The Day of the Lion: An Italian WW2 TL
- Thread starter The Red
- Start date
Anno XX
Anno XX
The year of 1942, the twentieth year of the Fascist calendar, had been intended to be the year in which Italy became “The Olympiad of Civilisation.”
The Esposizione Universale Roma had been planned to be more than a World’s Fair, it was to be the climactic triumph of the Fascist revolution. It had been designed to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the March on Rome, where Benito Mussolini had been granted power after a largely orchestrated coup, to highlight the success of his regime.
Since this initial assumption of power Mussolini had reigned virtually unchecked first as Prime Minister and then as Duce. He had transformed Italy from an unstable liberal Kingdom into a totalitarian dictatorship in which communists, socialists and trade unionists had been crushed, liberals exiled or marginalised and the old aristocracy absorbed into his own National Fascist Party. In the late thirties it was planned that the world would see these achievements on display.
Visitors were to enter the exhibition through a vast arch whose structure would tower above Rome. The Arch of Empire would be the tallest structure in Europe besides the Eiffel Tower and it was to be the symbol of Fascist Italy. It would illuminate at night so that Italians might never forget Fascism’s stamp on the capital.
Passing through the arch you would enter into the Imperial Square and be surrounded by gleaming white structures reminiscent of the Roman Empire. Here you would cross to the pavilion which would feature a celebration of the unique combination of art, technology and science that enshrined Italian supremacy. Italy’s greatest physicist, Enrico Fermi, would flee Italy in 1938 following the introduction of the antisemitic Leggi Razziali but Guglielmo Marconi would be hailed as a great Italian of this mould whose fascist credentials were solid. Da Vinci and Galileo would also be enshrined as fascist heroes, dead too long to protest.
The exhibition was designed to be the centrepiece of the blossoming new Roman Empire. It would overshadow the Colosseum and the Pantheon in much the same way as Mussolini’s triumphs had eclipsed those of the Caesars. Italy had been transformed into a corporate body in which class distinctions had vanished and all had their place in building an Empire which would retake control of the Mediterranean and expand Italian influence as far as Aden and Argentina. Many leading figures in the United Kingdom and the United States looked on in awe at the dynamic change in what had previously been regarded as a second rate power.
Much of this was rhetoric, Mussolini had consolidated political control over Italy by the thirties but this had required compromise with the old aristocratic and capitalist classes which inhibited the true transformation of society he had promised. The ‘revolution’ often took the shape of existing local officials changing their titles and staying in post. Health and natalism campaigns flopped and Italy’s small industrial base floundered. Emigration remained the most attractive prospect for many young Italians in spite of official and unofficial attempts to curb it. Attempts to standardise the Italian language across varying dialects stalled as the Italian military struggled to cope with the demands for adventures in Ethiopia and Spain.
As the inadequacies of fascist autarky began to take their toll the plans for the exhibition were scaled down; the arch became smaller and narrower and made of aluminium instead of steel or concrete. Technical problems continued regardless and work had not begun before Italy found itself in yet another world war.
By 1942 the war raged on and work on the exhibition had ceased. The same economic difficulties which plagued the World’s Fair had also forbidden Italy from joining initially and by the Spring of 1940 she remained badly unprepared. Nonetheless with the collapse of France Mussolini argued he needed a mere few thousand dead to victoriously reshape the map of Europe alongside his ally Hitler. Italian troops were sent into the Alps and across the Egyptian frontier with this intent. Two years later victory was no clearer on the archless horizon and Italy had suffered several humiliating defeats.
October 27, 1942, the day of the twentieth anniversary of the March on Rome was a subdued affair when it came. Mussolini marked it with the opening of the new headquarters of the Fasci Femminili, the Fascist women’s organisation. He made no speech. It is likely he was suffering from peptic ulcers, aggravated by stress.
The formal remembrance came in the form of an exhibition more reminiscent of the tenth anniversary in 1932 than the planned Olympiad. Various rooms celebrated Mussolini’s rise to power and his triumphs whilst featuring exhibits dedicated to smearing Italy’s Jewish and Communist enemies. Trophies from the North African front were displayed along with the promise that there would soon be a new addition to the exhibition showcasing Italian victory. The exhibition was greeted with little fanfare and was poorly attended.
Italian Fascism was proudly omnipotent in its worldview. The Fascist state embodied the Italian nation, individuals served the state and would always be underneath it. All aspects of life were politicised into the struggle for the vitality of the state. In 1942 young Italians were prompted to write essays with the prompt “Should we die for the glory of Mussolini and the immortal destiny of Italy?” Mussolini boasted of an amnesty in which tens of thousands of prisoners had been released, including political opponents, such was the confidence the state had in its own strength. All the same, the war had seen its hold over the Italian people falter.
In the twenty-first winter of the fascist calendar, rations would diminish to starvation levels and coal would become a luxury. The black market became so important for the sustenance of the average Italian that it was factored into Fascist economic planning. Tens of thousands of Italians would be taken prisoner at Stalingrad. Hundreds of thousands more were away from home fighting resistance movements across Europe, deep within the Soviet Union and in Africa against the Anglo-American alliance in whose countries many Italians had family members. Tens of thousands of Italian engineers and other specialists had been sent to labour in German war industries as ‘guest workers’ only to find themselves often being treated as harshly as the slaves imported from the east.
The American invasion of French North Africa and the subsequent dissolution of the Vichy regime in the French metropole allowed Italy to realise old irredentist claims and occupy Corsica and Tunisia. Mussolini boasted of the great success Italy had achieved with the final dissolution of France but the direct American entry into the war filled many with foreboding as did the decisive British victory at El Alamein. Italian cities were bombed frequently for the first time in the Autumn of 1942, it is possible that one of the reasons for the poor attendance of the anniversary exhibition was Italian civilians heeding Mussolini’s warning to evacuate industrial cities whenever possible.
The Italian people, never fully behind the war, were now increasingly against it and against Fascism in turn but Mussolini still believed a victory could be attained which would set everything right. He yearned for an opportunity to rejuvenate his regime even as it began to disintegrate from within.
The year of 1942, the twentieth year of the Fascist calendar, had been intended to be the year in which Italy became “The Olympiad of Civilisation.”
The Esposizione Universale Roma had been planned to be more than a World’s Fair, it was to be the climactic triumph of the Fascist revolution. It had been designed to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the March on Rome, where Benito Mussolini had been granted power after a largely orchestrated coup, to highlight the success of his regime.
Since this initial assumption of power Mussolini had reigned virtually unchecked first as Prime Minister and then as Duce. He had transformed Italy from an unstable liberal Kingdom into a totalitarian dictatorship in which communists, socialists and trade unionists had been crushed, liberals exiled or marginalised and the old aristocracy absorbed into his own National Fascist Party. In the late thirties it was planned that the world would see these achievements on display.
Visitors were to enter the exhibition through a vast arch whose structure would tower above Rome. The Arch of Empire would be the tallest structure in Europe besides the Eiffel Tower and it was to be the symbol of Fascist Italy. It would illuminate at night so that Italians might never forget Fascism’s stamp on the capital.
Passing through the arch you would enter into the Imperial Square and be surrounded by gleaming white structures reminiscent of the Roman Empire. Here you would cross to the pavilion which would feature a celebration of the unique combination of art, technology and science that enshrined Italian supremacy. Italy’s greatest physicist, Enrico Fermi, would flee Italy in 1938 following the introduction of the antisemitic Leggi Razziali but Guglielmo Marconi would be hailed as a great Italian of this mould whose fascist credentials were solid. Da Vinci and Galileo would also be enshrined as fascist heroes, dead too long to protest.
The exhibition was designed to be the centrepiece of the blossoming new Roman Empire. It would overshadow the Colosseum and the Pantheon in much the same way as Mussolini’s triumphs had eclipsed those of the Caesars. Italy had been transformed into a corporate body in which class distinctions had vanished and all had their place in building an Empire which would retake control of the Mediterranean and expand Italian influence as far as Aden and Argentina. Many leading figures in the United Kingdom and the United States looked on in awe at the dynamic change in what had previously been regarded as a second rate power.
Much of this was rhetoric, Mussolini had consolidated political control over Italy by the thirties but this had required compromise with the old aristocratic and capitalist classes which inhibited the true transformation of society he had promised. The ‘revolution’ often took the shape of existing local officials changing their titles and staying in post. Health and natalism campaigns flopped and Italy’s small industrial base floundered. Emigration remained the most attractive prospect for many young Italians in spite of official and unofficial attempts to curb it. Attempts to standardise the Italian language across varying dialects stalled as the Italian military struggled to cope with the demands for adventures in Ethiopia and Spain.
As the inadequacies of fascist autarky began to take their toll the plans for the exhibition were scaled down; the arch became smaller and narrower and made of aluminium instead of steel or concrete. Technical problems continued regardless and work had not begun before Italy found itself in yet another world war.
By 1942 the war raged on and work on the exhibition had ceased. The same economic difficulties which plagued the World’s Fair had also forbidden Italy from joining initially and by the Spring of 1940 she remained badly unprepared. Nonetheless with the collapse of France Mussolini argued he needed a mere few thousand dead to victoriously reshape the map of Europe alongside his ally Hitler. Italian troops were sent into the Alps and across the Egyptian frontier with this intent. Two years later victory was no clearer on the archless horizon and Italy had suffered several humiliating defeats.
October 27, 1942, the day of the twentieth anniversary of the March on Rome was a subdued affair when it came. Mussolini marked it with the opening of the new headquarters of the Fasci Femminili, the Fascist women’s organisation. He made no speech. It is likely he was suffering from peptic ulcers, aggravated by stress.
The formal remembrance came in the form of an exhibition more reminiscent of the tenth anniversary in 1932 than the planned Olympiad. Various rooms celebrated Mussolini’s rise to power and his triumphs whilst featuring exhibits dedicated to smearing Italy’s Jewish and Communist enemies. Trophies from the North African front were displayed along with the promise that there would soon be a new addition to the exhibition showcasing Italian victory. The exhibition was greeted with little fanfare and was poorly attended.
Italian Fascism was proudly omnipotent in its worldview. The Fascist state embodied the Italian nation, individuals served the state and would always be underneath it. All aspects of life were politicised into the struggle for the vitality of the state. In 1942 young Italians were prompted to write essays with the prompt “Should we die for the glory of Mussolini and the immortal destiny of Italy?” Mussolini boasted of an amnesty in which tens of thousands of prisoners had been released, including political opponents, such was the confidence the state had in its own strength. All the same, the war had seen its hold over the Italian people falter.
In the twenty-first winter of the fascist calendar, rations would diminish to starvation levels and coal would become a luxury. The black market became so important for the sustenance of the average Italian that it was factored into Fascist economic planning. Tens of thousands of Italians would be taken prisoner at Stalingrad. Hundreds of thousands more were away from home fighting resistance movements across Europe, deep within the Soviet Union and in Africa against the Anglo-American alliance in whose countries many Italians had family members. Tens of thousands of Italian engineers and other specialists had been sent to labour in German war industries as ‘guest workers’ only to find themselves often being treated as harshly as the slaves imported from the east.
The American invasion of French North Africa and the subsequent dissolution of the Vichy regime in the French metropole allowed Italy to realise old irredentist claims and occupy Corsica and Tunisia. Mussolini boasted of the great success Italy had achieved with the final dissolution of France but the direct American entry into the war filled many with foreboding as did the decisive British victory at El Alamein. Italian cities were bombed frequently for the first time in the Autumn of 1942, it is possible that one of the reasons for the poor attendance of the anniversary exhibition was Italian civilians heeding Mussolini’s warning to evacuate industrial cities whenever possible.
The Italian people, never fully behind the war, were now increasingly against it and against Fascism in turn but Mussolini still believed a victory could be attained which would set everything right. He yearned for an opportunity to rejuvenate his regime even as it began to disintegrate from within.
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What a fucking idiot.
Yeah, he's gonna bungee jump from a gas station way earlier, if he's going to starve the population even harder than IRL - I hope Italy will be able to liberate itself from Fascism as Greece did, rather than end up as an American protectorate in all but name.
In Greece it was more Germany that decided to retreat due to the military situation with the Soviet (and the Wallies) than the resistance liberating the nation on their own and she also had a serious multi years civil war and later a real fascist regime...so thanks but no thanks, plus come on we were an american protectorate? If we were, well the USA had done an extremely lousy job in keeping us down and controlled and the same can be said for all the rest of Western Europe
Thanks! Yeah it's going to be a more 'dynamic' year for Fascist strategy in 1943.
What a fucking idiot.
Yeah, he's gonna bungee jump from a gas station way earlier, if he's going to starve the population even harder than IRL - I hope Italy will be able to liberate itself from Fascism as Greece did, rather than end up as an American protectorate in all but name.
It's a good point in that being able to liberate yourself from Fascism doesn't guarantee you'll be free of them.
Fixed, thanks!
Anno XXI
Anno XXI
At the beginning of January 1943 Mussolini told his new National Directorate that the twenty-first year of the fascist era would be a decisive one for the destiny of Italy.
