12 March 1942. Catterick, England.
allanpcameron
Donor
12 March 1942. Catterick, England.
Maj-Gen Evelyn Fanshawe (GOC 11th Armoured Division), having just returned from a Senior Officers’ Training Course, had his subordinates in to try to disseminate some of what he had picked up. Fanshawe’s enthusiasm for the Course was somewhat unfamiliar to the others in the room. They usually dreaded these meeting because Fanshawe tended to pick everything apart and be generally dismissive of whatever ‘learning’ he was supposed to have picked up.
When CO of the Queens Bays in France in 1940, he’d seen his command decimated in an attempt to recapture bridges over the Somme from the Germans. Promoted to command 20th Armoured Brigade in 6th Armoured Division, then given the task of forming 11th Armoured Division, he had constantly argued from experience that any successful battle would need the combined efforts of tanks, artillery and infantry, preferably with air support.
It seemed that the War Office in the latest Training Course had picked up on this and much of what Fanshawe had preached was now becoming doctrine. The fighting in Greece, North Africa and now Malaya had all shown that cooperation between tanks and infantry was essential. The proposal to change the Basic Organisation of the Armoured Divisions to an Armoured Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, with Division level artillery and supporting elements was now going to be implemented in May.
Fanshawe didn’t say to his subordinates that he’d also been informed that he would soon be leaving the Division to command the Royal Armoured Corps Training Establishment. It was right and fitting for the new look Division to have a new GOC, but he felt that the last year he’d done as good a job as he possibly could. The fact that he’d been chosen to take over RAC Training was a reflection of that.
The details that he did give were that 11th Support Group (Brigadier Edward Jones) would become the HQ of the Divisional Royal Artillery, with two more Artillery Regiments to join the 13th RHA, 75th Anti-Tank Regiment and 58th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment.
Brigadier Christopher Peto’s 29th Armoured Brigade (24th Lancers, 23rd Hussars, 2nd Fife & Forfar Yeomanry) would be staying with the Division. Brigadier Otho Prior-Palmer’s 30th Armoured Brigade (22nd Dragoons, Westminster Dragoons, 1 Lothian & Border Horse) would be reassigned, though where exactly Fanshawe didn’t know. As he understood it, Fanshawe believed that the Infantry Brigade would be coming from 53rd (Welsh) Division which had exchanged an Infantry Brigade for a Tank Brigade as one of the experimental Mixed Divisions.
One of the things that Fanshawe had been leading the way on was the use of the Support Group’s three battalions of Motor Infantry. The 8th Bn Rifle Brigade, 12th Bn Kings Royal Rifle Corps and 12th Bn Green Howards were supposedly to be farmed out, one battalion each to the Armoured Brigades and Support Group. Trying to assault German positions on the Somme with a troop of tanks supporting a C0mpany of Infantry, without artillery support, had failed miserably. In all exercises that 11th Armoured Division had undertaken (both Tactical Exercises Without Troops ‘TEWT’ and field exercises) Fanshawe, with his subordinates, had worked out what they believed to be the best way to coordinate an attack on a strong enemy position using what was at his disposal. The idea some other Infantry Division/Tank Brigade would be on hand to clear strong positions, had led to the notion that Armoured Divisions, like the Cavalry of old, would be the exploitation force, one the enemy’s defences had been breached.
Unfortunately, that tactical doctrine hadn’t been much help in the war up until now, and had led to far too many deaths, in both infantry and tanks. One of the fundamental problems for the Armoured Division was because there was only one Royal Horse Artillery Regiment attached, it was always under powered. Added to the burden was that 2-pdr tank in the Valiant I* or other cruiser tanks couldn’t support the infantry except against enemy tanks. This meant that an enemy anti-tank gun screen became a major liability to an Armoured Division. 11th Armoured Division, when confronted with such a problem had learned to work as one, an Armoured Brigade and using the three Infantry Battalions as if they were one Infantry Brigade. The second Armoured Brigade could attempt to find a way around the enemy, or act as a distraction, or just remain in reserve until a breakthrough could be effected.
In their exercises, Fanshawe’s three Infantry Battalions had worked out various ways to support the tanks, or have the tanks support them, clearing out an enemy position. Like all Armoured forces, the need for more Close Support tanks to have an auxiliary artillery function had been an important lesson, and the original six per Regiment had been trebled to eighteen. Each Squadron therefore had four troops of three tanks, one of which had the 3-inch Howitzer, and two 2-pdrs. The Squadron HQ had two of each tank. With six CS tanks per Squadron rather than per Regiment, the ability of the Armoured Regiment to support infantry with HE in reducing enemy resistance was enhanced.
The Valiant II* that were replacing the I* would improve on this situation as the 6-pdr gun at least had some HE capacity, though still limited. It wouldn’t be until the Victor with the new 75mm HV’s dual capacity meant that the distinction between gun and CS tanks would be able to disappear. With the arrival of another two Artillery Regiments would be another element in making the Armoured Division capable of all its functions.
What Fanshawe and his men had achieved in the last year was to bring together a new Division from scratch, train it up and then write the training manual that was about to be disseminated throughout the Royal Armoured Corps, and indeed the Army as a whole. What worked for the Armoured Division in terms of tactics of cooperation between tanks, infantry and artillery would also work with Infantry Divisions supported by Tank Brigades.
