WI/PC: Culling the nobility in the high/late middle ages

[Ultima Ratio]

Okay, so I’ve read at numerous places that the French defeats at Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt actually contributed a lot to the centralization of the French state on account of most of the nobility dying in these battles, leading to a rise of royal power.

So this got me thinking, what other countries could benefit from such a trimming of the fat in the high to late middle ages? And what would be the opportunities for these to happen? The first countries that come to mind are Poland and Hungary, perhaps carried out by the Mongols?

 

[Byzantion]

Okay, so I’ve read at numerous places that the French defeats at Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt actually contributed a lot to the centralization of the French state on account of most of the nobility dying in these battles, leading to a rise of royal power.

So this got me thinking, what other countries could benefit from such a trimming of the fat in the high to late middle ages? And what would be the opportunities for these to happen? The first countries that come to mind are Poland and Hungary, perhaps carried out by the Mongols?

Maybe an earlier and effective invention of gunpowder makes the knights even more obsolete. Maybe paid low class mercenaries with arquebuse dominating the battlefields earlier instead of feudal conscripts.

 

[Whiteshore]

Have Ogodei Khan live longer, paving the way for the Mongols to ravage Europe and kill large swathes of the nobility in their rampage.

 

[avernite]

I think you need to be careful how far back you go; the HYW defeats helped the French state, because it could make effective use of the gaps in the nobility. If you go too early, you simply have to appoint new nobles to replace the lost ones.

So I imagine you'd be looking at something like the late 1300's (note this is also when, for example, the Burgundians started trimming the Dutch high nobility with no ill effects, but the eternal partitions of Wittelsbach lands were still ongoing). Good candidates are obviously the HRE, Poland, Hungary, but I think the Mongols would be too early to make it stick (after all the Mongols DID trim the Hungarian nobility).

 

[Ultima Ratio]

Have Ogodei Khan live longer, paving the way for the Mongols to ravage Europe and kill large swathes of the nobility in their rampage.

That's fine, but not really what I'm looking for. I don't want to kill off European nobility, I'm looking for the opportunity for other states to centralize early on just like France with the monarch exploiting the gap in noble power.

So I imagine you'd be looking at something like the late 1300's (note this is also when, for example, the Burgundians started trimming the Dutch high nobility with no ill effects, but the eternal partitions of Wittelsbach lands were still ongoing). Good candidates are obviously the HRE, Poland, Hungary, but I think the Mongols would be too early to make it stick (after all the Mongols DID trim the Hungarian nobility).

I thought so too. Not sure what opportunities would there be, I remember Charles I of Hungary fought a civil war with the nobles around that time.

 

[LSCatilina]

Okay, so I’ve read at numerous places that the French defeats at Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt actually contributed a lot to the centralization of the French state on account of most of the nobility dying in these battles, leading to a rise of royal power.

That's a bit exaggerated, slightly more exaggerated for Poitiers, definitely more for Crécy.

Not only the process of unification and bureaucratic centralisation was already ongoing, but it didn't really prevented french nobility and upper-middle nobility to remain a main social force, during the Wars of Religion, for instance..

Don't get me wrong, the important losses at these battles, especially Agincourt, effectively deprived France of an important part of its traditional social-military forces, but we're talking mostly small to middle nobility there, not a decimation of the aristocracy even if the losses of several great nobles including people with commanding charge effectively crippled the political capacity of French which were already suffering from a civil war.

Long story short, the impact was moral and political; rather than institutional; and unification of feudal states doesn't really goes trough decimation of its aristocracy : if it was the case Hungary and Poland would have became unified kingdoms after the Mongol invasions, which wasn't really the case.

Unification (rather than centralization) in France passed trough the establishment of a feudal hegemony by the Capetian kings (a constant policy since the XIth century, which really worked from the XIIth century onwards), a strong fiscal network (which allowed french kings to benefit from ressources either the aristocracy, either neighbours as England), and a ongoing professionalisation of the army since the XIVth century.

@Byzantion
The problem wasn't that gunpowder did created a military revolution (the XIIth knew something more radical and the aristocracy did relatively fine, even if it pushed the small nobility down and really quickened the decline of nobility as a social-military class), than it happened at a point where the said aristocracy either already lost before royal authority (Spain, France), or where they managed to form semi-bureaucratic states of their own (as most of German states).

With the XIIth and growing costs of supplying armies (levies and/or mercenaries), it became harder for the smaller nobility to really compete with the suzerains : in the late XVth, only Brittany and Burgundy could really think about competing with royal armies, and maybe Armagnac or Foix as well. Not because gunpowder had to leave the battlefield (a short look at late XVth ordinance proove the exact contrary), but only great lords that went to a similar build-up could really hope keep up the pace.

 

[Ultima Ratio]

That's a bit exaggerated, slightly more exaggerated for Poitiers, definitely more for Crécy.

Not only the process of unification and bureaucratic centralisation was already ongoing, but it didn't really prevented french nobility and upper-middle nobility to remain a main social force, during the Wars of Religion, for instance..

