Better Outcome In the Phillipines Defense Dec 1941
- Thread starter Carl Schwamberger
- Start date
You're expecting the Claudes to do more than harass the B-17s over Formosa? The Zeroes may have better luck but, they are not going to get all the bombers
It occurs to more that if weather conditions are a bit dicey, ground fog etc, the first notion the Japanese will have is when the bombs start landing. It is unlikely they have a standing CAP and if visibility poor the bombers may avoid being spotted, in which case they are long gone before interceptors can get them. Also rifle caliber rounds against B-17s...
no claudes, there were over 100 A6Ms, the army had some Ki-27s near the southern end. could those take on 15 B-17C/Ds?
"Suddenly, as the plane neared the field, two enemy fighters attacked from the rear of and below the plane in a approach which probably would have been observed sooner had the lower turret been manned. Bullets riddled the big bomber. "The commander's dome flew off," the instrument panel seemed to disintegrate, a machine-gun burst penetrated the left rear gunner's post killing T/Sgt. William J. Delehanty, the low-pressure oxygen tanks in the radio compartment exploded, and the empty bomb bay burst into flames. When the flames spread, Kelly ordered the crew to bail out. S/Sgt. James E. Hokyard, Pfc Robert A. Altman, and Pfc Williard L. Money dropped out of the rear compartment; Bean and Levin tumbled out of the escape hatch; and Kelly and co-pilot Lt. Donal D. Robins prepared to follow. The latter succeeded in pulling the rip cord of his parachute after being thrown clear of the plane by a tremendous explosion, and all those who previously had bailed out of the plane reached ground safely. But Kelly's body was later found near the wreckage of his plane." note, there wasn't a 'lower turret'.
Might they have been more inclined if it was spent buying US manufactured goods? If a large part was spent ordering a homogenous set of modern equipment and supplies for the Philippine Army they could possibly be willing to see a smaller part of it spent on addressing the manpower issues.
Why would they do that when they where not really willing to spend it on the US navy and army until very late?
A plausible POD might be to call the Philippine Army into US service when Japan joins the Tripartite Pact. That puts mobilization on a time frame similar to the call-up of the National Guard. In that event, mobilization could start in late 1940 rather than September 1941. During OTL, the Presidential Order to call the Philippine Army into service was issued on 26 July 1941 and Mac issued the mobilization order on 1 September 1941. That timing put their "ready to fight" planning date sometime after April 1942.
Using similar timing to OTL, the mobilization order goes out 1 November 1940. This in turn moves the construction and mobilization plan up to 15 February 1941 (versus 15 December). So, with an earlier "M-day" (1 November 1940), shift the transfer of troops and supply forward in a plausible fashion. Based on OTL, this puts ~120,000 men into training on M+106. With the new timeline, they get 9 months of training before 8 December 1941.
Aircraft deployment would probably stay on the OTL schedule because they were shipped when available, but other equipment and men would have been available. Moving the "M-day" would have a positive impact on the shipping situation. During OTL, 100,000 DWT of shipping was allocated but 1,100,000 tons of supply was sitting on the docks by ~M+91. The War Department made the commitment to reinforce the Philippines but they didn't have time to accomplish the task. By moving the M-day up 9-10 months the "shipping problem" is significantly mitigated.
It also gives the Philippine Army a 5-month head start on the lend-lease act. But even in the face of lend-lease commitments, the War Department found a significant level of supply and equipment (they just didn't have the time to get it there). Clearly not what was needed to fully "flesh-out" the Philippine Army, but much better than OTL.
The 34th and 161st Infantry Regiments ship on M+107 (OTL). The "Pensacola Convoy" (now absent the aircraft) left Hawaii on M+58. For the sake of argument, let's say the troops and artillery start arriving in the summer of 1941 (8 months after M-day). The Philippine Division now has 3 x US Infantry Regiments (31st, 34th and 161st) and its Philippine Scout Regiments (45th and 57th) are now available as cadre.
This scenario would give the USAFFE 9 Divisions on Luzon with 6-9 months of training (instead of 0-13 weeks) and much more equipment; plus the 61st Division on Panay and the 81st and 101st Divisions on Mindanao. Perhaps Brereton arrives much earlier as well and his plan to move the B-17s to Del Monte actually happens before 8 December.
Well, Mac is still Mac, but Homma now has a real problem on the ground. Air war would probably not have a different result (perhaps last longer). The Japanese did not have sufficient shipping (given their ongoing plans) to reinforce the Philippine ground force any time soon.
