vote. "A luxury which was denied the Sudetenland and Austria," he snapped back harshly.

Mościcki suppressed a smirk as he got under the man's skin so easily. Von Lettow-Vorbeck might have been a truly tremendous general, but he was still a novice politician. "Apologies," he said, choosing not to push when he was the one who wanted something. "I did not mean to offend."

"You obviously did not come here with only a slip of paper and a hope that we would give you what you want. A promise of non-aggression and an end to our… economic conflict benefits Poland more than Germany, after all."

"Are you so sure about that? Do not forget that Germany is not the only one with unresolved claims. I am willing to ignore the German interference in the Masovian plebiscite and look past your continued aggression towards Gdansk."

"Danzig," von Lettow-Vorbeck stressed the German name for the city, "is a prerequisite for any treaty, as is the Corridor. I can perhaps ignore the matter of Upper Silesia but the Corridor is a blight which must be undone."

"Polish access to the sea is non-negotiable."

Von Lettow-Vorbeck was clearly getting agitated because he rose and crossed to the windows, looking out across the river. "You bring nothing and expect me to sign over integral parts of Prussia?" he demanded.

Mościcki kept his expression neutral. "Don't forget our relative positions. The German army is in a pitiful state and you have few friends. If Polish troops were to march into Königsberg tomorrow… well, you wouldn't be able to muster much of a force to stop us."

Von Lettow-Vorbeck whirled, eyes wide. "Is that a threat?"

"Of course not, simply an observation. You need friends and we need assurances that we will not be stabbed in the back should the Soviets make a move against us. I may even be able to offer support against future actions against Austria. If it assauges your patriotic spirit, this will only be for a decade or so." Mościcki refrained from mentioning the obvious fact that even if von Lettow-Vorbeck was still around in ten years he very likely would not be President, and even if he was, that would mark ten extra years for Poland to prepare for a German attack. "We can offer priority in trade, support against Lithuania if you try to retake the Klaipeda region, and military access across the Corridor. Surely that it more than generous for a treaty which benefits us both."

The general shook his head. "A decade is too long for German subjects to suffer under Polish rule."

Mościcki was beginning to get a bit annoyed now. "And what of the Poles who suffered under Prussia and the German Empire? What of the Poles who still today work for paltry wages in Silesia and Masovia?"

"You say that while speaking so flippantly of Danzig!?"

"Gdansk will remain under Polish protection for the foreseeable future." Mościcki rose to his feet, narrowing his gaze at von Lettow-Vorbeck. "And all the better for it, I would wager. If this is the sort of leadership the German people would entrust with their future then clearly Poland has nothing to fear."

The two stared at each other from across the room, expressions level but the air almost boiling from the tension. Both were patriots who would do anything for their country and neither would give on the things which mattered to him.

"I think we are done here," the German President declared. He turned and barked something at one of the guards in that hideous tongue of the Germans and the doors behind Mościcki were pushed open, the clear message being that it was time to go.

"I hope you are prepared for how the history books will mark you," Mościcki added as a last parting barb as he crossed the threshold. "History is particularly unkind to tyrants and oppressors, and God even less so."

"You keep to your history books, I will trust in blood and steel, and we will see who comes out on top," President von Lettow-Vorbeck shot back.

President Mościcki returned to his car, this time not sparing a glance at the reliefs which lined the wall. It did not matter anyway; he would have ample time to view them when this place, along with the rest of East Prussia, was back in Polish hands where it belonged.





