Another interesting story so I'm looking forward to this TL continued. So is the main reason of Christanity being targeted is because it's western and seen possibly as a tool to destablize the nation.
And yes, Christianity is seen as being disruptive - the Qing have many strengths but among their weaknesses is their medieval attitudes towards religion. They mostly have a live and let live policy these days but that includes restrictions on evangelising (which is seen as a potential vector of foreign influence). The Oriental Orthodox faiths allied closest to the Qing grumble more and more about it though. There's also a small but slightly growing community of Qing citizens who converted overseas and came home
And yes, Christianity is seen as being disruptive - the Qing have many strengths but among their weaknesses is their medieval attitudes towards religion. They mostly have a live and let live policy these days but that includes restrictions on evangelising (which is seen as a potential vector of foreign influence). The Oriental Orthodox faiths allied closest to the Qing grumble more and more about it though. There's also a small but slightly growing community of Qing citizens who converted overseas and came home
So they'll probably moderate a bit. That view can definitely be understood especially in OTL where spreading the faith went hand in hand with colonialism with that quote about what happened when missionaries came to Africa. In regards to the Imperial Family have there been any "scandals" like in Britain where a member of the Imperial Family shocks everyone with a marriage that is disliked for various reasons.
So they'll probably moderate a bit. That view can definitely be understood especially in OTL where spreading the faith went hand in hand with colonialism with that quote about what happened when missionaries came to Africa. In regards to the Imperial Family have there been any "scandals" like in Britain where a member of the Imperial Family shocks everyone with a marriage that is disliked for various reasons.
There was one in the 20th century, which was part of the overall decline of the house. Spoilers though it's key to the very contested political and royal legacy of that period. The elites were furious and the average commoner was blissfully unaware until Yuzhang's reform period, and then after that it was generally Not Something To Be Discussed. After the sequence of bad emperors and heirs that lasted the better part of a century from the late 1800s to mid-1900s, the government eased up in marriage requirements and cleaned up their image, and things have been better since.
When looking through the thread, I noticed you mention in TTL Korea is basically to China what Canada to USA so are there any jokes about Korea essentially being another extension of the Qing given the fact that there are likely to be so many cultural similarities that people don't know the differences. Also intervention in Japan that's very interesting and I can't wait to see what that entails though I think there's a good chance it's allying with the modernizing faction of Japan to have stronger vassals to help fight off the Europeans.
This TL reminds me of one from some years back called "When China rules the world" in the Future History section, except that one was talking about a benevolent hegemony under the PRC, not the Qing.
I've only skimmed over a couple of the entries so far, but it looks great. Especially appreciate the little cultural details.
Yongzheng would die soon after the Chingunjav rebellion of heart failure. While he had many wives and even loved some of them, his true soulmate was the Great Qing and the mountain of paperwork it generated for him.
This TL reminds me of one from some years back called "When China rules the world" in the Future History section, except that one was talking about a benevolent hegemony under the PRC
When looking through the thread, I noticed you mention in TTL Korea is basically to China what Canada to USA so are there any jokes about Korea essentially being another extension of the Qing given the fact that there are likely to be so many cultural similarities that people don't know the differences. Also intervention in Japan that's very interesting and I can't wait to see what that entails though I think there's a good chance it's allying with the modernizing faction of Japan to have stronger vassals to help fight off the Europeans.
Korea is the somewhat more conservative little brother of the Qing and definitely overlooked ITTL. Unlike Japan or Vietnam there isn't really a lot to distinguish them ITTL from the more conservatively Confucian parts of the Qing, They're well off but somewhat insular and as a result not very relevant to the story as planned out.
Yongzheng and Qianlong, perhaps the two greatest emperors of any nation in the history of the world, blessed the Qing with their successive reigns. Yet some have suggested they, as the Americans put it, were born on third base and thought they did a home run.
