WI: There was a Pig War

[robcraufurd]

The premise of the thread was that there is a war so what happens. No question was asked about if there would be a war.

To be fair, even if we were bound by blood to stick to the original premise, the first post says:

The Brits were ordered to storm the islands and kick out the Americans but the British Admiral decided against it. What if he went with storming the San Juan Islands?

I think we all accept that the actual answer to that is "calmer heads prevail, his actions are disavowed and a diplomatic solution is found," because- delightful as the San Juan Islands may be- they're probably not worth more than twenty or thirty people dying over, tops.

 

[Saphroneth]

You do realize that Wraithverge just suggested there was a rail link between Halifax and Quebec in 1861, right?

Best,

I just saw that, yes. There was a railway from Halifax, and one to Quebec, but they aren't linked - it's possible that supplies were shipped between Pictou and Riviere de Loup (connected to Halifax and to Quebec respectively.)
I await clarification.

In any case - even completely discarding those, there's still two issues with your reaction to his statements.
First, harping on about the eve of quote. The eve of the Trent incident refers to before it - much like I would say, "on the eve of the US election in 1860 South Carolina was ready to secede if a pro-slavery candidate was not elected". I do not mean "they did not secede after the election had taken place", I mean "They had not yet seceded, but were planning to do so, before." In other words, the count before (eve of) must be added to the count shipped in order to get the count available.
Second, the count of weapons that arrived by ship and were unloaded in places connected to the Lower Canada rail system is... one you've pretty much ignored.

Also - what relation does someone mentioning a railway have to my saying you were a fool about mixing up the 1861 and 1859 situations in terms of militia training levels?

 

[frlmerrin]

If it's any consolation, I think everybody posting has conceded at one point or another that a war wouldn't actually have happened.

Actually I would have to disagree with this. There is at least one reasonable scenario that would lead to war although not I strongly suspect the sort of all out war being discussed in this thread.

The important thing to remember about the Pig War is that it was not about the mortality of the pig. The affair was not about the pig at all really, it was not even the cause of the confrontation. What it was really about was jurisdiction, sovereignty, good faith and trust between the two nations concerned.

The issue can be traced to the poor maps and charts of the seas below Vancouver Island available to the men who framed the Oregon Treaty in 1846. They did not really have a clue where the channels ran and hence there was ambiguity about who owned the San Juan Islands.

In 1848 the British proposed a boundary commission to resolve the issue.
The HBC set up a salmon curing station on San Juan Island in 1851 and a large farm on in 1853. In 1854 American tax collectors stole sheep from the farm in an attempt to collect taxes and assert American sovereignty. This action was disavowed by the USA’s Government the following year.

In 1856 the USA got around to finding the funding for the boundary commission and it began its work in 1857. Unfortunately the Commissioners were unable to agree on the boundary and they referred the matter back to their respective governments for instructions. The governments did nothing and the matter continued to fester.

In 1858 or 9 American settlers arrived on the Island and some of them squatted the HBC’s farm’s land.

After that there were lots of shenanigans about who’s laws were to be obeyed (this included the incident of the death of the pig) and who’s taxes were to be payed.

General Harney was the US Army officer commanding the Department of the Oregon. He was also anti-British, very anti-HBC and a firm believer in Manifest Destiny. He visited the American settlers on the island and discovered their problems with the British authorities. He saw these as an opportunity to bring the matter of the disputed Island to a head. He agitated with the American settlers to petition him for protection, not from the British but the local Indian tribes. Once in receipt of the petition he sent Capt. Pickett and Co D 9th US Infantry to occupy the island. They landed on July 27th in San Juan Harbour (now Griffin Bay) near the HBC wharf. There were between 64-66 men in the company. Some older accounts have Pickett having four field pieces with him; given the size of his company it seems improbable. Bizarrely he chose to fortify positions on the coast and well within range of naval guns.

