How would you realistically prevent NATO expansion into Eastern Europe after the Cold War

The real agency here is in the public opinion of Czech, Slovak, Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian societies.
These populations had very concrete historical reasons to distrust Russian intentions.
Thus they wanted security guarantees.
Only Nato was capable of credibly delivering such guarantees.
Thus these countries would seek to establish security cooperation against potential Russian resurgence.

Changes that could credibly butterfly this historical distrust away or close the doors for Nato expansion in a world where Russia itself was eager to cooperate with Nato during the 1990s are hard to come by.
 
Near the end of the Cold War Gorbicheve and Bush got together and helped hash out an agreement on German reunification. Part of this included an informal promise to not expand NATO any further into Eastern Europe. That promise of course went up in smoke after the collapse of the Soviet Union but it made me curious about how you could find some other ways to prevent NATO expansion into Eastern Europe?
(Also please don’t bring any of the weird Russian propaganda around this topic into the conversation)
France & Germany withdraws from NATO in early 90s , embarks on a long term economic partnership with Russia , Baltic states and Ukraine

A strong sentiment in Western Europe for US to withdraw its military presence from the continent
 
What about maintaining the Warsaw Pact alliance? Barring any NATO or Russian influence from taking hold after the 90s? Perhaps an Eastern Europe that distrusts both the West and Russia for whatever reasons, or just through inertia the alliance surviving?
 
What about maintaining the Warsaw Pact alliance? Barring any NATO or Russian influence from taking hold after the 90s? Perhaps an Eastern Europe that distrusts both the West and Russia for whatever reasons, or just through inertia the alliance surviving?
Lech Walesa proposed something like that in his "NATO-bis" scheme. It was also popular with Polish ex-communists. The gist of it was that Poland would invest in the kind of weapons expected to be needed to defend against an invasion, namely Stinger missiles, ATGMs, and, crucially, nuclear armament. One reason the idea was floated at all was that, in 1989-1991, there was still a residual fear that Germany would, after unification, pursue its pre-1939 border. So one way you might hamper NATO expansion would be to have Germany do exactly that.

But there is a common theme to "no NATO expansion scenarios"--as mentioned on the previous page, Nuclear Poland (as a corollary, Ukraine might not be so keen on giving up their nukes if Poland is openly developing its own).
 
The real agency here is in the public opinion of Czech, Slovak, Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian societies.
America just has to be the superpower that can't say no, huh?

There's something about that implication really rankles me. It really irons my waffle.

And Britain and France being the great powers that can't say no. And so with Germany and Italy not having a right to say no. Should bother them too.

The 'inevitabilst' reaction that comes up very often in reaction to what ifs about US post-Cold War policy in particular, and US Cold War policies (like the Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Korea proxy wars) as well, tends to smother alternate history discussion and more and more demonstrates to me at least the need for an "Alternate History Improv" sub-forum where, just like stage improv, "no" isn't an acceptable answer to the OP's premise. If you're playin', you run with it.
 
The problem with NATO not expanding after the Cold War is that the consequences of a power vacuum in central/eastern Europe is vastly more dangerous than the Pre-2008 world OTL. Poland was threatening to get nukes, Hungary and Romania were still arguing over Transylvania and the Balts were terrified of being subsumed into Russia again and wondering what to do with their Russian minorities.

If NATO is ruled out, all these places will know they have no insurance against a renewed Russia that had occupied them for either half a century in the case of Czechoslovakia/Hungary/Romania/Bulgaria or centuries period as with Poland and the Balts. In such a case, it's every man for himself - the Poles would eat grass to get nukes to stop Russia, the Balts will make OTL's language measures look like a hippie commune, and the same corrosive governance that Slovakia had which stopped its initial NATO bid will expand to the entirety of the Balkans. All this will, ironically, make Russia less safe since they've massively increased the geopolitical tripwires across the continent.