Using similar timing to OTL, the mobilization order goes out 1 November 1940. This in turn moves the construction and mobilization plan up to 15 February 1941 (versus 15 December). So, with an earlier "M-day" (1 November 1940), shift the transfer of troops and supply forward in a plausible fashion. Based on OTL, this puts ~120,000 men into training on M+106. With the new timeline, they get 9 months of training before 8 December 1941.
Aircraft deployment would probably stay on the OTL schedule because they were shipped when available, but other equipment and men would have been available. Moving the "M-day" would have a positive impact on the shipping situation. During OTL, 100,000 DWT of shipping was allocated but 1,100,000 tons of supply was sitting on the docks by ~M+91. The War Department made the commitment to reinforce the Philippines but they didn't have time to accomplish the task. By moving the M-day up 9-10 months the "shipping problem" is significantly mitigated.
It also gives the Philippine Army a 5-month head start on the lend-lease act. But even in the face of lend-lease commitments, the War Department found a significant level of supply and equipment (they just didn't have the time to get it there). Clearly not what was needed to fully "flesh-out" the Philippine Army, but much better than OTL.
The 34th and 161st Infantry Regiments ship on M+107 (OTL). The "Pensacola Convoy" (now absent the aircraft) left Hawaii on M+58. For the sake of argument, let's say the troops and artillery start arriving in the summer of 1941 (8 months after M-day). The Philippine Division now has 3 x US Infantry Regiments (31st, 34th and 161st) and its Philippine Scout Regiments (45th and 57th) are now available as cadre.
This scenario would give the USAFFE 9 Divisions on Luzon with 6-9 months of training (instead of 0-13 weeks) and much more equipment; plus the 61st Division on Panay and the 81st and 101st Divisions on Mindanao. Perhaps Brereton arrives much earlier as well and his plan to move the B-17s to Del Monte actually happens before 8 December.
Well, Mac is still Mac, but Homma now has a real problem on the ground. Air war would probably not have a different result (perhaps last longer). The Japanese did not have sufficient shipping (given their ongoing plans) to reinforce the Philippine ground force any time soon.
marathag
Banned
One of the problems was the lack of even Rifles to hand out to all the trainees. Dugout Doug was demanding new Garands, passing up P17s and M1903s that were plentiful in the States.
Too many men, not enough gear, let alone consumables like food and ammunition , or basics like uniforms and even blankets.
Then we get into the shortage of 75mm field artillery and machine guns and mortars for these 'Divisions'
Not to my knowledge.
And I should say (tho I can't, now, give due credit
), that idea did not originate with me. I do, however, absolutely endorse it as the ideal solution.Somehow, I see Chiang & Dougie getting along slightly worse than Monty & Patton.
I could fairly easily see duelling pistols at dawn before the P.I. are liberated. (Small exaggeration. )Y'know, I like the idea of Wainwright getting the "come home" order & going to Oz, with a similar promise to return--but less mania about it. Would he still insist on subs supplying guerrilla ops?
(Damn... Leave him in. )Notice, I continue to dream of all the PTO subs based out of Pearl (per my posts here), with the attendant benefits. (I disclaim McPherson's views as contrary to, & in conflict with, what I'd have done, good tho his work was.)
If the Philippine defenses had been better managed they would have held out longer even with the OTL sparse equipment and preparations. But as some posters have postulated what if there had been a much bigger build up of
troops and equipment in 1940?
Japanese Intelligence was very well informed of the OTL conditions in P.I. Any increases in the American and Filipino capabilities would have been detected and planned for. The Japanese would have devoted more resources to the invasion of the Philippines if they could find the extra men and ships.
But what if the Imperial Japanese staff look at a more heavily armed and prepared U.S. and Philippine army and calculate they can't supply enough units to invade the P.I. and still keep to the schedule for grabbing the more imperatively needed Malaysia and the DEI?
What if the Japanese decide not to attack the Americans or invade P.I. and instead devote all their immediate efforts including the Kido Butai to complete the conquest of the Southern Resource Area? Malaysia and the DEI would fall same as in OTL if not a little earlier. Then to protect their conquests the Japanese attack the P.I and U.S. forces using all the freed up shipping and Naval units available after the resource grab is largely completed.
What could have happened in an ATL is a more heavily armed,prepared and alerted Philippines would be facing almost the entire IJN and IJA assault forces in, maybe, April or May 1942. And if the USN sorties a large force to confront the Japanese? This is what the IJN staff would be dreaming of.
As terrible as the Fall of the Philippines was there were worse things that could have happened. I think the best outcome would have been if the OTL Japanese invasion had faced an OTL armed but better prepared and managed defense as described by the previous posters.
troops and equipment in 1940?