Capt. Hornby commanding HMS Tribune (screw frigate, 300 NHP, 30 x 32 lb + 1 x 10”, complement 300-330) was sent by Governor Douglas to remove the Americans. On arrival in OTL he decided to return to Esquimalt and obtain some more ships before talking the American commander (Pickett). He came back with revised orders to land marines to match the US troops on Aug 2nd with Satellite (21), Plumper (12) and additional marines and engineers. By this time Pickett had been considerably reinforced. In the event he did not carry out these orders. On talking to Pickett it became clear that the man was somewhat naive and did not really understand the political situation or the forces available to the RN in the Pacific none the less Pickett would not allow the RN to land marines. If he had not at the last moment agreed to refer to his superiors for orders it is likely Hornby would have forced a landing.
I would propose as a POD leading to war that Hornby on his first trip to the Islands decides to speak to Pickett and is received in the same intransigent way he was OTL on Aug 2nd. Realising the small number of American troops during his visit Hornby takes the opportunity to remove the Americans by force.

There is a heavy naval bombardment follow by a landing by the marines and a naval ‘brigade’ supported by boat guns. The poorly disciplined* American troops quickly surrender. There are many dead and injured from the bombardment. The injured are treated and the rest taken prisoner. The prisoners are delivered to US territory a few days later.

I am reasonably sure that as others have suggested this alone would not lead to war, cooler heads more geographically remote from the problem would have prevailed. However Harney was a persistent man and a bit of an idiot. I think there would be a strong probability he would re-occupy San Juan Island. Even the moderate elements of the RN such as Baynes the Station Admiral, who was absent until he arrived at Victoria on Aug 5th would see this as a direct challenge and there would be a second battle. If the British suffer significant losses and fail to re-take the island after than then I can see the British needing to demonstrate supremacy and going to war (of a limited kind)

*Historical evidence

 

[TFSmith121]

Interesting; so the Yorkshire militia was available for:

In the seven years following their formation in 1852, all had been embodied for continuous periods during the Crimea: the 1st West York Rifles and 3rd West York Light Infantry were subsequently re-embodied in 1857 and were not to disembody until February 1861 and May 1860 respectively. Three had offered to serve abroad (2nd and 3rd West York Light Infantry, North York Rifles); the 2nd West York Light Infantry was sent to the Mediterranean in mid-1855. So that's what the Yorkshire militia has done in seven years. Would anybody care to describe the glorious military record of the New York militia in the 44 years between 1815 and 1859?

Interesting; so the Yorkshire militia was available for home defense and as volunteers, and elements were used as rear-area imperial garrisons. They were not sent to the Crimea, the Baltic, the Russian Far East, or the Russian Arctic for active service.

Was any of that ever in dispute?

Thanks

 

[TFSmith121]

Hey, consensus...whadaya know...

To be fair, even if we were bound by blood to stick to the original premise, the first post says:


I think we all accept that the actual answer to that is "calmer heads prevail, his actions are disavowed and a diplomatic solution is found," because- delightful as the San Juan Islands may be- they're probably not worth more than twenty or thirty people dying over, tops.

Consensus...it's a beautiful thing.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

The Canadian railways:

I just saw that, yes. There was a railway from Halifax, and one to Quebec, but they aren't linked - it's possible that supplies were shipped between Pictou and Riviere de Loup (connected to Halifax and to Quebec respectively.)
I await clarification.

In any case - even completely discarding those, there's still two issues with your reaction to his statements.
First, harping on about the eve of quote. The eve of the Trent incident refers to before it - much like I would say, "on the eve of the US election in 1860 South Carolina was ready to secede if a pro-slavery candidate was not elected". I do not mean "they did not secede after the election had taken place", I mean "They had not yet seceded, but were planning to do so, before." In other words, the count before (eve of) must be added to the count shipped in order to get the count available.
Second, the count of weapons that arrived by ship and were unloaded in places connected to the Lower Canada rail system is... one you've pretty much ignored.