Your only chance might be to make Partnership for Peace take over, but that was all dependent on Russia upholding her end of the bargain to create western institutions and for Eastern Europe to feel they didn't need insurances. Russia by 1996 had been involved in multiple military operations of dubious nature (Transnistira, Chechnya), was universally considered to have rigged the vote to stop an even more authoritarian candidate taking over, and was already swept in a wave of Brezhnev nostalgia - Eastern Europe was not going to sign up for this when a tried and tested solution in NATO already existed. Incidentally NATO expansion was only a blip in West-Russia relations - Yugoslavia was a bigger flashpoint since it was the West interfering in Orthodox Slavic territory that Russia thought so important that WW1 began over it. Even then Russia's hatred of NATO wasn't a big deal until after the Orange Revolution and the thought of an Eastern Slavic country joining NATO (since now Ukraine had an openly Pro-NATO government albeit an Anti-NATO populace) - Putin barely reacted to the Baltic ascension because the Balts were non-Slavic and non-Orthodox, even less than Poles, so Russians basically accepted that they weren't part of their world in a way they wouldn't say in regards to Belarus or Ukraine. Hell I've even seen some analysts say he was more pissed that Romania and Bulgaria joined NATO both due to their being on the Black Sea but also the sense that these were peoples united to Russians in the Orthodox faith (and broader Slavic identity with regards to Bulgaria).
I agree with this

1. Europe is not unified
2. Alot of petty arguments and people all of sudden are like hey I want this border or that border or I don't like these people or those.

3. Russia never gave up the idea of it's sphere of influence

4. Ww3 and nuclear proliferation


Now what wasn't tried was hey.. Russia .. come one .. you got some cool toys
. So do we
. Let's be friends .. share
..join NATO.. we can rebrand .. blah blah..


Victory laps didn't help
 
Why not give Poland and Germany independent nuclear arsenals ? There is no way Russia will be expanding into central and Eastern Europe

Central Europe and Eastern Europe should have their own bloc with or without Russia
 
The Soviet Union does not go quietly and rages against the dying of the light

Its messy, horrible and tragic - poor poor Russia - but the result is what was the Soviet union breaking up into multiple smaller states along racial and social lines - with the once mighty economy in ruins through war and the lack of funding etc and states that are too busy hating each other to be a threat to anyone else.

So NATOs reason for existing is gone and becomes a 'club' that most of the members pay lip service too

With no bogeyman to the East there is no need for the Eastern Nations joining NATO
 
America just has to be the superpower that can't say no, huh?

There's something about that implication really rankles me. It really irons my waffle.

And Britain and France being the great powers that can't say no. And so with Germany and Italy not having a right to say no. Should bother them too.

The 'inevitabilst' reaction that comes up very often in reaction to what ifs about US post-Cold War policy in particular, and US Cold War policies (like the Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Korea proxy wars) as well, tends to smother alternate history discussion and more and more demonstrates to me at least the need for an "Alternate History Improv" sub-forum where, just like stage improv, "no" isn't an acceptable answer to the OP's premise. If you're playin', you run with it.

Like it or not eastern Europe is concerned by Russia even a Russia that is no longer the USSR, and subsequently Russia has done little to reduce that fear.

So yes of course current NATO members can veto the creation of new ones, but it's not great look when you take the above into consideration.

So as other have pointed out you want to stop teh increase sin NATO membership you have to reduced the fear of Russia and thus the appeal of NATO membership.


Why not give Poland and Germany independent nuclear arsenals ? There is no way Russia will be expanding into central and Eastern Europe

Central Europe and Eastern Europe should have their own bloc with or without Russia
Because generally speaking the nuclear club does not want to increase it's membership, and frankly everyone was very pleased when the break up of the USSR didn't result in half a dozen former SSR's or WP members with nuclear weapons.
 
Why not give Poland and Germany independent nuclear arsenals ? There is no way Russia will be expanding into central and Eastern Europe

Central Europe and Eastern Europe should have their own bloc with or without Russia

I don't think Germany is allowed to have nuclear weapons. Or at least, there's absolutely no will within the country to make them, even though they likely have the capability.
 
