Simplest POD to let South win Civil War?

[ZombieSlayer54]

Hey guys, quick question.

What is the simplest, and preferably closest to 1861, (non-ASB) POD which will allow the South to win the Civil War? Mind you, it doesn't have to be a Confederacy Wank POD. The South doesn't even have to survive for much longer after they achieve independence. Just something that lets them win it. It can be a minimal victory, achieving independence without Missouri/etc., or it can be a complete victory, taking their claimed territory in New Mexico, Missouri, and the other border states.

Thanks in advance.

-ZombieSlayer

 

[usertron2020]

They secede on James Buchanan's Inauguration Day, 1857. Four years with no interruptions while the South establishes a country. I'm not a Buchanan fan. I'm weird that way.

 

[ZombieSlayer54]

They secede on James Buchanan's Inauguration Day, 1857. Four years with no interruptions while the South establishes a country. I'm not a Buchanan fan. I'm weird that way.

Was there actually strong secessionist sentiment after the election of Buchanan OTL, or would that require a POD to make them want to secede after he wins?

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Well, IAOTO that a successful Maryland invasion in 1862 was plausible (with the lost orders staying lost as a PoD) and that it could have plausibly led to a successful CSA. IMO, it was just early enough to get the CSA foreign recognition and (to a certain limited extent) aid, and combined with other very plausible butterflies (Copperheads taking the midterms, for example), the CSA could gain enough of an advantage that the Union gives up -- if not under Lincoln, then under his Peace Democrat successor.

That all said, I am well aware that these are not uncontested points.

 

[LordVetinari]

Yes, the lost orders do lead people to begin making disparaging remarks about T-191. Yes, we know, some of it is ASB, let it go.

Most of the comments have some validity to them, though like much, not all are equally true or false, just middle ground truth.

 

[lloyd007]

The simplest POD is as usertron said... The South secedes during Buchanan's early presidency and Buchanan is like... "Fine... whatever..."

Lincoln doesn't have the legitimacy to contend this if he even wins (it very well might be Douglas)...

 

[DuQuense]

Lincoln Killed in Baltimore while traveling to Washington for the Inaugural.

 

[Snake Featherston]

TL-191 has the one POD that actually *would* give the South a victory in the war, namely a decisive victory over the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil. The problem was that Lee was not the general to win that victory.....

 

[67th Tigers]

The earliest real possibility of a victory with sufficient political gains to force the north to negotiate is a successful defence/invasion* of Kentucky against the Federal Army in September 1861.

* Delete according to your political beliefs.

 

[67th Tigers]

But the simplest of course is that Lincoln isn't able to provoke a war. Congress was showing no intention of doing anything other than allowing a seven state Confederacy to leave the Union before the attack on Ft Sumter.

 

[Xen]

But the simplest of course is that Lincoln isn't able to provoke a war. Congress was showing no intention of doing anything other than allowing a seven state Confederacy to leave the Union before the attack on Ft Sumter.

This is the simplist right here. Avoid the war. Northern sentiment ran highly along the lines of depart our wayward sisters and go in peace. Then Fort Sumpter happened and to the Union of 1861 it was comparable to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the September 11th attacks in 2001.

 

[mrmandias]

Probably the simplest would simply be to have Lincoln have some real conception of how bloody the conflict would be, and flinch from starting the war.

Or have Jeff Davis temporize on the federal forts, thus stringing out events and postponing the war until secession is seen as an accomplished fact. But getting Davis to temporize is approaching ASB

 

[Snake Featherston]

The earliest real possibility of a victory with sufficient political gains to force the north to negotiate is a successful defence/invasion* of Kentucky against the Federal Army in September 1861.

* Delete according to your political beliefs.

No, the only successful option is to use Joe Johnston's strategy with the manpower available to the South in the West, while avoiding the bureaucratic messes that dogged the Western war from start to finish while a general (preferably Longstreet or Jackson, who actually had ideas of tactics beyond "Attack Attack Attack") in the East wins first a major defensive victory against a Union army in Virginia to parry the initial Union strike and then guts a Union army in the North itself near Washington, thereby capitalizing in early 1862 on relative Union weakness to Confederate strength.