There had been setbacks, yes but he remained confident in the resilience of the Italian people and emphasised this above all else. Wars were not determined by arms or access to raw materials he argued but by political consciousness. He spoke favourably of the ideological fanaticism of the Red Army and attributed this to their imminent victory at Stalingrad. While he fantasised about a Spanish entry into the war turning the tide in North Africa and emphasised that Italy must still seek to conquer Egypt he predicted that soon Italy itself would be put to the test.
The conflation of political ideology and patriotic fervour which had defeated Fascism in Russia could also be used to save it at home when Allied troops arrived. The Mediterranean front was the decisive one of the war he argued and if the Italian people held firm, victory remained possible.
There were two problems with this calculation which Mussolini acknowledged privately. The first was that Italy had become overly dependent on her German ally, whose priorities lay in the east. Mussolini had once hoped to wage a parallel war in the Mediterranean alongside Germany on the continent but by the end of 1942 it had become entirely reliant on German resources for the maintenance of its own war effort. Adolf Hitler had come to view the Mediterranean front as important only in delaying an Anglo-American landing on the European mainland until the Soviet Union could be defeated.
Hitler remained an admirer of Mussolini but the Italian dictator had grown weary of playing second fiddle to his condescending German counterpart. He nonetheless was aware of his influence over Hitler and hoped to exploit this to convince his ally to make peace with the Soviet Union or at least maintain a defensive posture, so as to focus their combined strength on the Mediterranean front. Mussolini proposed a conference of the dictators to determine future Axis strategy but Hitler refused, stressing the crisis on the Caucasus front required his full attention. Instead Mussolini sent his Foreign Minister and son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano to Hitler’s headquarters alongside his Chief of Staff, Marshall Ugo Cavallero to convey his ideas. Hitler rejected the idea of peace with the Soviets, lecturing his Italian guests on how the Volga was the natural border of Europe which would need to be retaken and that the Soviets would be bled to death beforehand.
Cavallero and Ciano came home empty handed and Mussolini had them removed shortly thereafter. Cavallero was replaced by the anti-German Vittorio Ambrosio who immediately sought to reorganise Commando Supremo and in so doing restore Italian strategic independence from Germany. Mussolini took on the Foreign Affairs brief alongside his many other titles, believing this would give him greater control over dealings with Hitler and thus greater focus on the Mediterranean theatre.
The second problem was that Italian morale was crumbling on the homefront and within the army. If the war had indeed become one of political conviction this could prove fatal. Mussolini saw the National Fascist Party as paramount in dealing with this. Alongside the removal of Cavallero and the reshuffling of Ciano, Mussolini replaced or reshuffled almost his entire cabinet bringing in new men who he personally trusted. Carlo Scorza, a former street thug and veteran was promoted to the role of Party Secretary in the hopes that he would restore the Blackshirt presence on Italy’s streets. At the same time as Ambrosio replaced Cavallero, the loyal fascist Admiral Giuseppe Sirianni was made Chief of Supermarina in order to prepare the Italian Navy for its role in the coming year of decision.
By the second month of 1943 Mussolini believed Italy was well placed to face the great challenges ahead. He had secured his regime in a way that would revitalise the home front whilst taking steps to ensure the Axis would focus on the strategy needed to secure victory. If the Soviets could be made to accept a peace similar to Brest-Litovsk then the Axis would have the resources and manpower required to maintain a hold on Africa and return to the offensive there once more. If the Italian people could have their dynamism restored, they would shatter the plutocratic Americans and the perfidious British.
For Mussolini’s opponents, both underground and recently marginalised, it became clearer that he was leading Italy off of a cliff.
--
At the beginning of January 1943 Mussolini told his new National Directorate that the twenty-first year of the fascist era would be a decisive one for the destiny of Italy.
There had been setbacks, yes but he remained confident in the resilience of the Italian people and emphasised this above all else. Wars were not determined by arms or access to raw materials he argued but by political consciousness. He spoke favourably of the ideological fanaticism of the Red Army and attributed this to their imminent victory at Stalingrad. While he fantasised about a Spanish entry into the war turning the tide in North Africa and emphasised that Italy must still seek to conquer Egypt he predicted that soon Italy itself would be put to the test.
The conflation of political ideology and patriotic fervour which had defeated Fascism in Russia could also be used to save it at home when Allied troops arrived. The Mediterranean front was the decisive one of the war he argued and if the Italian people held firm, victory remained possible.
There were two problems with this calculation which Mussolini acknowledged privately. The first was that Italy had become overly dependent on her German ally, whose priorities lay in the east. Mussolini had once hoped to wage a parallel war in the Mediterranean alongside Germany on the continent but by the end of 1942 it had become entirely reliant on German resources for the maintenance of its own war effort. Adolf Hitler had come to view the Mediterranean front as important only in delaying an Anglo-American landing on the European mainland until the Soviet Union could be defeated.
Hitler remained an admirer of Mussolini but the Italian dictator had grown weary of playing second fiddle to his condescending German counterpart. He nonetheless was aware of his influence over Hitler and hoped to exploit this to convince his ally to make peace with the Soviet Union or at least maintain a defensive posture, so as to focus their combined strength on the Mediterranean front. Mussolini proposed a conference of the dictators to determine future Axis strategy but Hitler refused, stressing the crisis on the Caucasus front required his full attention. Instead Mussolini sent his Foreign Minister and son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano to Hitler’s headquarters alongside his Chief of Staff, Marshall Ugo Cavallero to convey his ideas. Hitler rejected the idea of peace with the Soviets, lecturing his Italian guests on how the Volga was the natural border of Europe which would need to be retaken and that the Soviets would be bled to death beforehand.
Cavallero and Ciano came home empty handed and Mussolini had them removed shortly thereafter. Cavallero was replaced by the anti-German Vittorio Ambrosio who immediately sought to reorganise Commando Supremo and in so doing restore Italian strategic independence from Germany. Mussolini took on the Foreign Affairs brief alongside his many other titles, believing this would give him greater control over dealings with Hitler and thus greater focus on the Mediterranean theatre.
The second problem was that Italian morale was crumbling on the homefront and within the army. If the war had indeed become one of political conviction this could prove fatal. Mussolini saw the National Fascist Party as paramount in dealing with this. Alongside the removal of Cavallero and the reshuffling of Ciano, Mussolini replaced or reshuffled almost his entire cabinet bringing in new men who he personally trusted. Carlo Scorza, a former street thug and veteran was promoted to the role of Party Secretary in the hopes that he would restore the Blackshirt presence on Italy’s streets. At the same time as Ambrosio replaced Cavallero, the loyal fascist Admiral Giuseppe Sirianni was made Chief of Supermarina in order to prepare the Italian Navy for its role in the coming year of decision.
By the second month of 1943 Mussolini believed Italy was well placed to face the great challenges ahead. He had secured his regime in a way that would revitalise the home front whilst taking steps to ensure the Axis would focus on the strategy needed to secure victory. If the Soviets could be made to accept a peace similar to Brest-Litovsk then the Axis would have the resources and manpower required to maintain a hold on Africa and return to the offensive there once more. If the Italian people could have their dynamism restored, they would shatter the plutocratic Americans and the perfidious British.
For Mussolini’s opponents, both underground and recently marginalised, it became clearer that he was leading Italy off of a cliff.
--
Antifascismo
Antifascismo
The Partito Comunista d'Italia (PCI) had found itself on the losing side of the struggle against Fascism following the March on Rome. The Italian section of the Communist International had been caught by surprise with the fascist stunt and the speed with which Mussolini was given control of the Italian state whose power was now entirely directed against them.
The party was officially outlawed, many members including its entire leadership were imprisoned or exiled. Thousands more were tortured by the Blackshirts who now controlled the streets. The trade unions which had provided a fertile ground for communist organisation and recruitment were banned. As debates raged in the Communist International as to what extent local Communist parties should submit themselves to ‘Bolshevisation’, organising themselves to match the structure and strategy of Lenin’s Bolsheviks, Italy began more and more to resemble the reactionary brutality of Tsarist Russia with any left-wing activity being driven underground.
Pursuing a clandestine approach allowed the PCI to survive as an organised body even though difficulties remained with communication between cells and the party leadership. As in the Soviet Union and elsewhere a powerful left opposition faction remained within the party which exacerbated organisation further. By 1942 the party had only a few thousand members within Italy but the movement retained its presence in the industrial towns and cities of northern Italy, even when it was more of a mantra than any concrete organisation.
For all its faults the PCI remained the most prominent organisation in active opposition to Mussolini’s regime. In lieu of open working class organisation, a communist leaflet or newspaper in a dock or factory would find itself being circulated through dozens or hundreds of different hands. Fascist bodies were infiltrated, surveyed and sabotaged. Mussolini proudly boasted of how the Communists were no longer a threat to Italy after twenty years of Fascism whilst also laying the blame for Italy’s increasing difficulties at their doorstep.
The final victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad in February 1943 was the greatest difficulty the Fascism had yet faced and was a rallying point for Communists within Italy. The war had focused the PCI, allowing their propaganda to tie together Italy’s strategic woes with the weakening of the Fascist regime. The long work days with no overtime pay and insufficient rations alongside Italian defeats and Allied air raids made it easy to highlight the many failures of the Fascist regime and its incompetent and increasingly delusional leadership. After Stalingrad demoralisation amongst Italian workers had reached its peak, it was clear that Italy would lose the war and many looked to the Red Army for deliverance. The PCI decided it was time to go on the offensive.
The Fiat automotive plant at Mirafiori was one of the largest industrial complexes in Italy, host to twenty thousands and the symbolic heart of a flourishing Italian industry in Fascist propaganda. Mussolini had made an awkward speech attempting to impress these notions on the workforce at the plant’s opening in 1939, only to receive a cold reception. The war had meant that even though the factory hadn’t yet produced any of the cars it was designed for, it was a vital component in war production. For strategic and propaganda purposes it was a perfect target for strike agitation.
Strikes had officially been abolished by the Fascists in 1926 but the Communists had already successfully encouraged some smaller strikes at the start of 1943. The PCI presence within the plant was minimal but the stated motivation for the strike was popular and the plan circulated widely. The Fascist state had announced a one time bonus would be paid to those workers whose homes had been affected by bomb damage. It was designed to display the state’s compassion though many saw it as a reluctant admission of culpability in failing to prevent enemy air raids. The strike demanded that the bonus be paid to all Italian workers.
The failure of rationing had left the Lira effectively worthless; however it was a popular proposal which allowed as many workers as possible to display their discontent. When the strike began on the 5th of March not all workers downed tools but three days later it had spread to the entire factory and beyond through the railways and into the northern industrial cities. By the 11th of March more than a hundred thousand workers were on strike in northern Italy with many more observing a work-to-rule, refusing to work overtime. The strike then spread south and demonstrations began to go beyond the central demand of the bonus to calling for the end to the war or even the end of Fascism.
The Fascists reacted first with dismay then with horror as the work stoppages and demonstrations continued week after week. After twenty years their control over the Italian worker was unravelling in front of their eyes and it seemed they would soon be faced not only by Allied armies in the field but also an armed revolution at home. The Communists had even appeared to set a date.
The PCI were jubilant with the success of the strike which had exceeded all expectations but its popularity had also left them overwhelmed. A great deal of organisation and planning had gone into the strike and the same would be needed to properly exploit its success. Plans were made for mass demonstrations for peace in Rome, Turin and Milan to take place. It was intended to be the beginning of the end of Fascism with subsequent demonstrations planned across the country for May Day. However it was not an armed revolt, the Communists lacked the numbers or the arms with which to carry one out. The arms factories remained on strike rather than producing weapons for a revolution.
Nonetheless Mussolini had begun to see the planned demonstrations as a Communist plot to seize control of the three cities, egged on by Hitler who urged him to crush the strikes and by his new party secretary who promised an army of Blackshirts could be summoned to save his regime. On Easter Sunday the demonstrations went ahead but were poorly attended, many workers who were happy to express their discontent via the demand for the bonus were left uncomfortable calling outright for the end of a regime that had taken great pleasure in disposing of its past opponents. The Communists had expected the streets of the three cities to be swamped but only a few thousand came out in Milan and Turin, and only a few hundred in Rome. Nonetheless the Fascists were ready for an armed revolution and responded accordingly.
The Easter Sunday massacre of April 25th took the form of a state sponsored riot as armed blackshirts gunned down peace demonstrators whilst the police looked on, ready to intervene on behalf of the blackshirts should the demonstrators fire back. Unarmed as most actually were, they fled. The violence ended swiftly with dozens dead and hundreds injured. Mussolini announced from the Palazzo Venezia to a crowd of triumphant Blackshirts that the Communist coup had been crushed whilst blood was still being washed off the Piazza del Popollo. He also agreed to extend the bonus payment to all workers and the strikes slowly petered out. It looked like the Fascist regime had successfully dealt with the strike using a balance of carrot and stick but many within it had been left deeply shaken.
The PCI were quick to martyr those who had fallen on Bloody Sunday but also realised their strategy had hit an impasse. Fascist violence against demonstrators angered many but also made them reluctant to put themselves in the line of fire. Nonetheless the strike had been a success, they had revealed the weakness of Mussolini’s regime and how they could be expected to respond to further insurrection. Newspapers and leaflets continued to circulate at Mirafiori and elsewhere while weapons began to go missing from the factory. Secreted part by part from worker to worker like leaflets and newspapers.