Don't get me wrong, the important losses at these battles, especially Agincourt, effectively deprived France of an important part of its traditional social-military forces, but we're talking mostly small to middle nobility there, not a decimation of the aristocracy even if the losses of several great nobles including people with commanding charge effectively crippled the political capacity of French which were already suffering from a civil war.

Long story short, the impact was moral and political; rather than institutional; and unification of feudal states doesn't really goes trough decimation of its aristocracy : if it was the case Hungary and Poland would have became unified kingdoms after the Mongol invasions, which wasn't really the case.

Unification (rather than centralization) in France passed trough the establishment of a feudal hegemony by the Capetian kings (a constant policy since the XIth century, which really worked from the XIIth century onwards), a strong fiscal network (which allowed french kings to benefit from ressources either the aristocracy, either neighbours as England), and a ongoing professionalisation of the army since the XIVth century.

Fine argument, I guess I overestimated the impact. Too bad, it was worth a shot

 

[Roger II]

For Poland, ironically axing the Liberum Veto and giving the Sejm the authority to muster armed forces or bar from/insist on nobilar armies being mobilized would possibly be centralizing since it would allow the Sejm to effectively control the military and blablahblah monopoly on the use o force.

 

[Max Sinister]

Same thing with the Wars of the Roses in England. But I don't know details.

 

[Jan Olbracht]

In the case of Poland and Hungary it was frequent changes of dynasties that vastly contributed to weakening of royal power.

 

[LSCatilina]

In the case of Poland and Hungary it was frequent changes of dynasties that vastly contributed to weakening of royal power.

That's true, but that's not systematical : English kingship was basically a hot throne game on this regard, with relatively few instabiity (the Anarchy is remarkable because of its relative exceptionnality). Now, it's true England knew more succession crisis than France, if quite limited one, but it didn't really went the way of a weakening of royal authority.

 

[alexmilman]

Maybe an earlier and effective invention of gunpowder makes the knights even more obsolete. Maybe paid low class mercenaries with arquebuse dominating the battlefields earlier instead of feudal conscripts.

The gunpowder had been known by the start of the 100YW and 2 last battles of that war had been won by the French with the help of the firearms. Yet, the compagnie d'ordonnance system established after the 100YW was lance-based. Of course, being a standing salaried army, they were not "feudal conscripts". Even at the midst of the Italian Wars gendarmes had been the main component of the French armies (keep in mind that the French had a powerful artillery when these wars started). Actually, they lasted all the way to the Wars of the Religion and their eventual demise was not due to the infantry with the firearms (you can't have only infantry) but due to the development of the cheap mercenary cavalry armed with the pistols (the reiters). But it seems that France was quite low on developing the firearms infantry and cavalry: the first regular regiments had been created only by Henry II.

OTOH, just having "mercenaries with arquebuse" was not a remedy. The first large-scale experience of creating the firearms-based army had been made by Charles the Bold of Burgundy and there is probably no need to explain how well his army fared against the Swiss pike formations. And a high-quality cavalry was successfully dealing with the shot-and-pike formations all the way to the early XVII (you can look at the history of the Swedish-Polish wars of that period).

 

[Jan Olbracht]

That's true, but that's not systematical : English kingship was basically a hot throne game on this regard, with relatively few instabiity (the Anarchy is remarkable because of its relative exceptionnality). Now, it's true England knew more succession crisis than France, if quite limited one, but it didn't really went the way of a weakening of royal authority.

Poland was extreme, throne passed from father to son was rather exception than rule, considering the fact, that out of 15 kings, who ruled between 1333 and 1672 only 4 left surviving legitimate sons, and birth of future Władysław III in 1424 was first birth of male heir of Polish king since birth of Casimir the Great 114 years earlier. The fact, that Władysław III was born from non-dynastic marriage and was only 10 yo when his father died also had impact, but childless death of Sigismund Augustus was crucial-he left question of succession open, nobility took full power in PLC after his death and could freely dictate conditions to future monarch.

 

[LSCatilina]

The gunpowder had been known by the start of the 100YW and 2 last battles of that war had been won by the French with the help of the firearms.

That being said, gunpowder was used, without much efficiency, since the XIIIth century. It was used from times to times during HYW, but without real role until the second Caroline phase. What was remarkable then was their use in a field battle and not a siege.
Now, as the Battle of Formigny point, it was still a relatively small field artillery, and pretty much useful as an element of surprise.

Yet, the compagnie d'ordonnance system established after the 100YW was lance-based. Of course, being a standing salaried army, they were not "feudal conscripts".

If you allow me to support your point there.
The distinction is a bit moot : compagnies were more or less permanently raised mercenaries (without much quality difference there) at this point (thanks to an excellent fiscal system) which, as Philippe Contamine very well pointed, were perfectly integrated within a late feudal army.
It's important to stress that standing armies re-apperance in France and Europe more generally wasn't made against Late feudal armies organisation, but alongside them on a common evolution where the royal hegemony was firmly established since the XIIth century as a cause, and not a consequence.

