Un popolo alla macchia
Un popolo alla macchia
Ambrosio was desperate to establish a direct link with the Allied commands but felt unable to leave Rome for direct talks. The reputation of the military regime had been badly damaged by the events of Mussolini’s death and its de facto leader did not want to leave the capital, having forbidden any evacuation. He sent General Castellano to Naples to plead with the American commander, General Mark Clark on his behalf.
The requests were met with continued assurances of help at a future date and questions in return about the stability of the new Italian regime particularly in light of their inability to protect the captive Mussolini.
Throughout Autumn the Allied armies would successfully establish themselves throughout Central and Southern Italy. They brought a sense of militaristic stability to those regions they occupied; however the new regime in Rome appeared to wield little influence outside of the capital. With the disruption to Italian infrastructure limiting print news and with only 4% of Italian homes owning a radio, the capital became more distant to most Italians than at any time since unification.
In many areas the old Fascist administration was largely intact, with only the most overt PNF officials having been removed or otherwise dispatched and the remainder simply swapping allegiance from Mussolini to the King. Indeed in the case of some prefectures this involved ‘practical’ officials who had previously embraced Fascism only after Mussolini’s rise to power.
The aftershocks of over a month of disruption to Italian infrastructure, whether from bombing, revolution or invasion, was beginning to take its toll on the already tenuous food supply. The exodus of refugees fleeing the German advance in northern Italy would dwarf the flight from Catania and numbered in the millions. It was a journey filled with danger; rough terrain, little access to food and shelter and for many no end destination.
Italy remained largely regional despite two decades of Fascist attempts to mould the nation into a single corporate organism and the differences between northerners and southerners sharpened with the influx of northern refugees in southern regions already facing severe shortages. The famine of 1944 would exacerbate these divisions to breaking point but in the Summer of 1943 it was already taking its toll on the social fabric..
Nonetheless with what remained of its effective military force concentrated around Rome, and the prestige control of the capital offered, the legitimacy of the Caviglia regime remained the closest thing to a functional Italian government in 1943 even whilst the German advance continued largely unchecked.
The modern heavy tanks of the SS swept south through the ancient cities of Modena, Parma and Reggio Emilia with minimal resistance; a protracted defence of Bologna was attempted by veterans of the Eastern Front and the local workers committee only for shortages in ammunition and equipment causing the besieged city to fall after a few days of heavy fighting. It was another bitter reminder of how Mussolini’s African and Russian campaigns had left the Italian Army unable to defend its own country.
The Germans would halt their march at Rimini infamously on orders from Fuhrer Military Headquarters rather than from any Allied or Italian pressure. It was a defeat worse than Carporetto had been for the Italian army both in scale and significance. In 1917 the panic caused by the rout of Italian forces had crucially turned to determined resistance and eventual victory against an exhausted foe. This time there had only been collapse and confusion hung in the air as to whether the Germans would consolidate their gains or march further south.
An air of helplessness surrounded the Italian Army which inevitably impacted the new regime they had established and exacerbated the sense of no-one being really in charge throughout much of Italy. The lack of information available to the centre and south sometimes mitigated knowledge of the extent of the disaster. Elsewhere rumours made it appear even worse with stories of the Germans seizing Rome and being nearby whichever location the gossip spread. Occasionally arriving Allied troops were presumed to be the Germans, causing panic rather than relief and occasional violence.
Despite the initial fears of Ambrosio there was no organised attempt at restoring Fascism to take advantage of the chaos. Fascist demonstrations would occur throughout August, particularly in areas overrun by the German advance; however the coup and the subsequent defection of its national leadership had left the movement decapitated. Local leaders had often sought to shield themselves from reprisal rather than plan to retake power.
Such demonstrations were typically accompanied by violence as anti-fascists, angry and emboldened, met the Blackshirts. The results of these altercations often depended on whether they were being broken up by Allied or German troops.
The German advance matched a similar route the Blackshirts had taken in crushing socialist and trade union activity in successive northern cities prior to the March on Rome; however it quickly began clear that the fortunes of Italian Fascism had faded with the abortive ‘Fascist Freedom Army’.
The Blackshirt attempts at reasserting their authority on the streets of northern towns and cities fared only slightly better in German-occupied territory. The SS had been chosen for their ideological commitment to Fascism however their brutality against occupied peoples did not make theoretical distinctions. It was soon to be concluded that the Fascists had failed to take advantage of German assistance in reviving their nation and as such had proven themselves unworthy of further cooperation. Mussolini was dead and, in Hitler’s eyes, Italy should die with him.
Roberto Farinacci would eventually gain German approval to reestablish the PNF in order to assist the German occupation and exploitation of Northern Italy. The former Party Secretary pledged to rebuild the party based only on loyal cadres and avoid the “hangers-on” he had first warned about in 1924. In doing so he pledged to revive the Fascist state and thus Italy itself. It was a delusion which would go on to ensure Italian Fascist complicity in the nightmare of the Operational Zones.
The SS were already giving Italians a taste of the new order in forcing the population of Rimini and the surrounding into the construction of fortifications. It was a round-up some local Blackshirts were happy to assist in and their collaboration was welcome. The Germans dug-in and prepared to renew their advance not further south but towards Milan.