Also - what relation does someone mentioning a railway have to my saying you were a fool about mixing up the 1861 and 1859 situations in terms of militia training levels?

Intercolonial - finally connected in 1876(be a long wait for the 1861 shipments, but they will get there eventually)...

http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/intercolonial-railway/

GTR - connected Sarnia to Riviere du Loup; also, plenty of land and ferry connections with the US, from Port Huron to Vermont and points east...

http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/grand-trunk-railway-of-canada/

Actually, if you look at the Bourne article I cited previously, here is the complete passage, and the sourcing below:

The British had added 8,000 rifles in June but another 25,000 ordered out in October, to compensate for the curb on reinforcements of British troops, missed the last regular ship to Quebec and the best that could be done was to send 5,000 of them to wait at Halifax. On the eve of the Trent incident, therefore, there were ready for the militia in Canada only 25,000 arms, 10,000 of them smoothbores, and some 13,000 rifles and 7,500 smoothbores in the Maritime Provinces.2 All these deficiencies - the 5,000 regulars by which Williams's force fell short of the 10,000 winter minimum, the additional arms, ammunition and equipment for the militia, the guns for whatever works Williams could improvize, and gunboats for the Lakes - were readily available in England. But the real difficulty was to get them to Canada for the winter and the Americans would between them completely cut Canada's communications with the sea.

Footnote 2 provides the following:

2 ' Small Arms in Store in Canada', 30 June, Lewis papers 2926; de Grey to Palmerston, private, 12 Nov., Broadlands papers; Stacey, pp. 19-20.

So, the dates in the footnote would suggest:

8,000 rifles were sent from the UK to British North America in June, 1861; these increased the number of rifles available in the Province of Quebec from 7,000 to 15,000; thus, the total number of small arms available in the province were 25,000 (including 10,000 smoothbores) in November, 1861 (when the Saint Lawrence closed due to ice); the same totals in 1859 (absent any older weapons present then, but not counted in 1861) presumably would have been 7,000 rifles and 10,000 smoothbores, for a total of 17,000.

Likewise, the totals in the Maritimes (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland) in November, 1861 totalled 13,000 rifles and 7,500 smoothbores; of those, however, 5,000 of the rifles were shipped to Halifax (Nova Scotia) and were intended for the Province of Canada, but were held in Nova Scotia (not even New Brunswick) because the Saint Lawrence was iced over. The total for 1859, therefore, (again, absent any weapons not included in the 1861 count) would have been 8,000 rifles and 7,500 smoothbores, for a total of 15,500 weapons.

Again, my point here is that transportation was slow between the UK and Nova Scotia, notably in the winter (HMT Melbourne actually took four weeks to cross the Atlantic in 1861, and could not get up the Saint Lawrence before the freeze; she turned back to Halifax and Wolseley et al went by steamer to Boston, traveling north across the US to get to the Province of Canada); likewise, even once a British battalion, bullet, or bean got to Halifax, it still had to be transferred to Saint John, take the winter sleigh road to Riviere du Loup, and only then go aboard a train...

Which then still had to make it through from Quebec (roughly) to Montreal and points west, on tracks that paralleled the border and in many locations were within rifle shot of it.

As was, in fact, the winter road from Saint John to Riviere du Loup. All in all, communications - by land or sea, and both messages and for men and material - was a very real strategic problem for the British in regards to the populated heart of British North America in the middle of the Nineteenth Century.

Ignoring this reality in any attempt to assess the balance of forces in BNA in the winter - of 1859 or 1861 - is (dare I say it) foolish.

Again, just as a theoretical exercise, in 1859 the entire Province of Canada had - on paper - some 5,000 volunteer (i.e. organized) militia; officers and men, organized into companies, batteries, troops, or battalions (all two of them) who drilled on a regular basis and got paid for it; the New York State Militia, in the same year, had - on paper - some 18,000 uniformed (i.e. organized) militia; officers and men, organized into battalions, brigades, and divisions (see the 1859 AGs report for said organization - I've linked to it in the past) who drilled on a regular basis and got paid for it.

