Ships in a Storm - A Finnish Navy Vignette

[DrakonFin]

Ships in a Storm


October 25th, 1939

The weather was horrid on the Archipelago Sea. High winds and constant rain conspired to make visibility very low, together with the rapidly approaching October night.

At least the enemy will not see us either, the man standing on the open bridge of the coastal destroyer Riilahti thought. The Riilahti was the flagship of the Finnish Coastal Fleet, and the man on the bridge was the fleet's commander, Commodore Thorolf Sjöman.

You have a sailor's name, Marshal Mannerheim had remarked to Sjöman as he was promoted to his current position three months ago. That it literally was, the commodore could only agree. And he was an old hand in the Finnish Navy, too, having signed up in the fleet in the second year of Finnish independence as a volunteer, already then over 30 and having the qualifications of a merchant ship captain.

The Riilahti led a flotilla of vessels, and under the conditions Sjöman ordered the ship's captain, one Arho, to slow down the speed to below 10 knots, sending word to the ship's radio room as well to relay the same information to the other vessels. The flotilla was in a hurry, sure, but it wouldn't be prudent to lose any of the ships to the storm raging in the archipelago before they even got to their destination. How ever difficult the weather was for the Finnish ships, Sjöman was sure that the conditions among the multitude of islands and the skerries all around, on the narrow shipping lanes criss-crossing the area, would be even more difficult to the Soviets who could not even use local pilots to help them. Sjöman really wished the Red Banner Fleet would run at least one of its battleships or cruisers aground here, get caught ignominously on the rocks. That would help his side considerably, at least for the time being.

Operation Regatta, it was called. The Finnish remilitarization of the Åland Islands, now that a Soviet attack against Finland imminent – according to Major Hallamaa and his intelligence people. Two flotillas of Finnish ships were now approaching the islands between the Finnish and Swedish mainlands – Karhu and Kontio, they were called. Sjöman's was the latter. The former was led by the Riilahti's sister ship, the Ruotsinsalmi, the most modern ship of the Finnish fleet – such as it was. Karhu included also the torpedo boats S1 and S2, the armed icebreaker Mahti and three passenger steamers commandeered from the Finnish Steamship Company and the Bore shipping company. For the while, the ships were packed to the gills with coastal infantry and ordinary infantry from the Turku area, men most of whom were puking their guts out right now, not accustomed to such conditions out here as Sjöman himself was.

Kontio, on the other hand, brought in the big guns. Sjöman would have very much liked his flotilla to be covered with more vessels, but the Swedish had been adamant about staying out of it, not to anger the Soviets and get into hot water themselves. So no Swedish submarines out there, keeping eye on the Red Banner Fleet. The Finnish Navy, of course, had no such modern vessels. The Finnish military had always been cash-strapped, after the Great Depression even moreso. In the last two years, if the government had any extra money, it would have been used on artillery pieces and fighter interceptors. The Navy seemingly always was skipped when resources were allocated for the military.

”Commodore”.

Someone had just addressed Sjöman. It was young Lieutenant Karhunen.

”Commodore, a message from the Klas Horn. The Twins have stopped.”

”What?”

That meant there was a big problem.

The commodore decided to get to the radio room himself to hear what was happening. With some difficulty, he climbed down from the bridge towards the radio room on the lower deck, banging himself against the ship's superstructure as he went.

Feeling terribly cold and soaked to the bone, Sjöman opened the door to the small radio room.

”Talk to me”, he said to the young seaman manning the radio, with heavy earphones covering his head.

”Commodore, the Klas Horn says that both Louhi and Tursas have stopped. It appears they are both listing heavily...”

Bloody hell, Sjöman thought as the man went back to listening to his 'phones, twiddling the control knobs in front of him.

”Sergeant”, he said, feeling a cold sweat on his forehead, despite being soaked otherwise as well, ”send orders to the entire flotilla to come to a full stop.”

He told Karhunen, who had followed him, to take the same orders to Arho as well.

The next few minutes were full of confusion and contradictory information coming in from the other ships of the flotilla. Sjöman tried to stay cool and make smart, responsible decisions, with the ship bobbing in the roiling water like a cork, with the October wind howling in his ears.

The Louhi and the Tursas. The Finnish fleet's big guns, such as they were. Both vessels armed with two 12 inch Obuhov guns in protected turrets, covered by six 40 mm Bofors AA guns. The gun barges had been dreamed up by the Navy planning office under Commodore Schwank in 1937 to offset the fleet's lack of capital ships in, the lack of any vessels with heavier naval guns in fact. Both were dependent on their armored, armed tugs, the Vetehinen 1-2 and the Vesihiisi 1-2, respectively.

