The Development of Dominion military power.
Out of all the unfulfilled naval expansion plans prior to WW1, this represents an interesting 'green fields' process and the most detailed of pre-war plans as a 68 page report that goes down to including how many bandsmen the navy would need in 20 years time.
https://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publ ... -henderson
In 1911, after the Australian Government outlayed £3.5m on the Fleet Unit (1BC, 2CL, 6DD, 2SS), Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson was tasked with proving a Naval blueprint for Australia. Henderson's plan was based on assumptions that allowed for an equivalent contribution by 4.5m Australians to 45m British and that Australia shared no land borders and therefore had a minimal requirement for an army. He also pointed out that
Britain's sea borne trade was worth £1B per year, Australia's was £162m per year and represents a 16% proportion of Britain's trade. This suggests Australia could
pay a higher defence burden than the 10% population proportion. Most of the document concerned crew levels and how to grow these with a close eye on where these recruits would geographically come from.
Over a 20 year timetable the RAN was to expand to 15 000 men, 5 000 reserves and centered on two Divisions based on population. East (NSW, Queensland) with 3BC, 3CL, 8DD, 3SS (1BC, 2CL, 4DD in Reserve) and West (Vic, TAS, SA, WA) with 3BC, 3CL, 4DD, 9SS (1BC, 2CL, 2DD Reserve). The East Division principal bases were Sydney, Brisbane, Westernport (VIC) and Port Stevens (NSW) with minor bases as Tamar River (TAS), Hobart, Townsville, and Thursday Island. The West Division principal bases were Fremantle, Port Lincoln and Westernport. Minor bases were Darwin, Albany, Cone Bay, Hobart and River Tamar.
The outlay was about £40m in infrastructure across the 6 main bases and 7 smaller bases, £20m in ship construction and £28m in operating costs. Paying for this would be about 2% of GDP per year and amount to £90m over 20 years. By 1910, Australia's defence spending was at £3m or 0.9% of GDP and only 14.7% of Government expenditure. By 1911-12 it was at £4.7m while 2% GDP, a usual defence burden, would push this number to £6.7m so the Henderson Plan is affordable. Infrastructure costs will be significant, A Fleet Base like Rosyth took 10 years to build and cost £4.25m. A drydock costs £1.25m and takes 4 years to build. One was needed in Sydney and one in Fremantle.
Never officially adopted, the government followed the blueprint during the war years, some ships were ordered inline with the schedule and several million pounds was spent on base construction. Note that this money was outside war funding. Jellicoe's postwar 1919 review also proposed an annual £4m contribution for Australia's naval defence but to the contribution of a Eastern Fleet, based on Singapore of 8 BB, 8 BC and 4 CV. During the war, Australian prices had doubled and debt soared. The mood on the navy had changed, apart from officer and ship exchange the Jellicoe report was completely rejected.
The Henderson schedule from 1918 onwards: (by 1917 1 BC, 3CL, 12DD 6 Subs 1 Tender would already been built)
1918 6 DD, 1 Tender
1919 1 BC
1920 1 CL, 1 Tender
1921 1 BC
1922 2 CL, 6SS
1923 1 Repair Ship
1924 1 BC
1925 1 BC
1926 1 BC (original 6 DD replaced)
1927 2 CL (original 3 SS replaced)
1928 Nothing (3 SS replaced)
1929 1 BC (original 3 CL replaced)
1930 Nothing (original BC replaced)
1931 1 BC
1932 2 CL
The BC were about £2m each, CL £450 000, DD and SS £90 000, Auxiliaries £200 000 each. These are Tiger/Renown size ships at about £70 per ton. CL will be Town/ C Class size. If a carrier was substituted for a later ship it would probably be about 14 000 tons with 18 aircraft as equal and equivalent lifecycle cost for a 27 000 ton BC.