Mussolini saw the end of the strikes as a validation of his rejuvenation efforts. Loyal Fascists had seen off the great challenge domestically just as they could still do to their foreign enemies even as they drew closer and closer to Italy.
Still many within his regime began to look for a way out before they arrived.
---
The Partito Comunista d'Italia (PCI) had found itself on the losing side of the struggle against Fascism following the March on Rome. The Italian section of the Communist International had been caught by surprise with the fascist stunt and the speed with which Mussolini was given control of the Italian state whose power was now entirely directed against them.
The party was officially outlawed, many members including its entire leadership were imprisoned or exiled. Thousands more were tortured by the Blackshirts who now controlled the streets. The trade unions which had provided a fertile ground for communist organisation and recruitment were banned. As debates raged in the Communist International as to what extent local Communist parties should submit themselves to ‘Bolshevisation’, organising themselves to match the structure and strategy of Lenin’s Bolsheviks, Italy began more and more to resemble the reactionary brutality of Tsarist Russia with any left-wing activity being driven underground.
Pursuing a clandestine approach allowed the PCI to survive as an organised body even though difficulties remained with communication between cells and the party leadership. As in the Soviet Union and elsewhere a powerful left opposition faction remained within the party which exacerbated organisation further. By 1942 the party had only a few thousand members within Italy but the movement retained its presence in the industrial towns and cities of northern Italy, even when it was more of a mantra than any concrete organisation.
For all its faults the PCI remained the most prominent organisation in active opposition to Mussolini’s regime. In lieu of open working class organisation, a communist leaflet or newspaper in a dock or factory would find itself being circulated through dozens or hundreds of different hands. Fascist bodies were infiltrated, surveyed and sabotaged. Mussolini proudly boasted of how the Communists were no longer a threat to Italy after twenty years of Fascism whilst also laying the blame for Italy’s increasing difficulties at their doorstep.
The final victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad in February 1943 was the greatest difficulty the Fascism had yet faced and was a rallying point for Communists within Italy. The war had focused the PCI, allowing their propaganda to tie together Italy’s strategic woes with the weakening of the Fascist regime. The long work days with no overtime pay and insufficient rations alongside Italian defeats and Allied air raids made it easy to highlight the many failures of the Fascist regime and its incompetent and increasingly delusional leadership. After Stalingrad demoralisation amongst Italian workers had reached its peak, it was clear that Italy would lose the war and many looked to the Red Army for deliverance. The PCI decided it was time to go on the offensive.
The Fiat automotive plant at Mirafiori was one of the largest industrial complexes in Italy, host to twenty thousands and the symbolic heart of a flourishing Italian industry in Fascist propaganda. Mussolini had made an awkward speech attempting to impress these notions on the workforce at the plant’s opening in 1939, only to receive a cold reception. The war had meant that even though the factory hadn’t yet produced any of the cars it was designed for, it was a vital component in war production. For strategic and propaganda purposes it was a perfect target for strike agitation.
Strikes had officially been abolished by the Fascists in 1926 but the Communists had already successfully encouraged some smaller strikes at the start of 1943. The PCI presence within the plant was minimal but the stated motivation for the strike was popular and the plan circulated widely. The Fascist state had announced a one time bonus would be paid to those workers whose homes had been affected by bomb damage. It was designed to display the state’s compassion though many saw it as a reluctant admission of culpability in failing to prevent enemy air raids. The strike demanded that the bonus be paid to all Italian workers.
The failure of rationing had left the Lira effectively worthless; however it was a popular proposal which allowed as many workers as possible to display their discontent. When the strike began on the 5th of March not all workers downed tools but three days later it had spread to the entire factory and beyond through the railways and into the northern industrial cities. By the 11th of March more than a hundred thousand workers were on strike in northern Italy with many more observing a work-to-rule, refusing to work overtime. The strike then spread south and demonstrations began to go beyond the central demand of the bonus to calling for the end to the war or even the end of Fascism.
The Fascists reacted first with dismay then with horror as the work stoppages and demonstrations continued week after week. After twenty years their control over the Italian worker was unravelling in front of their eyes and it seemed they would soon be faced not only by Allied armies in the field but also an armed revolution at home. The Communists had even appeared to set a date.
The PCI were jubilant with the success of the strike which had exceeded all expectations but its popularity had also left them overwhelmed. A great deal of organisation and planning had gone into the strike and the same would be needed to properly exploit its success. Plans were made for mass demonstrations for peace in Rome, Turin and Milan to take place. It was intended to be the beginning of the end of Fascism with subsequent demonstrations planned across the country for May Day. However it was not an armed revolt, the Communists lacked the numbers or the arms with which to carry one out. The arms factories remained on strike rather than producing weapons for a revolution.
Nonetheless Mussolini had begun to see the planned demonstrations as a Communist plot to seize control of the three cities, egged on by Hitler who urged him to crush the strikes and by his new party secretary who promised an army of Blackshirts could be summoned to save his regime. On Easter Sunday the demonstrations went ahead but were poorly attended, many workers who were happy to express their discontent via the demand for the bonus were left uncomfortable calling outright for the end of a regime that had taken great pleasure in disposing of its past opponents. The Communists had expected the streets of the three cities to be swamped but only a few thousand came out in Milan and Turin, and only a few hundred in Rome. Nonetheless the Fascists were ready for an armed revolution and responded accordingly.
The Easter Sunday massacre of April 25th took the form of a state sponsored riot as armed blackshirts gunned down peace demonstrators whilst the police looked on, ready to intervene on behalf of the blackshirts should the demonstrators fire back. Unarmed as most actually were, they fled. The violence ended swiftly with dozens dead and hundreds injured. Mussolini announced from the Palazzo Venezia to a crowd of triumphant Blackshirts that the Communist coup had been crushed whilst blood was still being washed off the Piazza del Popollo. He also agreed to extend the bonus payment to all workers and the strikes slowly petered out. It looked like the Fascist regime had successfully dealt with the strike using a balance of carrot and stick but many within it had been left deeply shaken.
The PCI were quick to martyr those who had fallen on Bloody Sunday but also realised their strategy had hit an impasse. Fascist violence against demonstrators angered many but also made them reluctant to put themselves in the line of fire. Nonetheless the strike had been a success, they had revealed the weakness of Mussolini’s regime and how they could be expected to respond to further insurrection. Newspapers and leaflets continued to circulate at Mirafiori and elsewhere while weapons began to go missing from the factory. Secreted part by part from worker to worker like leaflets and newspapers.
Mussolini saw the end of the strikes as a validation of his rejuvenation efforts. Loyal Fascists had seen off the great challenge domestically just as they could still do to their foreign enemies even as they drew closer and closer to Italy.
Still many within his regime began to look for a way out before they arrived.
---
Dissenso
Dissenso
Although the PCI was the most prominent organisation in opposition to Fascism it was not necessarily best placed to remove it. In the Spring of 1943 three conspiracies would emerge and occasionally coalesce to remove Mussolini from power from within his own regime. The lynchpin to all three conspiracies was the Italian Head of State, King Victor Emmanuel III. The King had put Mussolini in power and could also legally remove him, the Army and Navy swore its loyalty to him rather than Mussolini and the increasing unpopularity of the Fascist regime hadn’t yet affected the House of Savoy to the same extent. Italy had never been a country which was comfortably monarchist but even many republicans now looked to the institution for deliverance.
Despite Fascist repression there had remained an underground of Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists opposed to Mussolini’s regime. Though not as well organised as the Communists, Italy’s deteriorating war situation had also emboldened them into action. They were organised together by Ivanoe Bonomi, an elderly Liberal statesman who had been Prime Minister prior to the Fascist era. Bonomi retained strong links with the House of Savoy and figures within the military such as Marshal Pietro Badoglio who had become convinced of the need to remove Mussolini and Fascism in order to save Italy from destruction.
Bonomi hoped to include all anti-fascist elements within his organisation, including the Communists however the PCI were wary of the establishment figure who had been notoriously lenient towards the Blackshirts during his time in power. The success of the Mirafiori strike made them argue that they should play the leading role in any anti-fascist coalition, one not necessarily contingent on support from the King. Bonomi enjoyed more success with more moderate Socialist Republicans such as those of the Action Party however the violent put down of the Easter Sunday demonstrations split his coalition with some seeing the King as having dipped his hands in the blood. Bonomi continued trying to square the circle, arguing that only the King could concretely remove Mussolini and that if the dissenters to Fascism were disunited then the Fascist regime might survive the removal of Mussolini.
The conspiracy within the National Fascist Party was initially centred around Dino Grandi. Grandi had been a Fascist his entire political life but had long become the primary opposition figure within the regime, arguing in his own words that his loyalty to the Duce did not correspond to blind obedience. Grandi had opposed the alliance with Germany, criticised the Fascist regime’s increasing antisemitism and argued against Italian entry into the war. By the end of 1942 even his loyalty to Mussolini quietly faded after the Duce blocked an attempt by Grandi to make peace feelers via the British embassy in Spain and then removed him from the cabinet.
Mussolini had sought to rejuvenate his regime via this reshuffle but he invigorated the conspiracy against him in turn. Prominent Fascists who had been sidelined alongside Grandi now joined, including former Education Minister Giuseppe Bottai and former Foreign Secretary Galeazzo Ciano. Ciano was another lifelong Fascist, married to Mussolini’s daughter and considered by many to be his natural successor. An aristocrat who had become a Count following his father’s death, Ciano personified the compromises with the old Italian elites that Mussolini’s regime had made and by 1943 he had fallen out of favour. After his failure to successfully express Mussolini’s wishes to Hitler he had been replaced as Foreign Secretary by the Duce himself and made Ambassador to the Holy See.
Ciano, who had already been convinced of the need to find a way out of the war, now also determined that to do so would require the removal of his father-in-law. His demotion had given him access to a neutral nation full of Allied diplomats with which he could arrange a future without Mussolini alongside his aristocratic connections to the Italian Royal Family and contacts within the Italian Army.
The Army conspiracy was centred around Brigadier General Guiseppe Castellano, Head of Planning with the Army General Staff and friend of the newly appointed Commando Supremo Chief of Staff Vittorio Ambrosio. The Army conspiracy was less developed than those of Bonomi or the Fascists, with the crisis in North Africa occupying most of their time.
The Axis had been largely successful in securing Tunisia following the American landings in French North Africa but a subsequent Anglo-American offensive had linked their two fronts in the north east of the country. By April the Axis position was in a state of collapse. Supplying forces in North Africa, initially made easier with access to Tunisian ports, now became a suicidal endeavour for what remained of the Italian merchant fleet. Anglo-American air power had become dominant not only over the skies of North Africa but also southern Italy and, one after another, bombed out ports were rendered useless. Large scale evacuation of Italian forces was now impossible, and by the final surrender of the Axis armies in May only a handful had managed to escape at night in small boats.
The fall of Tunisia represented the end of the Italian Army as an operational force. Compounded by losses on the Eastern Front, Ambrosio was limited to only a handful of divisions to defend the vast Italian coastline with few remaining planes and tanks. On paper there remained 23 divisions with which to defend Italy but these were paper units with little more strength than a brigade.
16 and 17 year olds and First World War veterans were drafted to make up the shortfall but these children and old men lacked much experience of modern war and the bonus strike had left little to arm them with. The Italians were desperately scavenging anything they could from French stockpiles under their control to make up the shortfall. Even the more hardened veterans returning from the Eastern Front at Ambrosio’s direction were dismayed by being sent directly to build coastal fortifications in Sicily rather than be allowed any time to rest after their ordeal.
The continuing Allied air offensive against Italy and the build-up of resources in Tunisia indicated that an attack on Sardinia or Sicily was imminent and Ambrosio knew that Italy could no longer defend itself. The only options were to seek peace or to fall on Germany’s mercy. The Germans had the elements of three divisions already in Italy after supply issues prevented their transport to Tunisia and Hitler offered five more. The German dictator continued to prioritise the Eastern Front but accepted that only propping up his Italian ally would allow him to continue to do so.
Ambrosio instructed Mussolini to deny the German offer and demanded the German units already in Italy be placed directly under his command. He intended to keep them at arms length, split between Sardinia, Sicily and the mainland. Objectively Italy couldn’t hope to defend itself without German help but Ambrosio knew accepting it would undo the strategic autonomy he had hoped to foster and leave his country little more than a German puppet. Ambrosio sent a series of memorandums to the King laying out the perilousness of the strategic situation and recommending a way out of the war to ensure the survival of Italy and its monarchy.
The King, however, had not yet lost faith in Mussolini. Although shaken by Ambrosio’s candour and accepting audiences with all three shades of conspirators, Victor Emmanuel dithered and concluded that Italy had to find a way out of the war but that Mussolini was best placed to deliver it.
For Mussolini this was an impossible task, the Allies had made it clear that any peace would come at the expense of his regime but continuing the war would mean complete subordination to Germany. He was resigned to the fact that he had tied himself to Hitler’s fate though continued to search for a victory that would restore Italian prestige and cement the rejuvenation of his regime.
It could no longer come from the Army so instead he pinned his hopes on Italy’s most powerful weapon; her battle fleet.