Now, in my universe, 18,000 is more than three times as many as 5,000, which would suggest whatever the actual number of men fit to take the field might have been, the effectives in the Province of Canada are still going to be outnumbered 3 to 1 by the effectives in the State of New York. Add in the effectives (whatever number they may be) from Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Vermont, etc and the differential rapidly becomes clear...

Anyone else who comes forward on either side after the first group will be equally a scratch team - however, the US has arsenals, armories, foundries, forges, etc., as well as several professional schools for training officers. The Province of Canada has very little of the former, and nothing of the later.

Now if the balloon goes up in the winter of 1861, the numbers are even more challenging, aren't they? The US has some 500,000 regulars and volunteers already under arms, as compared to the (roughly) 5,000 regulars and 25,000 volunteers and militia that the British government thought could be relied on to show up in 1862 (source is Petrie, which has also been linked to and excerpted several times).

So, there you are.

And I'm sorry, is calling someone a fool really within acceptable bounds here?

Best,

 

[Saphroneth]

It is, indeed, a little personal. My apologies.


Now, as for the issue of rifles... when, precisely, is the inciting incident in this case?
The reason this matters is that within a month or so of the Trent incident, about sixty thousand rifles had either arrived in Canada or were flowing West.
It's also important because, by some accounts I have found, the winter of 1861-2 was one of the worst ones in the records. (So if there was such a crisis in 1859, then the river would freeze later and there is a later "last date" to send materiel.)

 

[frlmerrin]

You have some latitude as to the date of the inciting incident. The American Army occupied the island on 27th July so the earliest opportunity for them to come to blows with the British is the following day unless you want them killing HTC employees! In which case the 27th. The latest chance for an incident is the day after Barnes arrives at Esquimalt on 4th Aug. After that the RN are only going to react if British lives are lost.

Then about four weeks to get the news to Washington overland and via the telegraph system. Five weeks via Panama and telegraph. Then another 11 to 14 day to London telegraphically.
Five weeks to China and another two to India.

 

[Saphroneth]

You have some latitude as to the date of the inciting incident. The American Army occupied the island on 27th July so the earliest opportunity for them to come to blows with the British is the following day unless you want them killing HTC employees! In which case the 27th. The latest chance for an incident is the day after Barnes arrives at Esquimalt on 4th Aug. After that the RN are only going to react if British lives are lost.

Then about four weeks to get the news to Washington overland and via the telegraph system. Five weeks via Panama and telegraph. Then another 11 to 14 day to London telegraphically.
Five weeks to China and another two to India.

Right. So, latest possible alert-in-London is 22 September?

That's actually almost a month and a half in hand compared to OTL Trent. There's scope to get a LOT of rifles to Canada before the river freezes.

 

[robcraufurd]

if there was such a crisis in 1859, then the river would freeze later

The Quebec correspondent of the Morning Post reported on October 28 (in the Morning Post of 11 November 1859) that the river was not frozen but that a number of inward bound ships had been detained in the lower St Lawrence due to unfavourable winds; the government steam-tug service had only been able to take 94 vessels in the season to date, generally collecting them from the Brandy Pots and Bic, but he was expecting the winds to change shortly. On 11 November (reported 26 November) he announced that "our river steamers are fast leaving for their winter quarters... between 50 and 60 vessels remain in port, and there are a dozen more at Montreal, while several are still expected to arrive". On 25 November (reported 8 December) the North American made it out of the St Lawrence but in pretty bad weather; on 2 December (reported 17 December) there was floating ice in the St Lawrence and all the sea-going vessels were laid up. However, the winter seems to have been particularly mild: on 12 January (reported 27 January) he reported "We have, in Quebec, been disappointed of an ice bridge- the usual January thaw having set in a few days since, and caused the disappearance of much of the ice which for a long time had passed up and down with the ebb and flow of the tide on our glorious St Lawrence".