The original 1913 Fleet Unit of 1BC, 2CL, 6 DD and 2 SS had cost £3.5m. The future costs were outlined as £989 500 per year (£70 000 more per year than the yearly cost of establishing the fleet unit)
In 1932 Australia's Population was 5.4m. The Navy budget had shrunk from £2.6m (+£2m construction) in 1927-28 to just £1.5m (£0 construction) in 1932. Total defence spending in 1932 was £3.2m or 0.6% of GDP, in 1927 it had been £7.3m but still only 1% of GDP.
The cost of the war to Australia was £377 million, of which 70% (£264 m) was borrowed and the rest came from taxes (£113 m). Overall, the war had a significantly negative impact on the Australia economy. Real aggregate GDP declined by 9.5 percent over the period 1914 to 1920, while the mobilization of personnel resulted in a 6 percent decline in civilian employment. Meanwhile, although population growth continued during the war years, it was only half that of the prewar rate. Per capita incomes also declined sharply, failing by 16 percent.
By 1934 the total cost of the war had grown to £831.3m
The Australian Government was paying out £7.7m in war pensions per year by 1932. In a more prosperous world without WW1, an outlay of £8.3m per year by 1932 on the navy should have been quite easy.
If Australia was good for £14m in capital ships over 20 years then perhaps Canada could fund say £21m. While Canada may not develop a navy in the RAN's image, donating ships like Malaya and New Zealand is a cheap option. To take New Zealand as an example. She could opt to have a navy with a single CL for 20 years and this would cost the same as donating a BC with no further costs.
If Australia and Canada chose to live off the protection provided by the Empire and only commit 1% instead of 2% GDP then this is still a RAN of 4 BC and Canada gifting 5 QE type ships.
When Australia went to war in 1939, there were 9 cruisers, (2CA, 4CL, 3AMC), 5000 Naval Regulars and 5000 Reservists who were mobilised from a 7m population size. This was half the numbers envisaged for 1932 under the Henderson Plan.
The threats
German pre-war war plans targeted Australian shipping with cruisers with the idea of drawing off RN ships based in Europe. German plans assumed Japanese neutrality and were blunted with the arrival of HMAS Australia in 1913. It appears that the German military regarded the potential value of the region not only in strategic terms, but also in cultural value: Deutschtum, or the maintenance of German culture in a ‘foreign’ context, was an extremely important issue. There were 50,000 'German' immigrants in Australia in 1914.
German warships, Condor (in 1910) and Cormoran (in 1912) paid visits to several Australian ports including Sydney, Melbourne, Hobart, Adelaide, and Brisbane. Detailed reports were made on the state of German culture in each individual area, through contact with German social clubs and communities. The presence of German ‘patriotic’ spirit, through the forms of language, religion, and ‘imperial’ sentiment (the display of Kaiser Wilhelm's portrait in one Tasmanian home drew particular praise) were carefully noted by the visitors, and any absence of such loyalty in German communities deplored. Of course, there was a strategic purpose to this surveillance: as noted by the senior German station officer, Captain Kranzbuhler, following the 1910 tour, 'nothing serves German interests better than a visit by a German warship to Australian ports.’
The 1919 BC
These ships (laid down 1919 and 1921) could be about 29 000 tons full load, 6 15" guns, 9" belt, 30kts, 690ft long with 88 ft beam and 27 ft draft. A small tube boiler, geared turbine Lion with 6 15" guns. Faster and with bigger guns than a Kongo or any German ship. This ship would be about £2.3m, a 15% increase over budget but in line with contempories. 8 13.5" guns could be done on the same displacement, a mini-Hood. Speed could be dropped to 26 knots and 8 15" shipped with 4" secondaries. These ships would be mixed fuel oil/coal like the Cavendish class cruisers as the Australian navy was still coal based. With 6" in casements to save costs, they would probably be double storied like the 1914 battleships. To meet the cost of about £1.9m, then reduce size to 27 075 tons full load, 8 13.5" guns, 9" belt, speed down to 25 knots on a 670ft long, 90.3ft beam and 24.6ft draft hull. Secondaries would need to be 8 twin 4" in shields. The speed will match HMAS Australia as a tactical unit but not be enough to catch modern cruisers.
