What if General Patton takes command of First US Army after Normandy

[steel_captain]

Just speculating that instead of Courtney Hodges assuming command of 1st US Army after Omar Bradley takes over 12th US Army Group that George Patton is given command of it with Hodges commanding 3rd US Army?

What does that mean concerning the breakout after Cobra and the dash across France but more importantly, what does that mean concerning the Hurtgen Forest, Aachen and the Bulge? Is the Battle of the Bulge even attempted if the Germans realize they will be against Patton (who all the leadership in the Wehrmacht believed was the USA's best field commander)?

I don't know about the Bulge not happening but I don't believe Patton would have wasted his troops in the Hurtgen like Hodges did.

 

[steel_captain]

Oh well...I thought this might be an interesting thread but I guess not

 

[aaronupright]

OTL in the Northern France Campaign Hodges went just as far as Patton while facing greater opposition.
So, yeah. Hard to tell.
Who gets Third Army?

I don't know about the Bulge not happening but I don't believe Patton would have wasted his troops in the Hurtgen like Hodges did.

He did something similar at Metz. in OTL.

 

[Cymraeg]

Just speculating that instead of Courtney Hodges assuming command of 1st US Army after Omar Bradley takes over 12th US Army Group that George Patton is given command of it with Hodges commanding 3rd US Army?

What does that mean concerning the breakout after Cobra and the dash across France but more importantly, what does that mean concerning the Hurtgen Forest, Aachen and the Bulge? Is the Battle of the Bulge even attempted if the Germans realize they will be against Patton (who all the leadership in the Wehrmacht believed was the USA's best field commander)?

I don't know about the Bulge not happening but I don't believe Patton would have wasted his troops in the Hurtgen like Hodges did.

Sorry, but I have severe issues with the myth that the Germans regarded Patton as 'the USA's best field commander'. Yes, they did regard him a talented armour commander, but the way that he got badly bogged down at Metz and Nancy did not impress them. They did not follow his every move with bated breath.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Patton accepted OSS assistance for deep reconissance missions, and was not totally enchanted with ULTRA as the final word on intel matters. Hodges depended heavily on his G2 officer who both rejected the OSS liaison team, and thought ULTRA the uber source. The result was a under utilization of intel flowing up from the corps HQ, and the lack of any German radio messages about the up coming offense for ULTRA analysis. Hodges and Bradly got caught with their pants down.

Patton accepted ULTRA for what it was & kept his eye on all sources of intel. Its probable he would have guessed the Germans were up to something and not been as hind footed as Hodge. Best case is he prepares a ambush and the Wacht an Rhine offensive is stuffed in a week.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Patton was great at exploitation and responding swiftly to a developing situation, but in terms of forcing a breakthrough he really didn't prove any better than Hodges or Bradly or any other number of Allied commanders. We should also keep in mind that a large formations modern commander's own abilities[1] are invariably constrained by the material conditions and abilities of their subordinate formations and units[2]. Patton would still be facing the same logistical limitations and subordinate commands as historically.

Taking all that in mind, while he might be able to do better in the margins or respond to the Bulge better, he probably won't manage to surge all the way to the Rhine before winter, which probably represents the upper-limits of what the WAllies could have achieved given the material balance of power and overall logistical situation in the fall of 1944. We certainly can dismiss any idea of the WAllies breaking fully into Germany (east of the Rhine) and seizing the Ruhr - much less Berlin - before the new year's.

Not to mention, if Patton and his crew are in charge of 1st Army in the fall of '44... whose in charge of 3rd Army during the summer?

[1]Which really means "a commander and his headquarters staff's abilities", since modern decision-making in the headquarter of large formations like an army is more of a group activity than commonly appreciated even if the commander himself has the "final say"
[2]Though this is true of pre-modern army commanders as well, for that matter.

Sorry, but I have severe issues with the myth that the Germans regarded Patton as 'the USA's best field commander'. Yes, they did regard him a talented armour commander, but the way that he got badly bogged down at Metz and Nancy did not impress them. They did not follow his every move with bated breath.

I mean, your link basically DOES say the Germans did regard Patton as the USA's best field armored commander. It just also clarifies that the criteria was very specifically "best field armored commander" and not "best commander" and that the USA's "best" was regarded as by their own standards merely above-average. It also does give the reasons WHY the Germans made these judgements and the responses to them, which is helpful since said judgements are necessarily subjective.

 

[steel_captain]

I put in my scenario that Hodges would get Third Army instead of First

 

[aaronupright]

I put in my scenario that Hodges would get Third Army instead of First

Why?
Third Army was always earmarked for Patton.

 

[steel_captain]

Why?
Third Army was always earmarked for Patton.

The ATL was posed because First US Army was at the center of The Bulge and I was wondering how differently Patton would have responded plus I believe Hodges was very misguided to have remained in combat in the Hurtgen Forest for so long when the losses were huge for the Americans. Would Patton have seen the folly of trying to go straight through it?

 

[TenThousandToddlers]

the Wacht an Rhine offensive is stuffed in a week.

To be fair, and as no great defender of some of Ike/Bradley/Hodges, the most important part of the counteroffensive was stopped almost immediately for only minor, local gains. For all the focus on the Bulge, North end progress stopped hard at Elsenborne ridge, between mud, entrenchments and a couple Corp worth of artillery.

The ATL was posed because First US Army was at the center of The Bulge and I was wondering how differently Patton would have responded plus I believe Hodges was very misguided to have remained in combat in the Hurtgen Forest for so long when the losses were huge for the Americans. Would Patton have seen the folly of trying to go straight through it?

Where better preparations may have helped especially was in the center region. Historically the main loss was in a division or so getting overran. The units in the area fought fairly well, but being spread out and unsupported they were circled and destroyed. I'm not sure what the exact answer would be though, as there isn't an obvious set of terrain points like, say, Elsenborne.

Enough German units are involved that major casualties will be incurred regardless, but limiting the irrecoverable ones, the dead, captured and MIA, might be achieved along with a faster end to the operation.

It might be that better intel could lead to better recon, and that that might lead to disruption of German plans. It's hard to gather assaulting troops if assembly areas are getting bombed flat, for instance.