---
Although the PCI was the most prominent organisation in opposition to Fascism it was not necessarily best placed to remove it. In the Spring of 1943 three conspiracies would emerge and occasionally coalesce to remove Mussolini from power from within his own regime. The lynchpin to all three conspiracies was the Italian Head of State, King Victor Emmanuel III. The King had put Mussolini in power and could also legally remove him, the Army and Navy swore its loyalty to him rather than Mussolini and the increasing unpopularity of the Fascist regime hadn’t yet affected the House of Savoy to the same extent. Italy had never been a country which was comfortably monarchist but even many republicans now looked to the institution for deliverance.
Despite Fascist repression there had remained an underground of Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists opposed to Mussolini’s regime. Though not as well organised as the Communists, Italy’s deteriorating war situation had also emboldened them into action. They were organised together by Ivanoe Bonomi, an elderly Liberal statesman who had been Prime Minister prior to the Fascist era. Bonomi retained strong links with the House of Savoy and figures within the military such as Marshal Pietro Badoglio who had become convinced of the need to remove Mussolini and Fascism in order to save Italy from destruction.
Bonomi hoped to include all anti-fascist elements within his organisation, including the Communists however the PCI were wary of the establishment figure who had been notoriously lenient towards the Blackshirts during his time in power. The success of the Mirafiori strike made them argue that they should play the leading role in any anti-fascist coalition, one not necessarily contingent on support from the King. Bonomi enjoyed more success with more moderate Socialist Republicans such as those of the Action Party however the violent put down of the Easter Sunday demonstrations split his coalition with some seeing the King as having dipped his hands in the blood. Bonomi continued trying to square the circle, arguing that only the King could concretely remove Mussolini and that if the dissenters to Fascism were disunited then the Fascist regime might survive the removal of Mussolini.
The conspiracy within the National Fascist Party was initially centred around Dino Grandi. Grandi had been a Fascist his entire political life but had long become the primary opposition figure within the regime, arguing in his own words that his loyalty to the Duce did not correspond to blind obedience. Grandi had opposed the alliance with Germany, criticised the Fascist regime’s increasing antisemitism and argued against Italian entry into the war. By the end of 1942 even his loyalty to Mussolini quietly faded after the Duce blocked an attempt by Grandi to make peace feelers via the British embassy in Spain and then removed him from the cabinet.
Mussolini had sought to rejuvenate his regime via this reshuffle but he invigorated the conspiracy against him in turn. Prominent Fascists who had been sidelined alongside Grandi now joined, including former Education Minister Giuseppe Bottai and former Foreign Secretary Galeazzo Ciano. Ciano was another lifelong Fascist, married to Mussolini’s daughter and considered by many to be his natural successor. An aristocrat who had become a Count following his father’s death, Ciano personified the compromises with the old Italian elites that Mussolini’s regime had made and by 1943 he had fallen out of favour. After his failure to successfully express Mussolini’s wishes to Hitler he had been replaced as Foreign Secretary by the Duce himself and made Ambassador to the Holy See.
Ciano, who had already been convinced of the need to find a way out of the war, now also determined that to do so would require the removal of his father-in-law. His demotion had given him access to a neutral nation full of Allied diplomats with which he could arrange a future without Mussolini alongside his aristocratic connections to the Italian Royal Family and contacts within the Italian Army.
The Army conspiracy was centred around Brigadier General Guiseppe Castellano, Head of Planning with the Army General Staff and friend of the newly appointed Commando Supremo Chief of Staff Vittorio Ambrosio. The Army conspiracy was less developed than those of Bonomi or the Fascists, with the crisis in North Africa occupying most of their time.
The Axis had been largely successful in securing Tunisia following the American landings in French North Africa but a subsequent Anglo-American offensive had linked their two fronts in the north east of the country. By April the Axis position was in a state of collapse. Supplying forces in North Africa, initially made easier with access to Tunisian ports, now became a suicidal endeavour for what remained of the Italian merchant fleet. Anglo-American air power had become dominant not only over the skies of North Africa but also southern Italy and, one after another, bombed out ports were rendered useless. Large scale evacuation of Italian forces was now impossible, and by the final surrender of the Axis armies in May only a handful had managed to escape at night in small boats.
The fall of Tunisia represented the end of the Italian Army as an operational force. Compounded by losses on the Eastern Front, Ambrosio was limited to only a handful of divisions to defend the vast Italian coastline with few remaining planes and tanks. On paper there remained 23 divisions with which to defend Italy but these were paper units with little more strength than a brigade.
16 and 17 year olds and First World War veterans were drafted to make up the shortfall but these children and old men lacked much experience of modern war and the bonus strike had left little to arm them with. The Italians were desperately scavenging anything they could from French stockpiles under their control to make up the shortfall. Even the more hardened veterans returning from the Eastern Front at Ambrosio’s direction were dismayed by being sent directly to build coastal fortifications in Sicily rather than be allowed any time to rest after their ordeal.
The continuing Allied air offensive against Italy and the build-up of resources in Tunisia indicated that an attack on Sardinia or Sicily was imminent and Ambrosio knew that Italy could no longer defend itself. The only options were to seek peace or to fall on Germany’s mercy. The Germans had the elements of three divisions already in Italy after supply issues prevented their transport to Tunisia and Hitler offered five more. The German dictator continued to prioritise the Eastern Front but accepted that only propping up his Italian ally would allow him to continue to do so.
Ambrosio instructed Mussolini to deny the German offer and demanded the German units already in Italy be placed directly under his command. He intended to keep them at arms length, split between Sardinia, Sicily and the mainland. Objectively Italy couldn’t hope to defend itself without German help but Ambrosio knew accepting it would undo the strategic autonomy he had hoped to foster and leave his country little more than a German puppet. Ambrosio sent a series of memorandums to the King laying out the perilousness of the strategic situation and recommending a way out of the war to ensure the survival of Italy and its monarchy.
The King, however, had not yet lost faith in Mussolini. Although shaken by Ambrosio’s candour and accepting audiences with all three shades of conspirators, Victor Emmanuel dithered and concluded that Italy had to find a way out of the war but that Mussolini was best placed to deliver it.
For Mussolini this was an impossible task, the Allies had made it clear that any peace would come at the expense of his regime but continuing the war would mean complete subordination to Germany. He was resigned to the fact that he had tied himself to Hitler’s fate though continued to search for a victory that would restore Italian prestige and cement the rejuvenation of his regime.
It could no longer come from the Army so instead he pinned his hopes on Italy’s most powerful weapon; her battle fleet.
---
Lictor
Lictor
The Regia Marina had long been the pride of Italy and a strong navalist movement predated Fascism. Italy had few resources and despite being a continental power was dependent on the Adriatic and Mediterranean sea lanes for most of her trade. As such a powerful navy had become vital to maintaining Italian independence. Although the Regia Marina had suffered from a lack of cohesion following Italian unification by the turn of the century it had developed a reputation as a modern innovative force, defeating first the Ottoman and then the Habsburg navies prior to the outbreak of global conflict.
By the end of the First World War, and the collapse of both empires, Italian control of the Adriatic sea seemed secure. Italian naval doctrine in the early interwar period focused on maintaining control of the Adriatic whilst promoting good relations with the United Kingdom. The Washington Naval Treaty ensured, at least on paper, that Italy would have parity with its main Mediterranean rival, France. This seemed to ensure Italy’s security to the liberal government but to the incoming Fascist regime it appeared to be an acceptance of Italy as a second rate power.
Development of the Regia Marina under Mussolini and his naval minister Giuseppe Sirianni was in line with the Fascist worldview of Italy as an emerging global power. The focus became on control over the Mediterranean rather than security within it . The Suez Canal was seen as the new nexus of power in the modern world, one which required partial or full Italian control in order for Italy to achieve its destiny of expansion in Northern and Eastern Africa. The same went for the Dardanelles, Gibraltar and Malta.
As early as 1926 it was envisaged that war with France and the United Kingdom might be required to realise these aims. Only five years earlier the Italian naval minister Giovanni Sechi had warned “Britain can bring us to our knees in one month, without employing a single infantryman.” Now Mussolini set Italy on a collision course on the basis of British overreach and decline. France was viewed as a modern Carthage in contrast to Mussolini’s New Rome.
Italy first circumvented the parameters of the Washington Naval Treaty before ignoring them outright to build a cutting edge battle fleet capable of realising the Fascist ‘Mare Nostrum’ worldview. Navalism was promoted aggressively by Mussolini’s regime. Ship launches became major events in coastal cities with the Fascist controlled Naval League organising banquets and ceremonies across Italy. Italian submarines circumnavigated Africa and cruisers visited Australia and Japan. These visits along with foreign delegations being encouraged to attend annual fleet reviews were designed to impress potential allies and enemies alike.
The centre-piece of Fascist naval expansion were the massive Littorio-class battleships, named after the first of its kind and in turn based on the Lictor guards who would ceremonially carry the Fasces in the days of Rome. In much the same way the Regia Marina was used to promote Fascist prestige but was not an extension of the regime itself. Although loyalty to Fascism was pursued aggressively in the naval academy, there remained uncertainty over Mussolini’s policy.
As it became clear that the likelihood of a conflict with the United Kingdom was increasing some officers sometimes expressed their concerns, only to be punished. Sailors and non-commissioned officers were occasionally found with communist propaganda leaflets they had received from dock workers, being in possession of such materials was punished severely.
Nonetheless morale in the Regia Marina was generally good and the officer class remained highly nationalistic and if not devoutly Fascist they enjoyed the esteem and prestige the regime showered upon them. Mussolini had built a powerful fleet to ensure future Italian glory but contemporary Italy had only been able to afford it at the expense of its army and industry. Neither had been ready when the war with France and the United Kingdom did come.
The Regia Marina had been in a much stronger position when the war arrived although it was immediately beset by setbacks. The surprising collapse of France had led Mussolini to declare war hastily. This opportunism meant that when Italy went to war a quarter of its merchant fleet was outside of the Mediterranean, stranded due to British control of Gibraltar and Suez. This hobbled Axis supply to the North African front before it had even begun.
Less than a fortnight after Italian entry France asked for an armistice and the French fleet was neutralised however in the Autumn the Italian battle fleet was severely damaged by bombs and torpedoes from British carrier aircraft. Italian naval doctrine had remained focused on battleships in the interwar era and now seaborne airpower came into its primacy the Regia Maria lacked any aircraft carriers. They had also been slow to develop effective marine radar. This left the fleet vulnerable at night or whenever it strayed too far from land based air fields.
Due to these vulnerabilities the Regia Maria had been unable to achieve the aim which the Fascist regime had set out for it. Rather than securing Italian dominance of the Mediterranean the primary focus of the Italian fleet instead became maintaining the supply routes to the North African front, something it was unable to ever fully accomplish due to their inability to neutralise the British-held island of Malta.
The Italians had never been able to bomb Malta heavily enough to force its surrender nor had its blockade been able to entirely starve the island of supplies despite the damage inflicted on Allied convoys. In the meantime the British blockade of Italy had left the Regia Marina entirely dependent on their German ally for fuel oil.
The Germans were not forthcoming as their own supplies diminished and soon the Regia Marina found most of its battle fleet effectively immobilised. The increasing dominance of Allied air supremacy had dealt a crippling blow against Italian escort vessels and inflicted heavy damage on the battle fleet at port. By June 1943 around half of the fleet's pre-war strength was sunk and half of the remainder were undergoing repairs.
The Regia Marina could still count on powerful units, particularly its Littorio battleships but these faced issues with a lack of destroyers available for escort as well as a lack of air cover. Allied air power had become so dominant that the battle fleet had been forced to relocate from Naples to its northern base at La Spezia which itself was the target of heavy Allied bombing.
Nonetheless the battle fleet remained the most powerful weapon at Italy’s disposal. It gave Allied planners pause for even a one-way sortie by the Regia Marina could prove devastating to any operation if they were to be underestimated. In this way the battle fleet continued to contribute to the Italian effort in a hypothetical sense, even though it had not made battle since the Summer of 1942.
The notion of being a glorified guard dog was not particularly heartening to those at Supermarina who previously had been told they were the new conquerors of the Mediterranean. Even before being replaced the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Angelo Iachino, had resolved that the battle fleet would need to act against any Allied invasion of Italy. If not for any strategic purpose then to maintain its honour.
This sentiment was welcomed by his replacement, once again Admiral Guiseppe Sirianni who had been mandated by Mussolini to reevaluate the purpose of Regia Marina as he had done in the twenties. The prestige of the navy had helped empower the Fascist regime in its infancy, now it would bring about its rejuvenation by finding glory at the bottom of the sea.
---
The Regia Marina had long been the pride of Italy and a strong navalist movement predated Fascism. Italy had few resources and despite being a continental power was dependent on the Adriatic and Mediterranean sea lanes for most of her trade. As such a powerful navy had become vital to maintaining Italian independence. Although the Regia Marina had suffered from a lack of cohesion following Italian unification by the turn of the century it had developed a reputation as a modern innovative force, defeating first the Ottoman and then the Habsburg navies prior to the outbreak of global conflict.
By the end of the First World War, and the collapse of both empires, Italian control of the Adriatic sea seemed secure. Italian naval doctrine in the early interwar period focused on maintaining control of the Adriatic whilst promoting good relations with the United Kingdom. The Washington Naval Treaty ensured, at least on paper, that Italy would have parity with its main Mediterranean rival, France. This seemed to ensure Italy’s security to the liberal government but to the incoming Fascist regime it appeared to be an acceptance of Italy as a second rate power.