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Ambrosio was desperate to establish a direct link with the Allied commands but felt unable to leave Rome for direct talks. The reputation of the military regime had been badly damaged by the events of Mussolini’s death and its de facto leader did not want to leave the capital, having forbidden any evacuation. He sent General Castellano to Naples to plead with the American commander, General Mark Clark on his behalf.
The requests were met with continued assurances of help at a future date and questions in return about the stability of the new Italian regime particularly in light of their inability to protect the captive Mussolini.
Throughout Autumn the Allied armies would successfully establish themselves throughout Central and Southern Italy. They brought a sense of militaristic stability to those regions they occupied; however the new regime in Rome appeared to wield little influence outside of the capital. With the disruption to Italian infrastructure limiting print news and with only 4% of Italian homes owning a radio, the capital became more distant to most Italians than at any time since unification.
In many areas the old Fascist administration was largely intact, with only the most overt PNF officials having been removed or otherwise dispatched and the remainder simply swapping allegiance from Mussolini to the King. Indeed in the case of some prefectures this involved ‘practical’ officials who had previously embraced Fascism only after Mussolini’s rise to power.
The aftershocks of over a month of disruption to Italian infrastructure, whether from bombing, revolution or invasion, was beginning to take its toll on the already tenuous food supply. The exodus of refugees fleeing the German advance in northern Italy would dwarf the flight from Catania and numbered in the millions. It was a journey filled with danger; rough terrain, little access to food and shelter and for many no end destination.
Italy remained largely regional despite two decades of Fascist attempts to mould the nation into a single corporate organism and the differences between northerners and southerners sharpened with the influx of northern refugees in southern regions already facing severe shortages. The famine of 1944 would exacerbate these divisions to breaking point but in the Summer of 1943 it was already taking its toll on the social fabric..
Nonetheless with what remained of its effective military force concentrated around Rome, and the prestige control of the capital offered, the legitimacy of the Caviglia regime remained the closest thing to a functional Italian government in 1943 even whilst the German advance continued largely unchecked.
The modern heavy tanks of the SS swept south through the ancient cities of Modena, Parma and Reggio Emilia with minimal resistance; a protracted defence of Bologna was attempted by veterans of the Eastern Front and the local workers committee only for shortages in ammunition and equipment causing the besieged city to fall after a few days of heavy fighting. It was another bitter reminder of how Mussolini’s African and Russian campaigns had left the Italian Army unable to defend its own country.
The Germans would halt their march at Rimini infamously on orders from Fuhrer Military Headquarters rather than from any Allied or Italian pressure. It was a defeat worse than Carporetto had been for the Italian army both in scale and significance. In 1917 the panic caused by the rout of Italian forces had crucially turned to determined resistance and eventual victory against an exhausted foe. This time there had only been collapse and confusion hung in the air as to whether the Germans would consolidate their gains or march further south.
An air of helplessness surrounded the Italian Army which inevitably impacted the new regime they had established and exacerbated the sense of no-one being really in charge throughout much of Italy. The lack of information available to the centre and south sometimes mitigated knowledge of the extent of the disaster. Elsewhere rumours made it appear even worse with stories of the Germans seizing Rome and being nearby whichever location the gossip spread. Occasionally arriving Allied troops were presumed to be the Germans, causing panic rather than relief and occasional violence.
Despite the initial fears of Ambrosio there was no organised attempt at restoring Fascism to take advantage of the chaos. Fascist demonstrations would occur throughout August, particularly in areas overrun by the German advance; however the coup and the subsequent defection of its national leadership had left the movement decapitated. Local leaders had often sought to shield themselves from reprisal rather than plan to retake power.
Such demonstrations were typically accompanied by violence as anti-fascists, angry and emboldened, met the Blackshirts. The results of these altercations often depended on whether they were being broken up by Allied or German troops.
The German advance matched a similar route the Blackshirts had taken in crushing socialist and trade union activity in successive northern cities prior to the March on Rome; however it quickly began clear that the fortunes of Italian Fascism had faded with the abortive ‘Fascist Freedom Army’.
The Blackshirt attempts at reasserting their authority on the streets of northern towns and cities fared only slightly better in German-occupied territory. The SS had been chosen for their ideological commitment to Fascism however their brutality against occupied peoples did not make theoretical distinctions. It was soon to be concluded that the Fascists had failed to take advantage of German assistance in reviving their nation and as such had proven themselves unworthy of further cooperation. Mussolini was dead and, in Hitler’s eyes, Italy should die with him.
Roberto Farinacci would eventually gain German approval to reestablish the PNF in order to assist the German occupation and exploitation of Northern Italy. The former Party Secretary pledged to rebuild the party based only on loyal cadres and avoid the “hangers-on” he had first warned about in 1924. In doing so he pledged to revive the Fascist state and thus Italy itself. It was a delusion which would go on to ensure Italian Fascist complicity in the nightmare of the Operational Zones.
The SS were already giving Italians a taste of the new order in forcing the population of Rimini and the surrounding into the construction of fortifications. It was a round-up some local Blackshirts were happy to assist in and their collaboration was welcome. The Germans dug-in and prepared to renew their advance not further south but towards Milan.
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