So NATOs reason for existing is gone and becomes a 'club' that most of the members pay lip service too
It was already gone in 1989 OTL (see socialist governemnts in Eastern Europe collapse and the Malta summit). The initial cause for NATO was to "contain" Soviet influence. By late 80s it became damn obvious that Moscow is not going to threaten the US hold over it's core European allies. But hey, you could just admit that "cointanment" just mean unchecked bullying of Moscow in reality not allowing it to have any sphere of influence even in Former Soviet republics.

Like it or not eastern Europe is concerned by Russia even a Russia that is no longer the USSR, and subsequently Russia has done little to reduce that fear.
The Moscow had withdrawn it's troops without any bargaining very fast, throwing thousands of Russian soldiers out in the cold. In Baltics, first Russian minister of Foreign affairs managed to withdraw Russian troops in 1994-1995 instead of 1998 just to appease the local authorities and the West. The fears of Russia in some Eastern European countries are based purely on history and has nothing to do with the real Russian intensions and capabilities.

At the end, I understand that the West just fears to use any forms of appeasement to defeated powers since the end of WW2, but the thing is that Russia lost much hicher percent of it's territory and population after 1991 than Germany did. The Belovezhie was a Trianon for Russia, not Versailles. The country lost too hard to be able even in theory recover it's former sphere of influence.
 
The Moscow had withdrawn it's troops without any bargaining very fast, throwing thousands of Russian soldiers out in the cold. In Baltics, first Russian minister of Foreign affairs managed to withdraw Russian troops in 1994-1995 instead of 1998 just to appease the local authorities and the West. The fears of Russia in some Eastern European countries are based purely on history and has nothing to do with the real Russian intensions and capabilities.

Well its not that unusual to use previous history to inform your opinions right? And frankly Russian policy in the last decade has not helped with that.

At the end, I understand that the West just fears to use any forms of appeasement to defeated powers since the end of WW2, but the thing is that Russia lost much hicher percent of it's territory and population after 1991 than Germany did. The Belovezhie was a Trianon for Russia, not Versailles. The country lost too hard to be able even in theory recover it's former sphere of influence.
Only Russia has been trying pretty hard to rebuild it's sphere of influence,
 
Well its not that unusual to use previous history to inform your opinions right? And frankly Russian policy in the last decade has not helped with that.
But Russia was never so weak since 17th century.

Only Russia has been trying pretty hard to rebuild it's sphere of influence,
I would argue that Russian goals since 1991 laid no further than Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (basically how Solzhenitsyn outlined the ideal Russian borders during the time the USSR was collapsing). Plus, Putin showed that he is perfectly fine with formal independence of former SSR's and wants to use the economic means to influence them first (there was 0 Kremlin reaction ot the first Maidan of 2004 due to the fact that Russia was still able to peacefully lobby it's interests in Ukraine after it).
 
But Russia was never so weak since 17th century.

If you are Estonia or hell Poland that's still plenty strong enough to cause an issue.

also I think you are wrong in you comparison, C17th Russia did not have the equivalent of the world's 2nd largest nuclear stockpile

also given when then happened in terms of Russian expansion between the end of the C17th and then the C18th, I'm not sure it would be a comforting comparison anyway!

I would argue that Russian goals since 1991 laid no further than Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (basically how Solzhenitsyn outlined the ideal Russian borders during the time the USSR was collapsing). Plus, Putin showed that he is perfectly fine with formal independence of former SSR's and wants to use the economic means to influence them first (there was 0 Kremlin reaction ot the first Maidan of 2004 due to the fact that Russia was still able to peacefully lobby it's interests in Ukraine after it).
I'd argue Putin has demonstrated

1). he can't be trusted

2). he's very capable of changing his mind


So therefore it's reasonable for his neighbours to have some insurance, especially given the broader historical context were "we'll be fine so long as Russia behaves" may not be the most reassuring.
 
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