Japanese Intelligence was very well informed of the OTL conditions in P.I. Any increases in the American and Filipino capabilities would have been detected and planned for. The Japanese would have devoted more resources to the invasion of the Philippines if they could find the extra men and ships.
But what if the Imperial Japanese staff look at a more heavily armed and prepared U.S. and Philippine army and calculate they can't supply enough units to invade the P.I. and still keep to the schedule for grabbing the more imperatively needed Malaysia and the DEI?
What if the Japanese decide not to attack the Americans or invade P.I. and instead devote all their immediate efforts including the Kido Butai to complete the conquest of the Southern Resource Area? Malaysia and the DEI would fall same as in OTL if not a little earlier. Then to protect their conquests the Japanese attack the P.I and U.S. forces using all the freed up shipping and Naval units available after the resource grab is largely completed.
What could have happened in an ATL is a more heavily armed,prepared and alerted Philippines would be facing almost the entire IJN and IJA assault forces in, maybe, April or May 1942. And if the USN sorties a large force to confront the Japanese? This is what the IJN staff would be dreaming of.
As terrible as the Fall of the Philippines was there were worse things that could have happened. I think the best outcome would have been if the OTL Japanese invasion had faced an OTL armed but better prepared and managed defense as described by the previous posters.
First thing is Roosevelt declares a Nuetrality Exclusion Zone around PI, wide enough to make things uncomfortably difficult for the Japanese. This is the technique used vs the Germans in the Atlantic. It led to the undeclared naval war, despite German efforts not to escalate. Eventually they did & US warships were attacked and sunk. Maybe the Japanese can control their military and dance around the numerous air and sea patrols, and that the US exclusion zone makes cargo ship routing and warship operations difficult. The US government had already issued the Consider Hostile or Shoot on Sight order in November 1941. So any US patrol plane or warship commander wont be trying to second guess what to do if they run across Japanese forces intruding into the Exclusion Zone.
Then there is the 'Iceland Gambit'. The US occupied 'neutral' Iceland in June-July 1941. Now note how Japan avoided overt hostilities with the NEI for over a month after the 7 Dec DoW on the US and Britain. The Japanese hoped the Dutch would go along with their demands, out of recognition of the difficulty of their position and intimidated by the early victories against the US and Britain. Mpre specifically they hoped to minimize destruction of the oil industry by the Dutch. This despite that the Dutch declared a state of war between itself and Japan by 10 December. It was not until 11 January the Japanese issued a final ultimatum and DoW against the Dutch and intimated hostilities.
This may not fall out that way in this ATL. But, were the Japanese to hold off 2-4 weeks on a DOW there is narrow opportunity for the US. As with Iceland a token brigade including a squadron of aircraft could be rushed off to Java, and negotiations for some sort of treaty that includes the DEI in the 'Greater South Pacific Nuetrality Zone'.
Whatever else happens tho gives the US forces in PI a few extra precious weeks to prepare. The PI government can declare a state of emergency, allowing things like restrictions of rive transport between provinces to be ignored. When the Japanese do come its not going to be with the pants down surprise that occurred 8th December.
Then there is the 'Iceland Gambit'. The US occupied 'neutral' Iceland in June-July 1941. Now note how Japan avoided overt hostilities with the NEI for over a month after the 7 Dec DoW on the US and Britain. The Japanese hoped the Dutch would go along with their demands, out of recognition of the difficulty of their position and intimidated by the early victories against the US and Britain. Mpre specifically they hoped to minimize destruction of the oil industry by the Dutch. This despite that the Dutch declared a state of war between itself and Japan by 10 December. It was not until 11 January the Japanese issued a final ultimatum and DoW against the Dutch and intimated hostilities.
This may not fall out that way in this ATL. But, were the Japanese to hold off 2-4 weeks on a DOW there is narrow opportunity for the US. As with Iceland a token brigade including a squadron of aircraft could be rushed off to Java, and negotiations for some sort of treaty that includes the DEI in the 'Greater South Pacific Nuetrality Zone'.
Whatever else happens tho gives the US forces in PI a few extra precious weeks to prepare. The PI government can declare a state of emergency, allowing things like restrictions of rive transport between provinces to be ignored. When the Japanese do come its not going to be with the pants down surprise that occurred 8th December.
About the only thing which can change that is to start arming/training the PI Army two years earlier. With that & the OTL reinforcements its still a much tougher nut to crack.
If they are deterred from declaring war on the US entirely. The surprise attack on the US fleet was a high risk operation, but Yamamotos logic in attempting it was sound. Even if he did not understand the US War Plan ORANGE, or the RAINBOW plan he understood how damaging the battle fleet contributed to discouraging the US that the Japanese war hawks were depending on.
Not sure if many of the alternatives are worse?