Above all, don't yield Forts Henry and Donelson.

But the simplest of course is that Lincoln isn't able to provoke a war. Congress was showing no intention of doing anything other than allowing a seven state Confederacy to leave the Union before the attack on Ft Sumter.

He did not provoke the war. See: Star of the West incident.

 

[67th Tigers]

No, the only successful option is to use Joe Johnston's strategy with the manpower available to the South in the West, while avoiding the bureaucratic messes that dogged the Western war from start to finish while a general (preferably Longstreet or Jackson, who actually had ideas of tactics beyond "Attack Attack Attack") in the East wins first a major defensive victory against a Union army in Virginia to parry the initial Union strike and then guts a Union army in the North itself near Washington, thereby capitalizing in early 1862 on relative Union weakness to Confederate strength.

Naming two Confederate generals with a proven track record of incompetence in independent command?

The comparative strength ratios are quite off. In late 1861/ early 1862 the Union has a much more marked advantage in manpower than after the Confederate Conscription Act of April 1862 (and indeed, for a period of a few months in Summer 1862 the Confederacy can probably put more men into the field than the Union, although muster roll strength is still slightly lower). Emergency measures run though in summer 1862 push Union strength up immensely, and the force Burnside mishandles is the largest Union Army that ever fought.

He did not provoke the war. See: Star of the West incident.

President Buchanan sent the Star of the West, hence the cooler reaction to it being fired upon when it violated Confederate territorial waters. It was one of many petty skirmishes that occurred as the CS took US Federal property in their territory.

You may be confusing this with a second attempt to relieve the Federal garrison of Ft Sumter undertaken in April 1861, which triggered the decision to take Ft Sumter, which in turn spiralled out of control as Lincoln activated the militia initially to regain Federal property (when it became a war of conquest to "reunite the Union" is disputable, as that occurred over many months.)

 

[CalBear]

Congress ignores Lincoln and refuses to fund the war.

Lincoln decides that the Constiution doesn't allow him to use force to hold the Union together.

 

[Ryan the Rebel]

Naming two Confederate generals with a proven track record of incompetence in independent command?

Longstreet never had a big independent command, but true the Knoxville campaign was a mess but remember he was sent there by Bragg to be out of the way against Longstreet's advice. Calling Jackson's Valley campaign incompetent might just be a crime. Keeping an army three times his own's size in place for four months by marching circles around it (almost literally) is quite an accomplishment.

A few months ago I messed around with a TL in which the Confederates nearly destroy the Union army following an altered Bull Run. This allows them to take Washington early on. Thats as far as I got but that could end the war. The POD, if I remember, was a shift in the Confederate chain of command. I doubt the TL is still lying around, but I may try to dig it up now

 

[Snake Featherston]

Naming two Confederate generals with a proven track record of incompetence in independent command?

As opposed to Lee's record which consisted of senseless headlong charges like the ones at Malvern Hill, the third day of Gettysburg, the second day of the Wilderness, at Fort Stedman and so on? By comparison to Longstreet actually innovating tactics and having a magic touch to hitting the Union right where it hurt them? And of course Johnston was styming Sherman into September where Grant bottled up Lee in Petersburg in all of eight weeks.

The comparative strength ratios are quite off. In late 1861/ early 1862 the Union has a much more marked advantage in manpower than after the Confederate Conscription Act of April 1862 (and indeed, for a period of a few months in Summer 1862 the Confederacy can probably put more men into the field than the Union, although muster roll strength is still slightly lower). Emergency measures run though in summer 1862 push Union strength up immensely, and the force Burnside mishandles is the largest Union Army that ever fought.

Where IOTL Jefferson Davis admitted 3/4 of the Confederate army was AWOL by 1864.

President Buchanan sent the Star of the West, hence the cooler reaction to it being fired upon when it violated Confederate territorial waters. It was one of many petty skirmishes that occurred as the CS took US Federal property in their territory.