Development of the Regia Marina under Mussolini and his naval minister Giuseppe Sirianni was in line with the Fascist worldview of Italy as an emerging global power. The focus became on control over the Mediterranean rather than security within it . The Suez Canal was seen as the new nexus of power in the modern world, one which required partial or full Italian control in order for Italy to achieve its destiny of expansion in Northern and Eastern Africa. The same went for the Dardanelles, Gibraltar and Malta.
As early as 1926 it was envisaged that war with France and the United Kingdom might be required to realise these aims. Only five years earlier the Italian naval minister Giovanni Sechi had warned “Britain can bring us to our knees in one month, without employing a single infantryman.” Now Mussolini set Italy on a collision course on the basis of British overreach and decline. France was viewed as a modern Carthage in contrast to Mussolini’s New Rome.
Italy first circumvented the parameters of the Washington Naval Treaty before ignoring them outright to build a cutting edge battle fleet capable of realising the Fascist ‘Mare Nostrum’ worldview. Navalism was promoted aggressively by Mussolini’s regime. Ship launches became major events in coastal cities with the Fascist controlled Naval League organising banquets and ceremonies across Italy. Italian submarines circumnavigated Africa and cruisers visited Australia and Japan. These visits along with foreign delegations being encouraged to attend annual fleet reviews were designed to impress potential allies and enemies alike.
The centre-piece of Fascist naval expansion were the massive Littorio-class battleships, named after the first of its kind and in turn based on the Lictor guards who would ceremonially carry the Fasces in the days of Rome. In much the same way the Regia Marina was used to promote Fascist prestige but was not an extension of the regime itself. Although loyalty to Fascism was pursued aggressively in the naval academy, there remained uncertainty over Mussolini’s policy.
As it became clear that the likelihood of a conflict with the United Kingdom was increasing some officers sometimes expressed their concerns, only to be punished. Sailors and non-commissioned officers were occasionally found with communist propaganda leaflets they had received from dock workers, being in possession of such materials was punished severely.
Nonetheless morale in the Regia Marina was generally good and the officer class remained highly nationalistic and if not devoutly Fascist they enjoyed the esteem and prestige the regime showered upon them. Mussolini had built a powerful fleet to ensure future Italian glory but contemporary Italy had only been able to afford it at the expense of its army and industry. Neither had been ready when the war with France and the United Kingdom did come.
The Regia Marina had been in a much stronger position when the war arrived although it was immediately beset by setbacks. The surprising collapse of France had led Mussolini to declare war hastily. This opportunism meant that when Italy went to war a quarter of its merchant fleet was outside of the Mediterranean, stranded due to British control of Gibraltar and Suez. This hobbled Axis supply to the North African front before it had even begun.
Less than a fortnight after Italian entry France asked for an armistice and the French fleet was neutralised however in the Autumn the Italian battle fleet was severely damaged by bombs and torpedoes from British carrier aircraft. Italian naval doctrine had remained focused on battleships in the interwar era and now seaborne airpower came into its primacy the Regia Maria lacked any aircraft carriers. They had also been slow to develop effective marine radar. This left the fleet vulnerable at night or whenever it strayed too far from land based air fields.
Due to these vulnerabilities the Regia Maria had been unable to achieve the aim which the Fascist regime had set out for it. Rather than securing Italian dominance of the Mediterranean the primary focus of the Italian fleet instead became maintaining the supply routes to the North African front, something it was unable to ever fully accomplish due to their inability to neutralise the British-held island of Malta.
The Italians had never been able to bomb Malta heavily enough to force its surrender nor had its blockade been able to entirely starve the island of supplies despite the damage inflicted on Allied convoys. In the meantime the British blockade of Italy had left the Regia Marina entirely dependent on their German ally for fuel oil.
The Germans were not forthcoming as their own supplies diminished and soon the Regia Marina found most of its battle fleet effectively immobilised. The increasing dominance of Allied air supremacy had dealt a crippling blow against Italian escort vessels and inflicted heavy damage on the battle fleet at port. By June 1943 around half of the fleet's pre-war strength was sunk and half of the remainder were undergoing repairs.
The Regia Marina could still count on powerful units, particularly its Littorio battleships but these faced issues with a lack of destroyers available for escort as well as a lack of air cover. Allied air power had become so dominant that the battle fleet had been forced to relocate from Naples to its northern base at La Spezia which itself was the target of heavy Allied bombing.
Nonetheless the battle fleet remained the most powerful weapon at Italy’s disposal. It gave Allied planners pause for even a one-way sortie by the Regia Marina could prove devastating to any operation if they were to be underestimated. In this way the battle fleet continued to contribute to the Italian effort in a hypothetical sense, even though it had not made battle since the Summer of 1942.
The notion of being a glorified guard dog was not particularly heartening to those at Supermarina who previously had been told they were the new conquerors of the Mediterranean. Even before being replaced the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Angelo Iachino, had resolved that the battle fleet would need to act against any Allied invasion of Italy. If not for any strategic purpose then to maintain its honour.
This sentiment was welcomed by his replacement, once again Admiral Guiseppe Sirianni who had been mandated by Mussolini to reevaluate the purpose of Regia Marina as he had done in the twenties. The prestige of the navy had helped empower the Fascist regime in its infancy, now it would bring about its rejuvenation by finding glory at the bottom of the sea.
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The Supreme Sacrifice
The Supreme Sacrifice
The return of Admiral Giuseppe Sirianni as Chief of Staff caused some disquiet amongst the officers of Supermarina who saw him not only as a political appointment but also a political imposition designed to bolster the influence of Fascism in the Regia Marina.
At 78 years old Sirianni may have not been the most obvious candidate to lead the ‘rejuvenation’ efforts within the Italian navy but Mussolini admired his drive. The Admiral, who had once struck fear into the French, would raise the political consciousness of Italy’s strongest remaining asset in preparation for the year of decision.
Sirianni railed against what he saw as a continued soft spot for the British which had never been truly eradicated even after three years of war and more than a decade of prior preparation. Shortly after his arrival he brought forward the anticipated promotion of Admiral Carlo Bergamini to commander of the Italian fleet. This was seen by many as a snub against his predecessor, Angelo Iachino, and raised questions as to who else Sirianni might consider to be an ‘Anglophile’ in need of replacement.
In reality Sirianni had been more impressed by Bergamini’s focus on the need for the Regia Marina to prepare to make greater sacrifices as Italy entered a new phase of the war. The issue of the lack of fuel oil which had plagued the fleet since 1940 had been improved somewhat after the dissolution of the Vichy French State allowed the reserves of the French fleet to be scavenged and the access to Tunisian ports improved the prospects of supplying Axis forces in North Africa.
Bergamini argued that this provided an opportunity for the Regia Marina to take control of the Strait of Sicily and in doing so maintain control of occupied Tunisia whilst also fending off the anticipated Allied landing in the Balkans. Instead, only weeks after Sirianni and Bergamini had embarked on this strategy, the situation in North Africa had rapidly deteriorated and with it Allied air dominance of Axis supply routes made Bergamini’s emphasis on sacrifice a necessity. Dozens of escorts were sunk before Italian losses became unsustainable and the remainder of the Axis forces on the African continent were left to wither.
With the head of the naval staff and the fleet of one mind a plan had been put in place to devote the fleet’s remaining strength towards a daring Tunisian Dunkirk which would have seen the remaining Italian armies rescued and returned home to fight another day. The risks involved gave many Italian naval officers pause and after Luftwaffe attempts to evacuate German forces in Tunisia from the air ended in a massacre and the Allied bombing of ports in southern Italy became an all-out offensive the project was sidelined.
Bergamini and Sirianni were instead forced to accept the need to evacuate the battle fleet to La Spezia with a smaller force of older battleships being relocated to Taranto. Bergamini had argued that ships at port were no safer from Allied planes than they were at sea but by the Spring of 1943 the damage from Allied bombing was so extensive that the battle fleet could no longer be stationed at Naples in spite of the commander’s protests that La Spezia was little safer. Allied bombings of La Spezia in April and June would prove this theory correct.
Supermarina now faced the prospect of an Allied invasion of Italy, one which its intelligence indicated would come against Sicily April with defeat in Tunisia imminent internal assessments were made of the Regia Marina’s ability to defend Italy against different potential Allied assaults. The conclusion was made that in the event of an Allied invasion of Corsica or Sardinia the battle fleet would be able to intervene but a landing against Sicily should not be contested in a major way unless an opportunity to inflict a devastating blow against Allied forces presented itself.
This conclusion offended Bergamini who protested to Sirianni who in turn dismissed the report. He argued the report reflected the way in which the battle fleet had become used to inactivity. Army General Mario Roatta who assumed command of all Italian units on Sicily, including those of the Navy, painted a grim picture of Sicilian defence with only naval units operating on a wartime footing. Roatta stated a large German contingent would be necessary for the defence of the island. Bergamini argued that if Sicily were to be lost then the fleet would be entirely exposed to Allied air attack whilst the Allied fleets would be able to sortie from Sicily and attack the Italian coast at a moment’s notice. Moreover, entrusting the battle fleet with being Italy’s first line of defence would fit in better with the need to retain Italian strategic independence which Comando Supremo had been tasked with.
Sirianni concurred. Beyond that the old Fascist took exception to the notion of abandoning Sicily to its fate, unfavourably comparing detractors to the Italian premier Victor Orlando who had resolved to retreat to Sicily if necessary to continue the struggle against the Central Powers. “Are we officers of the Regia Maria less patriotic than Orlando the Mafiosi?” Sirriani asked at a meeting of the Comando Supremo. This resolve pleased Mussolini. An alternative plan submitted by Admiral Raffaele de Courten that the battle fleet might maintain its safety by retreating to Toulon in the event of Sicily falling led to him being sacked.
A visit by Admiral Karl Doenitz, the new Chief of the German Kriegsmarine, to Rome in May received a warm reception from Sirianni. Doenitz appreciated his counterpart’s ideological dedication and returned to report to Hitler that he was confident the Italians would fight to the end. He was impressed by their commitment to Sicily but expressed his own belief that the next Allied move would be made against Greece or Sardinia in line with information that German military intelligence had gleaned from documents carried by an apparent British marine officer whose plane had crashed off of the coast of Spain.
Whilst the Supermarina were also making preparations for a potential Allied invasion of Sardinia, their own intelligence continued to indicate that Sicily was the target. Even as Doenitz departed from Rome the island was under continuous attack from the air. A landing appeared imminent.
With Mussolini having given his blessing to Sirianni’s arguments, Italian naval planners now made their preparations to bring as much strength as possible to meet an Allied invasion fleet several times larger than anything they could bring to bear. Many resolved themselves to a one-way trip for the honour of the Regia Marina.
In the meantime Allied air power continued to deplete the battle fleet’s remaining strength at port, and the morale of the Italian sailor along with it.
---
The return of Admiral Giuseppe Sirianni as Chief of Staff caused some disquiet amongst the officers of Supermarina who saw him not only as a political appointment but also a political imposition designed to bolster the influence of Fascism in the Regia Marina.
At 78 years old Sirianni may have not been the most obvious candidate to lead the ‘rejuvenation’ efforts within the Italian navy but Mussolini admired his drive. The Admiral, who had once struck fear into the French, would raise the political consciousness of Italy’s strongest remaining asset in preparation for the year of decision.
Sirianni railed against what he saw as a continued soft spot for the British which had never been truly eradicated even after three years of war and more than a decade of prior preparation. Shortly after his arrival he brought forward the anticipated promotion of Admiral Carlo Bergamini to commander of the Italian fleet. This was seen by many as a snub against his predecessor, Angelo Iachino, and raised questions as to who else Sirianni might consider to be an ‘Anglophile’ in need of replacement.
In reality Sirianni had been more impressed by Bergamini’s focus on the need for the Regia Marina to prepare to make greater sacrifices as Italy entered a new phase of the war. The issue of the lack of fuel oil which had plagued the fleet since 1940 had been improved somewhat after the dissolution of the Vichy French State allowed the reserves of the French fleet to be scavenged and the access to Tunisian ports improved the prospects of supplying Axis forces in North Africa.
Bergamini argued that this provided an opportunity for the Regia Marina to take control of the Strait of Sicily and in doing so maintain control of occupied Tunisia whilst also fending off the anticipated Allied landing in the Balkans. Instead, only weeks after Sirianni and Bergamini had embarked on this strategy, the situation in North Africa had rapidly deteriorated and with it Allied air dominance of Axis supply routes made Bergamini’s emphasis on sacrifice a necessity. Dozens of escorts were sunk before Italian losses became unsustainable and the remainder of the Axis forces on the African continent were left to wither.
With the head of the naval staff and the fleet of one mind a plan had been put in place to devote the fleet’s remaining strength towards a daring Tunisian Dunkirk which would have seen the remaining Italian armies rescued and returned home to fight another day. The risks involved gave many Italian naval officers pause and after Luftwaffe attempts to evacuate German forces in Tunisia from the air ended in a massacre and the Allied bombing of ports in southern Italy became an all-out offensive the project was sidelined.