That's if we can trust newspaper reports, of course: I gather there's been a bit of controversy about that.

 

[Saphroneth]

The Quebec correspondent of the Morning Post reported on October 28 (in the Morning Post of 11 November 1859) that the river was not frozen but that a number of inward bound ships had been detained in the lower St Lawrence due to unfavourable winds; the government steam-tug service had only been able to take 94 vessels in the season to date, generally collecting them from the Brandy Pots and Bic, but he was expecting the winds to change shortly. On 11 November (reported 26 November) he announced that "our river steamers are fast leaving for their winter quarters... between 50 and 60 vessels remain in port, and there are a dozen more at Montreal, while several are still expected to arrive". On 25 November (reported 8 December) the North American made it out of the St Lawrence but in pretty bad weather; on 2 December (reported 17 December) there was floating ice in the St Lawrence and all the sea-going vessels were laid up. However, the winter seems to have been particularly mild: on 12 January (reported 27 January) he reported "We have, in Quebec, been disappointed of an ice bridge- the usual January thaw having set in a few days since, and caused the disappearance of much of the ice which for a long time had passed up and down with the ebb and flow of the tide on our glorious St Lawrence".

That's if we can trust newspaper reports, of course: I gather there's been a bit of controversy about that.

If it was that mild, might Riviere de Loup never have become ice bound at all? That's the eastern terminus of a rail link to Quebec - and possibly further west?

 

[Wraithverge]

Again, just as a theoretical exercise, in 1859 the entire Province of Canada had - on paper - some 5,000 volunteer (i.e. organized) militia; officers and men, organized into companies, batteries, troops, or battalions (all two of them) who drilled on a regular basis and got paid for it; the New York State Militia, in the same year, had - on paper - some 18,000 uniformed (i.e. organized) militia; officers and men, organized into battalions, brigades, and divisions (see the 1859 AGs report for said organization - I've linked to it in the past) who drilled on a regular basis and got paid for it.

Now, in my universe, 18,000 is more than three times as many as 5,000, which would suggest whatever the actual number of men fit to take the field might have been, the effectives in the Province of Canada are still going to be outnumbered 3 to 1 by the effectives in the State of New York. Add in the effectives (whatever number they may be) from Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Vermont, etc and the differential rapidly becomes clear...

Except you ignore the fact that the Canadian line militia are much more active than you credit them, especially units like the Montreal Fire Battalion.

Also, the regulations of the NYSM are that the uniformed militia are required to parade one day a year, and are are allowed several regimental and company parades every year. The militia could also undergo a six-day camp ending with annual parade but the state only authorised this once before the civil war - in 1856 with threat of war with England.

A few regiments of course were rich and sometimes paid for themselves to camp, notably the 7th who at least once paid for artillery practice in one of the forts.

This basically puts the class A volunteer militia of Canada as being much more trained than the NY militia.

Also, as has been pointed out, the paper 18,000 was never reached. Many militiamen only did it for tax relief, and rarely did much more than half the paper strength ever parade, and when called out in 1861 much of the uniformed militia had better things to do.

Anyone else who comes forward on either side after the first group will be equally a scratch team - however, the US has arsenals, armories, foundries, forges, etc., as well as several professional schools for training officers. The Province of Canada has very little of the former, and nothing of the later.

Although, of course, Canada has many more veterans of the British Army than you'd think, and is 9-10 days steaming away from half the worlds industry...

Now if the balloon goes up in the winter of 1861, the numbers are even more challenging, aren't they? The US has some 500,000 regulars and volunteers already under arms, as compared to the (roughly) 5,000 regulars and 25,000 volunteers and militia that the British government thought could be relied on to show up in 1862 (source is Petrie, which has also been linked to and excerpted several times).

1861? I think 350,000 heavily armed southerners might be a small issue, as well as 100,000 or so heavily armed Canadians once supplies get through....