It is true that they inherited a great empire from Kangxi, the largest in the world by population - but in that greatness lay one of their many challenges. The Chinese core was overpopulated. The silk farms of Jiangsu were crowded and operating on thin margins, farmers were beginning to run out of land for their children to inherit, and even the inefficient ironworks could barely afford to hire more people even as prices rose to absurd heights. More and more scholars passed the exam every year, only to have to languish in unemployment as they waited for an open job. More and more youths were forced to turn against Confucian tradition by becoming Buddhist monks and itinerant beggers, ending their family lineage in disgrace and depriving the state of tax. More and more foreign ingots entered the Qing, weakening their self-reliance. Without state intervention unemployment would only rise to crippling levels even as farmland would be overworked and the price of commodities would crash
Seeing the danger of this Yongzheng and Qianlong acted decisively. Most of their wise reforms, such as the renewed state monopoly on iron and the introduction of foreign tools, were relatively uncontroversial. The same cannot be said for their most ambitious policy, to sponsor migration from the overcrowded and strained Chinese core to the frontier.
Not the inland frontier where Han settlers were already arriving to farm thin hilltop soil and fight with the tribes who barely recognised the authority of Beijing, but the northern frontier. In 1740 when the Yongzheng Emperor first legalised migration "beyond the pass" that separated Manchuria from the Han, 300,000 Han farmers, craftsmen, and merchants would flock to Mongolia and Manchuria to start new lives. That number would peak at a million by 1748 and remain steady for the next decade. The Orkhon Valley and Liao River would be the centre of a new network of market towns. Even the distant Amur River would turn from frontier to hub, shipping not only food but furs and lumber south. Industry would follow, with smiths and tanners and even a modern cannery bringing Chinese civilisation to the frontier. Great roads funded by the overflowing treasury of Yongzheng would link them all together, and it became possible for a fisherman to haul in a catch in the morning at Yongmingcheng's Haishenwai District, have it salted and smoked in the afternoon, and delivered to the masses of Beijing two days later.
OTL Maps for context
There was of course resistance. Manchu and Mongol princes resented the loss of their traditional privileges as Han settlers and companies extended their grasp. In 1756 the Mongol General Chingunjav would lead an uprising in Outer Mongolia. Enraged by Mongol debt to Han companies and the first wave of settlers he would rally thousands of Khalkha Mongol warriors to attempt to secede. The ageing Yongzheng Emperor, having just returned from the funeral of his beloved friend Amursana following the Dzungar Khan’s tragic accidental death just outside Beijing, was in no mood to tolerate even a small challenge to his authority. Chingunjav’s rebellion was put down by a mixture of Khalkha and Dzungar warriors, selected to show the continued support of the Mongol people for the Great Qing. The rebellion would last less than a year, ending in 1757. While Yongzheng would be restrained towards the people he would be ruthless in breaking Mongolian power. Khalkha generals would find themselves watched by Han and even Dzungar officers. Most Mongolian nobles would find themselves invited to Beijing regularly, and the emperor would increase the frequency of princely visits, greatly draining their treasury while strengtheneing Qing surveillance. The Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, senior Buddhist incarnation of the Outer Mongolians, would be forced to reside along with the Changkya Khutuktu in Uliastai and surrounded by Manchu warriors. Even the Dalai Lama would join the response, reminding the nation that the Yongzheng was not only Emperor Manjushri the earthly manifestation of the Buddha of Wisdom, but also the Chakravarti, the great wheel turner and ruler of the world.
Most of the Mongolians accepted this measured response but some insisted on continued disobedience. When bandits were put down and loyalists raised up with wealth the discontent turned to words. Rumours would spread, rumours that the Qing general Amursana had conspired with Chingunjav and planned to lead a Dzungar rebellion to restore their Khanate. Rumours that Yongzheng had him murdered and tried to kill Chingunjav too. Rumours that were of course deemed treasonous with anyone caught spreading such slander arrested at once.