They were designed as floating coastal artillery, the main weapons themselves cannibalized from First World War era Tsarist coastal fortresses. The simple hulls built at the Crichton-Vulcan shipyard in Turku and the artillery fitted, with fire control systems, with the covert help of German engineers. The Finnish Navy had made the launching of the barges a big occasion – they were, after all, designed as a deterrent, to show the Red Banner Fleet that there could be a cost to trying to take the Åland islands in a potential war.

As Arho struggled to take the Riilahti closer to the two troubled gun barges, Sjöman could remember another storm 14 years earlier. A storm during a training exercise north of the Ålands where the ships of the Coastal Fleet had been in big trouble as well. But with right decisions, with tenacity and hard work, they had prevailed in the battle against the sea that time. Sjöman, much younger, had saved the torpedo boat he was commanding from almost sure destruction. The event had probably made it possible he was in his position today, with the stripes of a commodore on his soaked longcoat.

Maybe we'll manage this time as well, he thought optimistically as the ship approached the so-called Twins.

Commodore Sjöman did not get his wish. In the end, he was reduced to watching both gun barges slowly capsize and sink, one after the other, there just outside the island of Kråkskär. There was nothing that could be done about it, not in those conditions.

In the final reckoning, roughly half of the crew of both vessels could be saved from the debacle, at least. Under the circumstances, Sjöman thought is was very good. Back on the bridge of the Riilahti, as the morning was already starting to dawn, he turned to Captain Arho to thank him for his work that night when, again, there was young Lieutenant Karhunen.

”A message from the Utö lighthouse, Commodore”, he said, and somehow, then, Sjöman could see the light go out out from his eyes.

”The Russians are here.”


[filler]

 

[Rifleman]

Oh the Finnish Navy! This should be very interesting, can't say I hear it talked about much. Im looking forward to seeing what you do with it.

 

[DrakonFin]

Oh the Finnish Navy! This should be very interesting, can't say I hear it talked about much. Im looking forward to seeing what you do with it.

Well that was it, unfortunately. I will sometime in the future very likely write a longer story or TL about the Finnish Navy, but this was something I just had to get out of my system. It was prompted by a comment on the Finnish Navy's current acquisitions and their relationship to OTL decisions in the 20s and 30s published on the Helsingin Sanomat today. The POD here should be easy to pinpoint for our resident Finns at least, and the very likely consequences of it all as well.

 

[Jukra]

Yup! If Soviet Navy had balls during the Winter War they could even historically have tried to take Åland Isles by storm a la Germany in Norway 1940 thus cutting Finnish-Swedish SLOC's and opening the whole Finnish West Coast for amphibious landings. That could have well been a winning move which they fortunately did not take, perhaps partially thanks to Finnish Navy, perhaps partially due to sheer ineptness of not taking risks. And one would not take risks under Stalin's leadership. Finally, one reason might be the willingness not to antagonize Sweden too much.

 

[trurle]

OP by DrakonFin must be some sort of convoluted (and likely wrong) political play. For Finland, best war strategy was to allow Soviet occupation of Aland Islands, not to defend them. Dilution of Soviet resources to the province not contributing to the Finnish war efforts anyway is the good thing for Finland. Occupation of Aland Islands by Soviets may even draw Sweden into the war.

 

[Jukra]

OP by DrakonFin must be some sort of convoluted (and likely wrong) political play. For Finland, best war strategy was to allow Soviet occupation of Aland Islands, not to defend them. Dilution of Soviet resources to the province not contributing to the Finnish war efforts anyway is the good thing for Finland. Occupation of Aland Islands by Soviets may even draw Sweden into the war.

Åland Isles were and are a demilitarized province with only low population and no significant industries, sure. But they are situated at strategic crossroads between Finland and Sweden and also guard the approach to Bay of Bothnia. By taking Åland isles Soviets could have enacted a true naval blockade of Finland practically bringing down any traffic between Finland and the rest of the world (Rail and road connection with Sweden was of minor importance.).

But even more importantly, the Finnish coast north of Sea of Archipelago was not fortified like the southern coast was. The whole Western Coast from Rauma to Tornio would be open to amphibious raids and even invasion. Particularly after the sea would freeze one could well perform division-army scale invasion over ice using Åland as a logistics base. Merely having to guard the West and Southwest coast would tie up Finnish reserves, and as they were stretched thin this would have massive butterflies.