Since US was probably going to enter the war against Germany (and therefore with GB/USSR win) anything the Japanese do is simply going to be rolled back what ever happens?
Would Japan be able to successfully attack Australia or India much more than OTL without US involvement at least quickly in the 6-18 months before US likely ends up fighting Germany?
Even if USN/IJN don't fight early come 45~ with Germany defeated Japan will simply not be able to do anything US/GB/USSR dictate terms or she dies until they are accepted?
The reason that neutralizing the PI was considered essential by the Japanese was because if the USA was in control of the PI, and had access to reinforce and build up, the supply line from the "southern resource area" to Japan was in significant jeopardy. The USA could insist all merchant traffic through the "Philippine Neutral Zone" be inspected to ensure no "stolen" goods were being transported through the neutral zone. All Japanese merchant and warship movements observed by US forces will be reported in the clear. "Unknown" submarines may be sinking Japanese tankers - "well the Dutch have submarines that escaped from the DEI so we can only assume they are responsible (or British submarines)" - (note as long as they spend no more than 24 hours in harbor they can quite legally pull in and refuel and replenish in a neutral harbor) - there are so many islands here so we can't be expected to know if they hide in some cove somewhere over and above legal visits. Just a few of the obvious ways the USA can make life difficult for the Japanese. Of course, every day after 12/7/41 that Japan does not attack the PI the PI get stronger/reinforced, more fortifications built, supplies built up, more troops/planes and so forth.
As far as the Japanese devoting more resources to capture the PI, they can certainly do that however where do those resources come from? They were operating on a shoestring for the totality of their operations, on a short timeline, and on top of that got lucky. For example in spite of the mess that the British defense of Malaya was, the Japanese were at the end of their rope when the British surrendered - had some of the resources they had been needed in the PI as opposed to going to Malaya it is not unlikely that they might not have taken Singapore, or at least the fall would have been delayed. Similar delays or failures in other SEA campaigns are also not unlikely.
Again, the whole impetus for attacking the PI (and getting in to a war with the USA) was to ensure the free passage of raw materials from the "southern resource area" to Japan. The geostrategic location of the PI and the maritime routes still remains no matter how much the US does or does not beef up PI defenses, and the issues with raw material transport.
As far as the Japanese devoting more resources to capture the PI, they can certainly do that however where do those resources come from? They were operating on a shoestring for the totality of their operations, on a short timeline, and on top of that got lucky. For example in spite of the mess that the British defense of Malaya was, the Japanese were at the end of their rope when the British surrendered - had some of the resources they had been needed in the PI as opposed to going to Malaya it is not unlikely that they might not have taken Singapore, or at least the fall would have been delayed. Similar delays or failures in other SEA campaigns are also not unlikely.
Again, the whole impetus for attacking the PI (and getting in to a war with the USA) was to ensure the free passage of raw materials from the "southern resource area" to Japan. The geostrategic location of the PI and the maritime routes still remains no matter how much the US does or does not beef up PI defenses, and the issues with raw material transport.
HAHAHHAHA...don't worry not in this harbour...never happened here...all perfectly legal..... by this point RN warships are being refitted in US harbours in Atlantic any rules will be waved.....
ie Illustrious at the Norfolk Navy Yard 12 May - 25 October 1941
There would be no Japanese units diverted from the Malayan campaign or from the Indonesian campaign because there would be no near simultaneous attacks on the P.I. In fact the Japanese units used in OTL for the P.I would be available for the Malayan and DEI campaigns. When these campaigns are completed the entire attack forces, what's left of them, are used against the U.S. forces in the Philippines. A two step approach. The planned war against the U.S. is not deferred, just delayed a few months. Unless the U.S. initiates hostilities.
If Japan attacks the DEI/Malaya first, the USA WILL put the PI on a war footing immediately and the reinforcements and build up will go in to overdrive. Wake Island will have the defenses completed, and some betterment of the situation on Guam will probably happen. The radar system at PH will be operational full time, and the air defense coordination will be better (it could hardly be worse). The japanese won't do any better in the south compared to OTL - Australia is off the list, and they really won't go much further in Burma due to the weather issues and timeline. So now the Japanese have taken pretty much what they did in SEA, their losses there are pretty much the same give or take. NOW, several months later with the USA getting ready to make the transport of the resources problematic, the PI a much tougher nut, the PH operation (and crippling the US Pacific Fleet in one blow impossible), Wake problematic, and all of the military materiel under construction (ships, aircraft, etc) from 12/41 until when the war starts is additive not replacement.
Not clearing the PI is a risk Japan cannot take.
Not clearing the PI is a risk Japan cannot take.