Maj-Gen Evelyn Fanshawe (GOC 11th Armoured Division), having just returned from a Senior Officers’ Training Course, had his subordinates in to try to disseminate some of what he had picked up. Fanshawe’s enthusiasm for the Course was somewhat unfamiliar to the others in the room. They usually dreaded these meeting because Fanshawe tended to pick everything apart and be generally dismissive of whatever ‘learning’ he was supposed to have picked up.
When CO of the Queens Bays in France in 1940, he’d seen his command decimated in an attempt to recapture bridges over the Somme from the Germans. Promoted to command 20th Armoured Brigade in 6th Armoured Division, then given the task of forming 11th Armoured Division, he had constantly argued from experience that any successful battle would need the combined efforts of tanks, artillery and infantry, preferably with air support.
It seemed that the War Office in the latest Training Course had picked up on this and much of what Fanshawe had preached was now becoming doctrine. The fighting in Greece, North Africa and now Malaya had all shown that cooperation between tanks and infantry was essential. The proposal to change the Basic Organisation of the Armoured Divisions to an Armoured Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, with Division level artillery and supporting elements was now going to be implemented in May.
Fanshawe didn’t say to his subordinates that he’d also been informed that he would soon be leaving the Division to command the Royal Armoured Corps Training Establishment. It was right and fitting for the new look Division to have a new GOC, but he felt that the last year he’d done as good a job as he possibly could. The fact that he’d been chosen to take over RAC Training was a reflection of that.
The details that he did give were that 11th Support Group (Brigadier Edward Jones) would become the HQ of the Divisional Royal Artillery, with two more Artillery Regiments to join the 13th RHA, 75th Anti-Tank Regiment and 58th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment.
Brigadier Christopher Peto’s 29th Armoured Brigade (24th Lancers, 23rd Hussars, 2nd Fife & Forfar Yeomanry) would be staying with the Division. Brigadier Otho Prior-Palmer’s 30th Armoured Brigade (22nd Dragoons, Westminster Dragoons, 1 Lothian & Border Horse) would be reassigned, though where exactly Fanshawe didn’t know. As he understood it, Fanshawe believed that the Infantry Brigade would be coming from 53rd (Welsh) Division which had exchanged an Infantry Brigade for a Tank Brigade as one of the experimental Mixed Divisions.
One of the things that Fanshawe had been leading the way on was the use of the Support Group’s three battalions of Motor Infantry. The 8th Bn Rifle Brigade, 12th Bn Kings Royal Rifle Corps and 12th Bn Green Howards were supposedly to be farmed out, one battalion each to the Armoured Brigades and Support Group. Trying to assault German positions on the Somme with a troop of tanks supporting a C0mpany of Infantry, without artillery support, had failed miserably. In all exercises that 11th Armoured Division had undertaken (both Tactical Exercises Without Troops ‘TEWT’ and field exercises) Fanshawe, with his subordinates, had worked out what they believed to be the best way to coordinate an attack on a strong enemy position using what was at his disposal. The idea some other Infantry Division/Tank Brigade would be on hand to clear strong positions, had led to the notion that Armoured Divisions, like the Cavalry of old, would be the exploitation force, one the enemy’s defences had been breached.
Unfortunately, that tactical doctrine hadn’t been much help in the war up until now, and had led to far too many deaths, in both infantry and tanks. One of the fundamental problems for the Armoured Division was because there was only one Royal Horse Artillery Regiment attached, it was always under powered. Added to the burden was that 2-pdr tank in the Valiant I* or other cruiser tanks couldn’t support the infantry except against enemy tanks. This meant that an enemy anti-tank gun screen became a major liability to an Armoured Division. 11th Armoured Division, when confronted with such a problem had learned to work as one, an Armoured Brigade and using the three Infantry Battalions as if they were one Infantry Brigade. The second Armoured Brigade could attempt to find a way around the enemy, or act as a distraction, or just remain in reserve until a breakthrough could be effected.
In their exercises, Fanshawe’s three Infantry Battalions had worked out various ways to support the tanks, or have the tanks support them, clearing out an enemy position. Like all Armoured forces, the need for more Close Support tanks to have an auxiliary artillery function had been an important lesson, and the original six per Regiment had been trebled to eighteen. Each Squadron therefore had four troops of three tanks, one of which had the 3-inch Howitzer, and two 2-pdrs. The Squadron HQ had two of each tank. With six CS tanks per Squadron rather than per Regiment, the ability of the Armoured Regiment to support infantry with HE in reducing enemy resistance was enhanced.
The Valiant II* that were replacing the I* would improve on this situation as the 6-pdr gun at least had some HE capacity, though still limited. It wouldn’t be until the Victor with the new 75mm HV’s dual capacity meant that the distinction between gun and CS tanks would be able to disappear. With the arrival of another two Artillery Regiments would be another element in making the Armoured Division capable of all its functions.
What Fanshawe and his men had achieved in the last year was to bring together a new Division from scratch, train it up and then write the training manual that was about to be disseminated throughout the Royal Armoured Corps, and indeed the Army as a whole. What worked for the Armoured Division in terms of tactics of cooperation between tanks, infantry and artillery would also work with Infantry Divisions supported by Tank Brigades.