What is however known to be true is that after the death of Amursana the increasingly modernised and sedentary Dzungars would contribute their farmers and army to the Great Qing, helping greatly to check the other Mongolian tribes and Central Asian khanates.
Amursana the hero, painted here bravely leading Qing loyalists.
Yongzheng would die soon after the Chingunjav rebellion of heart failure. While he had many wives and even loved some of them, his true soulmate was the Great Qing and the mountain of paperwork it generated for him. The administration of 1758 was his creation, the most expansive government since the Mongol Yuan, a bureaucracy expanded tenfold. All the government rushed to obey his commands, admiring of his intellect and terrified of his harsh punishments, while the people chanted his name as he toured the nation and thanked him the prosperity he brought. Already elderly and overworked, the strain of Mongolian rebellions would push him into passing at the age of 79. After an appropriate period of mourning Qianlong ascended to the throne, and vowed to continue his fathers work.
But recognising that his father’s boundless energy and drive for development was not sustainable for the empire, Qianlong offered a number of concessions. Mongol debt would be forgiven, key land set aside for Manchu estates and Mongolian pastures, and most importantly Mongolian and Manchu land was guaranteed to be governed by local peoples for all time. There were just the first of his reforms towards a more open and liberal government inspired by the Great Song and idealised tales of western government, but they were also some of his longest lasting. Even in 2024 the Great Qing still mandates that in Manchu, Mongol, Turkic, and Tibetan regions the majority of administrative roles are filled by registered local ethnicities.
These migration reforms and the ethnic favouritism that counterbalanced them were controversial at the time, but they set the balance of industrial power and social respect that have made the Qing great. Without the Yongzheng Emperor insightful decision to normalise internal migrations, Qing China would have been left vulnerable to the growing power of western empires like Russia, Britain, and America. This chapter is, as the title says, a prelude to a series of incoming chapters about how the revitalised Qing would face off against the barbariansforeigners other nations of the world. This timeline will be focused on the 1800s for the foreseeable future before moving into the 1900s and the World War, with occasionally chapters refocusing on the modern day.
Yongmingcheng or "city of eternal light" the Yuan name for a settlement at OTL Vladivostok. The Qing name, Cucumber cliffs (Haishenwai) lacked gravitas so when the settlement expanded the city was restored to its Yuan name with Haishenwai just one of several districts. Thanks for catching that @sarapen
This, post #33, is the "master key" to the Qing domestic reform program, that gives them the internal basis for geopolitical endurance, industrialization, survival, and superpowerdom.
While not spelling out all details, it grabs from the discussion thread that precedes this main timeline, story, and vignette thread, with the core developmental reform being the tenfold expansion of the bureaucracy in 1758, thus addressing the central weakness of overly small government, not keeping up with massively burgeoning population in the 18th century, that was cited in that thread. As a matter of power-political stability the expansion of government officialdom helps in a quite simple way. In Lyndon Johnson's colorful turn of phrase, it increases the number of ambitious, intelligent men who are "inside the tent, pissing out, instead of outside the tent, pissing in". With more ambitious, intelligent men passing the imperial exams and serving the state, they are yes, collecting imperial salaries, but they are also collecting imperial revenues, overseeing their peers, superiors, and subordinates instead of rebelling or collecting "dues" after their dream has been so long deferred. The value of necessary public goods being administered into existence and useful projects being pursued should outweigh the detriment of some government bloat and funding of some government boondoggles.
Specific key political Qing dynasty events are altered too. Yongzheng's life is being extended 20 to thirty years. Also, the final Dzunghar war and genocide of the late 1750s with Amursana leading the Dzunghar side, does not appear to be happening. Instead, Amursana and his Dzunghars appear to be dynasty loyal, through and through, and they help suppress a rebellion by *other* Mongols. The exact timing of the Tibet and Xinjiang absorption is not quite made clear.
Qianlong takes over, older, maybe a little wiser, and certainly with more state capacity.