 

[trurle]

Åland Isles were and are a demilitarized province with only low population and no significant industries, sure. But they are situated at strategic crossroads between Finland and Sweden and also guard the approach to Bay of Bothnia. By taking Åland isles Soviets could have enacted a true naval blockade of Finland practically bringing down any traffic between Finland and the rest of the world (Rail and road connection with Sweden was of minor importance.).

But even more importantly, the Finnish coast north of Sea of Archipelago was not fortified like the southern coast was. The whole Western Coast from Rauma to Tornio would be open to amphibious raids and even invasion. Particularly after the sea would freeze one could well perform division-army scale invasion over ice using Åland as a logistics base. Merely having to guard the West and Southwest coast would tie up Finnish reserves, and as they were stretched thin this would have massive butterflies.

You`d better have a hard numbers about role of sea transport to Finland. Even a marginal railroad can transfer ~4000 tons of cargo per day, and Norway was in pretty cosy terms with Finland.
Also, Soviet invasion from bases on Aland Islands do not make much sense. The first leg of journey to Aland Islands is fully exposed to Finnish aviation and submarines. Do not forget, Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania are still independent states until June 1940. Attacking the Finland back from Aland islands is like..trying to punch somebody`s back through slit between buttocks. Possible, but angles and distances make attack more likely to fail compared to alternatives.

 

[DrakonFin]

You`d better have a hard numbers about role of sea transport to Finland. Even a marginal railroad can transfer ~4000 tons of cargo per day, and Norway was in pretty cosy terms with Finland.
Also, Soviet invasion from bases on Aland Islands do not make much sense. The first leg of journey to Aland Islands is fully exposed to Finnish aviation and submarines. Do not forget, Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania are still independent states until June 1940. Attacking the Finland back from Aland islands is like..trying to punch somebody`s back through slit between buttocks. Possible, but angles and distances make attack more likely to fail compared to alternatives.

Of all Finnish trade in the last century or so, import and export, consistently 80-90% has gone by ship. It is an old, cliche saying in Finland to quip that in terms of trade we are an island. It is pretty much true, though. In WWII, especially during the Winter War, taking the Åland islands would have allowed the USSR to set up an effective blockade of Finnish trade when the Soviets held the Estonian coast and the Estonian islands as well. The Baltic states maybe were theoretically independent, but at this time they were under Soviet military control. Estonia had signed the deal about handing over military bases to the USSR in the end of September 1939. Before the end of October, there were Soviet 25 000 soldiers in Estonia. A lot of the Soviet bombers that bombed Finnish cities during the Winter War IOTL, especially Turku, took of from bases in Estonia. The Red Banner Fleet cruised with impunity around the Estonian coast. That independent Estonia was in the winter of 39-40.

The Soviets, after taking the Åland islands, would not need to do an amphibious attack on Finland from them. The possibility of one would be enough to divert Finnish troops to the southwest from the eastern border, like Jukra points out. The islands could be used as a naval and air base to strangle Finnish trade - both to mount attacks against Finnish ports, like Turku that was the single-most important during the war, constantly bombed by the Soviets as it was, also nearby Rauma and Pori, and to attack any cargo and passenger ships that attempt to pass the islands on their way to Finland or from Finland to the Swedish waters.

There was no railway line to Norway in 1939-1940. There were barely some roads. There was one single track rail line to Sweden, one that involves a break of gauge at the border. You don't feed an entire nation or bring in all the military goods it needs through that single line close to the Arctic circle in the middle of one of the coldest winters on record. The Finnish railway network was overburdened as it was to handle the supply of the military and all the other needs of the nation in war conditions. The national transport system was geared towards the ports, mainly in the south of the country. A major restructuring of national logistics was all but impossible when the nation was fighting a war for survival.

