Marine Corps in the Mekong Delta

[Burton K Wheeler]

One of the things often used to point out the absurdity of the U.S. effort in Vietnam is that the U.S. Army created a special joint task amphibious force with the Navy while the Marine Corps ignored their amphibious roots and fought in the most mountainous part of Vietnam.

The reason for that isn't "durr Pentagon dum I smart". The Marines, in their never-ending quest for relevance, wanted to be the first unit on the ground in Vietnam, and the first place U.S. troops were needed was the Central Highlands.

I think that getting the Marines in the Mekong instead of the Central Highlands is not really a difficult thing to do. The real question is what would a more amphibious Vietnam experience do to change the Marine Corps?

 

[SwampTiger]

This is a question I have had for a while. The Marines should have had a faster development time in operating in the Delta. The Army did a good job once it learned the lessons of riverine and coastal combat. The development of improved landing and support vessels would be advanced. The Navy development of the Brown Water Navy may have been improved upon with Marine input. Maybe a stronger Marine focus on support helicopters. I would expect a clearer focus on doctrine in patrolling, landing and support of landing forces than the early Army attempts. The Army was better equipped and trained for the DMZ and Central Highlands conditions.

Either way, the political constraints placed upon the Armed Forces and the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese Government would have been greater factors on success or failure.

 

[173rd LRRP]

The Marines and 173rd Airborne were the US Fire Brigade stationed in Okinawa. They were sent in March and May respectively to secure major air strips as possible Air Heads. There were rumors when I got there in August 1966 that one battalion was to have made a parachute assault on Bien Hoa if required.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

One of the things often used to point out the absurdity of the U.S. effort in Vietnam is that the U.S. Army created a special joint task amphibious force with the Navy while the Marine Corps ignored their amphibious roots and fought in the most mountainous part of Vietnam.

The reason for that isn't "durr Pentagon dum I smart". The Marines, in their never-ending quest for relevance, wanted to be the first unit on the ground in Vietnam, and the first place U.S. troops were needed was the Central Highlands.

I think that getting the Marines in the Mekong instead of the Central Highlands is not really a difficult thing to do. The real question is what would a more amphibious Vietnam experience do to change the Marine Corps?

So who goes first and to the Highlands if not the Marines? How do the Marines react to being told no to their push to be first?
Functionally I'm not sure that the fighting in the Mekong would really change the Corps that much all things considered, they'd just be able to use their experience in amphibious warfare and connection with the navy more than they did IOTL. As it was post-Vietnam they largely resumed their expeditionary force posture.

 

[Decatur]

The Navy had a similar situation in 2006 in riverine operations in Iraq, which to which they responded by creating Naval Expeditionary Combat Command. I remember reading some critical comments about this, basically because the Navy was taking on tasks traditionally handled by marines. The naval response was that the Marine Corps was both unavailable and uninterested.

Maybe using a marine division in the Mekong Delta leads to different Navy-Marine cooperation postwar. For example, today we could still have marine detachments on warships. The Maersk Alabama incident would have ended a lot earlier if the ships on the scene had had marines with them instead of having to wait for the SEALS to arrive.

When the 9th Infantry Division deployed to in 1966, the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions were in the Central Highlands, under the control of III Marine Amphibious Force. The obvious thing to do would send one of those divisions to the Delta and replace it with the 9th. But I'm not sure if the U.S. Army would have been willing to place a division under the long-term control of a marine general.

In 1966 the Corps activated the 5th Marine Division on the West Coast as a replacement for the 1st Division. But there were no plans to send it overseas. (Two of its regiments did go to Vietnam in 1968 as a response to the Tet Offensive.) It might be possible to send that division instead of the 9th, but that would mean three-quarters of the USMC's main ground combat units were in Vietnam.

While the 9th Infantry Division did have responsibility for the Delta, it was only the 2nd Brigade that actually served afloat with Mobile Riverine Force. Maybe this could be replaced with a Marine regiment, presumably under 9th Division control. There is a precedent: during World War I the 4th Marine Brigade served in France as part of the 2nd Infantry Division.

 

[Burton K Wheeler]

I would guess that the best way to get Marines in the Delta would be to have them develop an early partnership with the ARVN Marines, like in the 65-66 time frame. That would mean 173rd Airborne would be the first unit in the Central Highlands and that the MAF would be in the IV Corps tactical zone. Just having more immediate concern for the tactical situation in the Delta in 1965 would get the Marines there.