 

[alexmilman]

That being said, gunpowder was used, without much efficiency, since the XIIIth century. It was used from times to times during HYW, but without real role until the second Caroline phase. What was remarkable then was their use in a field battle and not a siege.
Now, as the Battle of Formigny point, it was still a relatively small field artillery, and pretty much useful as an element of surprise.

Yes, during the 100YW artillery was mostly used during the sieges and scored at least one prominent target: Earl of Salisbury, commander of the English force besieging Orleans (don't remember the details, wasn't it something along the lines of a cannonball bouncing off his head without doing any harm, ricocheting into the wall a big piece of which fall down and crushed the brave earl? ).

At Fromigny there were presumably only 2 French culevrines but their fire was enough of a factor to provoke English into a rush attack from their advantageous position with a following disaster. Personally, I can't imagine how, short of a purely moral effect, this could happen: damage caused by these 2 guns could not be serious. OTOH, at Castillon the French seemingly had numerous artillery pieces and hand-held firearms. What's truly interesting (IMO) is that at the Battle of Monthlery the firearms had been seemingly completely absent (at least according to Phillip de Commines) while the archers were there and on both sides there was an opinion (not uniformly held) that the English model of the dismounted knights and archers is a recipe of a victory.

If you allow me to support your point there.
The distinction is a bit moot : compagnies were more or less permanently raised mercenaries (without much quality difference there) at this point (thanks to an excellent fiscal system) which, as Philippe Contamine very well pointed, were perfectly integrated within a late feudal army.

Yes, by the late 100YW most of the fighting forces on both sides were the professional mercenaries, not the traditional feudal levies. However, structure of the "lance" was present in both cases providing, as you said, an easy integration.

It's important to stress that standing armies re-apperance in France and Europe more generally wasn't made against Late feudal armies organisation, but alongside them on a common evolution where the royal hegemony was firmly established since the XIIth century as a cause, and not a consequence.

Indeed. A popular notion that "the cannons of the towns destroyed the feudal castles" was either coined by Engels or picked up by him from some other idiot making broad generalizations based upon a very narrow experience of some German cities fighting against the local feudals.

Of course, the early modern armies did not grew up from the city militias but rather evolved by adding the new elements to the existing "material". As I said, the last big scale attempt of a formal combination of the old and new features within the old lance structure had been made by Charles the Bold. The French during the Italian Wars had been preserving the old lances in parallel with the new pike and shot formations.

Spaniards and Germans (especially Spaniards who basically invented the pike and shot formations) were well ahead of the French and Italians in developing along these lines but eventually everybody picked up.

There were exceptions like the Swiss pikemen (effective city/rural militias existed during the Middle Ages but Swiss, unlike the Flemish, managed to come with the tactical solution effective against the cavalry) or Taborites, which would be just a regional (and reasonably short-term) "curiosity" if something very similar to their system (use of a wagenburg as a field fortification and extensive usage of the firearms) did not become an important part of the Cossack warfare.

 

[alexmilman]

Have Ogodei Khan live longer, paving the way for the Mongols to ravage Europe and kill large swathes of the nobility in their rampage.

I'm afraid that this is just one of the popular historic legends.

An idea that after the death of the Great Khan all descendants of Genghis had to drop everything they were doing and ride full speed to Karakorum does not stand up to any fact checking. After the death of Genghis (1227) the empire had been ruled for 2 years by Tolui as a regent. It took few years between Ogedei's death (1241) and Guyuk's election (1246) and all that time Ogedei's widow had been ruling as a regent. Regency (by Guyuk's widow) after Guyuk's death in 1248 lasted until 1251. After Ogedei's death Batu did not went to Mongolia at all.

In a reality, situation with the Mongolian Western Raid was somewhat peculiar. Batu, as a main heir of Jochi was "granted" conquest of the territories populated by the Kipchaks (and punishing them for disobedience and those who gave them a shelter for defiance). Outside of these territories, the conquered lands would fell into the direct jurisdiction of the Great Khan (aka, he could give them as appanages to whoever he wanted and there were plenty of Genghisid princes who were Batu's open enemies). On a purely practical side, gravity center of Batu's ulus HAD to be in the steppe area with Volga - Don steppes being the best both in the terms of climate and strategic location: close to the Russian territories (aka, easy to extract tribute) and still close enough to the Jochides' possessions in Asia (White Horde, formally ruled by Batu's brother, and Jochide's lands in Transoxania). On his own, Batu did not have too many Mongolian troops (4 - 5K) and most of his subjects were recently conquered Kipchaks, Bulgars of Volga, etc. He needed to consolidate his power and to make all these people into a new nation while also keeping the Russian territories under control.

On the opposite side of equation there were Batu's enemies led by Odedei's son, Guyuk and Büri, a grandson of Chagatai. Getting ulus on a far side of a nowhere was not their ambition and neither were they eager to help Batu in conquering his ulus.

So basically by the time the raid reached the end of the Hungarian steppe and Mongolian detachment reached the coast of Adriatic Sea, formally making it to the "last sea", there was not too much of a reason for the further advance. Of course, while Ogedei was alive the enterprise would probably continue but it seems highly unlikely that it would go all the way to the Atlantic coast or reach France.