Bergamini and Sirianni were instead forced to accept the need to evacuate the battle fleet to La Spezia with a smaller force of older battleships being relocated to Taranto. Bergamini had argued that ships at port were no safer from Allied planes than they were at sea but by the Spring of 1943 the damage from Allied bombing was so extensive that the battle fleet could no longer be stationed at Naples in spite of the commander’s protests that La Spezia was little safer. Allied bombings of La Spezia in April and June would prove this theory correct.
Supermarina now faced the prospect of an Allied invasion of Italy, one which its intelligence indicated would come against Sicily April with defeat in Tunisia imminent internal assessments were made of the Regia Marina’s ability to defend Italy against different potential Allied assaults. The conclusion was made that in the event of an Allied invasion of Corsica or Sardinia the battle fleet would be able to intervene but a landing against Sicily should not be contested in a major way unless an opportunity to inflict a devastating blow against Allied forces presented itself.
This conclusion offended Bergamini who protested to Sirianni who in turn dismissed the report. He argued the report reflected the way in which the battle fleet had become used to inactivity. Army General Mario Roatta who assumed command of all Italian units on Sicily, including those of the Navy, painted a grim picture of Sicilian defence with only naval units operating on a wartime footing. Roatta stated a large German contingent would be necessary for the defence of the island. Bergamini argued that if Sicily were to be lost then the fleet would be entirely exposed to Allied air attack whilst the Allied fleets would be able to sortie from Sicily and attack the Italian coast at a moment’s notice. Moreover, entrusting the battle fleet with being Italy’s first line of defence would fit in better with the need to retain Italian strategic independence which Comando Supremo had been tasked with.
Sirianni concurred. Beyond that the old Fascist took exception to the notion of abandoning Sicily to its fate, unfavourably comparing detractors to the Italian premier Victor Orlando who had resolved to retreat to Sicily if necessary to continue the struggle against the Central Powers. “Are we officers of the Regia Maria less patriotic than Orlando the Mafiosi?” Sirriani asked at a meeting of the Comando Supremo. This resolve pleased Mussolini. An alternative plan submitted by Admiral Raffaele de Courten that the battle fleet might maintain its safety by retreating to Toulon in the event of Sicily falling led to him being sacked.
A visit by Admiral Karl Doenitz, the new Chief of the German Kriegsmarine, to Rome in May received a warm reception from Sirianni. Doenitz appreciated his counterpart’s ideological dedication and returned to report to Hitler that he was confident the Italians would fight to the end. He was impressed by their commitment to Sicily but expressed his own belief that the next Allied move would be made against Greece or Sardinia in line with information that German military intelligence had gleaned from documents carried by an apparent British marine officer whose plane had crashed off of the coast of Spain.
Whilst the Supermarina were also making preparations for a potential Allied invasion of Sardinia, their own intelligence continued to indicate that Sicily was the target. Even as Doenitz departed from Rome the island was under continuous attack from the air. A landing appeared imminent.
With Mussolini having given his blessing to Sirianni’s arguments, Italian naval planners now made their preparations to bring as much strength as possible to meet an Allied invasion fleet several times larger than anything they could bring to bear. Many resolved themselves to a one-way trip for the honour of the Regia Marina.
In the meantime Allied air power continued to deplete the battle fleet’s remaining strength at port, and the morale of the Italian sailor along with it.
---
Well bad for operation Husky, while i not doubt his success it will be more costly and at least Regia Marina will go down with a bang and with honor, sure it will cost thousands of lifes but honor for the service and the party will be preserved (yes is sarcasm)...what a idiotic mess
Corkscrew
Corkscrew
In early June two waves of more than a hundred American B-17 bombers struck La Spezia Naval Base during the day. The high explosive bombs seriously damaged two of the Littorio class battleships, Roma and Vittorio Veneto alongside the base’s shore installations.
The attack left Supermarina shaken both by the ease with which the American raiders had been able to attack and the damage inflicted. Insufficient radar coverage had allowed the Americans to achieve complete surprise, anti-aircraft fire from land and sea had been ineffective, the handful of aircraft the Regia Aeronautica sent up to face the enemy had met similarly poor results.
The damage to Roma and Vittorio Veneto left the remainder of the battle fleet without two of its most powerful units with only one operational Littorio remaining. Bergamini was validated in his warnings about the fleet being little safer in port than on the open sea but now his plan of using the battle fleet as the first line of defence against Allied invasion had been seriously undermined. Nonetheless Sirianni did not waver from viewing the battle fleet as essential to defending against any Allied invasion and remained adamant that whatever units available at the time would be employed if it came.
The Fascist Admiral made this assurance to curb any potential lapse into inaction that might have been brought about by the American raid but also to emphasise the need to recover from it. Supermarina estimated that the damage to Vittorio Veneto could be fixed at the end of the month and Roma by the end of July. The crews of both ships found themselves being broken up, some would stay in La Spezia while the damaged battleships travelled to Genoa further up the coast and still considered safe from Allied bombs. Others were sent to act as crews for Italy’s dreadnought battleships in Taranto.
The First World War-era ships lacked the mobility of their modern counterparts but they remained dangerous and at the very least would force the Allies to divide their own forces in dealing with them, distracting them from the real danger. Workers at the Genoa dry dock had their working days extended to hasten the repair of the more modern units with the entire workforce of the dry dock running night and day shifts. To assist in this Allied prisoners were marched into Genoa from Fossoli POW camp to “help repair the damage they had done.”
The workers and sailors at La Spezia were under similar orders to repair the damage to the shoreline for the return of the two Littorios. The entire base became shrouded in smoke during the day, in an attempt to prevent any more daylight raids from achieving the same accuracy. It was made clear that an invasion may be imminent and that Italy would need every ship it could get.
The need for urgency was not unfounded, a few days after American bombs had struck La Spezia, the Italian island of Pantelleria along with the rest of the Pelagie Islands surrendered. Pantelleria lay in the Strait of Sicily less than 50 miles from the island and had been under constant blockade and bombardment since the fall of Tunisia. The mountainous island’s caves provided an effective defence against the bombs and shells but the island lacked reliable access to fresh water and there was insufficient food for the island’s civilian population and naval garrison.
What Italy had failed to bring about in Malta was now being inflicted on Italians. Pantelleria’s small Carthiginian harbour was cut off by Allied air patrols during the day, leaving only a handful of supplies to get through by braving the naval blockade at night. Constant air attacks on the island’s communications, power plant and road network made distribution of these scant resources almost impossible. May became June and the daily air raids became hourly, civilians and soldiers alike were subjected to a subterranean existence of darkness, hunger and thirst, unable to sleep or rest from the constant barrage above.
Under these conditions demoralisation came easily. Much of the Italian garrison were natives of the island and had little interest in their home being turned into a battlefield with their families trapped in the middle. Supermarina had refused to evacuate civilians from the island and along with much of the garrison they now felt abandoned to face an Allied invasion they weren’t equipped for.
Fascist propaganda had boasted throughout the war that Pantelleria was a powerful fortress bristling with aircraft and guns. On the 8th of June the Italian people heard that the Allied bombardment had failed to break the defenders and that the island would be held to the last. Three days later Admiral Gino Pavesi, Pantelleria’s military commander, concluded the situation was untenable. Due to the smoke from the constant bombing Pavesi had been unaware of the Allied invasion fleet approaching the shore when he informed Supermarina of the need to avoid a bloodbath. A response was still being considered in Rome when the smoke cleared and British troops landed to the sight of numerous white flags.
The fall of Pantelleria served to further worsen the morale of the Italian public. Three days after having been assured it would hold on until the end the seemingly impregnable fortress had surrendered without the defenders firing a shot. Fascist propaganda excused the surrender as having been due to a lack of water on the island but many Italians began to wonder whether it was a harbinger of the sort of military collapse an Allied invasion of the mainland would bring. For most Italians who were already war weary it became a question of when the war did end whether it would mean chaos or salvation for Italy.
The loss of the island had a profound effect on the morale of the Regia Marina. Supermarina had hoped for a protracted defence of the island in order to buy time for the battle fleet to lick its wounds. Instead an Italian Admiral had gone rogue and surrendered the island without a fight. To his fellow officers this was a source of great embarrassment and Bergamini made a fiery speech to the assembled crews at La Spezia where he denounced Pavesi as a stain on the Regia Marina which they would wipe clean with their heroism.
To add insult to injury, 50 British Lancaster bombers struck Genoa at dusk less than a fortnight after Pavesi’s surrender, further damaging Roma and Vittorio Veneto. It was now estimated neither ship would be seaworthy in August. It was time the Regia Marina did not have although the extent of the damage was suppressed. Devoted as Supermarina was to making battle with the Allied fleets, reality gave way to honour.
To many sailors at La Spezia, shrouded in smoke much like their comrades in Pantelleria had been, it was easy to empathise with Pavesi. Here was a ‘traitor’ who had opted to spare the lives of his men and civilians rather than fight an unwinnable battle. Although conditions were nowhere near as bad on the base compared with the island, long hours of hard labour on shore installations and a lack of real daylight proved demoralising enough on their own.
Many wondered what their reaction might be when called upon to make their own pointless sacrifice.
---
In early June two waves of more than a hundred American B-17 bombers struck La Spezia Naval Base during the day. The high explosive bombs seriously damaged two of the Littorio class battleships, Roma and Vittorio Veneto alongside the base’s shore installations.
The attack left Supermarina shaken both by the ease with which the American raiders had been able to attack and the damage inflicted. Insufficient radar coverage had allowed the Americans to achieve complete surprise, anti-aircraft fire from land and sea had been ineffective, the handful of aircraft the Regia Aeronautica sent up to face the enemy had met similarly poor results.
The damage to Roma and Vittorio Veneto left the remainder of the battle fleet without two of its most powerful units with only one operational Littorio remaining. Bergamini was validated in his warnings about the fleet being little safer in port than on the open sea but now his plan of using the battle fleet as the first line of defence against Allied invasion had been seriously undermined. Nonetheless Sirianni did not waver from viewing the battle fleet as essential to defending against any Allied invasion and remained adamant that whatever units available at the time would be employed if it came.
The Fascist Admiral made this assurance to curb any potential lapse into inaction that might have been brought about by the American raid but also to emphasise the need to recover from it. Supermarina estimated that the damage to Vittorio Veneto could be fixed at the end of the month and Roma by the end of July. The crews of both ships found themselves being broken up, some would stay in La Spezia while the damaged battleships travelled to Genoa further up the coast and still considered safe from Allied bombs. Others were sent to act as crews for Italy’s dreadnought battleships in Taranto.
The First World War-era ships lacked the mobility of their modern counterparts but they remained dangerous and at the very least would force the Allies to divide their own forces in dealing with them, distracting them from the real danger. Workers at the Genoa dry dock had their working days extended to hasten the repair of the more modern units with the entire workforce of the dry dock running night and day shifts. To assist in this Allied prisoners were marched into Genoa from Fossoli POW camp to “help repair the damage they had done.”
The workers and sailors at La Spezia were under similar orders to repair the damage to the shoreline for the return of the two Littorios. The entire base became shrouded in smoke during the day, in an attempt to prevent any more daylight raids from achieving the same accuracy. It was made clear that an invasion may be imminent and that Italy would need every ship it could get.
The need for urgency was not unfounded, a few days after American bombs had struck La Spezia, the Italian island of Pantelleria along with the rest of the Pelagie Islands surrendered. Pantelleria lay in the Strait of Sicily less than 50 miles from the island and had been under constant blockade and bombardment since the fall of Tunisia. The mountainous island’s caves provided an effective defence against the bombs and shells but the island lacked reliable access to fresh water and there was insufficient food for the island’s civilian population and naval garrison.
What Italy had failed to bring about in Malta was now being inflicted on Italians. Pantelleria’s small Carthiginian harbour was cut off by Allied air patrols during the day, leaving only a handful of supplies to get through by braving the naval blockade at night. Constant air attacks on the island’s communications, power plant and road network made distribution of these scant resources almost impossible. May became June and the daily air raids became hourly, civilians and soldiers alike were subjected to a subterranean existence of darkness, hunger and thirst, unable to sleep or rest from the constant barrage above.
Under these conditions demoralisation came easily. Much of the Italian garrison were natives of the island and had little interest in their home being turned into a battlefield with their families trapped in the middle. Supermarina had refused to evacuate civilians from the island and along with much of the garrison they now felt abandoned to face an Allied invasion they weren’t equipped for.
Fascist propaganda had boasted throughout the war that Pantelleria was a powerful fortress bristling with aircraft and guns. On the 8th of June the Italian people heard that the Allied bombardment had failed to break the defenders and that the island would be held to the last. Three days later Admiral Gino Pavesi, Pantelleria’s military commander, concluded the situation was untenable. Due to the smoke from the constant bombing Pavesi had been unaware of the Allied invasion fleet approaching the shore when he informed Supermarina of the need to avoid a bloodbath. A response was still being considered in Rome when the smoke cleared and British troops landed to the sight of numerous white flags.
The fall of Pantelleria served to further worsen the morale of the Italian public. Three days after having been assured it would hold on until the end the seemingly impregnable fortress had surrendered without the defenders firing a shot. Fascist propaganda excused the surrender as having been due to a lack of water on the island but many Italians began to wonder whether it was a harbinger of the sort of military collapse an Allied invasion of the mainland would bring. For most Italians who were already war weary it became a question of when the war did end whether it would mean chaos or salvation for Italy.