The other big reform is legalization and support of Han migration to Manchuria in 1740, this is something like a century or more in advance of OTL, leading to a better balance between the empire's human labor and land and other natural resources. Outer Manchuria, Haishenwai, will be way too developed for Russia to ever take over and becomes the center of a fish cannery industry. By the way, how did fish "canneries" work in the 18th century? The all-metal can hadn't been invented yet, right? Weren't things "canned" more in airtight sealed picle jars or pots instead?
In 1800, the Russian Empire would on paper reach from the Baltics to the Pacific, the largest contiguous empire in the world. Its border with the Great Qing would be the centre of economic activity that made the Tsar one of the richest monarchs in the world.
In 1900 Russia would be constrained between the Yenisei and the Gulf of Finland, and yet the average Russian would enjoy a quality of life unmatched in their history. But to explain Russia’s rapid changes we must look back to their roots in the decisions of the Yongzheng and Qianlong Emperors.
Frontier Settlement:
The Qng-Russian border was now a developed and densely populated region thanks to Yongzheng. With the conquest of the Dzungar Khanate nearly all of Russian Siberia now bordered a populated region of China. Dzungaria itself would be split between Oirat Mongolians in the province of Dzungaria and Uyghur Muslims in the province of Altishahr, and the Silk Road reopened. At first the newly stable border and the trade that flowed was a massive boon to the Russians and while the Qing had little interest in the cold and distant Siberian plateau they were more than happy to take the silver of Russian caravans in exchange for porcelain, woodcrafts, and of course tea.
The Russian invasion of Qajari Iran would change that. Russia would ruthlessly expand their border to the Caucuses mountain, raising concerns across Europe and Asia. Britain, still concerned of how Russian expansion could threaten their vital India colonies, would respond and the two would be plunged into what they cynically called the Great Game. Thinking of the Qing as a distant and benevolent partner they would not realise how their actions would be evaluated in Beijing, unintentionally dragging China with them and only realising too late that a lion and a bear are nothing next to a dragon.
Qajari Iran after Russian invasion
Part of this complacency was their limited knowledge of the court. The understanding in Europe was based more on propaganda and gossip than fact. As far as they knew, in the 1800 Qing’s official view of the world was still firmly rooted in sinocentrism. All land was the property of the emperor, delegated to the bureaucracy of the Great Qing, to their vassals, or held by barbarians. Border changes were of little concern.
Unknown to the Europeans and unofficially, the court was well aware that European powers had significant military and economic power that combined could overwhelm the still reforming Qing. While only a few recognised Russian expansion into Qajari Iran as a threat at first, the onset of European disputes would raise concerns of how it might affect Chinese trade and security. Any war in Asia could disrupt the revived Silk Road or threaten the Qing with a flood of refugees and bandits. Maintaining a buffer was essential to protect the Great Qing.
It wasn’t all doom. The newly enthroned Jiaqing Emperor also saw an opportunity to protect China and enrich his subjects by ending trade restrictions and opening cities all along the coast to the barbarians.
Three directions were understood by Qianlong and his successor Jiaqing as critical. Firstly the south sea, where British, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, and French influence was spreading. Secondly Central Asia, long a trade centre but fragmented from the Kazakh war with the Dzungars and Russian influence. And finally the long northern frontier. Of these three the latter two would shape Qing-Russian relations the most.
Central Asia:
Central Asia in 1800, senior Juz marked to show turcosphere
The two independent Kazakh leaders, the Junior and Middle Juz, had been disunited since the death of Ablai Khan - a situation that in 1800 Jiaqing could no longer tolerate. The Kazakhs were the easiest of the Central Asian tribes for China to reach, and the most powerful. They needed to be brought into the Qing tributary system and fortified as a wall against Russia and Britain.
Kazakhs from the third Senior Juz had been taken under Qing rule following the conquest of the Dzungars, and these Senior Juz steppe princes were sent by the emperor to bring gifts to their brothers. 1,000 rifles, 1,000 pieces of porcelain, and 1,000 silk robes, and the promise of more to come in exchange for support.
