Devvy
Donor
World statesmen who provided the stimulus towards integration; left to right: Schumacher (Germany), Nasser (Egypt), Eisenhower (USA), Stalin (Soviet Union)
Excerpt from "Channel Integration", by Henri Miskin
Many a man could point at two points in history for the eventual union of the member states in to the European Community. The devastation left across Europe following the Second World War was large, even in spite of the huge Marshall Plan loans from the United States. Even the noble statesman that was Winston Churchill famously commented "We must build a kind of United States of Europe" - even though he didn't see the United Kingdom as being a part of that. Those two events are:
1) The Stalin Note. Whether or not Stalin actually intended it to happen - many would comment not, the Note did eventually achieve aims he would approve of. The offer of German Unity between East and West (with the Saarland eventually reunifying later) turned what was West Germany away from moves towards pan-European Unity as fledgling steps were taken with the European Coal & Steel Community. Schumacher's West Germany would chase down union with East Germany with a gusto, consuming much political time to deliberations and motions. The end effect by 1956 was the eventual reintegration of much of Germany, taking a total of 4 years of negotiations, arguments and debates between the 4 major powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union). Much can be attributed to the death of Joseph Stalin, and the passing of the torch in Moscow to Molotov in 1953.
Molotov was found to be far more accommodating to the reunification of Germany - subject, of course, to some conditions. First most was the neutrality of a reunified Germany, which would also forbid the basing of foreign troops within Germany. Secondly, the limiting of German forces to be little more useful then glorified border guards & armed security - a situation that was duly cast in to the spotlight during Germany's messy revolution in 1986. The other demands fall by the way side, but the effect was to enforce neutrality on Germany, keeping the Soviets and NATO a comfortable distance apart, whilst also preventing any German-led resurgence that would punish the Soviets again. The case of "neutrality" was interpreted by the Soviet Union as all-encompassing - not just in military terms, which further detracted German participation in any European integration, whether justified or not.
2) The Suez Crisis. When the UK and France "intervened" in the Crisis to supposedly keep the peace, it was seen by many as an attempt to restore colonial prestige. Whilst the move may have succeeded militarily - Israel occupied the Sinai almost up to the Suez Canal, which was later secured by United Nations Peacekeepers, the UK and France were in for a torrid response diplomatically. Both were swiftly condemned, especially in the United States, who threatened to intervene economically by selling large amounts of British currency causing a crisis - a threat which Eisenhower intended to be taken seriously. A small sale to get the British to actually heed the American "requests" had consequences however - something that Eisenhower has oft lamented, and is recognised as one of the greatest US foreign policy blunders of the 20th Century. The move caused a wobbles in the British economy, and caused significant doubt in the US-UK relationship. The Crisis left the UK and France as defeated colonial powers; both recognised the difficulty of holding on to colonial possessions, and both had little financial ability to pay for it either.
Both recognised they needed to work together to forge a "Franco-British" path forwards, free of interference from both the United States and the Soviet Union - neither of which could be trusted not to act solely in their own interests. Even if Eden, the Prime Minister, was found by MPs to be misleading Parliament over the affair, Government circles were awash with "being betrayed by the Americans" - the whole affair had been a loss-loss for the United Kingdom, with Eden accused of destroying British influence in the Middle East, as well as estranging the United States who had rapidly become one of Britain's closest allies - although Eisenhower deserved some credit too. The final nail in the coffin of the UK-US close relationship came later during the Vietnam War in the early 1960s, when both the UK and France refused flat out to get in involved in any manner. The French for their part were doubly dismayed with the Americans; they saw it as the next step after a distinct lack of US support in the First Indochina War when France attempted to defeat Vietnam communists. Although Britain had taken the lead in requesting a ceasefire, they could hardly be blamed after such economic wobbles caused by further US interference. Following the Suez Crisis, US insistence that Israel withdrew to pre-war borders, ignoring Israeli defence requests only served to strengthen British-French-Israeli co-operation.
It is often said that the cause of fusion is two parts; firstly the compatibility of two atoms who are receptive to each other, and secondly an external stimulus which pushes them together. We can see from the events of the 1950s that the causes of fusion were both present; the UK and France both felt chastened by their former major ally, and also felt threatened by a "neutral" Germany - which rapidly came to show many left-wing looking policies, and had little to repulse a Soviet Union from rolling across it if it felt threatened by the west.
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Notes: So I supposed the root PoD here is the election of Schumacher as Chancellor of Germany. He chases a unified Germany with far more gusto (and as a bypoint ends up with the German capital in Frankfurt); as a result German efforts are on reintegration, scuppering attempts at European integration. However, the Suez Crisis occurs, with the US causing a wobble in the British economy after the Brits ponder whether to side with the French or listen to the Americans, which eventually leaves the UK and France looking at each other with nowhere else to turn; the UK-USA relationship having been shaken badly, and Franco-German rapprochement scuppered by German policy dictated by internal efforts.