The loss of the island had a profound effect on the morale of the Regia Marina. Supermarina had hoped for a protracted defence of the island in order to buy time for the battle fleet to lick its wounds. Instead an Italian Admiral had gone rogue and surrendered the island without a fight. To his fellow officers this was a source of great embarrassment and Bergamini made a fiery speech to the assembled crews at La Spezia where he denounced Pavesi as a stain on the Regia Marina which they would wipe clean with their heroism.
To add insult to injury, 50 British Lancaster bombers struck Genoa at dusk less than a fortnight after Pavesi’s surrender, further damaging Roma and Vittorio Veneto. It was now estimated neither ship would be seaworthy in August. It was time the Regia Marina did not have although the extent of the damage was suppressed. Devoted as Supermarina was to making battle with the Allied fleets, reality gave way to honour.
To many sailors at La Spezia, shrouded in smoke much like their comrades in Pantelleria had been, it was easy to empathise with Pavesi. Here was a ‘traitor’ who had opted to spare the lives of his men and civilians rather than fight an unwinnable battle. Although conditions were nowhere near as bad on the base compared with the island, long hours of hard labour on shore installations and a lack of real daylight proved demoralising enough on their own.
Many wondered what their reaction might be when called upon to make their own pointless sacrifice.
---
Autarchia
Autarchia
On the 25th of June, with fires still burning in Genoa, Ambrosio and Mussolini received a visiting Japanese delegation. Mussolini had long held up the alliance with Japan with great optimism, their string of conquests and tenacity in defence of them being a great source of confidence for him even though their entry into the war had also forced Italy into war against the United States. However his guests provided little comfort on this occasion, stating candidly that Japanese raids into the Indian ocean would not be an option in 1943 nor would they be able to provide any of the strategic raw materials the Italians requested.
Moreover the Japanese were blunt about the Italian strategic situation, arguing that Italy must move to a total war economy and contribute more to the overall Axis war effort. Mussolini reassured the delegation that steps were already being taken to fully mobilise Italian strength to deal a decisive blow against the enemy.
The Anglo-Americans may have been successful in Africa but they had now trapped themselves strategically, being forced into attempting a landing in Europe. Surely, this would be a debacle as bloody as the American offensives in the Pacific? If the invasion came against Italian territory the Allied troops might land but the Regia Marina battle fleet would destroy their convoys before Italian troops emerged from the mountains to drive them back into the sea.
The United Kingdom showed signs of exhaustion and the people of the United States were losing faith in the war having been unprepared for the privations of rationing. A failed invasion of Europe would leave them at a strategic impasse and worsen morale even further, perhaps to the breaking point.
It’s hard to determine to what extent Mussolini believed this fantasy. To a certain extent he had to, as a victory against the Anglo-Americans was the only way he could hope to find a way out of the war which didn’t mean the end of his regime. The Japanese ambassador, Shinrokuro Hidaka, would state later that Mussolini at this time would often appear agitated and confused, slipping in and out of reality.
There was also perhaps a degree of projection in Mussolini’s claims about Allied morale, for the Italian people were long past exhaustion. In June meat was taken off of the ration with the remaining allotment providing less than a 1000 calories. Rations for industrial workers were slightly higher however they compensated little for the increased hours demanded by the attempts to replace the loss of armaments from the disasters of Stalingrad and Tunisia or Blackshirt efforts to root out Communists on the factory floor.
Street fights between factory workers and Blackshirts became a common sight in the streets of northern Italian cities and towns for the first time since the twenties. The pervasiveness of the black market and the criminal enterprises it emboldened added to a sense of looming chaos. Much of Italy’s urban population who had family in the countryside returned there for better food security and an escape from Allied bombing although the collapse of fertiliser production left farmers dreading a failed harvest. Famine beckoned.
For those workers still within northern cities the Allied attacks on the Italian rail network and its subsequent takeover for military traffic proved to be as effective as strikes in grinding production to a halt. Extended shifts were often spent sitting idle and hungry waiting for this or that to arrive and contemplating getting home without being jumped by Fascist paramilitaries.
Morale was also being raised as an issue within the National Fascist Party. The Party Secretary Carlo Scorza reported that roughly one in ten Italians were party members but warned that those numbers held “no absolute value if they do not represent spirit and will.” His predecessor in the role, Roberto Farinacci, lamented that the party was “absent and impotent.” Scorza attacked much of the party membership and leadership for being opportunists who had joined for personal gain with no belief in Fascism.
Scorza recommended revitalising the party by gutting its membership of these opportunists, leaving only the Old Fighters such as himself who had been present at the party’s inception and the young Blackshirts attempting to reassert the party’s authority in the streets. Mussolini gave tacit approval to these calls for a purge which in turn helped galvanise support for Grandi’s anti-Mussolini conspirators within the party.
The Communists were not so apprehensive about their membership. Since the initial success of the March strikes had ended in a bloody suppression the PCI had grown in strength and influence, particularly within the plants and dockyards which had participated in the March action. The demand then had been focused on a bonus for workers, next time it would be for the end of the war, the end of Fascism, and the end of hunger; Peace, Freedom and Bread.
By June the PCI had accumulated a stockpile of ammunition, small arms and explosives with a few hundred fighters who had some form of experience or training; however their real strength was invested in urban workers as a whole. The Easter Sunday action had failed because too many sympathetic to their causes had been fearful of Fascist retaliation and they had been vindicated by the subsequent massacres. If the Communists could cut off the Fascist head however the workers of northern Italy would come out in support. Preparations continued in anticipation for the instigating event, expected to be the coming collapse of food distribution.
Ambrosio at the same time continued to look for a way out of the war which kept something of the existing Italian Kingdom intact, with or without Mussolini. The fall of Pantelleria had left him shaken and although Mussolini had declared that if the Allied invaders wanted to occupy Italian soil they would have to do so in a vertical position, his Chief of Staff knew that conditions on Sicily were little better for the Italian defenders than they had been for Pavesi’s men.
Like Pantelleria, Sicily had been under constant aerial attack and blockade since May. The Axis air forces on the island had lost more than half of their strength attempting to maintain control of its skies and most of the remainder were forced to evacuate. Only a quarter for the necessary supplies the island required were getting through causing civilians to wander the countryside for miles in search of food despite fears of being strafed by roaming Spitfires. As the weeks went by much of civilian life carried on underground in crowded shelters; after the fall of Pantelleria the air raid sirens rang day and night.
General Alfredo Guzzoni arrived in Sicily at the start of June to take over command of armed forces on the island. Though he had never visited the island before he was quick to ascertain the dreadful state of morale, including amongst his own troops. Although Guzzoni insisted he was not above shooting soldiers who refused to fight, he complained of chronic shortages of ammunition, fuel and modern weaponry.
The patchwork organisation of Army, Navy, Fascist militia and Germans which made up the defenders of the island had been organised into a central Sicilian Armed Forces Command however most of the 200,000 Italian defenders consisted of coastal units; poorly trained older men and young boys drafted to defend their homes. Guzzoni’s plan of defence relied upon these units sacrificing themselves to hold off the Allied invasion long enough for his two motorised divisions to arrive and drive them back into the sea. The armour they were to do this with consisted entirely of obsolete French tanks.
Guzzoni estimated he could repel one Allied landing but would not be able to stop a second. Ambrosio attempted to bolster the defence of Sicily by concentrating the German forces already within Italy there. He went as far as to consider requesting as many German divisions as possible for the defence of the Italian mainland, undermining his bid for strategic independence, but was persuaded against this by the determination of the Regia Marina to make battle against any Allied landing and by the warnings of Giuseppe Castellano who pointed out that if Italy were to detach itself from the war it would be best that there were as few Germans as possible to kick out.
The Army conspiracy continued to lay the groundwork for removing Mussolini, with the reliably anti-German General Giacomo Carboni being placed in control of Italian forces around Rome. If the order came Carboni could take control of the capital and deter any Fascist or German response. Ambrosio dithered, wary of going against the King he had sworn to obey, who in turn remained confident that Mussolini was still the best man to clean up his own mess.
Ambrosio muddled on, working to manifest Mussolini’s fantasies whilst preparing for them to collide with reality. Like all of his opponents, systemic or otherwise, he prepared not only for the end of Mussolini but how Berlin would react.
Unlike the Japanese, Germany was an ally who was all too happy to lend a hand.
On the 25th of June, with fires still burning in Genoa, Ambrosio and Mussolini received a visiting Japanese delegation. Mussolini had long held up the alliance with Japan with great optimism, their string of conquests and tenacity in defence of them being a great source of confidence for him even though their entry into the war had also forced Italy into war against the United States. However his guests provided little comfort on this occasion, stating candidly that Japanese raids into the Indian ocean would not be an option in 1943 nor would they be able to provide any of the strategic raw materials the Italians requested.
Moreover the Japanese were blunt about the Italian strategic situation, arguing that Italy must move to a total war economy and contribute more to the overall Axis war effort. Mussolini reassured the delegation that steps were already being taken to fully mobilise Italian strength to deal a decisive blow against the enemy.
The Anglo-Americans may have been successful in Africa but they had now trapped themselves strategically, being forced into attempting a landing in Europe. Surely, this would be a debacle as bloody as the American offensives in the Pacific? If the invasion came against Italian territory the Allied troops might land but the Regia Marina battle fleet would destroy their convoys before Italian troops emerged from the mountains to drive them back into the sea.
The United Kingdom showed signs of exhaustion and the people of the United States were losing faith in the war having been unprepared for the privations of rationing. A failed invasion of Europe would leave them at a strategic impasse and worsen morale even further, perhaps to the breaking point.
It’s hard to determine to what extent Mussolini believed this fantasy. To a certain extent he had to, as a victory against the Anglo-Americans was the only way he could hope to find a way out of the war which didn’t mean the end of his regime. The Japanese ambassador, Shinrokuro Hidaka, would state later that Mussolini at this time would often appear agitated and confused, slipping in and out of reality.
There was also perhaps a degree of projection in Mussolini’s claims about Allied morale, for the Italian people were long past exhaustion. In June meat was taken off of the ration with the remaining allotment providing less than a 1000 calories. Rations for industrial workers were slightly higher however they compensated little for the increased hours demanded by the attempts to replace the loss of armaments from the disasters of Stalingrad and Tunisia or Blackshirt efforts to root out Communists on the factory floor.
Street fights between factory workers and Blackshirts became a common sight in the streets of northern Italian cities and towns for the first time since the twenties. The pervasiveness of the black market and the criminal enterprises it emboldened added to a sense of looming chaos. Much of Italy’s urban population who had family in the countryside returned there for better food security and an escape from Allied bombing although the collapse of fertiliser production left farmers dreading a failed harvest. Famine beckoned.
For those workers still within northern cities the Allied attacks on the Italian rail network and its subsequent takeover for military traffic proved to be as effective as strikes in grinding production to a halt. Extended shifts were often spent sitting idle and hungry waiting for this or that to arrive and contemplating getting home without being jumped by Fascist paramilitaries.
Morale was also being raised as an issue within the National Fascist Party. The Party Secretary Carlo Scorza reported that roughly one in ten Italians were party members but warned that those numbers held “no absolute value if they do not represent spirit and will.” His predecessor in the role, Roberto Farinacci, lamented that the party was “absent and impotent.” Scorza attacked much of the party membership and leadership for being opportunists who had joined for personal gain with no belief in Fascism.
Scorza recommended revitalising the party by gutting its membership of these opportunists, leaving only the Old Fighters such as himself who had been present at the party’s inception and the young Blackshirts attempting to reassert the party’s authority in the streets. Mussolini gave tacit approval to these calls for a purge which in turn helped galvanise support for Grandi’s anti-Mussolini conspirators within the party.
The Communists were not so apprehensive about their membership. Since the initial success of the March strikes had ended in a bloody suppression the PCI had grown in strength and influence, particularly within the plants and dockyards which had participated in the March action. The demand then had been focused on a bonus for workers, next time it would be for the end of the war, the end of Fascism, and the end of hunger; Peace, Freedom and Bread.
By June the PCI had accumulated a stockpile of ammunition, small arms and explosives with a few hundred fighters who had some form of experience or training; however their real strength was invested in urban workers as a whole. The Easter Sunday action had failed because too many sympathetic to their causes had been fearful of Fascist retaliation and they had been vindicated by the subsequent massacres. If the Communists could cut off the Fascist head however the workers of northern Italy would come out in support. Preparations continued in anticipation for the instigating event, expected to be the coming collapse of food distribution.
Ambrosio at the same time continued to look for a way out of the war which kept something of the existing Italian Kingdom intact, with or without Mussolini. The fall of Pantelleria had left him shaken and although Mussolini had declared that if the Allied invaders wanted to occupy Italian soil they would have to do so in a vertical position, his Chief of Staff knew that conditions on Sicily were little better for the Italian defenders than they had been for Pavesi’s men.