The independent Kazakh Juz were overwhelmed by this generosity - and threatened. Not desiring to trade one master for another and not persuaded by their unenthusiastic Senior Juz brothers, they kept their distance even as the Qing continued to offer a protectorate. While Qing interest was restrained, it kept Russia from further entrenching itself for three decades, with the Russian tribunal at Petropavlovsk disbanded and Russia unable to project further influence. But the British invasion of Afghanistan in 1832 and the growing power of the Kokand Khanate to their south would finally force the Kazakhs to act. Preferring the Qing, who did not interfere unduly, the two Juz would swear allegiance. Kenesary Qasymūly, grandson of Ablai Khan, would ascend to become Khan of the Kazakhs and would be granted special trading privileges with the Qing Kazakhs and turks.
Kenesary would remain a vassal of the Qing until his death in 1883 at the advanced age of 81. Under his rule the Kazakhs would become a firm ally of the Great Qing, and would use Qing wealth to expand their khanate to include Khiva, Bukhara, Kokand, and the Turkmens. Kenesary would be remembered as the great moderniser of the Turks and a firm ally to all in the Tianxia Network, and his death would see widespread mourning - as well as radical shifts and a new government in the increasingly modernised central asia.
A statue of Kenesary Qasymūly in Samarkand, capital of the Republic of Turan
Siberia and Buryatia:
Buryatia in the time of Genghis, the northern reach of the Mongols
With the subjugation of the Dzunghars came unquestioned dominance over almost all of the Mongolians. The exception were the Buryats, who in 1689 and 1727 had been formally annexed and in 1800 were finding themselves encroached upon by Russian forts and frontiersmen. Siberia was still far from the grip of St Petersburg and the Tsar though, and the Qing had time to assert their claim as heirs of Genghis. Jiaqing supported this for three reasons:
The first was that Lake Baikal, the centre of the Buryat realm and the northern reach of the classic Mongolian civilisation, was a rich land to claim. Baikal is the largest freshwater lake in the world and could easily support a new Qing province.
The second was politics, both international and domestic. Jiaqing supported openness to foreign trade, but he also feared that they would push on outer territories like Taiwan, Tibet, and the previously restless Mongols. Seizing control of Baikal would not only show European empires that the Qing were a growing empire, but also satisfy the Mongol need for military glory and reassure them that the Qing had their interests at heart.
The third was tradition and Jiaqing’s desire for personal glory. The Sinosphere had many definitions such as culture and philosophy, but the most lasting geographic definition was the concept of the Four Sea. Three of the four had been bought under Qing direct rule;
The East China Sea/Eastern Sea
The South China Sea/Southern Sea
Lake Qinghai/Western Sea
The fourth traditional frontier, Lake Baikal, had been separated from Mongol and thus Qing rule by Russia. Retaking this land would prove that the Qing were the greatest of all the Chinese dynasties, and restrain Russian expansion. And more importantly it would earn Jiaqing a place in the annals of history beside his grandfather and father, both great warriors.
Unlike with the Kazakhs there were no strong rulers for the Qing to support. The Buryats were divided in two by Russian influence. Direct involvement would be necessary.
The Qing declaration in 1805 that they formally repudiated Russian treaties annexing Buryatia sent shockwaves throughout Europe. They claimed that as the rulers of all China, both inner and outer, they and they alone could speak for the Mongolians, and that any treaty which did not include them was invalid. The Qing army were the worlds largest, and while some border troops still languished, the army as a whole was also considered the worlds second finest behind the French.