You could adjust the IV Corps area up a bit and have the Marines in what was OTL the southern part of the III Corps tactical zone, in the area that 25th Infantry Division was in OTL. That way you can have two Marine divisions under III MAF in that corps area. OTL there were a couple separate Army brigades down there too.

The riverine task force was only a brigade, so I'm picturing a two-star MAGTF built around a Marine regiment, a Marine Air Group, and the OTL three navy amphibious squadrons plus other elements under a Navy captain. Maybe designated a MAB?

The biggest question I have is what this would do to the postwar Marine Corps. One thing I think is that the Navy SEALs would never gain their OTL prominence if it's Marines doing the raiding from the rivers thing, maybe Marine Recon units?

 

[Marc]

One of the things often used to point out the absurdity of the U.S. effort in Vietnam is that the U.S. Army created a special joint task amphibious force with the Navy while the Marine Corps ignored their amphibious roots and fought in the most mountainous part of Vietnam.

The reason for that isn't "durr Pentagon dum I smart". The Marines, in their never-ending quest for relevance, wanted to be the first unit on the ground in Vietnam, and the first place U.S. troops were needed was the Central Highlands.

I think that getting the Marines in the Mekong instead of the Central Highlands is not really a difficult thing to do. The real question is what would a more amphibious Vietnam experience do to change the Marine Corps?

Actually, the Corps had a long tradition going back to the late 1800's of primarily being the "State Department's shock troops." While amphibious assault is as old as the Corps, until WW2 it had become decidedly a secondary function. Ironically (in my view) military rivalry was directed to towards the Army's 82nd and 101st which were increasingly favored as foreign policy military first responders.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The biggest question I have is what this would do to the postwar Marine Corps. One thing I think is that the Navy SEALs would never gain their OTL prominence if it's Marines doing the raiding from the rivers thing, maybe Marine Recon units?

The SEALs also were used raiding north Vietnam, so they'd still have their special role.

 

[Burton K Wheeler]

Actually, the Corps had a long tradition going back to the late 1800's of primarily being the "State Department's shock troops." While amphibious assault is as old as the Corps, until WW2 it had become decidedly a secondary function. Ironically (in my view) military rivalry was directed to towards the Army's 82nd and 101st which were increasingly favored as foreign policy military first responders.

That's why this question is interesting to me. It definitely adds a new chapter to USMC history. May not change much with the 1980's Marine Corps, but post Gulf War it gives a new option to a Corps seeking relevancy.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

One of the things often used to point out the absurdity of the U.S. effort in Vietnam is that the U.S. Army created a special joint task amphibious force with the Navy while the Marine Corps ignored their amphibious roots and fought in the most mountainous part of Vietnam.

...

That decision was entirely out of the USMC hands. It was actually opposed by the current Commandant at the time, who after early retirement publicly voiced opposition to the strategy as executed by the Johnson Administration.

This was the initial rational. Protecting the primary US bases had priority, and the US Army forces in the US were not set up for a fast response.

The Marines and 173rd Airborne were the US Fire Brigade stationed in Okinawa. They were sent in March and May respectively to secure major air strips as possible Air Heads. There were rumors when I got there in August 1966 that one battalion was to have made a parachute assault on Bien Hoa if required.

... You could adjust the IV Corps area up a bit and have the Marines in ...

...The riverine task force was only a brigade, so I'm picturing a two-star MAGTF built around a Marine regiment, a Marine Air Group, and the OTL three navy amphibious squadrons plus other elements under a Navy captain. Maybe designated a MAB?

...

This was proposed, but Westmoreland lived by his own logic. Back in the 1980s I did a in-depth read of his auto biography. That led to some disturbing thoughts on Westy himself, the people who elevated him to that position, like MacNamarra, and US execution of strategy in SE Asia.

There were also serious propsals for a two corps amphibious invasion north of the DMZ and exploitation across to Laos. At least two plans were written for this. Post war it was outted the North Vietnamese feared exactly this 1966 to 1968 & would have felt forced to negotiate a armistice/peace treaty to get the Americans out. It appears they would have been very willing to throw the VC under the bus to return to the earlier status quo rather than continue fighting the US over control of North Viet Nam provinces.

... Maybe designated a MAB?...

