How would the US be shaped if Jackson lost in New Orleans? There for certain would be no Jackson Presidency, but what else?
WI: British take New Orleans
- Thread starter ThatOneGuy
- Start date
TFSmith121
Banned
Have you ever looked at a map of the battlefield?
Have you ever looked at a map of the battlefield?
There's a reason the British lost, and both Pakenham and Gibbs (IIRC) ended up KIA.
It's not because Jackson et al were "lucky."
The minor issue the treaty had already been signed presumably comes into play here, as well.
Best,
Have you ever looked at a map of the battlefield?
There's a reason the British lost, and both Pakenham and Gibbs (IIRC) ended up KIA.
It's not because Jackson et al were "lucky."
The minor issue the treaty had already been signed presumably comes into play here, as well.
Best,
The late Robert Remini argued that "although the treaty [of Ghent] had been signed it had not been ratified by either country, and it is certain that had the British won the Battle of New Orleans the treaty would have been repudiated or drastically altered to take such a victory into account." http://books.google.com/books?id=74IjtfEU_LkC&pg=PT193
Elsewhere Remini wrote: "Secretary Monroe stated the situation concisely to Madison: Had Jackson lost the Battle of New Orleans, Britain would have insisted that the entire Gulf Coast belonged to Spain, arguing that the Treaty of Ghent did not apply and that American claims to this area were specious because Mobile had been illegally seized and Louisiana illegally purchased. Thus Jackson's victory did more than simply demonstrate the excellence of American arms on the battlefield. It prevented the almost certain detachment of the entire Gulf Coast area (and maybe all of Louisiana as well) which would have been a major catastrophe for the United States had it happened. In a sense, then, Jackson's victory legitimized or legalized--if conquest ever legalizes--the Louisiana Purchase, which France had no business selling in the first place." http://books.google.com/books?id=7aw-AAAAQBAJ&pg=PT314 (The British position was that France had no right to sell to the United States since the Treaty of San Ildefonso of 1800, by which Napoleon had forced Spain to surrender Louisiana to him, specifically stated that France would not sell or otherwise alienate the territory without first offering to return it to Spain.)
My own view is that the British *might* be tempted at first after a victory at New Orleans to say that the Treaty of Ghent did not apply and that New Orleans and Mobile should be returned to Spain--or at the very least to make return to the US contingent on US concessions on the issues left unresolved at Ghent. However, IMO any such temptation would end the instant the news came that Napoleon had escaped from Elba. If the British hadn't turned all captured territory over to the US before that point, that would surely be enough to convince them to do so.
Elsewhere Remini wrote: "Secretary Monroe stated the situation concisely to Madison: Had Jackson lost the Battle of New Orleans, Britain would have insisted that the entire Gulf Coast belonged to Spain, arguing that the Treaty of Ghent did not apply and that American claims to this area were specious because Mobile had been illegally seized and Louisiana illegally purchased. Thus Jackson's victory did more than simply demonstrate the excellence of American arms on the battlefield. It prevented the almost certain detachment of the entire Gulf Coast area (and maybe all of Louisiana as well) which would have been a major catastrophe for the United States had it happened. In a sense, then, Jackson's victory legitimized or legalized--if conquest ever legalizes--the Louisiana Purchase, which France had no business selling in the first place." http://books.google.com/books?id=7aw-AAAAQBAJ&pg=PT314 (The British position was that France had no right to sell to the United States since the Treaty of San Ildefonso of 1800, by which Napoleon had forced Spain to surrender Louisiana to him, specifically stated that France would not sell or otherwise alienate the territory without first offering to return it to Spain.)
My own view is that the British *might* be tempted at first after a victory at New Orleans to say that the Treaty of Ghent did not apply and that New Orleans and Mobile should be returned to Spain--or at the very least to make return to the US contingent on US concessions on the issues left unresolved at Ghent. However, IMO any such temptation would end the instant the news came that Napoleon had escaped from Elba. If the British hadn't turned all captured territory over to the US before that point, that would surely be enough to convince them to do so.
TFSmith121
Banned
Which, of course, speaks to the point the British lost
Which, of course, speaks to the point the British lost at New Orleans for military reasons ...
Best,
Which, of course, speaks to the point the British lost at New Orleans for military reasons ...
Best,
TFSmith121
Banned
And with all due respect to the undeniable
And with all due respect to the undeniable bravery of the beggars in red, take a look at the map...
A 900-yard-long approach over a flat flood plain, flanked on one side by a levee and the Mississippi River, and on the other by a swamp, and across at least three ditches, toward a fortified line on the far side of a canal.
And the ration of attackers to defenders is roughly 4-3.
Not THAT's brilliant generalship.
And what's really worth considering about that is that Pakenham was universally regarded as skilled general officer, with extensive experience against the French in Europe.
Sort of provides the reality behind this sort of thing:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vH3-Gt7mgyM
Best,
And with all due respect to the undeniable bravery of the beggars in red, take a look at the map...
A 900-yard-long approach over a flat flood plain, flanked on one side by a levee and the Mississippi River, and on the other by a swamp, and across at least three ditches, toward a fortified line on the far side of a canal.
And the ration of attackers to defenders is roughly 4-3.
Not THAT's brilliant generalship.
And what's really worth considering about that is that Pakenham was universally regarded as skilled general officer, with extensive experience against the French in Europe.
Sort of provides the reality behind this sort of thing:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vH3-Gt7mgyM
Best,
I was more planning on discussing how 'Murica would be affected without a Jackson presidency (don't actually know why I didn't just ask that question)
Have you ever looked at a map of the battlefield?