You may be confusing this with a second attempt to relieve the Federal garrison of Ft Sumter undertaken in April 1861, which triggered the decision to take Ft Sumter, which in turn spiralled out of control as Lincoln activated the militia initially to regain Federal property (when it became a war of conquest to "reunite the Union" is disputable, as that occurred over many months.)

"Violated Confederate territorial waters?" Ridiculous. The Confederacy was not and never was a state in any sense of the term.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Longstreet never had a big independent command, but true the Knoxville campaign was a mess but remember he was sent there by Bragg to be out of the way against Longstreet's advice. Calling Jackson's Valley campaign incompetent might just be a crime. Keeping an army three times his own's size in place for four months by marching circles around it (almost literally) is quite an accomplishment.

Actually the Knoxville Campaign had more to do with Longstreet wanting Bragg's job and Bragg sending him to Knoxville to get him out of his hair. It was certainly strategically senseless, but then Bragg had plenty of exposure to the Idiot Ball himself (like for instance never seriously harassing the Cracker Line and his very bad use of the Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge terrain that ensured one successful frontal assault would trigger the disaster dominoes).

 

[67th Tigers]

As opposed to Lee's record which consisted of senseless headlong charges like the ones at Malvern Hill, the third day of Gettysburg, the second day of the Wilderness, at Fort Stedman and so on? By comparison to Longstreet actually innovating tactics and having a magic touch to hitting the Union right where it hurt them? And of course Johnston was styming Sherman into September where Grant bottled up Lee in Petersburg in all of eight weeks.

Where IOTL Jefferson Davis admitted 3/4 of the Confederate army was AWOL by 1864.

"Violated Confederate territorial waters?" Ridiculous. The Confederacy was not and never was a state in any sense of the term.

All of this is in keeping with the neo-Radical ideal of course, and is about as accurate as the Lost Cause ideal. Two ideals that are thesis driven and ignore the actual evidence.

Malvern Hill - Lee never ordered the attack. It was a tragic mistake. Lee had primed part of the line to demonstrate to the front when Longstreet's turning movement had taken effect (Longstreet failed to get in position that day, and by the time he was the next day McClellan had stepped back on the piste* to dodge the attack). The regulating brigade** was Armistead's, which advanced skirmishers to clear Federal skirmishers to their front, but was misinterpreted by those taking their cue from him, and taken as the "go signal".

Third day at Gettysburg - Lee's plan was workable. It was botched by his senior subordinate, Longstreet. He went in half-hearted, and doomed the attack from the start.

Second day of the Wilderness - Lee turned both the left and right of the main Federal force. The frontal attacks in question were Longstreet's down the Orange Plank Road against Hancock's detached force, which were then followed by a flank attack by Longstreet....

Fort Stedman - fell in an extremely effective infliltration by Gordon's force. It was then recaptured in a counterattack. Here it was the Federals that mounted a "senseless headlong charge", but it worked.

What do the desertion figures of late 1864 have to do with 1861? Have you compared them to the Federal desertion figures?

As to "territorial waters", your argument has no weight whatsoever. The Confederacy was a state when it declared itself a state and took control of its' national territory, no matter what the somantics of the issue and Washington's denialism. Or should we apply your argument to, say, the United States before 1783?




* Fencing term.
** The main method of directing formations in this period was the "regulating unit", to which all others would conform.

 

[Cryptic]

Hey guys, quick question.

What is the simplest, and preferably closest to 1861, (non-ASB) POD which will allow the South to win the Civil War?

Once the Union was committed in the long term, no dazzling confederate victories were going to win the total war. Union advantages were too great and the confederacy would still get ground down.

How about...

Lincoln dies suddenly of illness in 1861. Without Lincoln's charisma, Union commitment for the long term starts to diminish rapidly. Early historical confederate military victories accelerate failing commitment.

Late 1861, lukewarm union states start to withdraw their support for the war. Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland and even Indiana ("butternut districts") refuse to allow offensive operations from their territory or to raise troops to be used in offensive operations.

Early 1862, the war goes into a stalemate. Confederacy wins.