Following the logic of the time it would have been a Navy amphibious command with the Marines a subset. However logic was often twisted and things made complicated under Westys stewardship. Note that I am not blaming Westmorland for all ills in this. He was a product of Robert McNamarras tenure as Sec Def & a era when it was the thing to apply a lot of slick theory and academic thought from the wrong direction. As the management consultants say, the firsh rots from the head first & LBJ let some rot set in longer than desirable.

 

[Burton K Wheeler]

That decision was entirely out of the USMC hands. It was actually opposed by the current Commandant at the time, who after early retirement publicly voiced opposition to the strategy as executed by the Johnson Administration.

This was the initial rational. Protecting the primary US bases had priority, and the US Army forces in the US were not set up for a fast response.

This was proposed, but Westmoreland lived by his own logic. Back in the 1980s I did a in-depth read of his auto biography. That led to some disturbing thoughts on Westy himself, the people who elevated him to that position, like MacNamarra, and US execution of strategy in SE Asia.

There were also serious propsals for a two corps amphibious invasion north of the DMZ and exploitation across to Laos. At least two plans were written for this. Post war it was putted the North Vietnamese feared exactly this 1966 to 1968 & would have felt forced to negotiate a armistice/peace treaty to get the Americans out. it appears they would have been very willing to throw the VC under the bus to return to the earlier status quo rather than continue fighting the US over control of North Viet Nam provinces.

Following the logic of the time it would have been a Navy amphibious command with the Marines a subset. However logic was often twisted and things made complicated under Westys stewardship. Note that I am not blaming Westmorland for all ills in this. He was a product of Robert McNamarras tenure as Sec Def & a era when it was the thing to apply a lot of slick theory and academic thought from the wrong direction. As the management consultants say, the firsh rots from the head first & LBJ let some rot set in longer than desirable.

The post I've been waiting for! I nearly @-ed you in the OP. I guess the consensus is that there would have to be a very different initial security situation in Vietnam to get the Marines in the south and not on the border. That's a bit less interesting to me than how the Marines would have organized differently than the Army did and what would have changed about the postwar Marine Corps as a result. My vague thought is that the Navy SEALs and their mythology would be a Marine thing, but I'm not sure that this would be enough to ensure that.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The Navy had a similar situation in 2006 in riverine operations in Iraq, which to which they responded by creating Naval Expeditionary Combat Command. I remember reading some critical comments about this, basically because the Navy was taking on tasks traditionally handled by marines. The naval response was that the Marine Corps was both unavailable and uninterested. ...i.

The circumstances leading to this were as twisted as in Viet Nam. A simplistic explanation is Rumsfeld & Co were frantically trying to reverse their previous belief the Iraqi war was settled by Shock and Awe. The reversal of policy & a imperative for maximum effort to put boots on the ground in Iraq & Afganistan led to things like artillery battalions deployed as understrength infantry battalions. The Air Force combing out its establishment to boost its security units, the Navy units described above, and a complete reorganization of the US Army ground forces to provide a force suitable for counter insurgency warfare.

To put it another way, the key players in the Bush administration were proved completely wrong in their assumptions and strategy for the Afganistan/Traq invasions. Instead of being fired, they were allowed to flail about for several years trying to fight a war they had deliberately not planned for. It was inevitable a lot of convoluted decisions would result.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The post I've been waiting for! I nearly @-ed you in the OP. I guess the consensus is that there would have to be a very different initial security situation in Vietnam to get the Marines in the south and not on the border. ...

Or more forethought & consideration. To much of what happened was reactive and had short term considerations applied. One of the criticisms from General Krulak in 'Strange War Strange Strategy' was the lack of long term clarity within Westmorelands command.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

I would guess that the best way to get Marines in the Delta would be to have them develop an early partnership with the ARVN Marines, like in the 65-66 time frame.

An actual partnership or just a fancier version of the sidelining that occurred IOTL?

 

[Burton K Wheeler]

An actual partnership or just a fancier version of the sidelining that occurred IOTL?

Like OTL. My understanding is that OTL the ARVN and ROK Marines followed the USMC to the north when the Marines got established there. I was thinking you'd have the ARVN Marines engaged in the Delta in 64-65 and the USMC moves in to back them up, then takes over as per OTL.

 

[Riain]

For mine I Think its a good idea, but given the constraints others have mentioned it can't be implemented until a bit later in the war. iirc the Delta wasn't looked at until 66-67, by then the crisis in the Highlands had been dealt with so the entire MAF could be redeployed to the south. Indeed they might even be able to amphibious it up as a big and fast operation, in conjunction with Army divisions taking their positions in the north.