Each of the Eight Banners, the infantry core of the Qing Army before Xianfeng’s reign, consisted of 3 Kusai - one Han, one Mongol, and one Manchu section. Each Kusai had five battalions of 1,500 men, for a total of 7,500 soldiers in each Kusai and 180,000 soldiers in total. Qianlong’s industrial reforms had ensured that every Kusai was fully equipped with modern firearms, cannons, and an average of 4 horses per soldier. The Dzungar warriors who submitted found themselves recruited to fill the ranks of understrength Kusai, not only ensuring that on-paper strength matched reality but easing the integration of the Dzungars into the empire. Altishahr and Tibet were organised separately at this point in time as the Altishahr and Tibetan Regiments but would later be fully integrated and modernised.
Banners of the Great Qing, still in symbolic use in 2024
Despite this however the Qing refrained from entering the war directly. They had been listening to European traders, and they felt they could afford to wait a year. And in 1806 they would be proven right. The War of the Fourth Coalition had begun as Russia watched Napoleon march towards their heartland across Central Europe. Leaping on the opportunity, the Qing again vocally rejected the notion of Russian suzerainty in Buryat and demanded an Russian withdrawal before the year was out.
Facing a war on two fronts, the Russians weighed which was more important: their urban and economic centre in the west, or some forts and fur traders in the east. Deciding to cut their losses they sold their claim over Buryat to the Qing in exchange for the modern equivalent of 300 million Yuan. In 1807 Mongolian Kusai would enter Buryat, gently evicting the Cossack Garrison and tearing down the Russian flag. The Buryats would be organised into a new province, ruled separately from Uliastai and the “Outer Mongolians”.
The loss of Buryatia would cripple Russian expansion into the Siberian Plateau, and in 1822, 1825, and finally 1833 in conjunction with the Kazakhs, the Qing would purchase or intimidate the Russians out of all claims east of the Yenisei. This would not be the end of their retreat from the world, as a temporarily resurgent Iran would later retake what was stolen in the northern Caucasus, Sweden would sponsor an independent Finland in 1854, and the Austrian-led German Empire would force the Russia into a merely overlord role in 1870 as part of the war of German Unification. In 1869 Russia’s borders would change for the last time, with Karelia taken by Sweden to join their Finnish Protectorate.
This cycle of defeat, starting with the Qing, would break the power of the Tsars, who would find themselves forced to withdraw entirely from the Baltic states and viciously overthrown by a coalition of Russian reformers, Ukrainian nationalists, and ideologues ranging from socialists to conservative militarists. This shaky coalition was immediately on the verge of collapse of course, as the Duma descended into fistfights and paramilitaries stared each other down. Ironically the World War, which broke so many empires, would prove the still unnamed new federation's saving grace, as the country united to guard their border and the economy focused on rebuilding. Ironically much of this development would be financed by the Qing, desperate to delay the oncoming Great Depression with expansion into new and neutral markets. Sitting as the border between Asia and Europe, the Russians had the chance to leverage their geography into a position in the 20th century as one the leading secondary powers of Europe. This is the first of a sequence of chapters about the politics of the 1800s so if there's anything you like or dislike please let me know. This is my first timeline and I'm admittedly overwhelmed by expanding beyond my comfort zone of China so areas for improvement are welcome. I start a new job in two weeks so I'm trying to focus on these short and digestable chapters for now.
I tried to give as many specific numbers as possible. 300 million yuan ITTL is 300 million USD OTL for now (Lazy I know)
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are co-equal members of the Union. I know a lot of people wanted full independence for Ukraine and Belarus, and they probably would have broken away if the Tsar survived to enter the World War, but instead they formed a 'more perfect union'. Seemed happier this way
The modern Union of Vostoslav Republics, consisting of Belarus, Ukraine, and a Russia split between their Asian and European halves, is one of the greatest success stories of postwar Europe. One of the few liberal democratic republics, they stand opposed to both the modern authoritarianism of the Ultramodernists and the "renovated traditionalism" of the Qing-led Tianxia Network. In 2024 relations with the Qing are warm verging on friendly, but their closest ally is the United States of America, leader of the revisionist anti-Qing bloc. The future is bright for Russia, whose geographic importance as the "toll taker of Europe and Asia" and increasing research capability could see them rise into the ranks of the top 20 world economies once more.