Above, you say that my post must be "a convoluted (and likely wrong) political play". You seem to be arguing this from pretty limited base of knowledge about the Finnish position and possibilities. I admit that it is an AH argument about the need of the Finnish military to be able to protect the Ålands during the WWII period - or at least, in the Soviet view, appear ready to protect them, to have the units and vessels that seem able to put up a fight with the Red Banner Fleet's capital ships. I have been thinking about the issue for long, and I don't think there is anything "convoluted" about it. The OTL coastal ships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen, with their ten inch guns that had a similar range as the 12 inch Obuhovs on the Gangut-class ships of the Soviet fleet (and better, more modern systems besides), were the kind of ships the Soviets needed to take seriously. Thus they acted as a deterrent, a pocket fleet-in-being, so to speak, together with the small Finnish submarine fleet. IOTL the Soviets did not attempt an occupation of the islands - but in a timeline with a significantly weaker Finnish Navy, to the point of neglect (like in the story above), a Soviet attempt to take Åland would have been much more likely. And, given the massive imbalance of Finnish and Soviet naval forces in that case, it would have also very likely succeeded.

 

[trurle]

Of all Finnish trade in the last century or so, import and export, consistently 80-90% has gone by ship. It is an old, cliche saying in Finland to quip that in terms of trade we are an island. It is pretty much true, though. In WWII, especially during the Winter War, taking the Åland islands would have allowed the USSR to set up an effective blockade of Finnish trade when the Soviets held the Estonian coast and the Estonian islands as well. The Baltic states maybe were theoretically independent, but at this time they were under Soviet military control. Estonia had signed the deal about handing over military bases to the USSR in the end of September 1939. Before the end of October, there were Soviet 25 000 soldiers in Estonia. A lot of the Soviet bombers that bombed Finnish cities during the Winter War IOTL, especially Turku, took of from bases in Estonia. The Red Banner Fleet cruised with impunity around the Estonian coast. That independent Estonia was in the winter of 39-40.

The Soviets, after taking the Åland islands, would not need to do an ambhibious attack on Finland from them. The possibility of one would be enough to divert Finnish troops to the southwest from the eastern border. The islands could be used as a naval and air base to strangle Finnish trade - both to mount attacks against Finnish ports, like Turku that was the single-most important during the war, constantly bombed by the Soviets as it was, also nearby Rauma and Pori, and to attack any cargo and passenger ships that attempt to pass the islands on their way to Finland or from Finland to the Swedish waters.

There was no railway line to Norway in 1939-1940. There were barely some roads. There was one single track rail line to Sweden, one that involves a break of gauge at the border. You don't feed an entire nation or bring in all the military goods it needs through that single line close to the Arctic circle in the middle of one of the coldest winters on record. The Finnish railway network was overburdened as it was to handle the supply of the military and all the other needs of the nation in war conditions.

Above, you say that my post must be "a convoluted (and likely wrong) political play". I admit that it is an AH argument about the need to the Finnish military to be able to protect the Ålands militarily during the WWII period - or at least, in the Soviet view, appear ready to protect them, to have the units and vessels that seem able to put up a fight with the Red Banner Fleet's capital ships. I have been thinking about the issue for long, and I don't think there is anything "convoluted" about it. The OTL coastal ships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen, with their ten inch guns that had a similar range as the 12 inch Obuhovs on the Gangut-class ships of the Soviet fleet (and better, more modern systems besides), were the kind of ships the Soviets needed to take seriously. Thus they acted as a deterrent, a pocket fleet-in-being, so to speak, together with the small Finnish submarine fleet. IOTL the Soviets did not attempt an occupation of the islands - but in a timeline with a significantly weaker Finnish Navy, to the point of neglect (like in the story above), a Soviet attempt to take Åland would have been much more likely. ITTL, the Finnish Navy And, given the balance of Finnish and Soviet naval force in that case, it would have also very likely succeeded.

Yes, i missed security treaties with Baltic states. Pact with Estonia was finalized 11 October 1939. It make Soviet attacks in Bay of Bothnia area more likely than i thought in October-November 1939. But i still do not understand why Russians should invade Aland Islands while more valuable and yet lightly defended coastal areas if Finland proper are nearby, many of the potential landing beaches around Turku even closer to Soviet bases than the Aland Islands.
Some naval and aircraft action may be possible to isolate Aland Islands as the part of campaign of mainland.

As i remember soviet naval doctrine of the period, it placed a lot of emphasis to coastal artillery controlling straits. IF Soviet would decide to "control" the bay of Bothnia entrance, they would try to setup a gun fort on Finnish portion of Märket plus some islet like Emskar may be. The narrow straits east of Aland can be more simply mined to the complete unusability. But anyway the Porkkala landing target is much more lucrative and perceived less risky IF Soviet amphibious operation to be launched. It is a bit convoluted to try to control Bay of Bothnia without full control of Gulf of Finland. Even if limited control of Gulf of Finland due treaty with Estonia is already here.