There's a reason the British lost, and both Pakenham and Gibbs (IIRC) ended up KIA.
It's not because Jackson et al were "lucky."
The minor issue the treaty had already been signed presumably comes into play here, as well.
Best,
What if the British sent the majority of there forces to the right flank through the swamp and rolled them up that way? They could even surround the troops on the canal from the behind and force their surrender. They do have the superior numbers after all.
They still have to cross the canal, with good sightlines from the southeast corner of the American positions.
Attacking over prepared defenses like this at 4-3 odds wasn't great anyway. It doesn't have to be a rout, but without the bridging equipment, it was ugly.
Add to this the fact that the British force attempting to cross the canal OTL outright forgot the bridging equipment it was supposed to bring and you do indeed have a problem.
While it's a testament to British courage and discipline that the troops literally stood and died while under fire and without orders, it's a testament to just how poorly planned the whole operation was that such matters could be completely overlooked.
If Pakenham had just stopped getting back up on those horses...
It would be shaped the same, or larger. The United States would have taken Louisiana sooner rather than later in the next war.
Britain would not have the time (and doubtfully the resources and inclination) to settle Louisiana sufficiently to forestall the inevitable US invasion.
The USA had the local demographics, overwhelmingly. IN 1812, 6 million people to about 200,000 "British" including French Canadians.
The US would not be hemmed in. By 1830ish, no foreign power could win a land war in North American against the US.
1812 was about the last time a country could come even close and that was only due to Jefferson and Madison's incompetent preperations for war and the fact that the Canadian frontier defended itself. By 1830 or so, roads were better and the invasion route ready.
The most likely change would be the Canada would be conquered as well in the 3rd war between the US and Britain.
Britain would not have the time (and doubtfully the resources and inclination) to settle Louisiana sufficiently to forestall the inevitable US invasion.
The USA had the local demographics, overwhelmingly. IN 1812, 6 million people to about 200,000 "British" including French Canadians.
The US would not be hemmed in. By 1830ish, no foreign power could win a land war in North American against the US.
1812 was about the last time a country could come even close and that was only due to Jefferson and Madison's incompetent preperations for war and the fact that the Canadian frontier defended itself. By 1830 or so, roads were better and the invasion route ready.
The most likely change would be the Canada would be conquered as well in the 3rd war between the US and Britain.
Doubtfully. The Hartford convention went out if its way to avoid secession. If Britain does win, do they shred the treaty and continue fighting? Long term favours them but they weren't that keen on continuing OTL.
Maybe they declare the Louisiana purchase void and make America re-purchase the territory from Spain?
Well on this I disagree, but not for the reason you might think. If (and purely rolling with the hypothetical) the British took New Orleans, they would not annex it but use it as an enormous bargaining chip, or threaten to offer it to Spain.
All this of course would just add to the British hand at Ghent, and would probably be used to take concessions from the US in what would become Maine and northern New York. Annexation was, as far as I am aware, not on the table.
Amazing how well that worked out for them
On this I must completely disagree, but again, not for the reasons you think. The potential for the annexation of what would become Canada in this period is very slim. Unless the majority of Canadians themselves were to express desire for this annexation (and as know from history this is near ASB levels of unlikely post-1812) the political division and reluctance in the US itself would be very much against outright conquest. That wasn't even an agreed upon aspect of the 1812 war plans with opinion on the matter being divided three ways between the South, Northwest, and New England, all for vastly different reasons.
The other problem is that in terms of pure expansion it is unnecessary with so much "unoccupied" land to the West.
The third problem is that in a hypothetical third war between 1815 and 1850, how do you frame such a thing as the conquest of Canada? Will the merchants of New England again be willing to subject themselves to economic ruin? Will the settlers and farmers of the Midwest fight to add to the political clout of the merchants on the Atlantic? Will the slaveholders of the South fight to add more assured free soil territory to the Union and upset the delicate balance they have grappled so long to maintain their peculiar institution?
I won't go into the military side, but the purely political problems of fighting a war on the grounds of annexing Canada into the US are legion, ones which would threaten a US which presumably still has the growing divide between North and South.
Spain would probably think it's up for grabs at that point, with it changing hands like it is, they'd see whoever took it as too exhausted to defend it in any meaningful force, especially with Mexico RIGHT there.
Little changes except for discussions about how much the British would take under a different leader. London was pragmatic, even if they looked at the US as a collection of colonies gone astray with dreams of reconquest they knew at best they might get only Maine and a friendly satellite in New England. Detaching the rest of the Gulf Coast only means settlers begin moving westward and a very hostile North American nation with access and disputable claims to much of the continent is now angry, motivated, and thirsting for revenge. So they likely ask for trade arrangements.
There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half of our whole produce and contain more than half our inhabitants.
-Jefferson
-Jefferson
An Avoidable Diplomatic Disaster
I seriously doubt that the British would repudiate a treaty ratified by the Prince Regent right in the middle of the Congress of Vienna. It would make the UK look untrustworthy in the middle of critical negotiations of unprecedented scale.
In OTL, the British captured Fort Bowyer after being defeated at New Orleans. When they learned of the peace, they left Fort Bowyer without trouble. I don't see why they wouldn't do the same had they taken New Orleans.
I seriously doubt that the British would repudiate a treaty ratified by the Prince Regent right in the middle of the Congress of Vienna. It would make the UK look untrustworthy in the middle of critical negotiations of unprecedented scale.
In OTL, the British captured Fort Bowyer after being defeated at New Orleans. When they learned of the peace, they left Fort Bowyer without trouble. I don't see why they wouldn't do the same had they taken New Orleans.