This post, #34, I see as the most illuminating on the alternate geopolitical evolution of the Qing state, or at least, where the Qing state first dramatically diverged from its OTL geopolitical trajectory. It is the best approximation to a "master key" for Qing foreign policy, to match the one we have for domestic policy I quoted earlier. Of course, it only thoroughly outlines the narrative into the early 19th century, while providing glimpses and snapshots but not the pathway between points for the later period.
Key developments in this chapter include:
-The Jiaqing Emperor's voluntary opening of multiple coastal ports to international trade in 1800
-The Jiaqing Emperor's successful ultimatum to Russia in 1805, forcing Russia in the throes of Napoleonic conflict to cede Buryatia and the lands east of Lake Baikal
-Subsequent Qing dynasty efforts, through threats and bribery through the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, that force the Russians to yield all land claims in Asia, east of the Yenisei river of Siberia, and that that make all the states of Turkestan/Central Asia firmly Chinese, rather than Russian or Persian tributary vassals, including the Kazak hordes.
---it was an interesting choice to have Russia be rather beaten, pushed back and marginalized on its European borders as well. Because that was not a *mandatory* consequence of the Russian retreat from Asia in the face of Chinese power. Because the way you wrote it up, Russia was not being pushed back in damaging and futile lost wars, but backing down rather than fighting, and often getting paid to go away. And, although Siberia east of the Yenisei generated some revenue, it was not that much a source of net revenue for Russia's European capabilities. That backing away from Turkestan could weaken influence on Persia has a more natural logical connection. Nevertheless, there is nothing inherently implausible about the narrative of Russian containment chosen here.
-Qing strengthening in Asia also seems to have knock-on or butterfly effects of also forestalling Russian dominance over northern Persia, and making the British takeover of the Indian subcontinent, a good bit less complete than OTL.
- It is less clear what impact Qing power and power projection, because we know they finish the 19th century with a powerful navy, has on Southeast Asia, the Pacific Rim (although Japan remains independent), Australasia, Oceania, Hawaii, and the Indian Ocean. Although at some point China has a Somali intervention that does not go well.
This, post #33, is the "master key" to the Qing domestic reform program, that gives them the internal basis for geopolitical endurance, industrialization, survival, and superpowerdom.
While not spelling out all details, it grabs from the discussion thread that precedes this main timeline, story, and vignette thread, with the core developmental reform being the tenfold expansion of the bureaucracy in 1758, thus addressing the central weakness of overly small government, not keeping up with massively burgeoning population in the 18th century, that was cited in that thread. As a matter of power-political stability the expansion of government officialdom helps in a quite simple way. In Lyndon Johnson's colorful turn of phrase, it increases the number of ambitious, intelligent men who are "inside the tent, pissing out, instead of outside the tent, pissing in". With more ambitious, intelligent men passing the imperial exams and serving the state, they are yes, collecting imperial salaries, but they are also collecting imperial revenues, overseeing their peers, superiors, and subordinates instead of rebelling or collecting "dues" after their dream has been so long deferred. The value of necessary public goods being administered into existence and useful projects being pursued should outweigh the detriment of some government bloat and funding of some government boondoggles.
Specific key political Qing dynasty events are altered too. Yongzheng's life is being extended 20 to thirty years. Also, the final Dzunghar war and genocide of the late 1750s with Amursana leading the Dzunghar side, does not appear to be happening. Instead, Amursana and his Dzunghars appear to be dynasty loyal, through and through, and they help suppress a rebellion by *other* Mongols. The exact timing of the Tibet and Xinjiang absorption is not quite made clear.
Qianlong takes over, older, maybe a little wiser, and certainly with more state capacity.