 

[DrakonFin]

Yes, i missed security treaties with Baltic states. Pact with Estonia was finalized 11 October 1939. It make Soviet attacks in Bay of Bothnia area more likely than i thought in October-November 1939. But i still do not understand why Russians should invade Aland Islands while more valuable and yet lightly defended coastal areas if Finland proper are nearby, many of the potential landing beaches around Turku even closer to Soviet bases than the Aland Islands.
Some naval and aircraft action may be possible to isolate Aland Islands as the part of campaign of mainland.

As i remember soviet naval doctrine of the period, it placed a lot of emphasis to coastal artillery controlling straits. IF Soviet would decide to "control" the bay of Bothnia entrance, they would try to setup a gun fort on Finnish portion of Märket plus some islet like Emskar may be. The narrow straits east of Aland can be more simply mined to the complete unusability. But anyway the Porkkala landing target is much more lucrative and perceived less risky IF Soviet amphibious operation to be launched. It is a bit convoluted to try to control Bay of Bothnia without control of Bay of Finland.

Well, here we get to the point of the exercise: Åland would be an easy target to take if it is not believably defended by the Finns. Porkkala and other locations on the Gulf of Finland are defended by coastal guns, in fortifications built by the Russians in 1914-1917, and manned and developed by the Finns in the 20s and 30s. A landing on the Finnish coast on the Gulf of Finland is potentially much more expensive than taking the Ålands with no fortifications or coastal gun emplacements. Porkkala, for example, is covered by a 12 inch twin turret and two 8 inch guns on Mäkiluoto and four 6 inch guns on Träskö and Rönnskär. Near Helsinki, the Finns have another 12 inch twin turret and no less than sixteen 10 inch guns on five fortified islands, close enough to play merry hell with ships attempting a landing at Porkkala.

At the time, the Finnish coastal defence was built around these WWI-legacy coastal forts, as it was pretty much until the 1990s at least. For any Soviet attempt at a landing on the Gulf of Finland, these coastal guns would likely cause a significant impediment, along with the mine fields they would be covering. Åland had no such guns. Hence, the OTL coastal ships were built, to be able to take firepower to the islands if needed. In a TL without such Finnish vessels and an otherwise weak Finnish Navy, Åland is a soft target.

 

[Jukra]

You`d better have a hard numbers about role of sea transport to Finland. Even a marginal railroad can transfer ~4000 tons of cargo per day, and Norway was in pretty cosy terms with Finland.
Also, Soviet invasion from bases on Aland Islands do not make much sense. The first leg of journey to Aland Islands is fully exposed to Finnish aviation and submarines. Do not forget, Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania are still independent states until June 1940. Attacking the Finland back from Aland islands is like..trying to punch somebody`s back through slit between buttocks. Possible, but angles and distances make attack more likely to fail compared to alternatives.

I don't have my sourcebooks at hand due to summer holiday trip, but DrakonFin has already made the basic points. 4000 tons is load of a single ship, coming right into Southern Finland, not far north. Convoys to Turku ran throughout the war with Soviet navy trying to attack them with submarines, aircraft and aircraft laid mines. With Åland isles in Soviet hands there's no practical chance of this. As for Finnish Navy trying to attack the transports to Åland isles, sure, it's war, maybe Soviets would have even taken losses.

The main point is, that Åland isles were and are demilitarized during peacetime. On morning of 30 November 1939. just like on morning of 13 July 2017, there was not a single Finnish soldier, Finnish defensive minefield, Finnish warship, Finnish coastal fort or Finnish aircraft there. A perfect opportunity for any half-competent Soviet naval leadership to gain initiative and take the isles by coup de main. Direct the first echelon transport via air, submarines and warships, follow-on-forces with escorted convoys. Just like Germany on 9 April 1940, but without any chance of resistance, only uneventful unkoading at the pier. Finnish Navy could have contested the move but likely not succesfully. The fact that Finland had even a rather small navy may have been a factor for Soviet naval leadership to consider, but on the other hand, it can also have been sheer ineptitude.

(Åland isles are demilitarized even nowadays, though with range of modern weaponry and amount of air and naval transportation available for Finland it is rather irrelevant point. Besides, in time of crisis I'd bet there would be a contingent of Police and Border Guards just practising there, perhaps together with a reunion of naval reservists....)

 

[Aragorn]

I will follow this, very interesting.