The Second Polish Republic is a state often linked with racism and oppression, though this is not entirely fair as that characteristic ebbed and flowed through the duration of the state's life, peaking in the beginning, ebbing during the late 20's, and seeing a new rise in the 30's and beyond.
The rebirth of Poland in 1918 had been closely followed by a wave of Nationalism and racism, a century of suppressed cultural pride now erupting to damning results. Jews were hit especially hard by this and pogroms grew terrifyingly commonplace, as did persecution and expulsion of Germans, Lithuanians, Czechs, and other minorities deemed potentially "disloyal". This persecution grew so horrifying that the same Entente powers who had guaranteed Polish independence were now forced to intervene and Poland was forced to sign a treaty guaranteeing the respect of minorities and allowing for cultural autonomy (the same treaty was later extended to Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, all of whom had also acquired large minorities in the Great War). It was a humiliation for Poland but not one which they could rightfully refute when those same powers were the reason for Poland's security. The situation had been made even more complicated when the Polish-Soviet War pushed the Polish border deep into land occupied by Ukranians and Byelorussians, gaining them even more minorities as well as an even greater number of Jews. By 1931, Poland would have the second largest Jewish population in the world, containing within its borders a fifth of all Jews.
Much like in Germany, Jews were seen as untrustworthy; however, in Poland, this untrustworthiness was just as much tied to the perceived "German-ness" of Jews as it was to preexisting stereotypes and bias. The dominant language of European Jews was Yiddish, a language closely related to (and to a high extent mutually intelligible with) German. To many Poles, Jews would naturally be more loyal to Berlin than they ever would to Warsaw, and this perception was not helped by the generally anti-semitic stance of the Catholic Church which dominated Polish culture. The Catholic Church had provided early and extensive support for the young Polish Republic, optimistic at a new Catholic nation amidst a growing tide of atheism and Protestantism, and played a large role in education and governance which contributed to a parallel rise in Polish-centric Nationalism.
Prior to the Great War, talk of the restoration of Poland had been dominated by two concepts, the "Piast Concept" and the "Jagiellon Concept". The Piast Concept, named for the first ruling family of Poland over a thousand years before, focused on the perceived Western European nature of Poland and elevated the Polish state in contrast to the "savages" in Russia and the Baltics. This concept promoted a smaller, ethnically pure, industrial Polish nation-state akin to Germany or Italy; consequently, this idea focused on taking the industrialised Silesia and perhaps even parts of Pomerania from Germany to boost Poland towards this goal, expelling or assimilating the German population there.(1)
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Piast Poland
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histo...st_dynasty#/media/File:Polska_1102_-_1138.png)


The Jagiellon Concept, in contrast, prioritised Poland at its peak in territory under the Jagiellon dynasty, when Polish kings had sat upon the thrones of Lithuania, Hungary, and Bohemia. The goal of the Jagiellon faction was to focus on a larger, more multi-ethnic Polish Commonwealth influencing Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Polish language and culture would be dominant, but other Eastern peoples would continue to exist with cultural autonomy within the framework of this larger state. As one might expect, while the Piast Concept demanded the greatest sacrifice from Germany to come to pass, the Jagiellon Concept pitted Poland against the might of Russia.

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Jagiellon Poland
(https://cdn.britannica.com/11/64911-050-FB5521BC/Areas-dynasty-Jagiellon.jpg)


Józef Pilsudski, the man who led Poland against the Soviet Union and considered by many to be the father of the Polish Republic, had been an adherent of the Jagiellon Concept. Had he gotten his wish, the Second Polish Republic would have extended to the Black Sea and included most or all of what became Lithuania and the Belorussian and Ukrainian SSRs. Despite this dream not coming to fruition, his influence on the Second Polish Republic was felt in a deeply anti-Russian sentiment which dominated the Polish government. Though few were pro-German, some saw Germany as a preferable option—after all, Germany claimed parts of Western Poland, but Russia claimed nearly all of it, not to mention the fear of the Communist government which would come along with it.

Pilsudski was to Poland what Otto von Bismarck had been to Germany, a figure of tremendous political weight whose mere presence was enough to swing the pendulums of power and opinion. It was his influence that helped prop up the so-called “Sanationist” regime, one focused on a strong, authoritarian government capable of “sanitising” the perceived corruption in the Polish state and considered by many to be the reason that the regime enjoyed its widespread support. Even retiring hadn’t been enough to fully free him from politics and he would be quickly dragged back in by loyalists such as Ignacy Mościcki.