Like Pantelleria, Sicily had been under constant aerial attack and blockade since May. The Axis air forces on the island had lost more than half of their strength attempting to maintain control of its skies and most of the remainder were forced to evacuate. Only a quarter for the necessary supplies the island required were getting through causing civilians to wander the countryside for miles in search of food despite fears of being strafed by roaming Spitfires. As the weeks went by much of civilian life carried on underground in crowded shelters; after the fall of Pantelleria the air raid sirens rang day and night.
General Alfredo Guzzoni arrived in Sicily at the start of June to take over command of armed forces on the island. Though he had never visited the island before he was quick to ascertain the dreadful state of morale, including amongst his own troops. Although Guzzoni insisted he was not above shooting soldiers who refused to fight, he complained of chronic shortages of ammunition, fuel and modern weaponry.
The patchwork organisation of Army, Navy, Fascist militia and Germans which made up the defenders of the island had been organised into a central Sicilian Armed Forces Command however most of the 200,000 Italian defenders consisted of coastal units; poorly trained older men and young boys drafted to defend their homes. Guzzoni’s plan of defence relied upon these units sacrificing themselves to hold off the Allied invasion long enough for his two motorised divisions to arrive and drive them back into the sea. The armour they were to do this with consisted entirely of obsolete French tanks.
Guzzoni estimated he could repel one Allied landing but would not be able to stop a second. Ambrosio attempted to bolster the defence of Sicily by concentrating the German forces already within Italy there. He went as far as to consider requesting as many German divisions as possible for the defence of the Italian mainland, undermining his bid for strategic independence, but was persuaded against this by the determination of the Regia Marina to make battle against any Allied landing and by the warnings of Giuseppe Castellano who pointed out that if Italy were to detach itself from the war it would be best that there were as few Germans as possible to kick out.
The Army conspiracy continued to lay the groundwork for removing Mussolini, with the reliably anti-German General Giacomo Carboni being placed in control of Italian forces around Rome. If the order came Carboni could take control of the capital and deter any Fascist or German response. Ambrosio dithered, wary of going against the King he had sworn to obey, who in turn remained confident that Mussolini was still the best man to clean up his own mess.
Ambrosio muddled on, working to manifest Mussolini’s fantasies whilst preparing for them to collide with reality. Like all of his opponents, systemic or otherwise, he prepared not only for the end of Mussolini but how Berlin would react.
Unlike the Japanese, Germany was an ally who was all too happy to lend a hand.
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Well less german forces in Italy and the army more ready to fight them, maybe and i say maybe can give to the italian government a shot in exit the war in a better way than OTL
Alaric
Alaric
German doubts about the stability of their Italian ally had been festering even as the Fascist regime celebrated its twentieth year.
In November 1942, Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering who was second only to Hitler in the Nazi regime had made a visit to Rome. It was there where he had made a positive response to Mussolini’s proposals to end the war in the Soviet Union, encouraging the Italian dictator in turn to send his Foreign Secretary and the Chief of Staff to plead with Hitler. At the end of the visit Goering expressed grave doubts to Berlin about what might happen should Mussolini be incapacitated by illness.
Hitler had been distracted by the disaster unfolding at Stalingrad over the winter of 1942/43 but shortly after dismissing his Italian visitors he began to make plans for pursuing the war in the Mediterranean if Mussolini were to fall. The German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring had coordinated Wehrmacht activities in Italy since the end of 1941. At the beginning of 1943 Hitler had all German forces in the Mediterranean placed under Kesselring’s control. Just as Ambrosio and Mussolini sought to distance Italy from German influence, Hitler was detaching his troops from Comando Supremo. Kesselring would continue to defer to Italian command but Berlin now had a direct line to the theatre which bypassed Rome.
Kesselring had a high regard for Mussolini and, unlike Hitler, for the Italian people as a whole but he was aware of the sorry state of the Italian military and how vulnerable Italy was to potential Allied invasion. He had successfully lobbied Hitler to offer five divisions to assist in Italy’s defence only for Mussolini to reject the offer on Ambrosio’s advice. The Chief of Staff of Comando Supremo and his supposed German subordinate would continue to butt heads over the number and positioning of German forces in Italy throughout the Spring; Ambrosio only wanted weapons, Kesselring insisted on troops coming along with them. In Berlin paranoia grew about an impending Fascist collapse.
Ambrosio’s insistence on strategic independence, the wave of strikes, and the rumours of conspiracies against Mussolini convinced many within Hitler’s inner circle that the Italians; whether it be Ambrosio, the King or Mussolini himself, could not be trusted. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel argued that Germany should occupy the north of the country in order to protect German forces in the south against Italian duplicity. The industry and strategic location of the Po Valley were also seen as essential for the continuation of the German war effort.
Hitler remained unconvinced, he had been critical of Mussolini’s initial inaction against the March strike wave but was heartened when it culminated in brutal suppression by the Blackshirts. The report made by Admiral Doenitz of the high morale of the Regia Marina and how their untapped strength would be brought to bear against any enemy invasion gave him additional cause for optimism.
Furthermore Hitler remained fixated on the Eastern Front and the new weapons to be deployed there. After the situation in the Soviet Union stabilised in March Hitler had continued to ignore Mussolini’s requests to negotiate with Moscow, or at the very least remain on the defensive. On the contrary he had authorised a new offensive that would turn the odds back in Germany’s favour, one which he would remain committed to despite delays and occasional doubts as the new German heavy tanks waited to be unleashed.
With his mind occupied, Hitler found it gratifying to believe the assurances that the Italian situation was not as bad as some of his subordinates made it out to be. Hitler sent Rommel to Greece with an armoured division to prepare for an Allied invasion there and instructed Kesselring that more German troops were still available to the Italians but they would have to come from France rather than the Soviet Union.
The sudden Italian surrender on Pantelleria raised further German concerns about the reliability of their ally. The hope that Italian resistance would stiffen in defending their homeland now changed to a fear morale might collapse completely instead. The earlier proposals for an invasion of northern Italy in the event of an Italian collapse were now further developed, with an emphasis put on placing as many German troops within Italy as possible prior to the execution of the occupation. In the best case, from the German perspective, these units could be used to bolster Italian defences and stability within Italy and in the worst case it would minimise any Italian resistance to the occupation of their country.
Kesselring once again offered this ‘help’ to Ambrosio, sarcastically alerting the Italian Chief of Staff to the fact that time was running out for him to realise he needed German troops. An insulted Ambrosio replied that he had not come to such a conclusion, although later relented to Kesselring’s earlier requests that German forces already within Italy be concentrated in Sicily and the heel of the Italian boot. Ambrosio subsequently requested more German troops but only for Sardinia and under his command.
Kesselring, with Hitler’s blessing, responded by sending the reinforcements bound for Sardinia through the northern Italian railways to sail from Genoa. In transit German ‘liaisons’ were left behind at rail hubs in anticipation for further reinforcement of German troops, to better coordinate the arrival of Ambrosio’s requested weapons and, covertly, to take control of the railway lines should Mussolini’s regime collapse.
In Sicily the two reconstituted German armoured divisions arrived. They were ordered under Italian command although Kesselring’s headquarters had made sure that they would have a direct line of communication if Italian resistance were to falter. Although powerful on paper the German forces represented a shell of those units which had been destroyed in Tunisia, with less than a hundred tanks between them.
On the 5th of July, the same day as Hitler’s Summer offensive in the east finally began, Luftwaffe reconnaissance of Tunisian ports indicated a large number of hospital ships being amassed. Four days later, with German forces still struggling to achieve a breakthrough against powerful Soviet forces, further reports indicated five Allied invasion convoys headed towards Sicily. Kesselring never received the report, having died that same day in an Allied air raid.
That night whilst survivors raked through the wreckage of the San Domenico Hotel where Kesselring had made his headquarters, German forces on Sicily reported their first sightings of Allied paratroopers.
Operation Husky had begun.
---
German doubts about the stability of their Italian ally had been festering even as the Fascist regime celebrated its twentieth year.
In November 1942, Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering who was second only to Hitler in the Nazi regime had made a visit to Rome. It was there where he had made a positive response to Mussolini’s proposals to end the war in the Soviet Union, encouraging the Italian dictator in turn to send his Foreign Secretary and the Chief of Staff to plead with Hitler. At the end of the visit Goering expressed grave doubts to Berlin about what might happen should Mussolini be incapacitated by illness.
Hitler had been distracted by the disaster unfolding at Stalingrad over the winter of 1942/43 but shortly after dismissing his Italian visitors he began to make plans for pursuing the war in the Mediterranean if Mussolini were to fall. The German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring had coordinated Wehrmacht activities in Italy since the end of 1941. At the beginning of 1943 Hitler had all German forces in the Mediterranean placed under Kesselring’s control. Just as Ambrosio and Mussolini sought to distance Italy from German influence, Hitler was detaching his troops from Comando Supremo. Kesselring would continue to defer to Italian command but Berlin now had a direct line to the theatre which bypassed Rome.
Kesselring had a high regard for Mussolini and, unlike Hitler, for the Italian people as a whole but he was aware of the sorry state of the Italian military and how vulnerable Italy was to potential Allied invasion. He had successfully lobbied Hitler to offer five divisions to assist in Italy’s defence only for Mussolini to reject the offer on Ambrosio’s advice. The Chief of Staff of Comando Supremo and his supposed German subordinate would continue to butt heads over the number and positioning of German forces in Italy throughout the Spring; Ambrosio only wanted weapons, Kesselring insisted on troops coming along with them. In Berlin paranoia grew about an impending Fascist collapse.
Ambrosio’s insistence on strategic independence, the wave of strikes, and the rumours of conspiracies against Mussolini convinced many within Hitler’s inner circle that the Italians; whether it be Ambrosio, the King or Mussolini himself, could not be trusted. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel argued that Germany should occupy the north of the country in order to protect German forces in the south against Italian duplicity. The industry and strategic location of the Po Valley were also seen as essential for the continuation of the German war effort.
Hitler remained unconvinced, he had been critical of Mussolini’s initial inaction against the March strike wave but was heartened when it culminated in brutal suppression by the Blackshirts. The report made by Admiral Doenitz of the high morale of the Regia Marina and how their untapped strength would be brought to bear against any enemy invasion gave him additional cause for optimism.
Furthermore Hitler remained fixated on the Eastern Front and the new weapons to be deployed there. After the situation in the Soviet Union stabilised in March Hitler had continued to ignore Mussolini’s requests to negotiate with Moscow, or at the very least remain on the defensive. On the contrary he had authorised a new offensive that would turn the odds back in Germany’s favour, one which he would remain committed to despite delays and occasional doubts as the new German heavy tanks waited to be unleashed.
With his mind occupied, Hitler found it gratifying to believe the assurances that the Italian situation was not as bad as some of his subordinates made it out to be. Hitler sent Rommel to Greece with an armoured division to prepare for an Allied invasion there and instructed Kesselring that more German troops were still available to the Italians but they would have to come from France rather than the Soviet Union.
The sudden Italian surrender on Pantelleria raised further German concerns about the reliability of their ally. The hope that Italian resistance would stiffen in defending their homeland now changed to a fear morale might collapse completely instead. The earlier proposals for an invasion of northern Italy in the event of an Italian collapse were now further developed, with an emphasis put on placing as many German troops within Italy as possible prior to the execution of the occupation. In the best case, from the German perspective, these units could be used to bolster Italian defences and stability within Italy and in the worst case it would minimise any Italian resistance to the occupation of their country.
Kesselring once again offered this ‘help’ to Ambrosio, sarcastically alerting the Italian Chief of Staff to the fact that time was running out for him to realise he needed German troops. An insulted Ambrosio replied that he had not come to such a conclusion, although later relented to Kesselring’s earlier requests that German forces already within Italy be concentrated in Sicily and the heel of the Italian boot. Ambrosio subsequently requested more German troops but only for Sardinia and under his command.
Kesselring, with Hitler’s blessing, responded by sending the reinforcements bound for Sardinia through the northern Italian railways to sail from Genoa. In transit German ‘liaisons’ were left behind at rail hubs in anticipation for further reinforcement of German troops, to better coordinate the arrival of Ambrosio’s requested weapons and, covertly, to take control of the railway lines should Mussolini’s regime collapse.
In Sicily the two reconstituted German armoured divisions arrived. They were ordered under Italian command although Kesselring’s headquarters had made sure that they would have a direct line of communication if Italian resistance were to falter. Although powerful on paper the German forces represented a shell of those units which had been destroyed in Tunisia, with less than a hundred tanks between them.
On the 5th of July, the same day as Hitler’s Summer offensive in the east finally began, Luftwaffe reconnaissance of Tunisian ports indicated a large number of hospital ships being amassed. Four days later, with German forces still struggling to achieve a breakthrough against powerful Soviet forces, further reports indicated five Allied invasion convoys headed towards Sicily. Kesselring never received the report, having died that same day in an Allied air raid.
That night whilst survivors raked through the wreckage of the San Domenico Hotel where Kesselring had made his headquarters, German forces on Sicily reported their first sightings of Allied paratroopers.
Operation Husky had begun.
---
Oh f..k Kesserling is dead, not a real good thing for the German position in Italy and worse for the italian communist, the German original plan was to retreat on the more defensible Po Valley and leave the rest of Italy...if the PCI try an uprising under a German occupation (and with the German army not on his way to collapse) i doubt that will remain a PCI after