The other big reform is legalization and support of Han migration to Manchuria in 1740, this is something like a century or more in advance of OTL, leading to a better balance between the empire's human labor and land and other natural resources. Outer Manchuria, Haishenwai, will be way too developed for Russia to ever take over and becomes the center of a fish cannery industry. By the way, how did fish "canneries" work in the 18th century? The all-metal can hadn't been invented yet, right? Weren't things "canned" more in airtight sealed picle jars or pots instead?
This post, #34, I see as the most illuminating on the alternate geopolitical evolution of the Qing state, or at least, where the Qing state first dramatically diverged from its OTL geopolitical trajectory. It is the best approximation to a "master key" for Qing foreign policy, to match the one we have for domestic policy I quoted earlier. Of course, it only thoroughly outlines the narrative into the early 19th century, while providing glimpses and snapshots but not the pathway between points for the later period.
Key developments in this chapter include:
-The Jiaqing Emperor's voluntary opening of multiple coastal ports to international trade in 1800
-The Jiaqing Emperor's successful ultimatum to Russia in 1805, forcing Russia in the throes of Napoleonic conflict to cede Buryatia and the lands east of Lake Baikal
-Subsequent Qing dynasty efforts, through threats and bribery through the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, that force the Russians to yield all land claims in Asia, east of the Yenisei river of Siberia, and that that make all the states of Turkestan/Central Asia firmly Chinese, rather than Russian or Persian tributary vassals, including the Kazak hordes.
---it was an interesting choice to have Russia be rather beaten, pushed back and marginalized on its European borders as well. Because that was not a *mandatory* consequence of the Russian retreat from Asia in the face of Chinese power. Because the way you wrote it up, Russia was not being pushed back in damaging and futile lost wars, but backing down rather than fighting, and often getting paid to go away. And, although Siberia east of the Yenisei generated some revenue, it was not that much a source of net revenue for Russia's European capabilities. That backing away from Turkestan could weaken influence on Persia has a more natural logical connection. Nevertheless, there is nothing inherently implausible about the narrative of Russian containment chosen here.
-Qing strengthening in Asia also seems to have knock-on or butterfly effects of also forestalling Russian dominance over northern Persia, and making the British takeover of the Indian subcontinent, a good bit less complete than OTL.
- It is less clear what impact Qing power and power projection, because we know they finish the 19th century with a powerful navy, has on Southeast Asia, the Pacific Rim (although Japan remains independent), Australasia, Oceania, Hawaii, and the Indian Ocean. Although at some point China has a Somali intervention that does not go well.
Pretty much spot on! Amursana was assassinated here before he could rebel, and the Dzunghars remained divided into four regions under Qing rule contributing to a much stronger northern China. Tibet and Altishahr were absorbed at the same time as OTL, although the Himalayan border is further south in places too.
The LBJ quote is very apropos - the shortage of bureaucratic roles compared to candidates in real life was a massive driver of corruption. Scholars would pass the exams and then need to wait for a spot to open, bribe their way into it, and then recoup their costs and years of effort by taking bribes in turn. With Yongzheng reforming the tax system and expanding the bureaucracy, there are far more roles available and less incentive to corruption, and what corruption does exist is more effectively challenged.
As for the can it was invented earlier in the resource rich, population poor north although there was a brief period where the focus was on smoking, salting, and pickling. A lot of inventions were developed earlier.
Russia's fate is possibly on the darker end, but in a lot of ways it's derived from knock-on effects in Europe and West Asia, particularly in the development of the French, Persian, German and Scandinavian empires in the early 19th century. Russia OTL was something of a medium fish in a small pond that benefitted mainly from manpower and was catching up with European industry, but ITTL they're a medium fish in a very big pond with a lot of extra players spurred on by the Qing. Ironically by collapsing so badly that they weren't able to join either of the major 20th century wars, they're now in one of the stronger positions on the continent.
it was invented earlier in the resource rich, population poor north although there was a brief period where the focus was on smoking, salting, and pickling. A lot of inventions were developed earlier.