The Second Polish Republic was a Secondary power striving to become a Great one. Territorial gains in Europe were not enough, and talks had begun with various colonial powers about the possibility of Poland purchasing a colony off of them. Poland might have been prevented from claiming an empire in the 1800’s, but they could and would try to make up for it now.





(1) This concept would be used by Stalin to justify the Polish annexation of massive swathes of German territory following World War II IRL.

This chapter marks the first ripples of von Lettow-Vorbeck's presidency reaching the outside world, namely that the German-Polish Non-Aggression Declaration (made IRL between Hitler and Poland) will not come to pass. Von Lettow-Vorbeck is fully unwilling to negotiate one the matter of Prussia and that inflexibility -- owing to his personal devotion to the notion of Prussia and the Empire -- will cost him several friends. This is also important because something which I want to make clear is that von Lettow-Vorbeck is not a politician. He is a brilliant tactician, but he lacks that flexibility which politicians like Bismarck possessed which were focused on reshaping both means and goals. Von Lettow-Vorbeck has his goals, and unless he is put into a position where he has no other choice, he will not waver from them. He is a rock, both stable and stubborn.
 
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This won’t end well for Poland long term, but at the same time a hostile Poland will be a problem for Germany if they intend to credibly oppose the Soviets.

I do really like how this timeline manages to avoid glorifying or wanking LV and the Junkers in general.
 
This won’t end well for Poland long term, but at the same time a hostile Poland will be a problem for Germany if they intend to credibly oppose the Soviets.

I do really like how this timeline manages to avoid glorifying or wanking LV and the Junkers in general.
I originally really wanted to resolve the issue of Polish-German hostilities but, honestly, neither side was willing to make the needed and realistic concessions which would have actually brought peace. A hostile Poland is also an issue if Germany has any desire to renegotiate their claims in other parts of Europe, given Poland's proximity to the industrial base of Silesia and of course Berlin itself.

As for LV and the Junkers, that is something I am struggling to keep a balance on. I am trying to make it clear that by the 21st century in this timeline, LV will be a contentious figure, remembered for some great and some terrible things. He is better than Hitler, but that does not make him good. He is far from perfect in a lot of ways, but he benefits from the fact that most leaders in this era are all terrible in some manner, somewhat akin to Churchill IRL.
 
Does anyone know the average work hours in a week for Europeans before Hitler? For example, if a law was to be passed to restrict working hours to a more reasonable amount, would the goal be as high as 50, or was it already lower?
 

TheSpectacledCloth

Gone Fishin'
Does anyone know the average work hours in a week for Europeans before Hitler? For example, if a law was to be passed to restrict working hours to a more reasonable amount, would the goal be as high as 50, or was it already lower?
8 hours per day and 6 days a week. It often was between 40 and 50 hours a week.
 
did a little more research, and in the Netherlands there were already calls for a 40hr work week in the 1930s.
Of course the war came in between and things were delayed, and 45hrs was obtained in the 1950s, and 40hrs in the (late) 1960s
 
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did a little more research, and in the Netherlands there were already calls for a 40hr work week in the 1930s.
Of course the war came in between and things were delayed, and 45hrs was obtained in the 1950s, and 40hrs in the 1960s
So then by that logic it seems that something like a 44 (as @gradje Helpfully pointed out) would be a goal in Germany as a legally protected absolute maximum, with many already using a 40 hr standard. Just because it seems the trend for the legally protected hours to be slightly more than what the common norm is.
 
So then by that logic it seems that something like a 44 (as @gradje Helpfully pointed out) would be a goal in Germany as a legally protected absolute maximum, with many already using a 40 hr standard. Just because it seems the trend for the legally protected hours to be slightly more than what the common norm is.
yes, but the calls for 40 hrs would be something as a bait.
Ask for more, then you can compromise on that 44 so that everybody can be equally (un)happy.
That has been a standard negotiating tactic for a long time after all.
 
yes, but the calls for 40 hrs would be something as a bait.
Ask for more, then you can compromise on that 44 so that everybody can be equally (un)happy.
That has been a standard negotiating tactic for a long time after all.
That makes sense. It won't be a major point, it is just one of the throwaway concessions which von Lettow-Vorbeck grants to the liberals to keep them... not content, exactly, but not actively out to oppose him. But I wanted to make sure it made sense.
 
How would Germany rearm ITTL?
German rearmament is planned in phases. The first phase, the one which von Lettow-Vorbeck and von Schleicher considered imperative, was the formation of a home defence league loyal to the government, which was the Reichspolizei. The point of this is to ensure that, in the event of a sudden war, Germany won't be left utterly defenceless.

Phase two is not currently in the works due to economic concerns, and, according to expectations within the government, won't be viable to begin until, at the earliest, 1935, which is when they are hoping to have the main damages of the Depression fully handled (a prerequisite for any rearmament). This phase will feature a proper overhaul of the army to modernise their planning and technology, much like the Reichspolizei, and begin properly shoring up their armed forces towards the goal closer to their 1914 size.

Phase three is the more experimental phase, and will begin not when two is done, but once it is clear that two is underway and isn't going to trigger invasion by the Entente. This phase focuses on investment in new technologies and the formation of a more formidable air force, tanks, and new doctrines specifically targeting nations like Poland and France.

If all goes as planned, they are hoping to have an army equal to Poland by 1940 and France by 1943 or 1944.

(If anyone has more ideas on rearmament please let me know, this idea is still quite rough and I am far from a military expert)
 
German rearmament is planned in phases. The first phase, the one which von Lettow-Vorbeck and von Schleicher considered imperative, was the formation of a home defence league loyal to the government, which was the Reichspolizei. The point of this is to ensure that, in the event of a sudden war, Germany won't be left utterly defenceless.

Phase two is not currently in the works due to economic concerns, and, according to expectations within the government, won't be viable to begin until, at the earliest, 1935, which is when they are hoping to have the main damages of the Depression fully handled (a prerequisite for any rearmament). This phase will feature a proper overhaul of the army to modernise their planning and technology, much like the Reichspolizei, and begin properly shoring up their armed forces towards the goal closer to their 1914 size.

Phase three is the more experimental phase, and will begin not when two is done, but once it is clear that two is underway and isn't going to trigger invasion by the Entente. This phase focuses on investment in new technologies and the formation of a more formidable air force, tanks, and new doctrines specifically targeting nations like Poland and France.

If all goes as planned, they are hoping to have an army equal to Poland by 1940 and France by 1943 or 1944.

(If anyone has more ideas on rearmament please let me know, this idea is still quite rough and I am far from a military expert)
Ok, phase one sounds alright, and so does prioritizing economic recovery over military expansion. I would say that the proposed phases 2 and 3 don't quite make sense. Expanding the army size without accounting for proper doctrine and equipment would leave you with a bloated, obsolete army that would be as costly as useless at the end of phase 2.

With how badly the summit with the Polish president went, I'd say the first order of priority would be an army that can beat Poland. I think LV is smart enough to realize that if France enters the war so does England, which also means that the war is lost before it even begins, so the planning will mostly be focused on beating Poland alone while focusing diplomacy to keep France and the UK out. That also means that you don't need a massive, 1914 style army for the time being, as Poland is a decidedly inferior opponent.

About how actual rearmament would proceed, I'd say rather than expansion, the first thing to invest in would be the potential for expansion. Restart NCO training beyond the necessary levels for the current army, so that the army can adapt to a quick influx of recruits if necessary. Expanding industrial capabilities is a kinda obvious one and something that would be done even without the need for rearmament, but having preparations for a quick shift to war economy can't hurt. Funding officers and think tanks to develop doctrine and fomenting open discussion (open inside the army, not necessarily with the rest of the world) would be helpful.

The first proper expansion should probably be done with the end goal of an army limited in size that punches above its weight, and reintroducing conscription to have a pool of reserves to pull from if it comes to it. From there, just take it as quick as resources allow without ruining the economy.
 
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